Spokeo v. Robins, 2016 WL 2842447, 578 U.S.— (May 16, 2016)

NOTE: Where it is feasible, asyllabus (headnote)will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. SeeUnited Statesv.Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,200U.S.321,337.

CERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFOR THENINTHCIRCUIT

The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) requires consumer reporting agenciesto“followreasonableprocedurestoassuremaximum possible accuracy of” consumer reports, 15 U. S. C. §1681e(b), and imposes liability on “[a]ny personwhowillfully fails to complywith any requirement [of the Act] with respect to any” individual, §1681n(a).

PetitionerSpokeo,Inc.,anallegedconsumerreportingagency,operates a “people search engine,” which searches a wide spectrum of databasestogatherandprovidepersonal informationabout individuals to a variety of users, including employers wanting to evaluate prospective employees. AfterrespondentThomasRobinsdiscovered that his Spokeo-generated profile contained inaccurate information, hefiledafederalclass-actioncomplaintagainstSpokeo,allegingthat the company willfully failed to comply with the FCRA’s requirements.

The District Court dismissed Robins’ complaint, holding that he hadnotproperlypleadedinjuryinfactasrequiredbyArticleIII.The NinthCircuitreversed.BasedonRobins’allegationthat“Spokeoviolated hisstatutory rights”and the fact thatRobins’ “personal interests inthehandlingofhiscreditinformationareindividualized,”the courtheldthatRobinshadadequatelyallegedaninjuryinfact.

Held:Because the Ninth Circuit failed to consider both aspects of the injury-in-fact requirement, its Article III standing analysis was incomplete. Pp.5–11.

(a)Aplaintiff invoking federaljurisdictionbearstheburdenofestablishing the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing by demonstrating (1) an injury in fact,(2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) likely to be redressed by afavorablejudicialdecision.Lujanv.Defenders of Wildlife,504U.S. 555,560–561.Pp.5–6.

(b)As relevant here, the injury-in-fact requirement requires a plaintifftoshowthatheorshesuffered“aninvasionofalegallyprotected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, supra, at 560. Pp.7–11.

(1) The Ninth Circuit’s injury-in-fact analysis elided the independent “concreteness”requirement.Bothobservationsitmadeconcerned only “particularization,” i.e., the requirement that an injury “affecttheplaintiff inapersonaland individualway,”Lujan,supra, at560,n.1,butaninjuryinfactmustbebothconcreteandparticularized, see, e.g.,Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. ___, ___. Concreteness is quite different from particularization and requires aninjurytobe“de facto,”thatis,toactuallyexist.Pp.7–8.

(2)TheNinthCircuitalso failed toaddresswhether thealleged procedural violations entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concretenessrequirement.A “concrete” injuryneednotbea “tangible” injury. See,e.g., Pleasant Grove Cityv.Summum,555U.S.460. Todeterminewhetheran intangibleharmconstitutes injury in fact, bothhistoryandthejudgmentofCongressareinstructive.Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum ArticleIIIrequirements,butaplaintiffdoesnotautomaticallysatisfy theinjury-in-factrequirementwheneverastatutegrantsarightand purports to authorize a suit to vindicate it. Article III standing requires aconcrete injuryeven in thecontext ofastatutory violation. Thisdoesnotmean,however,thattheriskofrealharmcannotsatisfy that requirement. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.____.Theviolationofaproceduralrightgrantedbystatutecan be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact; in such a case, a plaintiffneednot allege anyadditionalharm beyond theoneidentifiedbyCongress,seeFederal Election Comm’nv.Akins, 524U.S.11,20–25.ThisCourttakesnopositiononthecorrectness of the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion, but these general principles demonstrate two things: that Congress plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk and that Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging abare procedural violation.Pp.8– 11.

742F.3d409,vacatedandremanded.

ALITO,J.,deliveredtheopinionoftheCourt,inwhichROBERTS,C.J., and KENNEDY,THOMAS, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ.,joined. THOMAS, J., filedaconcurringopinion.GINSBURG,J.,filedadissentingopinion, in whichSOTOMAYOR,J.,joined.

NOTICE: Thisopinionissubjecttoformalrevisionbeforepublicationinthe preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notifytheReporterofDecisions,SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order thatcorrectionsmaybemadebeforethepreliminaryprintgoestopress.

ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOF APPEALSFORTHENINTHCIRCUIT

JUSTICEALITOdeliveredtheopinionoftheCourt.

This case presents the question whether respondent Robinshasstandingtomaintainanactioninfederalcourt againstpetitionerSpokeoundertheFairCreditReporting Actof1970(FCRAorAct),84Stat.1127,asamended,15 U.S.C.§1681et seq.

