Search and Seizure - Automobiles

Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (2007)

When the police stop a vehicle that has a driver and passenger, the passenger is also “detained” for fourth amendment purposes. Therefore, if there was no basis for the stop, the passenger may contest the admissibility of any fruits of that stop (for which he has standing), such as a statement he made, or evidence seized from his person or personal belongings.

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)

In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court held that the police may conduct a search incident to arrest of the interior of a car whenever an occupant is arrested. In this case, the Court concluded that the same rationale allows the police to search a vehicle, even if the occupant is arrested by the police after exiting the car and is not within reach of the interior of the vehicle.

Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)

Five years after Thornton was decided, the Supreme Court followed up on the promise of the five Justices in Thornton who expressed displeasure with the scope of Belton, in the case of Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). Though stating that Belton was not expressly overruled, the Court determined that Belton required significant reigning in and held that a search incident to arrest, following an automobile stop, is only permissible “if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Thus, if the arrestee is in the back of the patrol car and restrained, the police may not automatically search the passenger compartment of the vehicle, simply because the defendant was arrested in, or immediately after exiting, the vehicle. What matters is the accessibility of the vehicle at the time of the search, not at the time of the arrest. A search may occur, however, even if the arrestee is not within reach of the car if there is “reason to believe” (i.e., not necessarily probable cause) that evidence of the crime for which the defendant is arrested is in the vehicle. In Gant, the defendant was arrested after he exited his vehicle in his driveway. He was arrested based on a warrant for a previous offense. There was no reason to believe that there was any evidence in the vehicle relating to the offense listed in the warrant. He was arrested and handcuffed in the back of the patrol car when the search of his vehicle occurred. The Court held that Belton – as heretofore construed – did not authorize this search and the evidence should have been suppressed.

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2004)

The police stopped a vehicle for speeding. The driver consented to a search of the car. Cash and drugs were found. Two other occupants of the car were arrested. The Supreme Court held that the evidence found during the consensual search was sufficient to justify the arrest of the two passengers. Therefore, one of the passenger’s subsequent confessions was admissible.

Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S.Ct. 1297 (1999)

When the police have probable cause to search a car, they may search all containers in the car, including containers known to belong to passengers, and for which there is no specific probable cause. The Court did not disturb its earlier holding in United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), which held that probable cause to search a car does not authorize the search of the person of a passenger.

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009)

If the police stop a vehicle lawfully and there is a passenger in the vehicle, if the police have a reason to believe the passenger is armed and dangerous, he may be frisked. This is true, even if the passenger is not believed to have committed any crime.

Florida v. White, 119 S.Ct. 1555 (1999)

Under Florida state law the police are authorized to seize an automobile for forfeiture purposes. (The same law exists with regard to federal forfeitures). In this case, the police observed the defendant, in his vehicle, involved in a drug transaction, but waited several months before seizing the car from a parking lot at defendant's place of employment. They then performed an inventory search. The Court upheld the warrantless seizure and inventory search even though there were no exigent circumstances and the probable cause to seize the vehicle arose several months earlier.

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)

The police may direct a passenger to exit a vehicle when the car has been stopped for a legitimate reason

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)

If a lawful traffic stop has been made and the basis for the traffic stop has been accomplished, the police may then request consent to search the vehicle without announcing to the driver that he is free to leave.

Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996)

If there is probable cause to search a car, there is no need to show the existence of particular exigent circumstances. That is, the fact that a car is involved is itself justification for dispensing with the search warrant requirement.

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)

Overruling United States v. Chadwick and Arkansas v. Sanders, the Supreme Court held that if the police have probable cause to search a container in a vehicle, but do not have probable cause to search the rest of the car, the “automobile exception” applies and the police may conduct a warrantless search of the container. In this opinion, the Court reviews the automobile exception and its theoretical underpinnings at length.

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)

If a person consents to a search of his automobile, an officer may search all closed containers found within the automobile. The officer is not required to make a second request before opening a closed container.

Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S.Ct. 484 (1998)

When the police make a traffic stop and issue a citation and do not make a custodial arrest, the police may not thereafter conduct a search of the vehicle on the theory that it is a search incident to arrest.

