Jury Instructions - Knowledge

United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)

The United States Supreme Court held that the statute outlawing the interstate transportation of obscene material depicting minors, 18 U.S.C. §2252, has an implicit requirement that the offender know that the actor depicted is a minor.

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994)

The National Firearm Act outlaws the possession of a machine gun. There is no explicit scienter requirement in the Act. The Supreme Court holds that there is an implicit knowledge requirement. Thus, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the weapon he possessed had automatic firing capability.

McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015)

In a normal prosecution for possession, possessing with intent to distribute, or distributing a controlled substance, the government can satisfy the element of “knowledge” in one of two ways: (1) the defendant knew that he was possessing/distributing a controlled substance (though not necessarily which one – he or she did know however, that the object possessed was a controlled substance); or (2) the defendant knew that he or she was in possession of a particular substance (e.g., heroin, marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine) which is, in fact, a controlled substance, even if the defendant did not know that the particular substance that he knew he was possessing was in fact a controlled substance. In other words, the defendant must either know that the substance possessed was some kind of controlled substance (though not necessarily which one) or that the substance was a particular substance, even if he did not know that that substance was a controlled substance. In a case involving an Analogue Drug, the same rule applies: the defendant must either be shown to know that the substance possessed was a particular substance that he knew to be an analogue, or he must be shown to have known that he possessed a particular substance which is, in fact, a qualifying analogue.

United States v. Tang Nguyen, 758 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2014)

The defendant was charged with conspiracy to fraudulently import contraband cigarettes. The Eighth Circuit held that although this is a general intent crime, the government is still required to prove “knowledge” that the defendant was transacting in contraband cigarettes. She undeniably knew that she was receiving cigarettes from overseas, but there was insufficient proof that she knew that they were contraband. A knowingly violation of the law requires proof that the defendant knew the essential facts, even if she did not know the law regarding contraband cigarettes.

United States v. Horse, 747 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 2014)

The defendant was charged with criminal sexual conduct (rape), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2), by having sex with the victim who lacked the capacity to consent. The issue addressed by the Eighth Circuit was whether the government must prove that the defendant knew that the victim lacked capacity to consent. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the defendant must, indeed, have known that the victim lacked the capacity to consent and the failure to instruct the jury on this point was plain error.

United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2013)

In a criminal copyright prosecution, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), the term “willfully” requires proof that the defendant intended to violate a criminal law, not just that he or she intended to make a copy of a copyrighted work. In a case involving counterfeit labels, the term “knowingly” requires proof that the defendant knew that the labels were counterfeit, not just that he knew that he was trafficking in labels that happen to turn out to be counterfeit.

United States v. Rouillard, 701 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2012)

It is a federal crime to have sex with a person who lacks the capacity to consent (e.g., because of intoxication) if the offense occurs on federal property. 18 U.S.C. § 2242. Does the defendant have to be shown to know the victim lacked consent? In this case, the Eighth Circuit held that knowledge of the victim’s lack of capacity is an element of the offense. Because sexual conduct is not inherently illegal, knowledge of the fact that makes the conduct illegal must be an element of the offense that must be proven by the government. REHEARING EN BANC GRANTED ON MARCH 3, 2013. See 740 F.3d 1170 (8th Cir 2014) (affirming the panel decision) and United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013).

United States v. Munguia, 704 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2012)

The defendant was charged with possessing pseudoephedrine knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it would be used to manufacture meth. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). The Ninth Circuit holds that “reasonable cause to believe” is to be applied in a subjective, not an objective, manner. Thus, the question is whether this defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the listed chemical was destined to be used to manufacture meth, not whether a reasonable person would have cause to believe this.

United States v. Huping Zhou, 678 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2012)

The defendant accessed personal patient records in violation of HIPAA. The question posed to the Ninth Circuit is whether the government was required to prove that the defendant knew that this was a crime. The statute provides that “A person who knowingly and in violation of this part – (2) obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an individual . . . shall be punished.” The Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant must be shown to know what he was doing, but not that what he was doing was a violation of the statute.

United States v. Chappell, 665 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2012)

When the defendant committed his prostitution offense, the law required proof that the defendant “knew” that the prostitute was younger than 18. Prior to trial, however, the law was amended to provide that the offense was committed if the defendant “knew, or acted in reckless disregard of the fact that the person was younger than 18.” The trial court instructed the jury under the new standard, even though that was not the law when the crime was committed. This was plain error.

United States v. Shim, 584 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2009)

In a Mann Act prosecution, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, the government must prove that the defendant knew that the woman was transported in interstate commerce. It is not sufficient to only prove that the defendant knowingly transported the woman.

United States v. Fields, 500 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2007)

The Child Support Recovery Act (18 U.S.C. § 228) requires proof that the defendant willfully failed to pay a past due support obligation to his child who resided in another state. Is the state required to prove that the defendant knew that his child resided in another state? According to this decision, the answer is “yes.” Though the “out of state” requirement is also a federal jurisdictional element of the offense, the court concludes that defendant’s knowledge of the location of the child is also an element of the offense that the government must prove.

United States v. Cacioppo, 460 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2006)

The defendants were prosecuted for making a false statement in connection with ERISA reports, 18 U.S.C. §1027. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury that a conviction could be predicated on a finding that the defendant recklessly disregarded whether his statement was false, or not. The statute requires proof of “knowing” false statements and reckless disregard for the truthfulness of a statement is not the same as knowing that a statement is false.

United States v. Murphy, 406 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005)

Two defendants were charged with threatening and beating up a government witness. Both defendants participated in the beating. However, one of the defendants was not shown to have known that the victim was being beaten because she was a witness. While she was guilty of assaulting the victim, she was not guilty of obstructing justice because of the absence of proof that she knew the reason for the assault.

United States v. Valencia, 394 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2004)

The Commodities Exchange Act makes it a crime to knowingly deliver or cause to be delivered false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports. Does this mean that a person can be found guilty if he (1) knowingly delivers; (2) a false report that he does not know is false? The Fifth Circuit held that pursuant to United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), the law would be interpreted to mean that the “knowledge” requirement applies not only to the delivery, but also to the falsity of the report.

United States v. Hussein, 351 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003)

Claiming that it is an issue of first impression, the First Circuit holds that it is no defense to a § 841 charge that the defendant did not know the type, or quantity of drugs that he possessed. In this case, the defendant acknowledged that he possessed a controlled substance knowingly, but claimed he did not know what type of drug, or the quantity. The First Circuit held that even post-Apprendi, this is not a defense.

United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607 (4th Cir. 1997)

The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the defendant, charged with possessing an unregistered firearm, had to be shown to have known the characteristics of his sawed-off shotgun that made it a firearm subject to the requirements of the Firearm Act. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). The failure to instruct the jury consistent with Staples, however, was not plain error.

United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997)

In order to prove a violation of the Clean Water Act, the government must prove that the defendant had knowledge of each of the facts -- the elements of the offense -- that constitute the crime, though the defendant need not be shown to have knowledge of the illegality of his conduct. Thus, the defendant must know that he was discharging a substance; must know the identity of the substance he was discharging; must know the instrumentality or method by which the pollutants were discharged; must know the physical characteristics of the property into which the pollutant was discharged that identify it as a wetland; must know the link between the wetlands and waters of the United States; and must know that he did not have a permit. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove the defendant's knowledge with regard to each element of the offense.

United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1998)

The defendant corporation was charged with violating OSHA laws, because a fire escape was in an unsafe condition, resulting in the death of an employee. The statute, 29 U.S.C. § 666, requires that the violation be willful before certain criminal penalties can be imposed. The judge instructed the jury that "willful" in this context means that the corporation either knew of the unsafe condition of the fire escape, or "should have known" of the hazardous condition. This was reversible error. "Should have known" is a civil negligence standard. In order to have knowledge, the corporation must have had actual knowledge, or remained deliberately ignorant of the unsafe condition.

United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991)

The trial court improperly instructed the jury that a corporate officer could be guilty of violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act either by having actual knowledge of the violation or by proof that the defendant is the responsible corporate officer who had direct responsibility for the activities that are alleged to be illegal. The judge also cautioned the jury that the proof must show that the defendant must have known or believed that the illegal activity of the type alleged occurred. While knowledge may be inferred from various circumstances, including the defendant’s position and responsibility – and while willful blindness may suffice in certain circumstances – the instruction in this case allowed the government to establish knowledge simply by proving that the defendant occupied a certain position and knew of prior violations. This was reversible error.

United States v. Hastings, 918 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1990)

After being asked by jurors to elaborate on the difference between “possession” and “knowing possession” in connection with a firearm offense, the trial judge’s incomplete charge could have left the jury with the belief that a finding of knowledge was not necessary in order to convict the defendant.

United States v. Cedelle, 89 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1996)

As explained by the Supreme Court in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 464 (1994), in a prosecution for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §2252(a)(2), the government must prove not only that the defendant knew he was in possession of a videotape, but also that he knew the participants were children and that they were engaged in explicit sexual activity. The trial court erred in its instruction to the jury in this case, but the error did not amount to plain error necessitating a reversal because the defendant expressly ordered child pornography from the undercover agents.

United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996)

The defendant was charged with a violation of 33 U.S.C. §1319(c)(2)(A), the Clean Water Act. The Act makes it a crime to knowingly discharge a pollutant into a navigable water. The question in this case was what the defendant had to “know?” The Fifth Circuit concluded that the government had to prove that the defendant knew (1) that he discharged; (2) a pollutant; (3) into a navigable water of the U.S. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the knowledge requirement only applied to the element that there was a discharge. Thus, in this case, the defendant should have been able to argue that he thought he was discharging water (as opposed to a pollutant) into the navigable waters.

United States v. Burian, 19 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1994)

The federal statute criminalizing the knowing receipt of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct has an implicit knowledge requirement that the defendant be aware (or be recklessly disregarding) the age of the performer.

United States v. Hooker, 997 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1993)

18 U.S.C. §922(k) outlaws the knowing transportation of firearms with altered serial numbers. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the knowledge element of the offense includes actual knowledge that the firearm had an altered serial number, not just knowledge of the interstate transportation.

United States v. Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1993)

Though the statute is silent on the mens rea element of the offense, the crime of carrying a weapon on an aircraft requires that the defendant know that he is carrying a gun, or at least that he should have known. The government urged a strict liability theory. Absent a clear indication from Congress that this was to be a strict liability offense, however, the court concluded that the minimum level of scienter – “should have known” – applies.

United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994)

Certain provisions of the Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. §924) require that the defendant act knowingly; other provisions require that the defendant act willfully. The difference is this: to act knowingly is to act with knowledge of what one is doing, that is, to act with the intent to do the act that is proscribed by the law. To act willfully requires that the defendant act with knowledge of what the law proscribes and to act in violation of the law, knowing that he is doing so. In short, willfully requires knowledge of what the law is; to act knowingly does not require knowledge of the law.

United States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 1995)

8 U.S.C. §1324(a) makes it an offense to bring any alien into the United States other than through a port of entry. The statute contains no explicit mens rea requirement. Nevertheless, the court concluded that Congress intended such a requirement. See Staples v. UnitedStates, 114 S.Ct. 1793 (1994); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The government must prove that the defendant knew that the individuals he was transporting were aliens and that he off-loaded them at other than a port of entry, intending to violate the law.

United States v. Stein, 37 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994)

In its money laundering instruction, the trial court correctly informed the jury that the defendant must have knowledge that the money engaged in the transaction was derived from a specified felony. In a later general charge to the jury, the judge explained that, “An act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and doesn’t act through ignorance, mistake or accident. The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that his acts or omissions were unlawful.” This latter instruction conflicted with the former instruction and therefore tainted the money laundering conviction. Where the jury is offered inconsistent instructions, one right and the other wrong, the jury cannot be presumed to have followed the correct instruction.

United States v. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1992)

A trial court should not give an instruction to the jury to the effect that an inference can be drawn that the driver of a vehicle knows of the existence of any contraband in the vehicle. In effect, this instruction could lead the jury to ignore other relevant facts and make a decision based solely on the facts giving rise to the inference.