Search And Seizure - Arrest Warrants – Arrests in Homes

Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002)

The Supreme Court summarily reversed a Louisiana Supreme Court decision that held that a warrantless entry into a house in order to arrest the occupant was permissible. Pursuant to Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), either a search warrant, or an arrest warrant is required to enter a home to make an arrest, assuming there are no exigent circumstances.

New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990)

The police violated Payton v. New York, by entering the defendant’s apartment and arresting him without a search warrant, or an arrest warrant. While in the apartment, the defendant made an incriminating statement. He was then removed from the apartment and made additional incriminating statements. The Supreme Court holds that the statements made outside the apartment need not be suppressed.

United States v. Nora, 765 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2014)

The police observed the defendant with a gun in his hand on the street and later on his porch. He retreated into his house. The police ordered him to come out of the house. This was improper: the police need a search warrant or an arrest warrant to enter a house or to order someone to exit the house. Possession of a loaded gun is, at most, a misdemeanor in California. The police officer had no basis for believing that the defendant posed a danger, or was committing a felony by possessing the gun.

United States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2013)

The police had reason to believe that the defendant was responsible for a homicide, but did not seek an arrest warrant for strategic reasons (having to do with state law that would prohibit any questioning after the issuance of an arrest warrant). The police went to the defendant’s hotel room and entered the open door. While handing him his pants to get dressed, the police saw a gun in a duffle bag. The Second Circuit held the entry was unlawful. If the police had an arrest warrant, entry into the hotel room may have been permissible, but absent an arrest warrant, entering the room was not permissible and only an arrest in a public place would have been permissible (absent consent to enter). The government also failed in its effort to invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine, because the guns in the duffle bag would not inevitably have been discovered: if the police had waited for the defendant to exit the room, it is certainly possible that he would have left without the guns, been arrested and taken away, in which case the guns would not have been discovered. It is also possible the defendant’s companion might have left the hotel room first, with the guns, and there was no basis to arrest or search her. These contingencies were possible and rendered the inevitable discovery doctrine inapplicable.

United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2011)

The information known to the police was not sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the target of an arrest warrant was present in the residence that they entered. There were also no exigent circumstances to justify the entry into the residence, despite apparent damage to the door frame that the police observed when they arrived.

United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326 (1st Cir. 2011)

The police had a warrant to arrest an individual and had information that the person was seen at a particular residence. The police went there, asked permission to enter (which was denied) and then entered without permission. The target of the warrant was not there, but the defendant was. He was frisked and a gun was found. The First Circuit held that the entry was unlawful, because the information known to the police did not amount to a reasonable belief that the target of the warrant was within. Because the officers entered unlawfully, there was no lawful basis to frisk the defendant and the gun found in his possession should have been suppressed.

United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2008)

The Sixth Circuit considers – but decides not to decide – what the proper standard is for assessing whether the police had sufficient information that the defendant was in the home which they entered with an arrest warrant. Pursuant to Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the police may enter a home with an arrest warrant if they have reason to believe that the suspect is in the home. What does “reason to believe” mean? The Sixth Circuit suggested that the standard probably is “probable cause” as opposed to “reasonable belief,” but ultimately decided in this case that there was insufficient information to support the entry under either standard. There was simply no reliable recent information that suggested that the defendant was then in the apartment that was entered.

United States v. Reeves, 524 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2008)

The police repeatedly knocked on the defendant’s motel room door, after calling him on the phone numerous times. They pounded on the door at least twenty minutes. This amounted to a de facto arrest and because it occurred at the defendant’s motel room, was unconstitutional in the absence of a search warrant. The fact that the officers remained outside is not critical. The defendant had been inside and was clearly under the belief that he was required to come out of the house.

McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007)

Payton requires a search warrant, or an arrest warrant before the police may enter a house to arrest an occupant. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), however, holds that if a defendant is standing in the open doorway, he may be arrested. What if the defendant opens the door in response to police knocking? May he be arrested without a warrant? The Eleventh Circuit holds that an arrest in this situation violates Payton.

United States v. Quaempts, 411 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2005)

If the police want to arrest a person in his home, an arrest warrant or search warrant is needed to enter the home. However, if the defendant opens the door and is standing in the threshold, the police may arrest him. In this case, the defendant lived in a small trailer and opened the door while still on his bed. He was immediately told that he was under arrest. The defendant’s act of opening the door, while still on his bed did not qualify as standing in the threshold and an arrest sans warrant was not valid and any fruit must be suppressed. The fruit of the warrantless arrest in this case was a statement by the defendant.

United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2003)

Generally, in order to arrest someone in his home, the police need a warrant to gain entry. However, in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the Supreme Court held that if the suspect is in the doorway of an open door, the police may arrest him. In this case, the police knocked on the door and the suspect handed a bottle of wine through a whole next to the door. This conduct was not sufficient to invoke Santana and the police could not order him to exit the house without a warrant, or to enter the house without a warrant. The evidence they observed in the house (guns and more liquor) should have been suppressed.

United States v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1998)

Armed with an arrest warrant, the police knocked on the defendant’s motel door and when the defendant answered the door, the police barged in. This was an unlawful entry, because the arrest warrant could have been executed in the doorway without the necessity of entering the premises. Note that the government waived the argument that the entry might have been justified as a permissible protective sweep.

United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991)

Under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the police may not enter a home to make a warrantless arrest; a warrant to arrest is necessary. If, however, the defendant is in the doorway when the police approach and he flees into the house, then the police may follow. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In this case, the defendant claimed that the police entered the house without consent and once inside announced that he was under arrest. He acknowledged that he was in the doorway when the police first arrived, though. The lower court refused to conduct a hearing, holding that this did not violate the Fourth Amendment. If, however, the defendant’s version were correct, this would violate the Fourth Amendment and a remand to develop the record was required.

United States v. Alvarez, 810 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1987)

The agents learned approximately two hours in advance that the defendant was waiting to receive a shipment of cocaine in the hotel room. They made no effort to obtain a telephone arrest warrant. Consequently, their warrantless arrest of the defendant was improper and evidence seized in the hotel room should have been suppressed. An arrest in a non-public place requires a warrant unless exigent circumstances require immediate action, and the situation in this case was not sufficiently exigent to excuse the need for a warrant.

United States v. McIntosh, 857 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1988)

Relying on the decision in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the Eighth Circuit holds that utilizing an arrest warrant to arrest a third party in a defendant’s home was not proper; a search warrant should have been required. Any evidence found during a warrantless search in the defendant’s home while searching for the arrestee must be suppressed. In this case, the defendant was an overnight guest in the house which was being searched for a suspect.

United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1989)

The defendant’s trailer was surrounded by law enforcement agents and he was ordered to exit. After his exit, he was arrested without a warrant. Though his arrest was technically executed in a “public place” (that is, outside his home) a warrant was nevertheless required since he was, in effect, arrested in his home in light of the show of force exhibited by the police officers.