Spokeooperatesa“peoplesearchengine.”Ifanindividual visitsSpokeo’sWebsiteandinputsaperson’sname,a phone number, or an e-mail address, Spokeo conducts a computerized search in a wide variety of databases and provides information about the subject of the search. Spokeo performed such a search for information about Robins,andsomeofthe information itgatheredandthen disseminatedwasincorrect. WhenRobinslearnedofthese inaccuracies,hefiledacomplaintonhisownbehalfandon behalfofaclassofsimilarlysituatedindividuals.

TheDistrictCourtdismissedRobins’complaint for lack ofstanding,butapaneloftheNinthCircuitreversed.The Ninth Circuit noted, first, that Robins had alleged that “Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” and, second, that “Robins’s personalinterestsinthehandlingofhiscreditinformationare individualized rather than collective.” 742F.3d 409, 413 (2014). Based on these two observations, the Ninth Circuitheld thatRobinshadadequatelyalleged injury in fact, a requirement for standing under Article III of the Constitution. Id.,at413–414.

Thisanalysiswasincomplete.Aswehaveexplainedin ourprioropinions,theinjury-in-factrequirementrequires a plaintiff to allege an injury that is both “concrete and particularized.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180– 181(2000)(emphasisadded). TheNinthCircuit’sanalysis focused on thesecondcharacteristic (particularity),but it overlooked the first (concreteness). We therefore vacate the decision below and remand for the Ninth Circuit to considerbothaspectsoftheinjury-in-factrequirement.

The FCRA seeks to ensure “fair and accurate credit reporting.” §1681(a)(1). To achieve this end, the Act regulatesthecreationandtheuseof“consumerreport[s]”1 by “consumer reporting agenc[ies]”2 for certain specifiedpurposes, including credit transactions, insurance, licensing, consumer-initiated business transactions, and employment. See §§1681a(d)(1)(A)–(C); §1681b. Enacted longbeforetheadventoftheInternet,theFCRAappliesto companiesthatregularlydisseminateinformationbearing on an individual’s “credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics,ormodeofliving.” §1681a(d)(1).

The FCRA imposes a host of requirements concerning the creation and use of consumer reports. As relevant here, the Act requires consumer reporting agencies to “followreasonableprocedurestoassuremaximumpossible accuracyof”consumerreports,§1681e(b);tonotifyproviders andusersofconsumerinformationoftheirresponsibilities under the Act, §1681e(d); to limit the circumstances in which such agencies provide consumer reports “for employment purposes,” §1681b(b)(1); and to post toll-free numbersforconsumerstorequestreports,§1681j(a).

The Act also provides that“[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the Act] with respect to any [individual3] is liable to that [individual]” for,amongotherthings,either“actualdamages”orstatutory damages of$100 to$1,000per violation,costs of the actionandattorney’sfees,andpossiblypunitivedamages. §1681n(a).

Spokeo is alleged to qualify as a “consumer reporting agency” under the FCRA.4 It operates a Web site that allowsuserstosearchforinformationaboutotherindividuals by name, e-mail address, or phone number. In response toan inquirysubmittedonline,Spokeosearchesawide spectrum of databases and gathers and provides informationsuchas the individual’saddress,phonenumber, maritalstatus,approximateage,occupation,hobbies, finances,shoppinghabits,andmusicalpreferences.App. 7, 10–11. According to Robins, Spokeo markets its services to a variety of users, including not only “employers who want to evaluate prospective employees,” but also “thosewhowanttoinvestigateprospectiveromanticpartners or seek other personal information.” Brief for Respondent 7. Personswishing toperformaSpokeosearch neednotdisclosetheiridentities,andmuchinformationis availableforfree.

Atsomepointintime,someone(Robins’complaintdoes not specify who)made a Spokeo search request for information aboutRobins,andSpokeotrawled itssourcesand generated a profile.Bysomemeansnot detailed inRobins’ complaint, he became aware of the contents of that profile and discovered that it contained inaccurate information. Hisprofile,heasserts,statesthatheismarried, haschildren,isinhis50’s,hasajob,isrelativelyaffluent, andholdsagraduatedegree. App.14. AccordingtoRobins’ complaint,allofthisinformationisincorrect.

Robins filed a class-action complaint in the United StatesDistrictCourtfortheCentralDistrictofCalifornia, claiming,amongotherthings,thatSpokeowillfully failed to comply with the FCRA requirements enumerated above.

The District Court initially denied Spokeo’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but later reconsideredanddismissed thecomplaintwithprejudice. App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The court found that Robins had not “properly pled” an injury in fact, as required by ArticleIII. Ibid

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.Relying onCircuit precedent,5 the court began by stating that “the violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injuryinfacttoconferstanding.” 742F.3d,at412. The court recognized that “the Constitution limits the power of Congress to confer standing.” Id., at 413. But thecourtheldthatthose limitswerehonored inthiscase becauseRobinsallegedthat“Spokeoviolatedhis statutory rights, notjust the statutory rights of other people,” and because his “personal interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized rather than collective.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). The court thus concluded that Robins’ “alleged violations of [his] statutory rights [were] sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement ofArticleIII.” Id., at413–414.

