Hobbs Act

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003)

One of the predicate acts in this civil RICO case was a Hobbs Act violation. The plaintiffs claimed that abortion protesters were engaged in Hobbs Act extortion. The Supreme Court held that the conduct in which the protesters engaged did not amount to extortion, because they were not attempting to obtain “property” from the targets of the protests.

Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)

In order to make out a Hobbs Act violation under the “color of official right” prong, there is no need to prove that any force or threat of force was used. Nor need the defendant make a demand for payment. In short, the passive receipt of a bribe is sufficient.

McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991)

In order for a campaign contribution to amount to a violation of the Hobbs Act, there must be proof of an explicit quid pro quo.

United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56 (3rd Cir. 2011)

A non-incumbent candidate for office who extorts money, but then loses the election, may not be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act. Only a public official can be prosecuted for extortion “under color of official right.” This principle applies, regardless of whether the charge is attempted extortion, or some other inchoate offense.

United States v. Dean, 629 F.3d 257 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

The defendant received license fees from people in D.C. She told some of the applicants that they had to pay certain license fees in cash, which she then pocketed. The citizens were not aware of her theft. This does not constitute bribery under § 201, because there was no quid pro quo. This did not amount to a Hobbs Act violation for the same reason. Clearly, she had committed a theft, but the citizen who paid the money was never told that the money had to be paid to her personally for some reason other than to have the license issued in exchange for the proper amount of the fee. In fact, the citizens had no idea that she was pocketing the money.

United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673 (2d Cir. 2010)

A Hobbs Act prosecution requires proof that the offense affected interstate commerce. Even in a robbery involving drugs, the government is required to prove that the offense affected interstate commerce. Because this is an essential element of the offense, the jury must be instructed that they must find that the robbery affected interstate commerce and the failure to do so is reversible error. See United States v. Parkes, infra.

United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2009)

The Ninth Circuit affirms the defendant’s Hobbs Act and Honest Services Mail Fraud convictions, concluding that the court properly explained to the jury that the government was required to prove that there was a quid pro quo arrangement between the unlawful payment and an official act, even though the words “quid pro quo” were not used. The court noted that the quid quo pro requirement must be proven in the Hobbs Act context whether the payment is made in the context of a campaign contribution, or not. In the context of an Honest Services Mail Fraud prosecution of a public official, a specific quid pro quois not required if the theory is an undisclosed conflict of interest, but a quid quo pro, at least an implicit quid pro quo, is required in an honest service “bribe” case. Portions of this case did not survive Skilling and Weyhrauch.

United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2009)

Two separate Hobbs Act convictions were reversed in this case. In one count, the defendant, a lobbyist for a company that was attempting to win a county contract, threatened a competing company if it did not withdraw its bid. He followed through on his threat, by encouraging a county supervisor to pass a resolution condemning the other company’s performance in another project. This conduct did not deprive the competing company of property under the Sheidler standard. The second Hobbs Act conviction was spoiled, because even though it involved the lobbyist’s effort to obtain money from a contractor in exchange for securing a favorable vote by a public official, the lobbyist himself was not a public official and the jury was not instructed that he must, in fact, have been acting on behalf of a public official in order to violate the Hobbs Act “under color of official right” offense.

United States v. Gray, 521 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2008)

The defendant was charged in a RICO indictment with various offenses, including paying bribes to public officials to ensure that the defendant’s clients were offered lucrative municipal contracts. As in Brock, discussed below, the court held that the bribe-payor (i.e., the person paying the public official) may not be convicted of a Hobbs Act offense unless that payor induces someone else to part with money or property. With regard to certain counts, Brock required reversal of the convictions (and predicate RICO offenses). With other counts, however, the government did offer evidence that the defendant induced other people to part with their property to pay the public official.

United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007)

If a person pays a bribe to a public official for some quid pro quo, the bribe-payor may not be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act on an “official right” extortion theory, because the bribe-payor is the person who was extorted, not a co-conspirator. The crime requires proof that the defendant obtained property “from another” which cannot be the defendant, himself.

