Speedy Trial - Statutory

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 126 S. Ct. 1976 (2006)

The Supeme Court holds that a defendant may not prospectively waive indefinitely the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act. Though the defendant signed a document prepared by the court that purported to waive the provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court held that the Act does not permit this kind of prospective waiver. The Court also held that the trial court must make specific findings under § 3161(h)(8), or an “ends of justice” delay will not stop the clock. Finally, the court held that there is no harmless error in this situation.

United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988)

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice because of the government’s failure to comply with the Speedy Trial Act. The Supreme Court reverses holding that the trial court did not properly exercise its discretion in deciding whether to grant the motion with, as opposed to without, prejudice.

Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345 (2010)

If a defendant seeks additional time to file pretrial motions, is the period of time between the filing of that motion and the actual filing of the pretrial motions automatically excludable? The Supreme Court held that this period of time is not automatically excludable. Section 3161(h)(1)(D) provides for an automatic exclusion of any period of delay resulting from certain proceedings, including any delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filng of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion. This does not include the period of time during which a defendant is given the opportunity to file motions. However, if the court makes express findings that the ends of justice are served by granting a continuance, this is a permissible method of stopping the clock.

United States v. Tinklenburg, 131 S. Ct. 2007 (2011)

Any time resulting from the filing of a pretrial motion falls within the exclusion of time for such pretrial motions, regardless of wehter the filing of the motion actually results in a delay. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). The Sixth Circuit had previously held that only pretrial motions that actually result in a delay toll the clock.

United States v. Ramirez, 788 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2015)

The trial judge complained about his crowded docket and postponed the defendant’s trial. Later, the judge entered an order declaring the case complex. The Seventh Circuit held that the Speedy Trial Act was violated and the post hoc rationale for the continuance did not overcome the actual reason announced by the court at the time the continuance was granted.

United States v. Hicks, 779 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2015)

A government motion “to set a trial date” stops the Speedy Trial clock for at most thirty days.

United States v. Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2013)

The Speedy Trial court should not have been tolled due to the existence of plea negotiations. There was no notification to the district court that a plea agreement had actually been reached (which would have briefly stopped the clock).

United States v. Ortiz, 687 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2012)

Section 3161(h)(3)(A) creates a tolling period resulting fromt eh absence of an essential witness. The absent witness in this case was the defendant’s co-conspirator, who fled after initially making a statement implicating himself and the defendant. The delay in this case resulted in the return of an indictment more than thirty days after the defendant’s arrest. The Fifth Circuit held that the co-conspirator was not an essential witness as far as seeking and obtaining an indictment and therefore § 3161(h)(3)(A) did not apply. The absent witness’s confession to the police was admissible in the grand jury proceeding and therefore his appearance was not essential.

United States v. Mathurin, 690 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012)

The government must obtain an indictment within thirty days of the defendant’s first appearance. 18 USC § 3161(h). The time between first appearance and the return of an indictment during which the defense and the prosecutor are engaged in efforts to resolve the case with a plea agreement is not excludable time. Though there are certain periods of excludable time during the thirty day window (e.g., “for other proceedings concerning the defendant”), this does not include plea negotiations.

United States v. Marshall, 669 F.3d 288 (D. C. Cir. 2012)

The government’s motion to permit the introduction of Rule 404(b) evidence did not stop the Speedy Trial clock. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to dismiss the indictment given the violation of the Speedy Trial Act.

United States v. Huete-Sandoval, 668 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012)

Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Bloate, the First Circuit holds that excluding days for the purpose of allowing the defendant to prepare motions was improper. Only pursuant to (h)(7) may the court exclude a period of time such as this, and only if specific findings are made that such time is necessary for a case-specific reason. The second period that the district court excluded was for 16 days when the defendant said that he was going to file for a continuance to enable him to consider a plea offer. No continuance, however, was ever actually requested. The First Circuit reluctantly held that this period was also not properly excluded. The First Circuit reversed the conviction with directions to dismiss the indictment, though the lower court was permitted to do so without prejudice.

United States v. Bloate, 655 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2011)

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit held that the Speedy Trial Act was violated and that a document filed by the defendant styled, “Waiver of Pretrial Motions” did not constitute a “motion” which stopped the Speedy Trial clock pursuant to § 3161(h)(1)(D).