United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2014)

The police were watching the Interstate for a vehicle that was suspected to be involved in a methamphetamine distribution operation. When the vehicle was spotted, an officer pulled behind it. The vehicle crossed a lane line without a proper signal. The officer activated his lights. The officer determined that the tint on the window was too dark. The driver and the passenger (the defendant) were excessively nervous. The driver consented to a search of the vehicle, at which point the passenger/defendant was asked to exit the vehicle and he was frisked. Because there was no basis to believe that he was armed or dangerous, there was no legitimate basis to frisk the defendant and the evidence derived from this frisk should have been suppressed. The facts that the driver and passenger were nervous and that the vehicle was suspected of being involved in a drug trafficking operation are not sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the passenger was armed or dangerous, even coupled with the officer’s experience that drug dealers are often armed. The court ridicules the notion that any passenger in a car can be frisked if the driver or the vehicle is suspected of being involved in drugs: this would presumably include “a fourth grader, a ninety-five-year-old gentleman with Parkinson’s disease, or a judge this court.” The law requires individualized suspicion of the person who is to be frisked, not a general belief that someone in the vehicle might possibly be armed.

United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)

A man was seen leaving what was described by the police as a stash house with a white box. That man was later observed giving the box to the defendant. The defendant’s car was followed briefly and the police believed that he engaged in counter-surveillance maneuvers. Later the defendant, with the box was pulled over for a minor technical motor vehicle infraction and the officer could no confirm that he had a valid driver’s license. The car was searched and the box was found to contain cocaine. The government contended that there was probable cause to search the car. The Ninth Circuit disagreed: the officer’s testimony that the house was a “stash house” was worth little, because no facts were offered to support that conclusory statement. The claim that the defendant engaged in counter-surveillance was equally unhelpful. The government next argued that the car was subject to impoundment and inventory, but the Ninth Circuit rejected this theory, too, because there was insufficient information that the car was obstructing traffic, or otherwise in need of being impoundment. Moreover, the government did not show that the impoundment was appropriate under California law.

United States v. McCraney, 674 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2012)

The limitations on a search incident to arrest announced in Gant are not limited to situations where the defendant is handcuffed in the rear of a patrol car. Here, the defendants were outside the car, surrounded by several law enforcement officers. A search of the car was not a valid search incident to arrest.

United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2012)

Three police officers testified that as the car in which the defendant was a passenger drove past them, they observed a small crack in the windshield. The car was stopped and the defendant was ordered out of the car and frisked and the officer felt a gun. The defendant assaulted the police officer and fled, after which he was stopped and a gun was found in his possession. The district court found that the officers were untruthful when they said that the observed a crack in the windshield and that the stop, therefore, was illegal. The government conceded the illegality of the stop, but claimed that the assault of the officer was an intervening event that authorized the search (incident to arrest). The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument: the gun was found during the course of the illegal stop (and the frisk) which was before the defendant engaged in the intervening assault.

United States v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2011)

The defendant was a passenger in a car. The driver was stopped and he had a suspended license. The police asked the defendant/passenger for his license to see if he would be allowed to drive the car. A record check was performed on the defendant’s license and it revealed a prior armed robbery conviction and also a suspended license. The police then frisked the defendant, discovering evidence used in a drug/firearm prosecution. The Fourth Circuit held that the frisk was not lawful, because there was no reasonable basis for believing that the defendant was armed, or dangerous, and therefore no reason to frisk him.

United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2011)

The police stopped the defendant’s car because a quick records check did not show that the registration of the vehicle matched the vehicle color. In the car was the defendant and a young girl. The officer suspected that the young girl was a prostitute. He asked both the defendant and the girl questions and his suspicions increased. Ultimately, he decided that the girl lied about her age and he decided to search the car. The Ninth Circuit held that the stop fo the vehicle was permissible, as was the prolonged questioning. The search, however, was not lawful. Perhaps there was probable cause to arrest the girl, but there was not probable cause to search the car. There was no basis for believing that there was evidence of a crime in the car.

United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633 (10th Cir. 2001)

The defendant was arrested on the sidewalk near a parking lot. The court concluded that there was probable cause to support the arrest (a belief that the defendant had participated in a bank robbery). The police then searched a rental car, which had been rented by his girlfriend which was in the parking lot. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant did not have standing to contest the search of the car in general, because he was not on the rental agreement, but he did have standing to challenge the search of the closed suitcases which he owned that were in the trunk of the vehicle. The court also held that the search was not a valid probable cause search of the vehicle, because there was no probable cause to believe that the car contained any evidence. The search was not a valid search incident to arrest, because the defendant was over 100 feet away from the car when he was arrested and he was handcuffed in the back of the patrol car (note, this case was decided pre-Gant). This was not an inventory search, because the police conceded that they were searching for evidence and had not decided to impound the car until the evidence was found.

