Search and Seizure - Pre-Search Seizure

Bailey v. United States, --- S. Ct. – (2013)

Though Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), permits the police to detain people who are at the scene that is the target of a search warrant, in this case the police followed individuals who left the scene prior to the search and detained them about a mile away, without any information that they were subject to a Terry stop. The Supreme Court held that this amounted to an unlawful detention that necessitated the suppression of any evidence derived from the stop of the individuals.

United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 2013)

The police had probable cause to believe that drugs were being distributed from a convenience store. The defendant lived on the second floor of the store. After watching another man engaged in what appeared to be drug dealing at the store, the police detained the defendant as he was seen leaving the premises and started the process of obtaining a search warrant. The detention lasted for four hours. During this time, the defendant made an incriminating statement and a gun was found in his room when the warrant was later executed. The Fourth Circuit, distinguishing Illinois v. McArthur, held that the detention was invalid and the evidence was suppressed. Unlike in McArthur, the police did not have probable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in the drug dealing.

United States v. Cha, 597 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2010)

The police seized the defendant’s house and held it for twenty-four hours (not allowing the defendant to enter), while a search warrant was obtained. This was too long and the evidence obtained from the search that was conducted thereafter should have been suppressed, even though it could not be said that the search or the discovery of the evidence was the “fruit” of the illegal seizure. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) and Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). Though the evidence was not discovered as the fruit of the illegal seizure, the discovery of the evidence was the direct result of the constitutional violation. The court also rejected the government’s effort to extend the Herring good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to this situation.

United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009)

If the police seize an item such as a computer from a house, based on probable cause (without consent to search it and without a search warrant authorizing the search or seizure), they must seek a warrant promptly. In this case, the police went to the defendant’s house and asked if he had any child pornography on his computer. He initially responded, “yes, probably.” He did not give the officers consent to seize the computer. Nevertheless, based on probable cause the officer seized the hard drive. He kept the hard drive in his office for several weeks (during which time he was on training and was otherwise occupied). Thereafter, twenty-one days after the computer was seized, he obtained a search warrant. The Eleventh Circuit held that this delay was impermissible and suppressed the evidence obtained from the computer. The court noted that personal computers contain a substantial amount of private information and depriving the defendant of the computer that length of time without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Among other arguments rejected by the Eleventh Circuit, the notion that the search would have taken more than three weeks even if the warrant had been obtained on the day of the seizure, did not support the delay. The court observed that a hard drive of a personal computer is the “digital equivalent of its owner’s home, capable of holding a universe of private information.” For that reason, a three-week delay in starting the search process was not reasonable.

United States v. Ward, 144 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1998)

The defendant checked his suitcase, which contained a kilogram of cocaine, on a bus from L.A. to Indianapolis, but did not board the bus. He flew to Indianapolis and awaited the arrival of the bus. When the bus stopped in St. Louis, the police became suspicious of the bag and took it out of the luggage compartment and asked the passengers if anybody claimed it. Nobody did, and the police confirmed that none of the passengers were heading for Indianapolis. The bag was taken out of the bus and the bus departed. Later, a drug dog alerted to the bag and a warrant was obtained. The Seventh Circuit concludes in this case that the luggage was “seized” when it was taken off the bus; however, there was a reasonable suspicion justifying the seizure. Relying on United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the court held that detaining luggage is the same as detaining a traveler and must be supported by an articulable suspicion. See also United States v. Puglisi, 723 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1984). This rule applies even if, as in this case, the traveler was not accompanying his luggage, because the detention would have deprived the traveler of his luggage at the ultimate destination. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detaining mail is not unlawful if it is delivered the next day). Because there was an articulable suspicion, however, the dog alert and the execution of a search warrant was permissible.

United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 1998)

After the defendant and his colleague were arrested making a drug sale, the colleague told the police that some of the drugs came from the defendant’s house and that more drugs were left there. The police went back to that location and “secured” the home which involved detaining four occupants, and searching the house, including requiring each of the occupants to empty their pockets. The agents then endeavored to get a search warrant, including in the application information obtained during the search. The Court refused to allow the evidence to be admitted under an inevitable discovery theory because of the blatant violation of the defendant’s rights prior to getting a search warrant. The court distinguished both Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) and Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). In Segura and Murray, the warrant did not contain any information learned during the illegal search. Moreover, “the offensiveness of the officers’ actions in this case is not limited to the seizure of premises, but extends to the detention of occupants and the continued, prolonged, illegal search by wandering officers.”