United States v. Burrell, 634 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2011)

The government sought a continuance because a critical government witness (law enforcement officer) was scheduled to be on specialized training when the trial was scheduled. The trial court, relyion on 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(3), found that the witness could not, though the exercise of due diligence, be brought to trial by the government. The Fifth Circuit reversed. There was no showing that the government made reasonable efforts to secure the attendance of the witness at trial. There was no evidence concerning where the witness was at training, how many hours he was required to attend, whether he could miss one day for purposes of attending the trial, or what the cost of transportation would be. For the same reason the trial court could not rely on the “ends of justice” tolling period.

United States v. Alvarez-Perez, 629 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2010)

Several rulings on a Speedy Trial Act dismissal, including holding that the speedy trial clock begins to run upon the filing of an information, even if an indictment is later filed. The court also rejected the government’s argument that the defendant waived the speedy trial act error.

United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2010)

The trial court repeatedly granted continuances in this case, but provided inadequate reasons to justify the ends-of-justice continuances. The indictment should have been dismissed, though a remand to the district court was necessary to determine whether the dismissal should be with, or without, prejudice.

United States v. Jones, 601 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2010)

When a defendant successfully appeals his conviction, the Speedy Trial Act allows only seventy days between the date that the district court receives the mandate and the date the defendant’s retrial begins. New charges added by a superseding indictment do not reset the speedy trial timetable for offenses either charged in the oriniginal indictment or required under double jeopardy principles to be joined with such charges. In this case, following reversal of the conviction, the government investigated additional charges agains the defendant before starting the new trial and during this period of time, the 70-day period (i.e., non-excludable days) expired. The court also explains how to calculate time when various motions are filed (some of which were set down for a hearing, some of which were not). The original charges should have been dismissed.

United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2009)

The trial court granted several “ends of justice” continuances. Many of the continuances were granted to enable the defendant to “review newly provided discovery” or for the prosecution to locate a co-defendant and transport him to the jurisdiction. The trial court failed to adequately make case-specific findings to support the various continuances. The fact that many of the continuances were at the request of the defendant is not determinative, because the Speedy Trial Act protects the interest of the public, not just the defendant, in a speedy trial.

United States v. Henry, 538 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008)

The trial court failed to adequately perfom the (h)(8) balancing between the need for a continuance and the public’s interest in a speedy trial. A remand was necessary to make findings on the record.

United States v. Young, 528 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2008)

The defendant was initially indicted for possession of an unregistered silencer. Two months later, the indictment was superseded and various drug counts were added to the indictment. When the case went to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the firearm charge, because more than seventy non-excludable days passed prior to the trial on that charge. The Eleventh Circuit held that neither the filing of a superseding indictment, nor a dismissal and re-indictment operates to re-start the speedy trial clock.

United States v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

The Speedy Trial clock started on the day of the co-defendant’s arraignment. The clock did not stop indefinitely when the government filed a motion to permit the introduction of a prior conviction under Rule 609, because the defendant never responded and there was no hearing contemplated by the motion. In the trial court’s pre-Zedner ruling, it also found that there was an “implicit” finding of the need for an “ends of justice” continuance. Zedner does not approve that procedure. In light of the violation of the Speedy Trial Act, the conviction was reversed and the trial court was obligated to determine whether the dismissal of the indictment would be with, or without, prejudice.

United States v. Kuper, 522 F.3d 302 (3rd Cir. 2008)

A defendant who has prevailed in a motion to dismiss on the basis of a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, but whose success is tempered by the fact that the dismissal was entered without prejudice, may not appeal that decision to the Court of Appeals. A dismissal without prejudice is not a final order.

United States v. Lewis, 518 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2008)

When the Ninth Circuit initially reviewed this case, it found that the Speedy Trial Act was violated during one period of delay, and perhaps during another. The case was remanded to determine the facts surrounding the second period of delay and then to dismiss the indictment either with, or without prejudice. The lower court then simply dismissed the indictment without prejudice based on the first period of delay. Because the second period of delay, if it did violate the Act, may have prompted a dismissal with prejudice, the lower court erred in failing to make a determination about the facts surrounding that delay. In deciding whether to dismiss with, or without prejudice, the court must consider the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances which led to the dismissal, and the impact of re-prosecution on the administration of justice. The Supreme Court, in UnitedStates v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988), also requires that prejudice to the defendant be considered. In this case, because the lower court failed to make necessary findings about the cause and extent of the delay, the determination of whether the dismissal should be with, or without, prejudice could not properly be made.

