Search and Seizure - Particularity of Things to be Seized

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004)

Though the search warrant application and the supporting affidavit both listed the types of items that the officers intended to seize, the search warrant itself did not list any items that were authorized to be seized and failed to incorporate the affidavit or application. The Court held that when an affidavit is needed to render the search warrant itself valid, the affidavit must be served on the person who is being searched at the time the warrant is served. The Supreme Court held that the search was unlawful and the agent could be sued by the homeowners.

United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134 (3rd Cir. 2014)

The warrant presented to the target at the time the search is executed must contain a list of the items to be seized. The failure to have a particularized list in this case was a constitutional violation, but the officers executed the warrant in good faith.

United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2013)

The search warrant affidavit provided inadequate probable cause to support the search and seizure of defendant’s computer. The application sought a warrant to look for evidence of the violation of a particular New York statute, “and or federal statutes”. That statute related to the registration of internet service provider and communications accounts (the officer simply cited the wrong code section). The Second Circuit held that this warrant violated the particularity requirement in that it did not proplerly limit the scope of the search, or, for that matter, the type of evidence that the police were authorized to search for. The Second Circuit emphasized the importance of having proper limits when a computer is the subject of the search. The court also addressed the proper method of “severing” the improper portions of a search warrant from the legitimate clauses. If only limited parts of the warrant are valid (in a warrant that is otherwise sweeping and invalid), suppression of the evidence is appropriate. However, where isolated portions are invalid, the court may uphold the search that is authorized by the legitimate portions of the warrant.

United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2010)

The search warrant authorized the agents to seize all computers and other hardware. The application specified that the agents were looking for child pornography. The application, however, was not incorporated into the search warrant. The Second Circuit agreed that the search of the computers was improper, because of the lack of particularity regarding what the agents were searching for. Nevertheless, the exclusionary rule did not apply, because the agents did, in fact, know what they were looking for and acted in good faith.

Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d 628 (10th Cir. 2009)

A search warrant that authorized the seizure of all possible evidence of any crime was overbroad. The overbreadth of the warrant in this case rendered the entire warrant defective (regardless of the manner in which the warrant was actually executed). Note that this is a civil case, so the question did not focus on suppressing evidence, but rather on the liability of the sheriff for executing the warrant.

United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2009)

The search warrant was overbroad with respect to certain categories of documents that the agents were required to seize. The Ninth Circuit held that his is not technically a “particularity” defect, because the warrant was particular – it was just too broad. However, the Court held that suppression of those categories of documents was sufficient to cure the defect. This was not a case in which total suppression was required, as in United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986).

United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006)

Though the FBI and the AUSA intended to get a search warrant that would have allowed the agents to search the defendant’s car and house (and there was, in fact, probable cause to search both the car and the house), they mistakenly submitted a search warrant that only identified a safe in the house and the car as the target of the search. Searching the entire house was therefore impermissible. Moreover, because the search warrant clearly only authorized the search of the car and the safe, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The evidence suppressed, however, was limited to the evidence that was seized that was not located in the car or safe.

San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2005)

A search warrant that authorized the seizure of “any evidence of gang affiliation” was too broad and the execution of the warrant was so abusive (including shooting dogs) that the officers would not be entitled to qualified immunity.

United States v. Bridges, 344 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2003)

There was probable cause to search the defendant’s office based on the information in the application that documented his efforts to provide illegal tax advice to various clients, including undercover agents. The search warrant in this case, however, was overly broad. It listed, among the items to be seized, “All records . . . documents . . . computer hardware and software . . .” Though this list was detailed, it was too expansive. There was simply no boundary to what could be seized. In addition, the warrant did not specify the crimes that were the subject of the search (nor did the warrant incorporate the application) so there was no limitation in that manner. Though the application was detailed, the warrant was not. All evidence should have been suppressed. (No discussion of Leon).

Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232 (3rd Cir. 2003)

The warrant particularly described the location to be searched and the people who were to be searched at that location. The attached (and incorporated affidavit) included additional people that the affiant believed should be searched. The affidavit could not broaden the scope of the narrowly drawn search warrant, and searching other people at the location was improper. (This is a civil rights case that was brought by other people at the premises who claimed that searching them violated their fourth amendment rights).

