Insanity

Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994)

It is not necessary to inform the jury about the consequences of their verdict, if the verdict is not guilty by reason of insanity. The rule might be otherwise if some type of misstatement of the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict is made in the presence of the jury – for example, by a witness, or the prosecutor.

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)

A statute which permits an insanity acquitee to be committed to an institution, though he no longer suffers from any mental illness, until he can prove that he is not dangerous to himself or others violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Once the defendant has recovered his sanity, he cannot be committed to a psychiatric facility. Prior precedent, including Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), permitted the continued commitment of the defendant, but only as long as he remained mentally ill.

United States v. Christian, 749 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2014)

Prior to a related state court trial, the defendant was examined by a doctor who was asked to assess the defendant’s competence to stand trial and the doctor concluded that the defendant was not competent. In the defendant’s federal criminal trial, he sought to call the same doctor to testify about the defendant’s defense of diminished capacity. The doctor testified that his competence examination was sufficient to support his conclusion about the defendant’s diminished capacity, but the trial judge held that the two standards are different and therefore, having only evaluated the defendant for purposes of determining his competence, the expert could not offer any opinion about diminished capacity. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The doctor should have been permitted to testify and explain why his examination was sufficient to enable him to formulate an opinion on the subject of the defendant’s diminished capacity.

United States v. Goodman, 633 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2011)

The defendant relied on the insanity defense in this armed robbery case. The trial court barred the defense from introducing evidence of his combat experiences and his mental health around the time of his army experience. He had received extensive treatment for mental illness after returning from Iraq and clearly suffered from mental illness as a result of his combat experience. Limiting the “lay” witness testimony to his behavior at the time immediately surrounding the time of the robberies was reversible error. The defendant’s mental health a few years prior to the armed robberies was not irrelevant to his insanity defense. In addition, the trial court erred in barring the defense to offer lay “opinion” testimony about the defendant’s mental condition. Rule 704(a) specifically allows testimony in the form of an opinion that embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Rule 704(b), however, provides an exception for experts, who are not permitted to offer opinions as to the state of mind of a criminal defendant if that mental state is an element of the crime of which the defendant is accused.

Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2010)

Trial counsel ineffectively developed the insanity defense evidence that was available in defense of the defendant who was charged with murder. The defendant was apparently operating under a delusional compulsion that required him to commit the crime. His delusion led him to believe that what he was doing was morally proper, even if it might have been a crime.

United States v. Long, 562 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009)

The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the insanity defense. Expert testimony established that he suffered from schizotypal personality disorder that at times resultd in the defendant losing contact with reality.

Perez v. Cain, 529 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2008)

The evidence at the state trial demonstrated that the defendant was insane and the state courts unreasonably applied Constitutional standards regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.

United States v. Allen, 449 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2006)

Insanity is a viable defense to a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, even though the offense is a general intent crime.

United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005)

When the defendant raises the defense of insanity, in order for the jury to return a guilty verdict, not only must the jury unanimously find the defendant guilty; the jury must also unanimously reject the insanity defense. This applies to all affirmative defenses.

United States v. Rinaldi, 351 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2003)

Between the time the defendant entered his plea and the scheduled sentencing date, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that he suffered from A.D.D. The trial court ordered that the defendant be committed for a 45-day evaluation. The Seventh Circuit held that the provisions of Fed.R.Crim.P. Rule 12.2 do not apply, because the defendant was relying on a defense of insanity: his claim related only to his intent to present a diminished capacity defense (lack of capacity to form specific intent).

United States v. Baker, 155 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1998)

The defendant was found not guilty only by reason of insanity. Before he was committed, another evaluation was performed and the district court determined that he was not in need of commitment, but imposed conditions on his release. This is not permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 4242. Conditions for release may only be imposed after someone has already been committed, not in lieu of commitment. Remand was appropriate to allow the district court to decide whether release was appropriate, given the fact that conditions could not be imposed.

Huminak v. Beyer, 871 F.2d 432 (3rd Cir. 1989)

The defendant based his defense in this murder prosecution on diminished capacity. It violated due process for the trial court to instruct the jury that the burden of proving diminished capacity is on the defendant. Because the diminished capacity defense seeks to negate the existence of the requisite intent to commit the crime, the burden cannot be placed on the defendant to establish this defense. Rather, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite intent.

In re Newchurch, 807 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1986)

It is improper to commit a defendant to a penal institution for mental examination without a finding that such commitment is necessary to enable the government to prepare for trial. In this case, the defendant notified the government that he planned to plead that he was insane at the time of the charged offense but was presently mentally competent.

United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (5th Cir. 1986)

The Fifth Circuit approves the various provisions of 18 U.S.C. §20 which places the burden on establishing insanity on the defendant, precludes expert testimony on the ultimate issue of insanity, and permits a conviction despite a defendant’s inability to conform his actions to the requirements of the law.