Wegrantedcertiorari. 575U.S.___(2015)

II A

The Constitution confers limited authority on each branchoftheFederalGovernment.ItvestsCongresswith enumerated“legislativePowers,”Art.I,§1;itconfersupon thePresident“[t]heexecutivePower,”Art.II,§1,cl.1;and it endows the federal courts with “[t]hejudicial Power of theUnitedStates,”Art.III,§1.Inordertoremainfaithful tothistripartitestructure,thepoweroftheFederalJudiciary may not be permitted to intrude upon the powers giventotheotherbranches. SeeDaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,504U.S.555,559–560(1992).

AlthoughtheConstitutiondoesnotfullyexplainwhatis meant by “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,” Art.III,§1,itdoesspecifythatthispowerextendsonlyto“Cases”and“Controversies,”Art.III,§2.And“‘[n]oprinciple ismorefundamentaltothejudiciary’sproperrolein our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-courtjurisdictiontoactualcasesorcontroversies.’ ” Raines v. Byrd,521U.S.811,818(1997).

Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy. The doctrine developedinourcaselawtoensurethatfederalcourtsdo not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood. Seeid.,at820. Thedoctrinelimitsthecategory of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federalcourttoseekredressforalegalwrong. SeeValley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454U.S. 464, 473 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–499 (1975). In this way,“[t]helawofArticleIIIstanding...servestoprevent thejudicialprocessfrombeingusedtousurpthepowersof thepoliticalbranches,”Clapperv.Amnesty Int’l USA,568 U.S.___,___(2013)(slipop.,at9);Lujan,supra,at576– 577,andconfines the federalcourts toaproperlyjudicial role,seeWarth,supra,at498.

Ourcaseshaveestablishedthatthe“irreducibleconstitutional minimum”ofstandingconsistsofthreeelements. Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560. The plaintiff must have (1) sufferedaninjuryinfact,(2)thatisfairlytraceabletothe challengedconductofthedefendant,and(3)thatislikely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id., at 560–561;Friends of the Earth, Inc.,528U.S.,at180–181. The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements. FW/PBS, Inc.v.Dallas,493U.S.215,231(1990).Where, ashere,acaseisatthepleadingstage,theplaintiffmust “clearly ... allege facts demonstrating” each element. Warth,supra,at518.

This case primarily concerns injury in fact, the “[f]irst and foremost” of standing’s three elements. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,523U.S.83,103 (1998). Injury in fact is a constitutional requirement, and “[i]t is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirementsbystatutorilygrantingtherighttosuetoa plaintiffwhowouldnototherwisehavestanding.”Raines, supra, at820,n.3;seeSummersv.Earth Island Institute, 555U.S.488,497(2009);Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event...may CongressabrogatetheArt.IIIminima”).

Toestablishinjuryinfact,aplaintiffmustshowthathe orshesuffered“aninvasionofalegallyprotectedinterest” that is“concreteandparticularized”and“actualor imminent, notconjecturalorhypothetical.” Lujan,504U.S.,at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). We discuss the particularizationandconcretenessrequirementsbelow.

1

For an injury to be “particularized,” it “must affect the plaintiffinapersonalandindividualway.” Ibid.,n.1;see also, e.g., Cuno, supra, at 342 (“‘plaintiff must allege personal injury’”); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (“‘distinct’”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751(1984)(“personal”);Valley Forge,supra,at472(standing requires that the plaintiff “‘personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury’”); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974) (not “undifferenti- ated”);Public Citizen, Inc.v.National Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin.,489F.3d1279,1292–1293 (CADC2007) (collect-ingcases).7

Particularizationisnecessarytoestablishinjuryinfact, but it is not sufficient. An injury in fact must also be “concrete.” Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, however, that independent requirement was elided. As previously noted,theNinthCircuitconcludedthatRobins’complaint alleges “concrete, de facto” injuries for essentially two reasons. 742 F.3d, at 413. First, the court noted that Robins “alleges that Spokeo violatedhis statutory rights, notjust the statutory rights of other people.” Ibid. Second, the court wrote that “Robins’s personal interests in the handling of his credit information areindividualized rather than collective.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Both of these observations concern particularization, not concreteness. We have made it clear time and time again thatan injury in factmustbebothconcreteandparticularized. See,e.g.,Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,573 U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 8); Summers, supra, at 493; Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554U.S.269,274(2008);Massachusettsv.EPA,549U.S. 497,517(2007).

A “concrete” injury must be “de facto”; that is, it must actually exist. See Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 2009). When we have used the adjective “concrete,” we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term— “real,” and not “abstract.”Webster’sThirdNew International Dictionary472(1971);RandomHouseDictionaryof the English Language 305 (1967). Concreteness, therefore, isquitedifferentfromparticularization.