United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 1997)

Though the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, the search warrant in this case insufficiently specified the items to be seized. The warrant was a boilerplate narcotics search warrant (focusing on items relating to the possession and distribution of drugs), but the agents were actually looking for narcotics manufacturing evidence.

In re Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Solid State Devices, Inc., 130 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1997)

The government established probable cause that certain practices of the target corporation were fraudulent. Indeed, there was information that the company "routinely" engaged in fraudulent practices. Nevertheless, the corporation itself was not pervaded by fraud, in the sense that the corporation had little legitimate business. Therefore, a warrant which resulted in the seizure of approximately 90% of the corporation's records over a five year period, including 2,000 file drawers, was overbroad and the target's motion for return of seized property should have been granted.

United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 1997)

The agents provided an affidavit in support of a search warrant which set forth probable cause to search the defendant's residence. The warrant, however, contained no limitation whatsoever on what could be seized: it simply authorized the agents to search the defendant's residence. The affidavit was not attached to the warrant (though it was incorporated by reference), at least one of the searching agents did not know the contents of the affidavit, and the affidavit was not served on the defendant at the time of the search. The government explained that it did not want to disclose the identity of the confidential informants. This was an unlawful "general" search and was not saved by Leon. The requirement of particularity serves two functions: the agents are informed of the limitation relating to what they can seize and the target is informed of what the agents are entitled to seize. Neither goal was achieved in this case.

United States v. Falon, 959 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1992)

When a corporation is entirely consumed by fraud, an “all records” search is permissible. Similarly, when an individual runs his business, not in a corporate form, but in an entirely illegitimate manner, an “all records” search is permissible. However, when the target of such a search is the person’s home, an “all records” search is not appropriate. In such cases, the warrant should specify business-related documents in order to minimize the seizure of the defendant’s personal non-business related documents. The appropriate remedy is partial suppression – suppression of those items which should not have been seized.

United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1987)

The search warrant in this case authorized the seizure of cartons of women’s clothing, the contents of those cartons, without identifying the contents of the cartons, and control slips identifying the stores intended to receive those cartons. The vice with this warrant was the failure to specify what types of clothing were subject to seizure – that is, what clothing was believed to have been stolen and thus within the parameters of the search warrant affidavit. The Court holds that the warrant was overbroad on its face and that the good faith exception did not apply because the obvious infirmity of the warrant.

United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1992)

A search warrant which authorized the seizure of various items and “any other evidence relating to the commission of a crime” was not sufficiently particular. An officer could not rely on this warrant in good faith. There was no limiting language in the warrant indicating what “crimes” were the focus of the search. Furthermore, a sufficiently particular affidavit does not cure an overbroad warrant: resort to an affidavit to remedy a warrant’s lack of particularity is only available when it is incorporated by reference in the warrant itself and attached to it.

United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1987)

The search warrant in this case authorized the search and seizure of any papers, things or property of any kind relating to the robbery and murder under investigation. The court holds that this type of warrant is insufficiently particular and is invalid under the Fourth Amendment. However, it is not so facially invalid as to render the police officer’s reliance on it unjustified. Therefore, the good faith exception saves the search in this case.

United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1992)

If a search warrant fails to particularize the items to be seized, but specifically incorporates the affidavit which provides the necessary specificity, the warrant is lawful. But if the warrant does not specifically incorporate the affidavit, then the affidavit does not cure the defective warrant. Nevertheless, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).

Rickert v. Sweeney, 813 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1987)

The search warrant in this case authorized an IRS agent to search and seize various business records belonging to tax payers and constituting evidence of violations of the general conspiracy statute and of the general tax evasion statute. This is insufficiently particularized to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1995)

A search warrant authorized the seizure of virtually every document at the target corporation’s office. The warrant did not limit the time period of relevant documents, did not provide any limiting language to the broad categories of items to be seized and did not even specify the nature of the fraud which was supposedly evidenced in the documents. The government would not be permitted to use evidence which was lawfully seized: the court would not sever the overbroad portions. Indeed, each of the categories of documents was overbroad. Finally, this was not a search warrant which could be rescued by the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Even though two AUSA’s, a magistrate, and the agents believed that the warrant was valid, the court concludes that no reasonable agent could have relied on the warrant in good faith.

