Search and Seizure - Exigent Circumstances

Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011)

The Supreme Court held that the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement applies even if the law enforcement agents “created” the exigency, unless the agents created the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment. The fact that certain legal investigative techniques may create an exigent circumstance, even if it is foreseeable, does not foreclose reliance on that exception to the search warrant requirement. In King, the police smelled marijuana coming from an apartment. The police knocked on the door loudly, announcing that they were the police. They then heard noise indicating that evidence might be destroyed and the police entered. The Court held that there was nothing about the officers’ conduct that foreclosed reliance on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement (though the case was remanded for further fact-finding by the trial court).

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006)

The police may enter a house pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception if there is an objectively reasonable belief that entry is necessary to render aid to an injured person, or to prevent imminent injury to someone inside. The subjective motivation of the officers (i.e., whether they are entering to render aid or to make an arrest), is not relevant: what matters are the objective facts that are known to the officers and whether those objective facts support the need to enter to render aid.

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)

The police, under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, entered the apartment where a shooting occurred. While there, the police decided to search the apartment for evidence of the possession of stolen property. During the course of this search, the police lifted up a stereo to examine the serial numbers. This constituted a search which was not justified by the initial warrantless search of the premises.

United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2014)

The defendenat was stopped in his vehicle and charged with smuggling undocumented aliens. He was brought to the police station where he and one of his passengers were questioned. The passenger admitted that they regularly were engaged in smuggling activity. The police seized the defendant’s cell phone and listed it on a property report as seized evidence. Approximately 90 minutes later, the police searched the contents of the phone. The Ninth Circuit held that this was a not proper search incident to arrest search, not a proper exigent circumstances search and not a proper “automobile exception” search. In addition, the court rejected the inevitable discovery doctrine and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as reasons not to apply the exclusionary rule.

United States v. Nora, 765 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2014)

The police observed the defendant with a gun in his hand on the street and later on his porch. He retreated into his house. The police ordered him to come out of the house. This was improper: the police need a search warrant or an arrest warrant to enter a house or to order someone to exit the house. Possession of a loaded gun is, at most, a misdemeanor in California. The police had no basis for believing that the defendant posed a danger, or was committing a felony by possessing the gun.

United States v. Mallory, 765 F.3d 373 (3rd Cir. 2014)

The police chased a man with a gun into a house. This was a permissible hot pursuit / exigent circumstances entry into the house. However, after the defendant was handcuffed and in control of the officers and a security sweep of the house was accomplished, there was no need for any further warrantless searching of the house (including for the weapon) and the discovery of the gun during this further search should have been suppressed.

White v. Stanley, 745 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 2014)

The smell of marijuana, without more, does not provide an exigent circumstance that justifies an immediate warrantless entry into a house. The court noted that this is particularly true in states where medical marijuana laws have been enacted.

United States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2013)

A neighbor called the police and reported that there was a bullet hole in a wall adjacent to the caller’s apartment. (There were no reports of gunshots). The police went to the scene and knocked on the defendant’s door and there was no answer. The next day, the police returned to the scene and entered the apartment. The Eleventh Circuit held that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the entry into the apartment (indeed, the plice waited until the next day to force entry into the apartment) and the evidence found during that warrantless entry (the police found guns) should have been suppressed.

United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2013)

The police went to the defendant’s house in response to a domestic disturbance call. The wife had left by the time the police arrived and the defendant agreed to talk to the police on the front porch. During this conversation, the police learned that the defendant had a grenade in the house. Without pausing to obtain a warrant, the police went into the house, found various guns in one part of the house and pried open a closet door and found other explosives there. The Fourth Circuit held that exigent circumstances did not support this warrantless entry into the house.

United States v. Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161 (7th Cir. 2012)

The police responded to a report of gunshots. When they arrived at the scene, they saw one man (the defendant) running toward an apartment building. Next, the police were told by a bystander that his cousin had been shot and that he was hiding in a particular apartment. The police went to the apartment and the shooting victim and the defendant came to the door. The victim had a graze wound on his arm. The police were not given any information that there were any guns in the apartment or any perpetrator of the shooting. The police were not told that the shooting had occurred in the apartment. Neither the victim, nor the defendant was armed. After detaining the defendant, the police entered the apartment, later arguing that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. The Seventh Circuit held that exigent circumstances did not authorize the warrantless entry and the evidence located in the apartment should have been suppressed.

