Search and Seizure - Curtilage

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013)

The police, based on an unverified tip, brought a drug-sniffing dog up the sidewalk to the front door of the defendant’s house. The dog alerted and the police then obtained a search warrant. The Supreme Court held that bringing the dog up to the front door was a search because it amounted to a trespass onto the defendant’s property for the purpose of conducting a search. The Court held that the police entered the curtilage of the home and, unlike open fields, this is an area of the home that must remain free from unwarranted intrusions by the police that are conducted for the purpose of searching for evidence.

United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2012)

A border patrol agent followed a man crossing the border up to the house of the defendant. The agents followed the man (unbeknownst to him) through the gated front entrance to the property and into the carport. This was an unlawful search: entering the carport amounted to entering the curtilage of the property. The court also held that the good faith of the officer in pursuing the illegal alien was not a basis to exempt this case from the exclusionary rule. The court noted that the good faith intention of the officer is not a proper factor to consider in deciding whether a Fourth Amendment search is illegal. Thus, the government’s suggestion that the officer was engaged in a proper “knock-and-talk” was not persuasive: the officer’s conduct was not consistent with the conduct of an officer who would simply go up to the front door of a house and knock in order to speak to the occupant.

United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2011)

The police entered the curtilage of the defendant’s property – and did so without a warrant – when they walked up the driveway and into the backyard from where they could look into the windows of an “outbuilding.”

Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2011)

In this civil rights case, the en banc Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had an expectation of privacy in the attached garage that had one wall common to their house and a door that was capable of fully closing, though it was open when the police initially arrived.

United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2010)

A neighbor called the police and reported that a white man wearing a black leather jacket had just climbed over a fence in her neighor’s yard and she could not see who it was, but the neighbors were not home. The police went to the location, looked over the fence and promptly detained (with guns drawn) the defendant, who fit the description and was walking around in the backyard. He was searched and a gun was found. They then determined that he lived at that house; and also learned that he was a convicted felon who could not possess a firearm. The Ninth Circuit held (1) there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant – despite the report from the neighbor, the police should have asked the defendant his name and obtained information about where he lived before arresting him ; (2) there were no exigent circumstances to support the arrest and search; (3) the backyard was part of the curtilage of the house.

United States v. Gentry, 839 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1988)

A search warrant was directed at a rural address. The Court holds that this does not extend to vehicles which were detained at the perimeter of the property. An officer forcibly led the vehicle to a place within the territorial scope of the warrant. This did not authorize a search of the vehicle.

United States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 1997)

The area of the defendants’ backyard that was searched without a warrant was within the curtilage of the house and the seizure of evidence in this area violated the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights. The backyard was in the same fenced in area as the house; and the area was clearly separated from the adjoining fields. Introducing the evidence seized from this area, however, was harmless error.

United States v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1993)

A law enforcement agent, posing as a passerby with car trouble, entered the property of the defendant. The lower court held that the agent never intruded within the curtilage of the property. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the area fifty feet from the house (and six feet from the garage in which the marijuana was located) was within the curtilage of the house. This spot was within the curtilage, even though there was a fence between the agent and the defendant’s home.