United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 1995)

The police had probable cause to obtain a search warrant. However, the warrant instructed the officers to seize items set forth in attachment #1, but there was no attachment. The only attachment which existed accompanied the search warrant application. In this situation, the officers could not seize anything other than what was obviously contraband in plain view.

United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1994)

The search warrant authorized the seizure of narcotic controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, marijuana cultivation equipment, instructions, notes, cultivation magazines, currency, documents and records and fruits and instrumentalities of a violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1). This latter clause was too overbroad; it provided to the executing officers no guidance as to what was to be seized. This provision was not saved by Leon. All evidence seized pursuant to this clause of the warrant would be suppressed.

United States v. Weber, 915 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1990)

The defendant’s house was searched pursuant to a search warrant that was directed at the presence of obscene material in the defendant’s home. The search warrant, however, allowed officers to search for a wide variety of magazines and advertising materials, none of which was backed up by probable cause. The only evidence against this defendant was the fact that a couple of ads addressed to him apparently depicted child pornography. The affiant’s statement about the “proclivities of pedophiles” did not support a wall-to-wall search of the house. The affidavit simply did not support a search for child pornography in general. The court rejected certain aspects of the warrant as “rambling boiler-plate recitations designed to meet all law enforcement needs.” Finally, the court concludes that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The court amended the opinion at 923 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1990).

United States v. Stubbs, 873 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989)

The search warrant in this case was overbroad. There was no reference to criminal activity; it only described generic categories of documents without any effort to specifically describe the items which the officers could have seized under a probable cause standard.

United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986)

The search warrant in this case authorized the search of a jewelry store and the seizure of all notebooks, notes, documents, address books, and other records; safety deposit boxes, keys, cash, gemstones and other items of jewelry and other assets, all of which were evidence of the violations of thirteen enumerated statutes. Because the law enforcement officers could have been more particular in regard to what they believed was evidence or contraband, the search warrant in this case was invalid. Furthermore, because the search warrant was not attached to the affidavit, it was not permissible to cure the defects in the warrant by referring to the affidavit. Finally, because the warrant was facially deficient, the police officers could not have relied upon it in good faith and therefore the evidence was suppressed. The court also discusses the government’s argument that even though portions of the search warrant were broad, the items which were seized pursuant to the search warrant paragraphs which were not overbroad could still be used as evidence. The court rejects this argument: The search warrant was overbroad through and through. No items were specifically identified in the search warrant; consequently nothing could be seized lawfully. The court also rejects the government’s argument that certain items were found in plain view and could be used in evidence under that rule. The court holds that because the warrant was overbroad, the police officers had no right to be in the jewelry store and consequently had no right to have a “plain view” of the items which were obviously illegal.

United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986)

Sections of the federal warrant in this case which authorized the seizure of documents showing an employer/employee relationship between persons named and unnamed and evidence of defendant’s association with anyone, did not meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the search warrant was so facially deficient that officers could not have acted in “objectively reasonable” reliance upon it.

United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988)

A search warrant authorized agents to seize a broad range of records “relating to” violations of federal export laws. The affidavit only suggested a violation of the export laws relating to the export of a particular type of equipment to a particular foreign country. The warrant was thus overbroad and could not be saved by the “good faith” doctrine. The agents who executed the search warrant paid little heed to the few limits which were placed on the warrant.

United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988)

During the course of a search conducted pursuant to a federal search warrant, a state deputy sheriff seized numerous stolen items which had no relationship whatsoever to the object of the search. The court holds that everything which was seized would be suppressed. The reason for the exclusion of all evidence was the executing officers’ “flagrant disregard” for the terms of the warrant.