United States v. Williams, 511 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007)

A defendant may not sign a prospective indeterminate waiver of his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. Also, the district court may not retroactively grant an “ends of justice” continuance. While findings of fact may be entered after the fact, the findings themselves must be made before the continuance is granted.

United States v. Lopez-Valenzuela, 511 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2007)

The Fifth Circuit held that the date the indictment was returned was the start date for the seventy day clock, because the defendant had already appeared in court. The government unsuccessfully argued that the date he filed a written waiver of appearance and entered a not guilty plea was the date that started the clock.

United States v. Stephens, 489 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2007)

In joint defendant cases, if the clock has not run out on one defendant, the clock is tolled “for a reasonable period of time” as to co-defendants. § 3161(h)(7). In this case, a co-defendant entered a guilty plea and the district court tolled the clock for the defendant for seven weeks while the co-defendant’s plea was being considered (i.e., prior to sentencing). The Fifth Circuit reversed: delaying the defendant’s trial for seven weeks while the co-defendant’s plea was being considered was not reasonable. In addition, the defendant’s severance motion, which did not require a hearing, only created a thirty-day clock stoppage from the date the motion was taken under advisement. § 3161(h)(1)(J).

United States v. Sanders, 485 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

The trial court made inadequate Zedner findings to support the various tolling periods of the speed trial clock and the only remedy was to reverse the conviction and dismiss the indictment.

United States v. Suarez-Perez, 484 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2007)

The trial court issued a nunc pro tunc order suspending the Speedy Trial clock under the ends of justice provision, but provided inadequate reasons. The conviction was set aside and the indictment was dismissed. The trial court was directed to make a decision about whether the dismissal should be with, or without, prejudice.

Greenup v. United States, 401 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2005)

When a defendant waives his statutory speedy trial rights, the district court must make a specific finding pursuant to § 3161(h)(8)(A) that the continuance serves the ends of justice. Unless the court considers the factors set forth in the statute, the defendant’s waiver is not effective to stop the clock. The Sixth Circuit later ordered that the opinion be “depublished.”

United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2005)

The defendant was in state custody, awaiting state charges. The feds issued an arrest warrant and notified the state that it intended to try the defendant on federal charges. The state proceedings were terminated, but the state continued to hold the defendant, apparently only because of the federal detainer, for another three months. The Fourth Circuit held that this violated the Speedy Trial Act. Where a defendant is kept in state custody without any pending state charges and only on the basis of a federal warrant, the Speedy Trial clock runs and the thirty-day limit for obtaining an indictment is triggered.

United States v. Lewis, 349 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003)

A government’s motion to present evidence non-sequentially which was delayed an extensive period of time, did not stop the Speedy Trial clock the entire time, because the defendant requested a hearing on the motion.

United States v. Watkins, 339 F.3d 167 (3rd Cir. 2003)

The government’s failure to indict the defendants on the charges for which they were arrested within thirty days violated the Speedy Trial Act and required dismissal of those charges. Charges on other offenses, however, did not need to be dismissed. Thus, the conspiracy to import drugs offense should have been dismissed, but the substantive importation charge could go forward.

United States v. Pitner, 307 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2002)

When there is an interlocutory appeal, the 70-day Speedy Trial clock is interrupted, but not restarted. Here, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss a new indictment which was returned following an earlier mistrial.

United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 1997)

When the court invokes the "ends of justice" basis for postponing a trial, the findings in support of this continuance must be made before the time limit expires, though the written order may be entered after the 70-day period expires. In this case, the court's only findings within the time limit, was that a continuance was needed to accommodate the court's schedule. A congested court calendar is not a permissible basis for a § 3161(h)(8)(A) continuance. The indictment should have been dismissed and a remand was necessary for the lower court to determine whether the dismissal should be with, or without prejudice.

United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1997)

The defendants' first conviction was reversed in September 1994, with the mandate being issued in December 1994. In January 1996 -- over a year later -- the re-trial was held. The Speedy Trial Act requires re-trial within seventy days after the mandate is issued. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e). Various continuance motions filed by both the government and the defense caused the delay of over a year. The longest delay, however, was occasioned by an (h)(8) continuance for the purpose of ensuring "continuity of counsel." The continuance, however, was not justified by the facts. Vague statements by counsel that a continuance is needed because of scheduling conflicts, vacations and time needed to prepare, may not be the basis for a four month delay. On remand, the case would be re-assigned to a new judge to decide whether the dismissal should be with, or without prejudice.