Sulie v. Duckworth, 864 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1988)

The defendant’s post-Miranda silence should not have been used against him to establish his sanity in a state criminal case. Though it was error, it was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s sanity and guilt.

United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988)

The Insanity Defense Reform Act provides that it is an affirmative defense that an accused was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts as a result of a severe mental disease or defect and that “mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.” This provision does not apply to a defense based on the inability to form the specific intent to commit the crime. Psychiatric evidence of a defendant’s inability to form the specific intent is admissible and not barred by 18 U.S.C. §17(a), or Fed.R.Evid. 704(b) which prohibit a psychiatric expert testifying about the mental condition of a defendant with regard to the “ultimate issue” of the accused’s capacity to form the requisite intent.

United States v. Samuels, 801 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1986)

The evidence in this case was insufficient to establish that the defendant was sane at the time that he wrote a letter to the President threatening to kill him. The defendant introduced evidence that at the time he mailed the letter, he was in a mental health clinic experiencing acute exacerbation of chronic, psychotic process. The government’s evidence was based on evidence not relating to the defendant’s condition at the time of the offense.

United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988)

The Insanity Defense Reform Act did not eliminate the defense based on diminished capacity. The court concludes that Congress was concerned with a defendant’s ability to excuse guilt, as opposed to disproving guilt. The insanity defense excused guilt while the inability to form the specific intent constitutes a denial of guilt.

United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1993)

An insanity instruction should be given when a defendant offers proof of multiple personality disorder. The inquiry focuses on the host personality, not just the acting personality. If the host personality was not aware of the offense when it was being committed, an insanity instruction would be appropriate. The trial court focused exclusively on the acting personality – the personality in control at the time of the offense.

United States v. Westcott, 83 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1996)

The Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §17 does not bar the defense from introducing evidence of a defendant’s mental disease or defect in contexts other than reliance on the insanity defense. If the defendant claims that he lacked the mens rea element of the offense (as opposed to lacking the capacity to form the mens rea element), he may offer expert psychiatric evidence.

United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1990)

The Court of Appeals holds that the District Court abused its discretion in prohibiting the defendant from raising an insanity defense on the grounds of the defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 12.2(a). That Rule requires a defendant to give notice of an intent to raise an insanity defense. The defendant filed a notice entitled “Notice of Intent to Rely Upon Expert Testimony of Defendant’s Mental Condition.” In response, the government filed various motions relating to the insanity defense including a request that the defendant be examined at the federal prisoner’s medical center. The defendant also filed a Motion in Limine requesting a ruling on whether she would be permitted to introduce evidence not only of insanity, but also her diminished capacity. The government sought to bar evidence of the insanity defense because of the defendant’s failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 12.2(a). The trial court granted the motion. The Eleventh Circuit reverses: This amounted to an abuse of the trial court’s discretion; the government was clearly aware of the intention of the defendant to raise the defense and the government was not prejudiced. The court also reviewed the admissibility of evidence relating to the diminished capacity defense. The court concludes that Congress meant to eliminate any form of legal excuse based upon one’s lack of volitional control. This includes a diminished ability or failure to reflect adequately upon the consequences or nature of one’s actions. Thus, “diminished capacity” is not a defense. However, there is a distinction between evidence of psychological impairment that supports an “affirmative defense” and psychological evidence that negates an element of the offense charged. Psychological evidence that aids the trier in determining the defendant’s specific state of mind with regard to the actions she took at the time the charged offense was committed is not an affirmative defense but is evidence that goes specifically to whether the prosecution has carried its burden of proving each essential element of the crime, at least when specific intent is at issue. Psychiatric evidence is admissible to negate specific intent to commit the crime. This is not to say that evidence which demonstrates an incapacity to reflect or control the behavior that produces the criminal conduct is admissible. Rather, such evidence must focus on the defendant’s specific state of mind at the time of the charged offense. The trial court did not err in excluding the evidence in this case because the defendant failed to establish that the evidence would be admissible under these standards.

United States v. Owens, 854 F.2d 432 (11th Cir. 1988)

Insanity as an affirmative defense applies to charges of possession of a firearm in violation of federal law.

Bailey v. Spears, 847 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1988)

A habeas petitioner alleged sufficient facts to raise questions about his sanity at the time of the offense, and his competence to stand trial, requiring a remand for the taking of additional evidence.

United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C.Cir. 1991)

The defendant was found competent to stand trial, but had a viable insanity defense. However, he refused to enter a not guilty by reason of insanity plea. Reversing prior precedent, the D.C. Circuit concludes that if a defendant is competent to stand trial, he has the right to waive the insanity defense and the trial court is not obligated to instruct the jury on that defense.