2

“Concrete”isnot,however,necessarilysynonymouswith“tangible.”Although tangible injuries areperhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed inmany of our previous casesthatintangibleinjuriescanneverthelessbeconcrete. See, e.g.,Pleasant Grove City v.Summum, 555U.S. 460 (2009)(freespeech);Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.v. Hialeah,508U.S.520(1993)(freeexercise).

Indeterminingwhetheran intangibleharmconstitutes injury in fact,bothhistoryand thejudgment ofCongress play important roles. Because the doctrine of standing derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and becausethatrequirementinturnisgroundedinhistorical practice, it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that hastraditionallybeenregardedasprovidingabasis fora lawsuit in English or American courts. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529U.S.765,775–777(2000).Inaddition,because Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms thatmeetminimumArticleIIIrequirements,itsjudgment isalsoinstructiveandimportant.Thus,wesaidinLujan that Congressmay “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuriesconcrete,de facto injuriesthatwerepreviously inadequate in law.” 504 U.S., at 578. Similarly, JusticeKennedy’sconcurrenceinthatcaseexplainedthat “Congresshas thepower todefine injuriesand articulate chainsofcausationthatwillgiverisetoacaseorcontroversy where none existed before.” Id., at 580 (opinion concurringinpartandconcurringinjudgment).

Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harmsdoesnotmeanthataplaintiffautomaticallysatisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grantsapersonastatutoryrightandpurports toauthorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III standingrequiresaconcreteinjuryeveninthecontextofa statutoryviolation.Forthatreason,Robinscouldnot,for example,allegeabareproceduralviolation,divorcedfromany concreteharm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. See Summers, 555 U.S., at 496 (“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation ... is insufficienttocreateArticleIIIstanding”);seealsoLujan, supra,at572.

Thisdoesnotmean,however,thattheriskofrealharm cannotsatisfy therequirement ofconcreteness.See, e.g., Clapper v.Amnesty Int’l USA,568U.S.____.Forexample, the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure. See, e.g., Restatement (First) of Torts §§569 (libel), 570 (slander per se) (1938). Just as the common law permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other words,aplaintiffinsuchacaseneednotallegeanyadditional harmbeyond the oneCongresshas identified.See Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998) (confirming that a group of voters’ “inability to obtain information” that Congress had decided to make public is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III); Public Citizenv.Department of Justice,491U.S.440,449 (1989)(holdingthattwoadvocacyorganizations’failureto obtaininformationsubjecttodisclosureundertheFederal AdvisoryCommitteeAct“constitutesasufficientlydistinct injurytoprovidestandingtosue”)

In the context of this particular case, these general principles tell us two things: On the one hand, Congress plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk. On the other hand, Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation. AviolationofoneoftheFCRA’sproceduralrequirements may result in no harm. For example, even if a consumer reporting agency fails to provide the requirednoticetoauseroftheagency’sconsumerinformation,that informationregardlessmaybeentirelyaccurate.Inaddition, notallinaccuraciescauseharmorpresentanymaterial riskofharm.Anexamplethatcomesreadilytomind isan incorrectzipcode.It isdifficultto imaginehowthe disseminationofanincorrectzipcode,withoutmore,could workanyconcreteharm.8

Because theNinthCircuit failed to fullyappreciate the distinctionbetweenconcretenessandparticularization,its standinganalysiswas incomplete.Itdidnotaddressthe question framed by our discussion, namely, whether the particularproceduralviolationsallegedinthiscaseentail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement. We takenopositionas towhether theNinth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion—that Robins adequately allegedaninjuryinfact—wascorrect.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and thecase isremanded forproceedingsconsistentwith this opinion.

ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOF APPEALSFORTHENINTHCIRCUIT

JUSTICETHOMAS,concurring.

The Court vacates and remands to have the Court of Appeals determine “whether the particular procedural violationsallegedinthiscaseentailadegreeofrisksufficient tomeettheconcretenessrequirement.” Ante,at11. In defining what constitutes a concrete injury, the Court explains that “concrete” means “‘real,’” and “not ‘abstract,’” but is not “necessarily synonymous with ‘tan­ gible.’”Ante,at8–9.

IjointheCourt’sopinion.Iwriteseparatelytoexplain how,inmyview,theinjury­in­factrequirementappliesto different types of rights. The judicial power of commonlaw courts was historically limited depending on the nature of the plaintiff’s suit. Common­law courts more readily entertained suits from private plaintiffs who alleged aviolationoftheirownrights,incontrasttoprivate plaintiffs who asserted claims vindicating public rights. Thoselimitationspersistinmodernstandingdoctrine.

I A

Standing doctrine limits the “judicial power” to “‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, andresolvedby,thejudicialprocess.’”Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for aBetter Environment,523U.S.83,102 (1998)).Tounderstand the limits that standing imposes on “the judicial Power,”therefore,wemust“referdirectlytothetraditional, fundamental limitations upon the powers of common­ lawcourts.”Honig v.Doe,484U.S.305,340(1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting). These limitations preserve separation of powers by preventing the judiciary’s entanglement in disputes that areprimarilypolitical innature.This concern is generally absentwhen a privateplaintiffseeks to enforce only his personal rights against another private party.

