Legal Ethics 2.0: Massachusetts Makes Changes To Its Rules Of Professional Conduct – Communications With Jurors

Following the 2012 and 2013 American Bar Association’s amendments to its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, many jurisdictions began to reexamine their own rules. Massachusetts followed suit, and on July 1, 2015, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) adopted several revisions to the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct (Mass. R. Prof. C.) recommended by its Standing Advisory Committee. This blog post will be the first in a series designed to inform practitioners of several important changes to the Massachusetts rules.

Communicating with Jurors

Last summer then Governor Patrick signed into Massachusetts law House Bill 4123 which made two significant changes to Massachusetts Superior Court procedure involving trials. The first allowed Plaintiffs’ counsel to request a specific dollar amount as damages; the second allowed for questioning of prospective jurors (voir dire). This summer, the SJC made a significant change to the Massachusetts Rules relating to communications with jurors after they render their verdicts by amending Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 to largely conform to ABA Model Rule 3.5.

The former Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5, articulated in Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192 (1979) and reaffirmed in Commonwealth v. Solis, 407 Mass. 398 (1990), prohibited lawyer-initiated, post-verdict juror contact unless authorized by court order for good cause shown. Although the Standing Committee noted that “good cause” was a relatively low threshold, it remained concerned that a complete prohibition of non-judicially approved lawyer-initiated communications with jurors after a verdict may violate the First Amendment and prevent lawyers from receiving useful feedback.

As such, the SJC followed the Standing Committee’s recommendation and revised Mass. R. Prof. C. Rule 3.5 to largely follow the corresponding Model Rule. Under the new Rule 3.5, attorneys may communicate with jurors post-verdict unless: (i) the communication is prohibited by law or court order; (ii) the juror has made known to the lawyer, directly or indirectly, a desire not to communicate with the lawyer; or (iii) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.

Clearly, the Standing Committee’s desire for clarity of the rules and concerns over potential First Amendment issues were strong, and unlike several other revision recommendations, unanimously recommended this significant alteration to the rules. In effectively abrogating Solis and Fidler, the SJC agreed, and appeared to have little concern regarding the impact the new rules may have on jurors’ willingness to serve or the potential for improper challenges to their verdict.

For more information on the revised rules visit:

http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/rules/a-sjc-order-rules-of-professional-conduct-adopted-march-2015.pdf