United States v. Ramirez, 676 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2012)

The police believed that the occupants of a hotel room had heroin in their possession. The police knocked on the door; the occupants opened the door and then immediately shut it when they saw the police were there. The Eighth Circuit held that this did not authorize the police to enter under the exigent circumstances theory. Prior to knocking on the door, there was no evidence that the occupants were aware that the police were there or that any evidence was being destroyed. The occupants have the right to refuse to allow the police to enter (and this is what the Kentucky v. King Court held), and the mere act of shutting the door was not sufficient to establish that there were exigent circumstances (i.e., that the occupants were about to destroy evidence).

United States v. Simmons, 661 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2011)

The defendant’s roommate called the police and said that the defendant had a gun and he requested that the police come to the apartment to help him retrieve his property from inside the apartment. The police went to the apartment and asked the defendant about the presence of a gun, and the defendant told them it was in his room. The police went into the room and retrieved the gun, leading to the defendant’s prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Second Circuit held that the un-Mirandized questioning was proper pursuant to Quarles, but the entry into the bedroom was not supported by exigent circumstances or any other exception to the warrant requirement which is especially important in the context of the search of a home. The evidence should have been suppressed.

United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2011)

The information known to the police was not sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the target of an arrest warrant was present in the residence that they entered. There were also no exigent circumstances to justify the entry into the residence, despite apparent damage to the door frame that the police observed when they arrived.

United States v. Martinez, 643 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2011)

A 911 operator received a “static” only call. There was nobody on the line, just static. An officer was dispatched to the house. When the police arrived, there was on sign of any emergency, or even an occupant in the house. The police looked into the house from a sliding glass door and saw various boxes of electronic equipment and the house appeared somewhat disheveled. The police then entered, announced their presence and asked if anybody was home (nobody was in the house) and conducted a sweep search, during which they found drugs and child pornography. When they exited the home, the defendant drove up and he was questioned and made incriminating statements. The police then secured a search warrant. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court suppressing all the evidence on the basis that there was no exigency that supported the warrantless entry into the house and the defendant’s statement was the fruit of that unlawful statement. Thus, the search warrant was the fruit of the poisonous tree.

United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2010)

The police were provided information from a recently-arrested individual that the supplier of drugs was located at a certain residence. The police went to that residence, knocked on the door and were denied consent to enter. The police entered despite the occupant’s refusal to consent. The police then secured the property and awaited the arrival of a search warrant. The Seventh Circuit held that there were no exigent circumstances supporting this entry. However, pursuant to Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), the seizure of the house was permissible because there was probable cause to believe there were drugs in the house.

United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2010)

A neighbor called the police and reported that a white man wearing a black leather jacket had just climbed over a fence in her neighor’s yard and she could not see who it was, but the neighbors were not home. The police went to the location, looked over the fence and promptly detained (with guns drawn) the defendant, who fit the description and was walking around in the backyard. He was searched and a gun was found. They then determined that he lived at that house; and also learned that he was a convicted felon who could not possess a firearm. The Ninth Circuit held (1) there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant – despite the report from the neighbor, the police should have asked the defendant his name and obtained information about where he lived before arresting him ; (2) there were no exigent circumstances to support the arrest and search; (3) the backyard was part of the cartilage of the house.

United States v. Menchaca-Castruita, 587 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2009)

The defendant’s landlord entered the defendant’s house and saw marijuana in plain view on the floor. The landlord promptly called the police from the driveway. The defendant came out of the house, assaulted the landlord and then fled in his car before the police arrived. The police then arrived and entered the house without a warrant. The Fifth Circuit held that exigent circumstances did not justify entering the house without a warrant. The officers had no reason to believe that they were investigating a violent drug-trafficking ring; there was no evidence that the defendant had a firearm, or that there was a firearm or anybody else located in the house; or that there was any risk that the evidence was at risk of being destroyed. There was time to obtain a warrant and no reason not to do so.

United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2009)

The police had information that a trespasser was residing in an apartment. This did not provide a basis for bursting into the apartment. There were no exigent circumstances, or hot pursuit of the suspect.