Common­-law courts imposed different limitations on a plaintiff’s right to bring suit depending on the type of right the plaintiff sought to vindicate. Historically, common­lawcourtspossessedbroadpowertoadjudicatesuits involvingtheallegedviolationofprivaterights,evenwhen plaintiffs alleged only the violation of those rights and nothing more. “Private rights” are rights “belonging to individuals, considered as individuals.” 3W.Blackstone, Commentaries *2 (hereinafter Blackstone). “Private rights” have traditionally included rights of personal security(includingsecurityofreputation),propertyrights, andcontractrights.See1id.,at*130–*139;Woolhander & Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich.L.Rev.689,693(2004).Inasuitfortheviolationof a private right, courts historically presumed that the plaintiffsufferedade factoinjurymerelyfromhavinghis personal, legal rights invaded. Thus, when one man placed his foot on another’sproperty, the property owner needed to show nothing more to establish a traditional case or controversy. See Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B.275,291,95Eng.Rep.807,817(1765).Manytraditional remedies for private­rights causes of action—such as for trespass, infringement of intellectualproperty,and unjust enrichment—are not contingent on a plaintiff’s allegation of damages beyond the violation of his privatelegalright.SeeBriefforRestitutionandRemediesScholars asAmici Curiae6–18;seealsoWebbv.Portland Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508 (No. 17,322) (Me. 1838) (stating that a legal injury “imports damage in the nature of it” (internalquotationmarksomitted)).

Common­law courts, however, have required a further showing of injury for violations of “public rights”—rights thatinvolvedutiesowed“tothewholecommunity,considered asacommunity, in itssocialaggregate capacity.” 4 Blackstone *5. Such rights include “free navigation of waterways, passage on public highways, and general compliance with regulatory law.” Woolhander & Nelson, 102Mich.L.Rev.,at693.Generally,onlythegovernment hadtheauthoritytovindicateaharmbornebythepublic at large, such as the violation of the criminal laws. See id., at 695–700. Even in limited cases where private plaintiffs could bring a claim for the violation of public rights, they had to allege that the violation caused them “someextraordinarydamage,beyondtherestofthe[community].” 3 Blackstone *220 (discussing nuisance); see also Commonwealth v. Webb, 27 Va. 726, 729 (Gen. Ct. 1828).* Anactiontoredressapublicnuisance,forexample, washistoricallyconsideredanaction tovindicate the violation of a public right at common law, lest “every subject in the kingdom” be able to “harass the offender withseparateactions.”3Blackstone*219;seealso4id., at *167 (same). But if the plaintiff could allege “special damage” as the result of a nuisance, the suit could proceed. Theexistenceofspecial,individualizeddamagehad the effect of creating a private action for compensatory relief to an otherwise public­rights claim. See 3 id., at*220. Similarly,aplaintiffhad toallege individualdamage indisputes over theuseofpublic lands. E.g.,Robert Marys’s Case, 9 Co. Rep. 111b, 112b, 77 Eng. Rep. 895, 898–899 (K. B. 1613) (commonermust establish not only injuria [legal injury] but alsodamnum [damage] to challenge another’sovergrazingonthecommons).

B

These differences between legal claims brought by private plaintiffsfortheviolationofpublicandprivaterights underliemodernstandingdoctrineandexplaintheCourt’s description of the injury­in­fact requirement. “Injury in fact” is the first of three “irreducible” requirements for Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The injury­in­fact requirement oftenstymiesaprivateplaintiff’sattempttovindicatethe infringement of public rights. The Court has said time andagainthat,whenaplaintiffseekstovindicateapublic right, the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered a “concrete”injuryparticulartohimself.SeeSchlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,418U.S.208,221–223 (1974) (explaining this where plaintiffs sought to enforce the IncompatibilityClause,Art.I, §6, cl.2, againstMembers of Congress holding reserve commissions in the ArmedForces);seealsoLujan,supra,at572–573(evaluating standingwhereplaintiffssoughttoenforcetheEndangered Species Act);Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183– 184 (2000) (CleanWater Act). This requirement applies withspecial forcewhenaplaintiff filessuit torequirean executive agency to “follow the law”; at that point, the citizenmustprovethathe“hassustainedorisimmediately indanger ofsustainingadirect injuryasa result of that [challenged] action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.” Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (percuriam). Thus,inacasewhereprivateplaintiffssoughtto compel the U.S. Forest Service to follow certain procedures when it regulated “small fire­rehabilitation and timber­salvage projects,” we held that “deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation ... is insufficient to create Article III standing,” even if “accorded by Congress.” Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 490, 496–497(2009).

But the concrete­harm requirement does not apply as rigorously when a private plaintiff seeks to vindicate his ownprivaterights.Ourcontemporarydecisionshavenot required a plaintiff to assertan actual injury beyond the violationofhispersonallegalrightstosatisfythe“injuryin­fact” requirement.See,e.g., Carey v.Piphus,435U.S. 247,266(1978)(holdingthatnominaldamagesareappropriate when a plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been infringedbuthecannotshowfurtherinjury).

Theseparation­of­powersconcernsunderlyingourpublicrights decisions are not implicated when private indi­ viduals sue to redress violations of their own private rights. But,when they are implicated, standing doctrine keeps courts out of political disputes by denying private litigants the right to test the abstract legality of government action. See Schlesinger, supra, at 222. And by limiting Congress’ ability to delegate law enforcement authority to private plaintiffs and the courts, standing doctrinepreservesexecutivediscretion.SeeLujan,supra, at 577 (“‘To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliancewith thelawintoan‘individualright’vindicableinthecourtsis to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courtstheChiefExecutive’smostimportantconstitutional duty,to‘takeCarethattheLawsbefaithfullyexecuted’”). But where one private party has alleged that another privatepartyviolatedhisprivaterights,thereisgenerallynodangerthattheprivateparty’ssuitisanimpermissible attempt to police the activity of thepolitical branches or, morebroadly,thatthe legislativebranchhas impermissibly delegated law enforcement authority from the executive toaprivateindividual.SeeHessick,Standing,Injury inFact,andPrivateRights,93CornellL.Rev.275,317– 321(2008).

C

When Congress creates new private causes of action to vindicateprivateorpublicrights, theseArticleIIIprinciples circumscribefederalcourts’powertoadjudicateasuit allegingtheviolationofthosenew legalrights.Congress cancreatenewprivaterightsandauthorizeprivateplaintiffs tosue basedsimply on the violation of those private rights. SeeWarth v.Seldin,422U.S.490,500(1975).A plaintiffseeking tovindicateastatutorilycreatedprivate right need not allege actual harm beyond the invasion of that private right. SeeHavens Realty Corp. v.Coleman, 455U.S.363,373–374 (1982) (recognizingstanding fora violation of theFairHousing Act);Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137–138 (1939) (recognizing thatstandingcanexistwhere“therightinvadedisalegal right,—one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statutewhichconfersaprivilege”).Aplaintiffseeking to vindicate a public right embodied in a federal statute, however, must demonstrate that the violation of that public right has caused him a concrete, individual harm distinctfromthegeneralpopulation.SeeLujan,supra,at 578(notingthat,whateverthescopeofCongress’powerto createnewlegalrights,“itisclearthatinsuitsagainstthe Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain”). Thus, Congress cannot authorize private plaintiffs to enforce public rights in their own names, absent some showing that the plaintiff has suffered aconcreteharmparticulartohim.

II

Giventheseprinciples,IagreewiththeCourt’sdecision to vacate and remand. The Fair Credit Reporting Act createsaseriesofregulatoryduties.Robinshasnostanding to sue Spokeo, in his own name, for violations of the duties that Spokeo owes to the public collectively, absent someshowingthathehassufferedconcreteandparticular harm. See supra, at 4–5. These consumer protection requirements include, for example, the requirement to “post a toll­free telephone number on [Spokeo’s] website through which consumers can request free annual file disclosures.” App.23,FirstAmendedComplaint¶74;see 15U.S.C.§1681j;16CFR§610.3(a)(1)(2010).

But a remand is required because one claim inRobins’ complaint rests on a statutory provision that could argu­ ably establish a private cause of action to vindicate the violation of a privately held right. Section 1681e(b) requires Robins to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximumpossibleaccuracyoftheinformationconcerning the individual about whom the report relates.” §1681e(b) (emphasisadded).IfCongresshascreatedaprivateduty owedpersonallytoRobinstoprotecthis information,then theviolationofthelegaldutysufficesforArticleIIIinjury in fact. Ifthatprovision,however,vestsanyandallconsumers with the power to police the “reasonable procedures” ofSpokeo,withoutmore,thenRobinshasnostanding tosueforitsviolationabsentanallegationthathehas suffered individualized harm. On remand, the Court of Appealscanconsiderthenatureofthisclaim.

ONWRITOFCERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOF APPEALSFORTHENINTHCIRCUIT

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins,dissenting.

IntheFairCreditReportingActof1970(FCRAorAct), 15 U.S.C. §1681 et seq., Congress required consumer reporting agencies, whenever preparing a consumer report, to“followreasonableprocedurestoassuremaximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” §1681e(b). To promote adherence to the Act’s procedural requirements, Congress granted adversely affected consumers a right to sue noncomplying reporting agencies. §1681n (willful noncompliance); §1681o (negligent noncompliance).1 ThomasRobinsinstitutedsuitagainstSpokeo,Inc.,alleging that Spokeo was a reporting agency governed by the FCRA, and that Spokeo maintains on its Web site an inaccurateconsumerreportaboutRobins.App.13.