United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2011)

The police stopped an automobile in which the defendant was a passenger. The stop was found to be improper, because there was no articulable suspicion supporting the stop. During the course of the stop, the police learned that there was an arrest warrant for the defendant. The question in the Sixth Circuit was whether the existence of an arrest warrant and the evidence found during a search incident to the arrest was the fruit of the illegal stop, and did the exclusionary rule bar the introduction of the evidence. The Sixth Circuit held that the exclusionary rule did apply and the evidence would be suppressed. Contrary authority in the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997), was rejected by the Sixth Circuit.

United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010)

When the defendant’s car was searched, Gant had not yet been decided, and the search was valid under then-prevailing law in the Circuit (interpreting Belton to authorize a search anytime there was an arrest of the driver). The question in this case, is whether a pre-Gant search is subject to suppression if the case is brought to court post-Gant. In other words, if the search was lawful when it was conducted, but subsequent changes in the law rendered it unlawful, should the exclusionary rule be applied. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply in this situation, relying on Illinois v Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) and Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). The Supreme Court affirmed. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).

United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009)

The police pulled over the car in which the defendant was a passenger because the officer could not see a license plate on the car. Upon approaching the car, the officer saw a dealer plate displayed in the rear window. The officer thought the car might be stolen, because the driver had no paperwork establishing his ownership, but after calling in the VIN number, the officer found no report that the car was reported stolen. Nevertheless, the officer questioned the defendant – the passenger – and decided that his answers to various questions were suspicious and eventually, he was arrested. The police later determined that he was an illegal alien. The Tenth Circuit held that the continued detention of the occupants of the car was not legal. Once the officer saw the dealer tag, there was no basis for detaining them. The officer’s testimony that dealer tags are limited circumstances in which a driver test-drives a car was legally incorrect. The officer’s mistake of law (as opposed to mistake of fact) could not justify the continued detention of the vehicle’s occupants. The court remanded the case to the lower court to assess the extent to which the exclusionary rule would apply in this case (i.e., excluding evidence of the defendant’s identity and status as an illegal alien).

United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009)

The police searched the defendant’s vehicle pursuant to the “search incident to arrest” doctrine after the defendant was handcuffed and removed from the immediate vicinity of the vehicle. At the time the search occurred in this case, the controlling precedent was New York v. Belton which authorized a search in this situation. However, after the search occurred and while the case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona v. Gant, which held that the search incident to arrest doctrine did not apply in this situation. The question is whether reliance on prevailing Supreme Court precedent amounts to good faith and therefore obviates the need for the exclusionary rule. The Ninth Circuit held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in this situation and the evidence was suppressed pursuant to the Gant decision. The “pipeline” rule of retroactivity provides that any change in the law applies to any case then in the pipeline, i.e., still in the process of direct appeal. This case did not survive the decision in Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).

United States v. Lopez, 567 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2009)

The search incident to arrest in this case violated the rule in Arizona v. Gant. (No discussion of a whether a pre-Gant search, which would have been valid under Belton would be upheld on a good faith theory).

United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2008)

The defendant was driving his car and was seen by the police, who thought the car had improper window tinting and that the defendant had not properly signaled a turn. The police followed the defendant, but did not activate their emergency lights. The defendant parked his car and started walking towards his house. The police parked behind the defendant’s car and then walked to catch up with the defendant who was finally approached on the front lawn of a neighbor. The police told the defendant to stop; he fled. After catching him, the police went back to the car and searched it. This was not proper. This was not a proper inventory search or a proper search incident to arrest.

United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007)

The police may not stop a car based on information that the driver has committed a misdemeanor in the past that poses no continuing threat to public safety. While the police may stop a car where the driver is believed to have committed a DUI offense, or a breach of the peace that may be ongoing, in this case, the defendant allegedly committed a “noise violation” in the past. This did not support a vehicle stop.

United States v. Spinner, 475 F.3d 356 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

The police approached the defendant who had parked his car illegally and immediately became suspicious of him, because of his movements inside the car. He stepped out and agreed to be frisked. The police then asked to look in his car, but he denied consent. The police looked in the car, nevertheless, and discovered a gun. The government argued that this “car frisk” was justified under the doctrine of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The D.C. Circuit disagreed, concluding that there was insufficient information to support a “frisk” of the car under the standard of Terry. The defendant was outside his car and had already been frisked himself and therefore no risk was posed to the police that necessitated any further searching of the car.