United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 2008)

The police went to a hotel after receiving a tip that an escapee was there with his girlfriend. The police thought it was possible that methamphetamine was being made in the hotel room. The defendant was arrested outside the room. The girlfriend denied that there was any methamphetamine being manufactured in the room, but when the police quickly looked around, there were drug related items in the room. There was no reason to believe, however, that there was actual manufacturing in progress. Because of the lack of any such information, there was no basis to immediately start searching luggage that was in the room on the basis of exigent circumstances. Moreover, the girlfriend did not have the apparent authority to consent to a search of the luggage, which did not belong to her. “Apparent authority cannot exist if there is ambiguity as to the asserted authority and the searching officers do not take steps to resolve the ambiguity.”

United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2008)

Border patrol agents tracked illegal aliens into a house. They then entered the house without a warrant, claiming that they had exigent circumstances because there was the possibility that the aliens were ill or suffering from heat exhaustion. The Tenth Circuit held that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrant entry into the house.

United States v. Mowatt¸ 513 F.3d 395 (4th Cir 2008)

The police went to the defendant’s door and smelled marijuana and heard loud music. They knocked on the door and when the defendant cracked the door open, the demanded entry, including grabbing the defendant, who they believed was hiding something behind his back while he was standing at the door. There were no exigent circumstances that required the police to demand entry into the apartment. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (smell of drugs in house does not create exigency justifying warrantless entry). Butsee Kentucky v. King, noted above, which expressly abrogates this opinion.

United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2007)

The police (who did not have a search warrant) knocked on the defendant’s door and after 20 seconds, heard someone inside say, “The police are at the door.” This did not provide exigent circumstances to enter the house.

United States v. Ellis, 499 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2007)

The police went to the defendant’s home to conduct a “knock and talk.” The defendant answered the door and denied that anybody was in the house or that he lived there. Another officer at a side door heard moving around in the house and entered the house. The officer at the front door did not communicate information relating to what the defendant said, to the officer at the side door. The mere sound of “movement in the house” is not enough to amount to probable cause that evidence was being destroyed or hidden. There was no probable cause basis for the officer at the side door to justify his entry and thus the exigent circumstances exception to the requirement of obtaining a search warrant did not apply.

United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2007)

The police had reason to believe that a house was a “stash house” for illegal aliens. They went to the house to conduct a “knock and talk”. A large group of officers in the front and back, as well as a helicopter overhead arrived at the residence. When a commotion ensued, the police yelled, “Police, open the door.” When a man came out and ran back in, the police followed him in with their guns drawn. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement did not apply, because the exigency was entirely caused by the unnecessary conduct of the police. If there was probable cause (and the court did not decide whether there was, or not), a search warrant should have been obtained. The purpose of a “knock and talk” (or at least a legitimate knock and talk), is not to create a show of force that prompts a response, but rather to make an investigatory inquiry or to seek consent. The conduct of the police in this case caused the exigency and this is not a legitimate basis to conduct a warrantless search of a house. See also United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 2000). Not clear if this decision would survive Kentucky v. King.

United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005)

The police entered the defendant’s house, believing that a burglary might be in progress. There was very little information that supported this belief, other than the fact that the front door was slightly ajar and a report from a neighbor that there was light in the house and the house had been vacant for several weeks. This was an insufficient basis for an exigent circumstances entry. The court held, however, that a subsequently-obtained search warrant (on the basis of what was seen in the house during the exigent circumstances search) could be validated under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. A lengthy dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc argues at length why the good faith exception should not apply in this situation. 444 F.3d 537.

United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361 (3rd Cir. 2006)

The Third Circuit decided that the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement may not be invoked if the police create the exigency (in this case by knocking on the hotel room door and announcing that they were the police) that triggers their need to enter the premises without a warrant. In this case, the police should have maintained surveillance of the hotel room and obtained a warrant.

United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2005)

The police went to the defendant’s door and she immediately retreated and yelled to the occupants inside, “Police.” The government argued that this created exigent circumstances to support a warrantless entry. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. The woman simply exercised her constitutional right not to permit entry to officers who had no search warrant and this, alone, did not create an exigency supporting a warrantless search. Moreover, any exigency was created by the officer’s attempt to enter the residence without a search warrant. Evidence of the drug lab found in the house should have been suppressed. This case did not survive the decision in Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).

United States v. Deemer, 354 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2004)

There were no exigent circumstances justifying the entry into defendant’s hotel room. The police had received a 911 call, but could not determine from which room in the hotel the call had been made. When the police knocked on the door of the room in which the defendant was an occupant, a woman answered the door and said everything was ok and she had not called 911. The police said they wanted to look inside and walked in, discovering a methamphetamine laboratory.

