On June 12, 2018, the Supreme Court of Ohio will hear oral argument in the case of State of Ohio v. Edwin A. Vega, 2017-0618. The main issue in the case is whether a police officer may, during a search for raw marijuana after an initial traffic stop, open and search sealed odorless envelopes in the car. Also at issue is whether an unreasonable amount of time passed between the initial traffic stop and an extension of the stop to search for drugs which ultimately resulted in an arrest. Justice DeGenaro recused herself from the case. Sitting for her is Judge Marilyn Zayas of the First District Court of Appeals.
Case Background
On March 28, 2015, Cleveland State University Police Officer Jeffrey Madej pulled over Appellee Edwin Vega, after allegedly witnessing him run a red light. When Officer Madej approached the vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the car. Because of the smell, Officer Madej searched Vega’s car and found a small amount of raw marijuana in the center console, along with three cell phones, cases of rolling papers, several aerosol canisters of odor-masking spray, an open pack of hard candy, and an open box with two sealed envelopes. Vega told Officer Madej that the envelopes contained stickers, but Officer Madej felt the envelopes and said they did not feel like stickers. Vega then refused to give consent to open the envelopes. The initial traffic stop and search lasted 23 minutes.
After the initial search revealed a small amount of marijuana, Officer Madej requested the services of a K-9 unit. However, no unit was available. The resulting delay from the unsuccessful attempt to locate a K-9 unit took an additional 38 minutes. Officer Madej also called his supervisor and the Ohio State Highway Patrol to ask whether he had probable cause to open the envelopes. He was advised that it was okay to open the envelopes.
Later, after 53 minutes into the traffic stop, Officer Madej wrote Vega a ticket for the traffic violation and another for misdemeanor possession of marijuana.
While the tickets were being written, the decision was made to open the envelopes based on the strong odor of marijuana coming from the car. Inside the envelopes were 150 individually packaged Sweet Stone Candies. These hard candies were the same type found in the center console. Officer Madej then realized the candy could contain marijuana and at this point, an hour and twelve minutes into the stop, Officer Madej arrested Vega for drug trafficking. The candies later tested positive for marijuana and Vega was indicted on several drug related offenses.
Vega moved to suppress the 150 individual packages of marijuana candy found in the envelopes. Judge Dick Ambrose of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, granted the motion finding that the marijuana candy was discovered during an unconstitutional search and detention. The state appealed.
The Appeal
In a split decision authored by Judge Patricia Ann Blackmon, in which Judge Mary Eileen Kilbane concurred, the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the order granting the motion to suppress. The appeals court held that while Officer Madej did have probable cause to search the car based on the odor of marijuana, he did not have probable cause to search the envelopes because he did not believe them to contain the object of his search, raw marijuana, and because he did not detect the odor of marijuana coming from them. The appeals court also held that an unreasonable amount of time passed between the initial traffic stop and the arrest.
Judge Melody J. Stewart dissented on the grounds that even though the envelopes did not smell like marijuana, they could still have reasonably concealed the marijuana. Therefore, Judge Stewart found there was probable cause to open the envelopes. Judge Stewart also found that the amount of time that passed was reasonable and any delay in obtaining the services of a drug-sniffing dog was irrelevant.
The State brought this jurisdictional appeal.
Votes to Accept the Case*
Yes: Justices O’Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWine
No: Chief Justice O’Connor
*Then-Justice O’Neill not participating
Key Statutes and Precedent
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“The right of the people to be secure…against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…”)
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution (“The right of the people to be secure…against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated…”)
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (Established the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on warrantless searches. Under this exception, an automobile may be searched without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has reasonable or probable cause.)
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (“When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers […] to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one.”)
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”)
State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10 (“The smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.”)
State v. Gonzales, 2009-Ohio-168 (6th Dist.) (“Compartments and packages within a vehicle which could contain the illicit object for which the police have probable cause to believe exist may be searched.”)
State v. Miller, 2011-Ohio-3600 (10th Dist.) (“A police officer may stop and detain someone for a minor misdemeanor offense, but the officer is not allowed to arrest that person and conduct a search incident to that arrest.”)
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (Absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures.)