United States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006)

In a lengthy opinion carefully reviewing the record of the suppression hearing, the First Circuit held that the trial court erred in making a credibility determination that the officer who made the traffic stop in this case was truthful about the passenger (the defendant) not wearing a seatbelt. Based on the officer’s testimony, which was riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions, the district court should have granted the suppression motion.

United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2006)

If the police stop a car without an articulable suspicion, the discovery of contraband in the car must be suppressed, even in a prosecution of a passenger. Though Rakas v. Illinois indicates that the passenger has no expectation of privacy in the car, the passenger’s motion to suppress is predicated on his unlawful detention and the fruit of that unlawful detention, rather than on the expectation of privacy in the automobile. The court’s opinion runs twenty pages and comprehensively reviews the law of “fruit”.

United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2006)

The police pulled the defendant over because his windshield was cracked. A gun was found and the defendant was prosecuted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Driving with a cracked windshield, however, is not a violation of Nebraska State law. Therefore, the stop of the defendant was unlawful and the discovery of the gun was a fruit of the illegal stop. The government’s argument that the officer acted in good faith was rejected: The mistake of law was not objectively reasonable. The question is not whether the officer subjectively believed that the law was being violated, but whether, from an objective point of view, a belief that the law was being violated was reasonable.

United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2006)

The police pulled the defendant over for having his turn signal on when he rounded a curve. This was a not a valid basis for pulling the car over and any evidence found as a result of that stop should have been suppressed. There is no “mistake of law” defense to an improper stop.

United States v. Cole, 444 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 2006)

The defendant stopped at a stop sign just shy of the cross walk, but over the solid white line. He claimed that this did not violate Texas law. The government argued that the traffic stop was valid regardless of the actual Texas law, because the officer, in good faith, thought that the law required the defendant to stop before the solid white line. The Fifth Circuit held that a good faith mistake as to the law was not a cure for an invalid stop.

United States v. Kennedy, 427 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 2005)

The defendant’s girlfriend said that the defendant “deals” drugs and “keeps” drugs in his car. This did not establish probable cause that the defendant then had drugs in his car. A search of the car was not permissible under the probable cause prong of the automobile exception.

United States v. Jaquez, 421 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2005)

The police received a report of gun shots at a location and that a red car was involved. Fifteen minutes later, an officer pulled over the defendant who was driving a red car in the general vicinity of the reported gun shots. The Fifth Circuit held that there was insufficient information to support the stop of the defendant’s car and the subsequent consent search was invalid.

United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

The police may search the inside of a car incident to an arrest. The trunk, however, may only be searched if there is probable cause to believe that there is contraband or evidence in the trunk. In this case, the defendant was arrested for driving a car with stolen license plates and without a valid driver’s license. The police claimed that the trunk might contain evidence that the car was stolen, but the court concluded that stolen license plates on the car does not suggest further evidence in the trunk. (Judge [now Chief Justice] Roberts dissented).

United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2003)

The police had a warrant for the defendant’s arrest. They followed him home and after he exited his car and was approaching his front door, they approached him and started talking. He then fled. A search of his car was not supported as a search incident to arrest.

United States v. Maple, 348 F.3d 260 (D. C. Cir. 2003)

The defendant was arrested in his car for speeding and driving with a suspended license. The officer decided not to impound the car and pulled it into a parking lot. He noticed a mobile phone on the floor and opened a console between the bucket seats for the purpose of hiding the phone in there. This amounted to a search and was unlawful.

United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394 (11th Cir. 1998)

The driver of a rental car has standing to contest a search of the car, even if the car is overdue to the rental company.

United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438 (3rd Cir. 2000)

The defendant drove to his parole officer in a borrowed car. The defendant admitted to the officer that he did not have a license. This did not authorize the officer to search the trunk of the car. The search of the trunk was not supported by an articulable suspicion.

United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994)

When a police officer effects a stop of a vehicle, all of the occupants have had their freedom of movement restrained, and thus all of the occupants have been seized. The passengers, as well as the driver, may feel that they are not free to leave once they have been stopped by the police. Therefore, if the stop is illegal, fruits of that stop, including evidence found in the car, must be suppressed in a trial involving the passengers of the car. In this case, the stop was lawful.

United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498 (1st Cir. 1994)

The defendant was a passenger in a car which was stopped by local police, who knew that the defendant was wanted in another jurisdiction. In the trunk was the defendant’s briefcase. There was no probable cause to search the briefcase based on these facts alone. There was nothing but “conventional wisdom” supporting the officer’s belief that incriminating evidence would be found in the defendant’s briefcase.