In particular, Robins alleged that Spokeo posted “a picture ... purport[ing] to be an image of Robins [that] was not in fact [of him],” and incorrectly reported that Robins “was in his 50s, ... married, ... employed in a professionalortechnical field,and...haschildren.”Id., at14. RobinsfurtherallegedthatSpokeo’sprofileofhim continuestomisrepresent“thathehasagraduatedegree,that his economic health is ‘Very Strong[,]’ and that his wealthlevel[isin]the‘Top10%.’” Ibid.Spokeodisplayed that erroneous information, Robins asserts,when hewas “out of work” and “actively seeking employment.” Ibid. Because of themisinformation,Robinsstated,he encountered “[imminent and ongoing] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.” Ibid.2 As Robins elaborated on brief, Spokeo’s report made him appear overqualified for jobs he might have gained, expectant of a higher salary than employers would be willing to pay, and less mobile because of family responsibilities. See Brief for Respondent44.

I agree with much of the Court’s opinion. Robins, the Court holds, meets the particularity requirement for standingunderArticleIII. Seeante,at8,11 (remanding only for concreteness inquiry). The Court acknowledges thatCongresshastheauthoritytoconferrightsanddelineate claims forreliefwherenone existedbefore. Ante,at 9;seeFederal Election Comm’nv.Akins,524U.S.11,19– 20(1998)(holdingthatinabilitytoprocureinformationto whichCongresshascreatedarightintheFederalElection CampaignActof1971qualifiesasconcreteinjurysatisfying Article III’s standing requirement); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (holding that plaintiff advocacy organizations’ inability to obtain information that Congress made subject to disclosure under theFederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct “constitutesa sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue”); Havens Realty Corp.v.Coleman,455U.S.363,373(1982)(identifying, as Article III injury, violation of plaintiff’s right,securedbytheFairHousingAct,to“truthful information concerning the availability of housing”).3 Congress’ connection of procedural requirements to the prevention ofasubstantiveharm,theCourtappearstoagree, is “instructive and important.” Ante, at 9; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,504U.S.555,580(1992)(KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“As Government programs and policies becomemore complex andfarreaching,wemustbesensitivetothearticulation of new rights of action ....”); Brief for Restitution and Remedies Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae 3 (“Congress cannot authorize individual plaintiffs to enforce generalized rightsthatbelongtothewholepublic. ButCongress cancreatenewindividualrights,anditcanenacteffective remedies for those rights.”). See generally Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: AkinsandBeyond,147U.Pa.L.Rev.613(1999).

IpartwayswiththeCourt,however,onthenecessityof a remand to determine whether Robins’ particularized injurywas“concrete.”Seeante,at11. Judgedbywhatwe have said about “concreteness,” Robins’ allegations carry him across the threshold. The Court’s opinion observes thattimeandagain,ourdecisionshavecoupledthewords “concreteandparticularized.”Ante,at8 (citingasexamples, Susan B. Anthony Listv.Driehaus,573U.S.___,___ (2014) (slip op., at 8);Summers v.Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009);Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.,554U.S.269,274(2008);Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007)). True, but true too,inthefourcasescitedbytheCourt,andmanyothers, opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the terms “concrete”and“particularized.”

Inspection of the Court’s decisions suggests that the particularityrequirementbarscomplaintsraisinggeneralized grievances, seeking relief that no more benefits the plaintiffthanitdoesthepublicatlarge. See,e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S., at 573–574 (a plaintiff “seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the publicatlargedoesnotstateanArticleIIIcaseorcontroversy” (punctuationomitted));Perkinsv.Lukens Steel Co., 310U.S.113,125(1940)(plaintiffslackstandingbecause they failed to show injury to “a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the public’s interest in the administration of the law”). Robins’ claim does not present a question of that character. He seeks redress, not forharmtothecitizenry,butforSpokeo’sspreadofmisinformation specificallyabouthim.

Concretenessasadiscreterequirementforstanding,the Court’sdecisionsindicate,referstotherealityofaninjury, harm that isreal,notabstract,butnotnecessarily tangible. Seeante,at8–9;ante,at1(THOMAS,J.,concurring). Illustrative opinions include Akins, 524 U.S., at 20 (“[C]ourts will not pass upon abstract, intellectual problems, but adjudicate concrete, living contests between adversaries.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 67 (1986) (plaintiff’s “abstract concern does not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art[icle] III” (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (“Plaintiffs must demonstrate a personalstakeintheoutcome....Abstractinjuryisnot enough.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Babbitt v. Farm Workers,442U.S.289,297–298(1979)(“Thedifference between an abstract question and a ‘case or controversy’ isoneofdegree,ofcourse,andisnotdiscernablebyanyprecisetest.Thebasicinquiryiswhethertheconflicting contentions of the parties present a real, substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.” (citation, some internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted)); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) (“organization’s abstract concern ... does not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art.III”); California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 69 (1974) (“There must be ... concrete adverseness”; “[a]bstract injury is not enough.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326U.S. 88, 93 (1945) (controversymust be “definite andconcrete,nothypotheticalorabstract”);Coleman v.Miller, 307U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion ofFrankfurter, J.) (“[I]t [is] not for courts to pass upon... abstract, intellectual problems but only ... concrete, living contest[s] betweenadversariescall[ing]forthearbitramentof law.”).