United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2003)

The landlady of the defendant’s residence was concerned that there might be a water leak at the premises because of the high water bill. The landlady went to the premises and walked around, but found no leak – though she did find some suspicious plants. She called the DEA and they came back with her to the apartment and then claimed to go inside with her a second time to look again for a water leak. Of course, they found no leak, but did find a substantial quantity of marijuana. The Sixth Circuit held that there were no exigent circumstances (i.e., a water leak) that justified the law enforcement entry into the premises. Had there really been an emergency (or even a perceived emergency), the landlady would have called a plumber, not the DEA.

United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2002)

The police received a domestic disturbance call and went to the defendant’s house. He answered the door, intoxicated, and said his wife was not home. The wife then appeared and said that they had been arguing. The defendant went back into the house, and neither the defendant, nor the wife consented to an entry by the police. Nevertheless, they entered and found stolen firearms and drugs. The Tenth Circuit holds that exigent circumstances did not support the warrantless entry. The officers knew that the defendant had no history of violence and there was no basis for believing that his retreat into the house was cause for concern from a safety point of view. The court rejected the government’s invitation to create a broader exigent circumstances rule for domestic violence cases.

United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1997)

The police received a tip that two burglars were at a motel. Six officers went to the motel and went to the room in front of which the burglars' car was parked. The police knocked on the door and yelled, "Open up." When one of the defendants opened the door, the police observed (through the open door) various coins (they knew a coin collection had been stolen in the burglary). The officers pulled their weapons and arrested both defendants. They then obtained a search warrant on the basis of what they observed in the room. The trial court correctly granted a motion to suppress. Though the police did not enter the room in order to see the coins, when they ordered the occupants to open the door, and thereby gained the ability to see in the room, this amounted to a search. Demanding that the occupants open the door did not amount to a consent search and there were no exigent circumstances necessitating the immediate entry into the room. The search pursuant to the search warrant was not salvaged by Leon, because the information contained in the application (the observations that were gained through the illegal entry), negate the existence of good faith. Finally, the officers would not have inevitably discovered the evidence, because absent the illegal entry, no other investigatory effort was underway to obtain a search warrant for the motel room.

United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998)

The government made a controlled delivery of what the defendant believed to be a child pornographic tape to the defendant. Unbeknownst to the defendant, the tape was blank. When he obtained the tape and went into his office, the police followed shortly thereafter, later justifying this warrantless entry on the basis that the defendant might destroy that tape, as well as the rest of his collection once he discovered the police were present. The court holds that the circumstances were not exigent – except to the extent that the police created the exigency by first knocking on the door to alert the defendant to their presence.

United States v. Beltran, 917 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1990)

Police were aware for three hours that a suspect was involved in a drug transaction at her apartment. There was no excuse for not obtaining a search warrant at that time even if they decided to delay executing it until later in the day. There were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry of the suspect’s apartment to arrest her.

United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1989)

The officers saw the subject of an arrest warrant leave and re-enter a house. They waited two hours, then ordered all occupants of the house to exit. No effort was made to obtain a search warrant during this two-hour period. After the occupants exited, the defendant was arrested and the officers entered the house to conduct a protective sweep. No exigent circumstances justified the search of the house at that time in light of the agents’ failure to obtain a search warrant during the two hours that the house was kept under surveillance. The holding in this case was governed by the decision in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). That is, an arrest warrant for a visitor of a house is not a sufficient basis to search the house.

Singer v. Court of Common Pleas, Bucks County, PA, 879 F.2d 1203 (3rd Cir. 1989)

No exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into the defendant’s house where there was a report of domestic violence. Although domestic violence is certainly a serious matter, the victims of the alleged assault were no longer in the house when the officers executed the search. The defendant assaulted the police officer who entered the house. Because the officer had no right to be there, the defendant could not be convicted, under Pennsylvania law, of aggravated assault on a police officer.

United States v. Campbell, 945 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1991)

There was no basis for executing a warrantless search at the defendant’s residence. The officers delayed the search for more than an hour after determining that drugs were on the premises.