United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1998)

The police believed that the defendant was transporting drugs, but had no basis for stopping the vehicle other than the fact that the defendant activated his direction signal, but then entered an intersection and did not make a turn. Flashing a turn signal, but not turning, however, is not a criminal offense under Texas law, so stopping the vehicle was not authorized. The defendant’s subsequent consent to a search of his vehicle was tainted by this unlawful stop and was not valid.

United States v. Adams, 26 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 1994)

The defendant was arrested in the front yard of the house by officers who were prepared to search the house. He was cuffed. Later, the officers searched the defendant’s car when they determined which car was his. This is not a proper Belton search. Clearly, the search was not incident to arrest and the officers did not even know the car belonged to the defendant until after he was arrested and cuffed.

United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1994)

The police had probable cause to believe that the defendant had drugs or paraphernalia in his house and would have drugs in a pickup truck when he drove to work. A search warrant for the house and the pickup was obtained. The police set up surveillance at the defendant’s house; when he left in a car, he was stopped and his car was seized. There was no probable cause to believe that there were any drugs in the car, however, and the search warrant only covered the house and the pickup. Also, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), did not support the seizure of the car. There, the Court held that the occupant of a house could be detained during the execution of a search warrant at the house. Here, however, the defendant was nowhere near his home when he was stopped. The seizure of the car in this case was followed by a dog sniff, which was positive, followed by the execution of another search warrant for the car. Because the dog sniff would not have been possible without the unlawful seizure, the search warrant for the car represented the fruit of the poisonous stop. Finally, even though the car was searched pursuant to a warrant, the officers were not acting in good faith when they unlawfully seized the car and submitted it to a dog sniff. The good faith exception, therefore, did not apply.

United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 1997)

San Francisco’s inventory policy required officers to identify all visible property in an impounded vehicle. The policy did not authorize the opening of closed containers to inventory the contents of containers. Here, the police searched the pants pockets of a pair of jeans found in the back seat and found heroin. This was not a lawful inventory search because there was no authorization in the city policy to search the pockets of clothes found in an impounded vehicle. This was also not a valid search incident to arrest, because the search occurred long after the occupants were arrested and were safely in the police station and the car had been towed. A valid search of an automobile incident to arrest must occur roughly contemporaneously with the arrest.

United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1988)

The defendant was stopped by a police officer who suspected that he was driving with a suspended license. The suspect was placed in the patrol car. Subsequently, the police officer searched the defendant’s car and found various items of contraband. The government contended that this was a lawful arrest and the search of the car was permissible under the search incident to arrest doctrine. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that this was a lawful Terry stop, which does not authorize a search incident to arrest. The search of the automobile was improper and the Motion to Suppress should have been granted.

United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987)

The defendant was arrested, handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. Thirty to forty-five minutes later, the officers executed a search on the car contending that it was “incident to the arrest.” The Ninth Circuit holds that the evidence should have been suppressed. The Court initially concluded that it was not an inventory search because the subjective intent of the officers was to conduct a search for evidence rather than to conduct a search to inventory the contents. The Court further concluded that it was an improper search incident to arrest because of the amount of time which had expired between the arrest and the search, the inaccessibility of the car to the defendant at the time of the search, and because the defendant was handcuffed and removed from the car at the time of the search.

United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993)

When the defendant’s car was pulled over, the officer smelled burnt marijuana. He searched the passenger compartment with the occupant’s consent and found nothing. A search of the trunk was not justified.

United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1992)

Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license. The car was parked in a gas station and the defendant was taken away. The police then inventoried the contents; the officer removed the cover of a speaker in the door panel and located cocaine. This was not a proper search incident to arrest, nor a proper inventory search. It could not be a search incident to arrest, because the defendant had already been taken away in a patrol car. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). This was not a valid inventory search, because searching inside speakers in door panels is not standard police procedure.

United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1988)

An automobile search requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances. In most cases, however, the fact that an automobile is mobile is sufficient to satisfy the exigency requirement. Nevertheless, in cases in which an automobile is parked in a parking lot and is inaccessible, exigent circumstances may possibly not be found. In this case, however, because the automobile belonged to someone other than the defendant and keys were available to the defendant’s brother, exigent circumstances were found to exist.

United States v. McFadden, 722 F.Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1989)

The defendant was arrested several blocks from the location of his parked car. A police officer had previously locked the doors to the defendant’s vehicle prior to pursuing the defendant. The subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement.