N.D.Ala.: Pretrial detainee can’t sue over false arrest yet

Defendant was pretrial detainee suing over his arrest. At this stage, the § 1983 suit should be dismissed without prejudice because it might implicate whether he was wrongfully charged in the first place and thus violate Heck. Ferguson v. Alabama, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171183 (N.D.Ala. Nov. 12, 2015), adopted 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170921 (N.D.Ala. Dec. 22, 2015):

To the extent the plaintiff is seeking to recover monetary damages of $40,000,000.00 for a Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim, such a claim is cognizable in a § 1983 action. See, e.g., Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996) (“A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and forms a basis of a section 1983 claim.”). However, this claim cannot be pursued while the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee. Rather, such a § 1983 claim does not accrue until that invalidity of the plaintiff’s detention is proven. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). The bar under Heck applies to suits filed by pretrial detainees. Mallery v. McLeod, 2012 WL 2378140, at *3-4 (N.D.Fla. 2012) (citing Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2004); Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108 (3d. Cir. 1996)).

In short, a claim for monetary damages that challenges the plaintiff’s detention, under the facts of this case, is not cognizable under Heck. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, Fourth Amendment claims sometimes can be brought without proof that the underlying conviction has been called into question. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Because an illegal search or arrest may be followed by a valid conviction, … a successful § 1983 action for Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations does not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction. As a result, Heck does not generally bar such claims.”). However, Heck does preclude those claims that “if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction because they would negate an element of the offense.” Id. at 1160 n. 2. In order to determine whether such a negation would occur, the undersigned must look at both “the claims raised under § 1983″ and “the specific offenses for which the § 1983 claimant was convicted.” Id. See also McDowell Bey v. Vega, 588 Fed.App’x 923, 926 (11th Cir. 2014). Here, the traffic stop resulted in the drug trafficking and other charges. If this court found the stop to be improper, all “fruits of the poisonous tree” would similarly be improper, and hence the state court proceedings would be wholly undermined. See Cano-Diaz v. City of Leeds, Ala., 882 F.Supp. 1280, 1288-1289 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (“if Cano-Diaz were to prevail on her claim that she was pulled over and detained without the requisite probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would apply to invalidate or expunge the second offense she was charged with ….”).