United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1990)

The police went to the defendant’s hotel room after arresting a person who had just exited the room with cocaine. The officers knocked on the door; the defendant opened the door, but upon seeing the police, he immediately tried to close the door. The police forced their way in. The defendant was arrested and asked if the officers could search the room. Defendant consented. The entry into the room was unlawful and the ensuing purported consent was invalid. The entry was not in hot pursuit and was not justified by exigent circumstances. This case is distinguishable from United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), because there, when the police arrived, the defendant was in the doorway and quickly retreated upon seeing the police.

United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1993)

The police were looking for a suspect in a motel. The officers knocked on the door and the occupants answered, “O.K.” but did not immediately open the door. The police heard whispering and drawers opening and closing. When the doorknob turned, the police forced their way in. This was not a proper exigent circumstances search. The police caused the exigency by going to the room without a warrant and announcing their presence. The police did not have evidence that contraband was in the room and the officers could have “covered” the entrance until a search warrant could be obtained. This case needs to be re-examined in light of Kentucky v. King.

United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 1994)

The police went to an apartment where a 14-year-old girl had been kidnapped and held for several days. When the police arrived, the girl answered the door, but she was unable to let the officers in (or escape) because of a locked iron gate. The police broke open the iron gate. The girl then “consented” to a search of the apartment – the defendant was not at home. This was not a valid consent search. The girl did not have the authority to consent to a search of the apartment. The fact that she was locked in established that she was not free to come and go (and hence invite others to do the same). There were also no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. Because the defendant was not present, the apartment could have been secured and a search warrant obtained.

United States v. Ogbuh, 982 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1993)

The defendants waited in a hotel room for two days for the seller of heroin. The seller was then intercepted by federal agents at the airport and immediately agreed to cooperate. The agents did not get a warrant, instead immediately entering the hotel room with the seller. Exigent circumstances did not justify this warrantless search. The one-hour delay it would have taken to get a warrant was not so long, given the purchasers’ willingness to wait for two days for the seller. Moreover, it should not have taken an hour to get a warrant. The government cannot erect barriers to getting a warrant expeditiously (requiring an AUSA’s approval before an agent goes to a magistrate), and then use this hurdle as an excuse for not getting a warrant at all.

United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1991)

Several members of a conspiracy had been arrested and others were known to be at large. The police did not have specific information that anybody was in a particular house, however. The entry into this house, without a warrant, was not justified by the exigent circumstances exception. There must be an objectively reasonable belief that someone is in the apartment and that the destruction of evidence is imminent.

United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1990)

Agents must have affirmative proof of the likelihood of destruction of evidence in order to justify a warrantless entry. In this case the police had ascertained the relationship between drugs and this residence by virtue of having stopped a car eight miles away. It is unlikely that any occupants of the residence were aware of this arrest and thus likely to immediately destroy evidence.

United States v. Buchanan, 904 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1990)

The police lacked sufficient basis to enter the defendant’s home without a search warrant solely on their belief that the defendant’s wife would destroy evidence after the defendant was arrested by DEA agents. Because the police were aware that the defendant’s wife was at home asleep, there was no reason to believe that she would be aware that the defendant had been arrested and thus there was time to get a search warrant. Furthermore, once the police entered the house without a search warrant, the subsequent consent of the defendant (even assuming he was lawfully arrested) was tainted by this unlawful entry and the police could not rely on a consent search. Finally, the government cannot rely on the “inevitable discovery” exception because the police were not pursuing an alternate line of investigation at the time that the search was conducted. Police who believe they have probable cause to search may not enter the premises and excuse their failure to get a warrant on the basis that they would have gotten one anyway.

United States v. Templeman, 938 F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 1991)

Police officers sent an informant into a house with a package of cocaine which had a beeper inside. The police entered the house without a warrant. This was improper – there was no reason why the police could not have obtained a warrant before delivering the drugs.

United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1990)

The police set up a controlled delivery of a UPS package in which cocaine had been found. There was no reason that the police could not have obtained a search warrant prior to making the delivery, therefore, there were no exigent circumstances justifying the entry into the recipient’s home after making the delivery. The requirement of obtaining a warrant applied even though the defendant had earlier hidden drugs immediately after receiving it. There was no reason that the police could not have obtained a warrant and immediately gone in when the delivery was made.

United States v. Suarez, 902 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1990)

The mere subjective belief of law enforcement agents that danger exists in the premises does not justify a warrantless search based on exigent circumstances. The agents must be capable of pointing to specific and articulable facts supporting their belief that other dangerous persons may currently be in the building or elsewhere on the premises in order to justify a warrantless entry. Mere speculation does not suffice.