United States v. Gonzales, 137 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1998)

The prosecutor's statement that he could not prepare for trial in the allotted time was not an adequate basis for granting an ends-of-justice Speedy Trial continuance. The prosecutor offered no specifics and the trial itself only lasted three days. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss. The lower court would have to decide on remand whether the dismissal would be with, or without, prejudice.

United States v. Alford, 142 F.3d 825 (5th Cir. 1998)

The defendant was initially charged in a two-count indictment. Later, eight more counts were added in a superceding indictment. Trial was held within seventy days of the superceding indictment, but this was more than seventy days from the initial indictment. The first two counts, therefore, should have been dismissed.

United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 1998) Violation of the 70-day Speedy Trial Act requirement necessitated dismissal of the indictment (without prejudice). The court explained various provisions of the Act: (a) § 3161(h)(1)(F) exclusions apply to motions; if the motion requires a hearing, all time up to the date the hearing is conducted is excludable, in addition to thirty days thereafter for a decision on the motion. Excludable time for motions that do not require a hearing is thirty days. All told, there were approximately 120 non-excludable days between arraignment and trial. The government’s argument that the defendant waived the provisions of the Act was rejected by the First Circuit: though the defense may not cause a delay and affirmatively waive the provisions of the Act and then claim a violation, a waiver for a discrete period of time does not negate the requirements of the Act for all time.

United States v. Ramirez, 973 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1992)

The trial court properly dismissed the indictment with prejudice in light of the Speedy Trial Act violation. The violation in this case was caused by an eighty-one day delay in ruling on the pretrial motions. Though the offense was serious (500 grams of cocaine), what motivated the court was the fact that the delay was caused by carelessness and a dismissal was necessary as a deterrent measure and to ensure that such delays do not occur in the future. When a delay is caused by the court or the prosecutor, this militates in favor of a dismissal with prejudice.

United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1995)

The defendant’s trial was severed from the trial of the co-defendants’ trial. Once the co-defendants’ trial ended, the speedy trial clock started running. Also, the fact that the lower court deferred ruling on a Kastigar motion until the conclusion of trial did not toll the statute. In declaring a case complex, the district court may not delay the trial indefinitely: The length of an exclusion for complexity must be not only limited in time, but also reasonably related to the actual needs of the case. The court also notes that a superceding indictment inherits the clock of the original indictment. Finally, the court held that the defendant may not waive the speedy trial act provisions, except in cases where the defendant treats the Act as a game of trial strategy. The court concludes, however, that the failure to dismiss the indictment was harmless error, because the indictment would have been dismissed without prejudice.

United States v. Giambrone, 920 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1990)

The trial court did not err in dismissing the indictment with prejudice. The government was “extremely lax” in complying with the Speedy Trial Act. The first indictment was dismissed without prejudice three months after the initial case was set for trial because of the unavailability of the government’s star witness. The second case was handled at a routine pace, but seventy days expired before the case was set for trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice: “A pattern of disregard for the responsibility to bring criminal cases to trial expeditiously has the potential for nullifying the requirements of the Act, for if the government suffers only dismissals without prejudice on motion of the defendant, it in effect gains successive 70-day periods in which to bring the defendant to trial.”

United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.3d 271 (3rd Cir. 1995)

The government sought to toll the Speedy Trial Act clock because an essential government witness, who was a severed co-defendant, was pleading the Fifth and thus was “unavailable.” This was not proper. A witness who the government may immunize is not “unavailable.”

United States v. Jones, 56 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1995)

Almost a year and a half after arraignment, the defendant was tried. Shortly before the first scheduled trial date, which was set three months after the arraignment, a co-defendant moved for a continuance to complete discovery. The motion was never ruled on by the trial court and over a year passed before the trial was held. Shortly before the trial, the court entered an order “memorializing” his granting the continuance motion. This violated the Speedy Trial Act. A motion for a continuance which is pending for over a year does not create excludable time under §3161(h)(1)(F). Also, the court gave no reason why a continuance for a year was necessary under the ends of justice provision, §3161(h)(8)(A).