Robins would not qualify, the Court observes, if he allegeda“bare”proceduralviolation,ante,at10,onethat results in no harm, for example, “an incorrect zip code,” ante, at 11. Far from an incorrect zip code, Robins complains ofmisinformationabouthiseducation,familysituation, andeconomicstatus,inaccuraterepresentationsthat could affect his fortune in the job market. See Brief for CenterforDemocracy&Technologyetal.asAmici Curiae 13 (Spokeo’s inaccuracies bore on Robins’ “ability to find employmentbycreatingtheerroneousimpressionthathe was overqualified for the work he was seeking, that he might be unwilling to relocate for a job due to family commitments, or that his salary demands would exceed whatprospectiveemployerswerepreparedtoofferhim.”); BriefforRestitutionandRemediesScholarsetal.asAmici Curiae 35 (“An applicant can lose [a] job for being overqualified; asuitorcanloseawomanifshereadsthatheismarried.”).TheFCRA’sproceduralrequirementsaimedto preventsuchharm. See115Cong.Rec.2410–2415(1969). I therefore see no utility in returning this case to the Ninth Circuit to underscore what Robins’ complaint already conveys concretely: Spokeo’s misinformation “cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.” App.14.

For the reasons stated, I would affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

1 TheActdefinestheterm“consumerreport”as:

“anywritten, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumerreportingagencybearingonaconsumer’screditworthiness, creditstanding,creditcapacity,character,generalreputation,personal characteristics,ormodeoflivingwhichisusedorexpectedtobeusedor collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishingtheconsumer’seligibilityfor—

“(A)credit or insurance tobeusedprimarily forpersonal, family, or householdpurposes;

“(B)employmentpurposes;or

“(C)any otherpurposeauthorizedundersection1681b of this title.” 15U.S.C.§1681a(d)(1).

2 “Theterm‘consumerreportingagency’meansanypersonwhich,for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engagesinwholeorinpartinthepracticeofassemblingorevaluating consumercreditinformationorotherinformationonconsumersforthe purposeoffurnishingconsumerreportstothirdparties,andwhichusesanymeansorfacilityofinterstatecommerceforthepurposeofpreparing orfurnishingconsumerreports.”§1681a(f).ingorfurnishingconsumerreports.”§1681a(f). 3 Thisstatutoryprovisionusestheterm“consumer,”butthattermis definedtomean“anindividual.” §1681a(c).

4 Forpurposesofthisopinion,weassumethatSpokeo isaconsumer reportingagency.

5 See Edwards v. First American Corp., 610 F.3d 514 (CA9 2010), cert.grantedsub nom. First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards,564 U.S.1018 (2011),cert.dism’das improvidentlygranted,567U.S.___ (2012)(per curiam).

6 “Thatasuitmaybeaclassaction...addsnothingtothequestionof standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allegeandshowthattheypersonallyhavebeeninjured,notthatinjury hasbeensufferedbyother,unidentifiedmembersoftheclasstowhich theybelong.’”Simonv.Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization,426 U.S.26,40,n.20(1976)(quotingWarth,422U.S.,at502).

7 Thefactthataninjurymaybesufferedbyalargenumberofpeople does not of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance. The victims’ injuries fromamass tort, for example, are widely shared,tobesure,buteachindividualsuffersaparticularizedharm.

8 Weexpressnoviewaboutanyothertypesoffalse informationthat maymeritsimilartreatment.WeleavethatissuefortheNinthCircuit toconsideronremand.

*The well­established exception for qui tam actions allows private plaintiffstosue inthegovernment’sname fortheviolationofapublic right. SeeVermont Agency of Natural Resources v.United States ex rel. Stevens,529U.S.765,773–774(2000).

1 Congress added the right of action forwillful violations in 1996 as partoftheConsumerCreditReportingReformAct,110Stat.3009–426.

2 Because this case remains at the pleading stage, the court of first instance must assume the truth of Robins’ factual allegations. In particular,thatcourtmustassume,subjectto laterproof,thatSpokeo isaconsumerreportingagencyunder15U.S.C.§1681a(f)andthat,in preparing consumer reports, Spokeo does not employ reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy, in violation of the FCRA.

3 Justas theright to truthful informationatstake inHavens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), was closely tied to the Fair Housing Act’s goal of eradicating racial discrimination in housing, so therighthereatstake isclosely tied to theFCRA’s goal ofprotecting consumersagainstdisseminationofinaccuratecreditinformationabout them.