Search and Seizure - Knock and Announce

Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006)

When the police violate the knock-and-announce rule, the appropriate remedy is not suppression of the evidence. Though there is obviously a deterrent component to the exclusionary rule, the knock-and-announce rule is not principally designed to prevent the government from seeing or obtaining evidence in the house (i.e., the purpose of the rule is not to enable the homeowner to destroy the evidence), suppressing the evidence is not an appropriate remedy.

United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003)

The Supreme Court held that waiting 15 – 20 seconds prior to forcibly entering a house was permissible under both the federal knock and announce statute and the Constitution. The Court held that the standard of “reasonableness” was the only appropriate yardstick in gauging whether the police waited an appropriate length of time prior to entering the apartment when nobody responds to knocking on the front door. What matters are the facts known to the police (thus, the fact that the defendant was in the shower – unbeknownst to the officers – is not relevant). The officers may break open the door if they reasonably believe that they have been denied admission into the house.

United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998)

A no-knock entry is justified if police have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would be dangerous or futile, or inhibit the effective investigation of the crime. Here, with good reason, the police obtained a no-knock warrant. The police executed the warrant by breaking open a garage window and announcing their presence. Excessive or unnecessary property destruction during a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful. 18 U.S.C. §3109, which authorizes the breaking of windows where the police are denied admittance, does not prohibit the breaking of a window, as in this case, even in circumstances where admittance is not denied. Where, as here, the police act reasonably, this satisfies the Fourth Amendment and §3109.

Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997)

The Fourth Amendment does not authorize a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule (the constitutional requirement recognized in Wilson v. Arkansas) in all felony drug investigations. While the magistrate, in an appropriate case, may authorize an entry without knocking and announcing, there must be a showing to authorize this method of gaining entry, as opposed to a per se exception (created by the state supreme court in Wisconsin) to the knock and announce rule in all cases of a general category.

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)

The knock and announce rule, which has its roots in the common law, is part of the fabric of the Fourth Amendment and in some cases, the failure to knock and announce can render a search violative of the Fourth Amendment.

Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2015)

Even if an officer is engaged in hot pursuit of a suspect to a home, this does not necessarily eliminate the knock and announce rule, which is designed to protect the safety not only of the suspect and the officer, but also other occupants of the house.

United States v. Neilson, 415 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005)

Law enforcement officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the no-knock provision in the search warrant was valid. Though there was some information known to the police that weapons and drugs were inside, there was no evidence of violence and a prior search at the premises did not involve any violence, even though guns were found at that time. Moreover, though there was probable cause that a small amount of drugs were at the scene (apparently personal use quantities), there was no indication that any trafficking occurred at the house.

United States v. Smith, 386 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2004)

Officers must have more than a mere hunch before they can claim that exigent circumstances support the issuance of a no-knock warrant. The fact that drugs and guns are known to be in the house and that one of the occupants is known to be a biker is not sufficient to support the issuance of a no-knock warrant. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997). The warrant in this case also did not satisfy the good faith standard of Leon. Among other things, the warrant in this case did not, in fact, authorize a no-knock entry (though one was requested and it was arguable that the magistrate intended to grant that authority).

United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790 (6th Cir. 1996)

The mere fact that officers are aware that there are firearms inside a house is not sufficient, alone, to justify entering with a warrant without knocking and announcing. Absent more, such as knowledge that an occupant has a record of violence; prior threats to an officer’s safety; or a verified reputation of an occupant’s violent tendencies, the police must still knock and announce, even if they know that there are drugs and guns inside. The court also held that the mere possibility that the occupants might destroy drugs inside the apartment is not enough to violate §3109, or the Fourth Amendment’s common law knock and announce requirement.

United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir. 1993)

The police announced their presence and entered the defendants’ house five seconds thereafter. This violated the knock and announce rule and was not salvaged by the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Also, the inevitable discovery rule has no application in this context, because the knock and announce rule would be rendered meaningless.

United States v. Zermeno, 66 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1995)

The trial court did not clearly err in holding that the police violated the federal knock and announce rule, 18 U.S.C. §3109. The police approached the front door of the defendant’s house and yelled, “Open the door.” Before the defendant could reach the door, the police had commenced using a battering ram. The fact that this was a narcotics investigation did not establish, without more, that there were exigent circumstances justifying the agents’ conduct.

United States v. Becker, 23 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir. 1994)

A SWAT team kicked in the door of the defendant’s home in order to execute a search warrant. The government argued that there was fear of an active methamphetamine lab on the premises, as well as volatile chemicals. At co-conspirators’ homes, there were also loaded weapons found during searches. None of these factors justified a search without notification. There was no information then known to the police that there actually was an operating methamphetamine laboratory at the home. Also, the fact that the co-conspirators had been arrested suggests that the defendant would have dismantled his laboratory, assuming that there was one previously in existence. Finally, the fact that co-conspirators had guns does not support an entry without notice.

United States v. Mendonsa, 989 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1993)

Though the police heard noise inside, were aware that one of the occupants was a parolee from an armed robbery conviction, and that drug activity was known to have occurred at the location, this did not excuse a violation of the knock and announce requirement.

United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96 (10th Cir. 1996)

The police approached the defendant’s house with a search warrant and within three seconds of announcing their presence battered the door down. This violated the constitutional requirement that the police knock and announce. Even if the police were aware of the existence of guns in the house, this was not sufficient, absent any proof that the officers were concerned about their safety.

United States v. Stewart, 867 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1989)

Exigent circumstances did not justify a SWAT Team’s use of a steel battering ram and stun grenade to serve a residential search warrant. There was no knowledge on the part of officers that such force was required. All evidence seized during the course of the ensuing search was suppressed. The mere fact that drug dealers commonly carry firearms and may destroy evidence does not excuse compliance with the knock and announce rule.