Illinois Supreme Court: Medical Malpractice Caps Unconstitutional

Yesterday the Illinois Supreme Court issued an opinion in which they rejected statutory caps on non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions as unconstitutional under the state’s constitution. This isn’t entirely surprising as the Illinois Supreme Court had previously held in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997) that Section 2-115.1 which provided for caps on non-economic damages in all cases were unconstitutional as they violated the special legislation clause which was intended “to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis.” In Best, the court also noted that although the legislature may limit certain types of damages, such as damages recoverable in statutory causes of action, the limitation on damages in section 2–1115.1 violated the separation of powers clause.

Following its holding in Best, the Illinois high court found that the caps in the medical malpractice statute was an unconstitutional legislative remittitur that violates separation of powers. According the court, under the statute the trial court is “required to override the jury’s deliberative process and reduce any non-economic damages in excess of the statutory cap, irrespective of the particular facts and circumstances, and without the plaintiff’s consent. Section 2–1706.5 thus violates the separation of powers clause because it ‘unduly encroaches upon the fundamentally judicial prerogative of determining whether a jury’s assessment of damages is excessive within the meaning of the law.’ Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 414. Section 2–1706.5, like section 2–1115.1, effects an unconstitutional legislative remittitur.”

The Court continued that “[t]he separation of powers clause prohibits one branch of government from exercising “powers properly belonging to another.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1. Thus, the inquiry under the separation of powers clause is not whether the damages cap is rationally related to a legitimate government interest but, rather, whether the legislature, through its adoption of the damages cap, is exercising powers properly belonging to the judiciary. In other words, does the statute unduly encroach on the judiciary’s ‘sphere of authority’….”