United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940 (5th Cir. 1994)

Two provisions of the Speedy Trial Act were the focus of this case: 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(1)(F) and §3161(h)(1)(J). Under (F), anytime between the filing of a motion and a hearing on the motion is excludable, even if the delay in holding the hearing is unreasonable. (F) also excludes anytime after the hearing during which time the court is “assembling papers,” such as post-hearing briefs. Once all the papers have been received, (J) applies and limits the time in which a decision may be made to 30 days. Any time more than 30 days is not excludable. If no hearing is required by a motion, then (F) only allows for 30 days excludable time to rule on the motion. Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986). In this case, a motion for a bill of particulars (which did not require a hearing) a motion for a pretrial James hearing (which was never held, and thus did not require a hearing) and a motion in limine, were all covered by the subsection (F) 30 day rule. In calculating the 30 days, the matter is deemed submitted on the last day in which briefs are actually filed. Here, the district court permitted too much time to pass. The court of appeals held that the indictment should be dismissed without prejudice.

United States v. Ortega-Mena, 949 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1991)

The defendant filed a Brady motion to which the government responded in one day that there was no exculpatory evidence. Only two days on the clock were tolled by this motion. Also, an “ends of justice” tolling period cannot be predicated on a crowded court docket, even if the court is engaged in a related trial.

United States v. Castle, 906 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1990)

The government took more than ten days to transport a prisoner to obtain a mental competency exam. The government complained that this was due to budgetary cuts at the United States Marshal’s office. The Court stated that this is no excuse. The fact that the government acted reasonably was also not an excuse for failing to comply with the Speedy Trial Act provisions.

United States v. Velasquez, 890 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1989)

The defendant was arrested on May 16. The indictment was not returned until July 19. The government contended that the 30-day limit prescribed by §3161(b) was tolled because a co-conspirator’s competency was being evaluated during the interim. The Court also sought refuge in the exclusion for “delay resulting from consideration by the Court of a proposed plea agreement,” §3161(h)(1)(I). The Court rejects both excuses: Determining the competency of a co-defendant does not provide an excuse for failing to indict the defendant; and because the plea agreement was never submitted to the Court for consideration, that exclusion also does not apply. The Court goes on to hold that only the substantive count for which the defendant was arrested need be dismissed. Thus, the Court may prosecute the defendant for conspiracy but not the substantive offense for which he was arrested.

United States v. Bigler, 810 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1987)

The failure of the federal government to gain custody of a state prisoner and seek the appointment of a lawyer for him resulted in a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. Excluded from the seventy-day indictment-to-trial period is any period during which the defendant is in state custody awaiting trial on state charges. However, once the state proceedings were concluded, the government delayed in gaining custody of him from the state jurisdiction. Furthermore, the government delayed in finding a lawyer to represent defendant once he was in federal custody.

United States v. Moran, 998 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1993)

The trial court allowed the defendants two weeks to file suppression motions after arraignment. This was not excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act. Moreover, the thirty days which the Act allows for consideration of motions under advisement was exceeded in this case and the excess time should have been counted on the Speedy Trial clock.

United States v. Crawford, 982 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1993)

The indictment in this case should have been dismissed because of a Speedy Trial Act violation. A continuance was supposedly granted, but there were no findings made as to the reason for the continuance, or the necessity for the continuance.

United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223 (7th Cir. 1994)

Following the granting of a mistrial requested by the defense, the government dismissed the indictment and reindicted the defendant on similar charges. The new indictment would proceed under the same speedy trial clock – the clock did not start anew with the new indictment. Thus, the government had seventy days from the date of the granting of the mistrial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(1)(F), rather than seventy days from the return of the new indictment.

United States v. Dezeler, 81 F.3d 86 (8th Cir. 1996)

The defendant’s attorney withdrew on the 72nd day of the speedy trial clock. This did not stop the clock and because the time had expired prior to the attorney’s withdrawal, there was no basis for denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. In calculating the time, the court noted that pursuant to §3161(h)(1)(J), once a motion is taken under advisement, a decision must be reached within thirty days and any time longer than that is not excluded.

United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1994)

In the criminal complaint, the defendant was charged with mail fraud. The original indictment, however, did not allege mail fraud. A superceding indictment three months later, added the mail fraud counts. This violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161(b). Trial counsel’s failure to move to dismiss these charges amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1994)

Over 500 days of non-excludable time could not be justified by a post-trial finding of complexity and the need to satisfy the “ends of justice.” Moreover, the pendency of pretrial motions does not amount to excludable time, unless the pendency of those motions causes delay. Thus, motions which are pending and which are held until trial and which do not cause delay, do not create excludable periods of time. The Ninth Circuit concludes, moreover, that the indictment should be dismissed with prejudice.