State v. Taylor, 2015-Ohio-3252 (10th Dist.) (The smell of marijuana establishes probable cause to search a vehicle including every part of the car that may conceal the object of the search.)
State’s Argument
The search in this case was justified under the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement. This includes containers and packages within the car.
Officer Madej was justified in opening the sealed envelopes because the strong smell of marijuana coming from Vega’s vehicle gave him probable cause to search the entire car. This probable cause extended to the sealed envelopes because they could conceal the object of the search, marijuana. For these reasons, the Eighth District’s decision should be reversed.
The Eighth District’s decision found that Officer Madej did not have probable cause to open the envelopes because they did not smell like marijuana. However, this finding was in error because it is inconsistent with Houghton. Under Houghton, an officer does not need an individualized showing of probable cause to search each container in a car. Yet, finding that there was not probable cause to search the envelopes due to their lack of smell is tantamount to requiring an individualized showing of probable cause for each container.
Even though Officer Madej did not smell marijuana coming from the envelopes, “[s]mell is not the sine qua non of a drug search supported by probable cause.” Although Officer Madej did not smell marijuana coming from the envelopes, he still had probable cause to search the envelopes based on the totality of the circumstances which included his observation of the strong smell compared to the small amounts of marijuana found, the feel of the envelopes that did not match Vega’s description of the contents, the 3 cell phones, the odor masking sprays, and other indicators of narcotics.
Finally, the length of time that passed from the initial traffic stop was reasonable. Rodriguez does not prohibit the extension of traffic stops as a bright line rule, but instead contemplates that reasonable suspicion could justify an extension. The totality of the circumstances of what Officer Madej observed in the vehicle during his initial search gave him reasonable suspicion and thus justified the extension of the traffic stop.
Rodriguez does not require an officer to complete the investigation for the unrelated offense in the same amount of time as to issue the initial traffic citation. Therefore, Officer Madej did not have to complete his search for raw marijuana in the same time that he had to issue the violation for running the red light. Thus, the amount of time that passed was reasonable.
Vega’s Argument
Officer Madej did not have probable cause to search the envelopes in Vega’s car because the envelopes were odorless. Being odorless, they could not have concealed the source of the strong odor of marijuana which is what Officer Madej was looking for. Furthermore, Vega’s detention after the initial search was unconstitutional. For these reasons the search was unlawful and any evidence it uncovered must be suppressed. Therefore, the Eighth District’s decision should be affirmed.
The State is correct that under Ross probable cause to search a car extends to the containers in the car. However, the extension of probable cause is limited to containers that may reasonably conceal the object of the search. This is an important limitation from Ross that the State has failed to recognize. This limitation is not the equivalent of a required individualized showing of probable cause. Instead, it simply requires that the packages be capable of concealing the object of the search. The envelopes in Vega’s car did not meet that requirement because the object of the search was the source of the strong odor of raw marijuana and the envelopes did not smell of marijuana.
In Ross, Justice Stevens explained that probable cause to search a van for undocumented aliens does not extend to a suitcase in the van because a human could not fit in a suitcase. Vega’s case presents an analogous situation to Justice Stevens’s example. An envelope that does not smell of marijuana cannot conceal the source of the strong smell of marijuana. Therefore, Officer Madej did not have probable cause to search the envelopes. Because he did not have probable cause to search the envelopes, the evidence found inside must be suppressed.
Not only did Officer Madej not have probable cause to search the envelopes, he was not justified in extending the traffic stop after the initial search. Under Rodriguez, a traffic stop can only be extended based upon the observance of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity not related to the initial stop. However, here the envelopes did not smell of marijuana and exhibited no other signs of criminality. Therefore, there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would justify the extension of the stop.
After the initial search only turned up a misdemeanor amount of marijuana and did not uncover any other containers that could reasonably conceal the source of the odor, Officer Madej should have issued Vega his citations and let him go. Instead he detained him for an additional 38 minutes. This additional 38 minutes was an unconstitutional detention. Because Officer Madej discovered the marijuana candy after the impermissible detention, this evidence must be suppressed.
State’s Proposed Proposition of Law
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when police extend a traffic stop based on probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband. Officers may extend the traffic stop and detain the driver for as long as necessary to reasonably complete the search of the vehicle and its packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015) and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982) explained.
Student Contributor: Ivy Charneski