United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1989)

The defendant was suspected of being the perpetrator of a series of bank robberies. While the police were outside his house maintaining surveillance, they learned that he had just perpetrated another robbery. While waiting for his return, the police went to a pay phone to check on the status of the case. Upon their return to the house, they found that the defendant had returned home and his car was parked out front. Without consent and without either an arrest, or search warrant, the officers entered the house. This was unlawful. Because the defendant was unaware of the police officers’ presence, there were no exigent circumstances justifying this warrantless entry. Following the entry, the defendant was shot and brought to the hospital. His wife subsequently consented to a search of the house. Though the initial entry was unlawful, the wife’s subsequent consent was not tainted by the initial unlawful entry and the evidence was therefore admissible.

United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1989)

Based on their suspicion that accomplices were located in certain hotel rooms, the police entered and searched the rooms. There were no exigent circumstance justifying this warrantless entry. A remand was required to determine whether a subsequent search, undertaken pursuant to a search warrant, was tainted by this initial unlawful entry.

United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1988)

A police officer was advised by defendant’s landlord that chemicals were being stored in the defendant’s garage. Experts testified at the suppression hearing that these chemicals are quite volatile and could explode in the hot weather. However, the police officer had only limited knowledge of the explosive potential of the chemicals and thus, his exigent circumstances search of the garage was unlawful.

United States v. Howard, 828 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1987)

The delivery and storage of chemicals in a detached garage did not provide probable cause for believing that a drug laboratory was being maintained in the house or that there was a risk of fire or explosion in the house justifying the warrantless securing of the home.

United States v. Alvarez, 810 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1987)

Federal agents had between an hour and a half and two hours from the time they learned that the defendant was waiting for a shipment of cocaine in a hotel room until they arrested him after breaking into his room. The police had time to obtain a warrant and thus the exigent circumstances did not authorize this entry. Furthermore, they could have simply obtained an arrest warrant which would have justified the warrantless intrusion into the apartment.

United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560 (10th Cir. 1992)

The police could not state with certainty that anybody was left in a house in which there was believed to be marijuana when other conspirators were arrested. Fearful that others were still in the house who would be alerted, the police entered to preclude the destruction of evidence. This was improper. Even absent continuous surveillance, the police must do more than merely suspect that other conspirators remain in the house who may destroy evidence before they can rely on the exigent circumstances exception.

United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988)

The Tenth Circuit holds that if there is time after learning of probable cause to search a house for the agents to obtain a warrant, they should do so. In this case, a rather “long time between the time probable cause arose and the time the entry was made” elapsed, but the Court held that the warrantless search was nevertheless justified.

United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1987)

The presence of 22 cans of black powder in the defendant’s bedroom did not constitute exigent circumstances justifying a two hour inventory-type search of the bedroom. During the course of the search, the police officers exhibited no particular concern for their own safety.

United States v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F.3d 1529 (11th Cir. 1995)

Though various law enforcement agents were arresting people around the apartment where the target was located, this, alone, did not create exigent circumstances justifying the entry into the apartment. There was no evidence that people in the apartment were aware of the activities going on outside.

United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir. 1991)

The mere presence of contraband does not give rise to exigent circumstances to search a house without a warrant. The arrest of co-conspirators away from a residence does not justify entering the premises without a warrant if the occupants are unaware of their colleagues’ arrest. The error in admitting the evidence in this case, however, was harmless.

United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1991)

In an en banc decision, the Eleventh Circuit extensively reviews the law governing exigent circumstances searches. The court concludes that the search in this case was supported by exigent circumstances. The court notes, however, that circumstances are not normally considered exigent where the suspects are unaware of police surveillance and that a warrantless search is illegal when police possess probable cause but instead of obtaining a warrant create exigent circumstances.

United States v. Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1987)

The possibility that luggage may have contained explosives was not an exigent circumstance allowing a warrantless search. Although the police officer may have been justified in seizing the suitcase to prevent loss or destruction, a warrant should have been required to open it.

United States v. Timberlake, 896 F.2d 592 (D.C.Cir. 1990)

Though an officer claimed to have smelled PCP, and was aware that PCP was dangerous and explosive, the officer did not testify that he faced any dangerous circumstance which would have justified a warrantless and non-consensual entry into the defendant’s apartment.