United States v. Engstrom, 7 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1993)

After a reversal of the first conviction, the trial court set the case down for trial within the 70-day time limit. Shortly thereafter, however the case was transferred to another district judge which set the case down for trial after the time limit expired. After realizing that the new date was outside the time limit, the judge solicited a motion to continue (which the government filed) and then granted the motion with a conclusory finding that a continuance was needed to serve the ends of justice. This was a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and the conviction was reversed.

United States v. Hoslett, 998 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1993)

The routine setting of dates for the filing of pretrial motions does not toll the Speedy Trial clock. Only where the preparation of motions requires extra time and a request for an extension of time has been granted does the clock stop.

United States v. Delgado-Miranda, 951 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1991)

The defendant has the right to a hearing, and to be represented by counsel at that hearing, when the trial court decides to dismiss a case with, or without prejudice, because of a Speedy Trial Act violation.

United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1991)

Three days prior to trial, the government obtained a superseding indictment which added a conspiracy and lengthened another conspiracy. According to United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231 (1985), “to avoid prejudicing a defendant, a continuance should be granted where there is a meaningful possibility that a superseding indictment will require an alteration or adjustment in the planned defense.” With regard to the counts that were added or altered in the superseding indictment, the convictions were reversed.

United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990)

An “ends of justice” continuance needs to be specifically limited in time and specific findings must be made in the record to justify such a continuance under 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(8)(A). At the commencement of this 33-defendant case, the district court declared that it was a complex case and came within the “ends of justice” exclusion. Though discovery deadlines were later established, the continuance was indefinite in nature. No defendant objected to these orders. The appellate court acknowledged that because of the complexity of the case, some continuance was necessary. However, an indefinite period of excludable time was not justified. The Ninth Circuit also notes that the monitoring of the limitations period is not the exclusive burden of the district judge, the government shares the responsibility for the speedy trial enforcement. As a result of the delay in this case, the convictions were reversed and the district court would need to determine whether a dismissal of the indictment would be with or without prejudice.

United States v. Karsseboom, 881 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1989)

The trial court dismissed some but not all counts of an indictment. The defendant was reindicted on the counts which were previously dismissed. All counts of the indictment are subject to the clock which was running on the original indictment.

United States v. White, 864 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1988)

When granting a dismissal without prejudice, the trial court must set forth its findings with regard to the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)(2). The failure to do so requires a remand.

United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 1997)

The only basis for the court’s §3161(h)(8) continuance was a crowded court docket; that is, that the court was engaged in another trial and could not try this case when initially set. This basis for stopping the Speedy Trial clock is specifically outlawed by §3161(h)(8)(C).

United States v. Pasquale, 25 F.3d 948 (10th Cir. 1994)

The defendant entered a guilty plea, but before sentencing, was permitted to withdraw the plea. The speedy trial clock’s 70-day period began the day the plea was withdrawn. Several weeks later, a new attorney was appointed. The new attorney requested a continuance for two months in order to prepare the defense. The court granted this motion, but made no findings regarding the ends of justice. Even though the attorney requested the continuance, the trial court’s failure to make contemporaneous ends of justice findings required that the conviction be set aside and the indictment dismissed – without prejudice.

United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1993)

Though the defendant waived his rights under the Speedy Trial Act to be indicted within 30 days of arrest, this was ineffective. Absent findings by the judge that the ends of justice would be served, the defendant’s waiver did not protect the public’s right to the speedy disposition of criminal cases. A dismissal without prejudice, however, was the appropriate remedy.

United States v. Miranda, 835 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1988)

A local rule of the Southern District of Florida requires counsel to notify the Court of developments in the case. The defendants failed to comply with this local rule. The Eleventh Circuit holds that this does not preclude a dismissal on speedy trial grounds.

United States v. McNeil, 911 F.2d 768 (D.C.Cir. 1990)

There is no need that the defendant prove that he suffered actual prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act if the violation resulted from the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of time under §3161(h)(3) because of the supposed absence or unavailability of an essential witness. Unlike §3161(h)(8) which specifically requires a finding of prejudice, under §3161(h)(3), there is no requirement that the Court balance the ends of justice against the right of the defendant to a speedy trial. The Court went on to find that the unavailable witness was in fact “not essential” and thus there should have been no excludable time.