United States v. Mann, 493 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2007)

The defendant was convicted of various offenses, including mail fraud, wire fraud, and Hobbs Act, based on stealing motorists’ speeding ticket money. Because the government failed to prove that some of the motorists were traveling interstate, those counts had to be dismissed because of the failure to prove a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2007)

Proof that a defendant’s robbery was designed to obtain illegal drugs – marijuana – is not alone sufficient to establish that the crime involved an effect on interstate commerce. The government must introduce evidence that the marijuana was, or was at least likely, to have traveled in interstate commerce. (The government satisfied its burden in this case).

United States v. Zhou, 428 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2005)

In order to be guilty of the crime of extortion under the Hobbs Act, the defendant must obtain the property of another with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence of fear. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). The victim must be shown to have parted with the property as a matter of choice, though the victim may act out of fear. This is what differentiates (albeit by a razor’s edge) extortion from robbery. In a case of robbery, the property is taken against the victim’s will. The evidence in this case demonstrated that the defendants robbed the victim, they did not commit extortion.

United States v. Santos, 449 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2006)

The defendants tried to rob an undercover drug agent by flashing fake DEA badges. The use of the fake badge did not amount to “force” in support of a Hobbs Act robbery charge. With regard to one alleged co-conspirator, moreover, the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant was a knowing participant in the conspiracy to rob the victim. Mere presence and association with the other conspirators was all that was established.

United States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2005)

A private citizen may not be prosecuted for a Hobbs Act “color of official right” extortion offense unless he is conspiring with a public official or aiding and abetting a public official. The defendant in this case was an attorney who “masqueraded” as a person who could “fix” criminal cases. The people paying the money, however, knew that he was not a state official when they paid him money. The Hobbs Act is reserved for cases in which the defendant is, in fact, a public official, or otherwise extorts money under color of official right. The defendant in this case did not qualify.

United States v. McCormack, 371 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2004)

The court affirmed the defendant’s Hobbs Act conviction. The defendant attempted to extort the victim into paying him $100,000 from his mutual fund. This would have had the effect of depleting the assets of the mutual fund and this provided a sufficient impact on interstate commerce. The First Circuit rejected, however, the government’s invitation to hold that any extortion of a substantial amount of money has an impact on interstate commerce.

United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2002)

The defendants threatened a county with a lawsuit, but premised the lawsuit, in part, on false allegations which were contained in an affidavit prepared by one of the defendants. The Eleventh Circuit held that threatening a lawsuit is not ‘wrongful” within the meaning of the Hobbs Act. Particularly in this case, where the threat involved a lawsuit against a governmental entity, First Amendment considerations also came into play (the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances). In short, the Hobbs Act does not criminalize the fabrication of evidence, or perjury if the “threat” to use the evidence or testimony relates to a civil lawsuit. The court also concluded that this conduct did not amount to mail fraud, because the false affidavits were known to the “victims” to be false, so the victims were not being deceived.

United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2002)

An extortion offense committed against a person who is employed by a company engaged in interstate commerce does not affect interstate commerce, simply because the employee misses time at work.

United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1998)

The defendant went into a sporting goods store and asked to see some guns. Two unloaded guns were given to him and he promptly ran out of the store. While fleeing, he ran his car in the direction of store employees who chased him. This does not amount to a Hobbs Act robbery. The store employee who gave the guns to the defendant knew that they were empty and there was no threat or use of force. Though one of the employees was hurt in the parking lot, this does not establish that the guns were taken by means of force or violence.

United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1993)

Defendant’s Hobbs Act conviction was reversed in light of the jury instructions which indicated that a conviction could be based on conduct which did not require that the money given to the Congressman involved a quid pro quo. The holding in McCormick v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 1807 (1991), though on its face limited to cases in which money is given during a campaign, also applies in cases in which the elected official receives money after he is elected: that is, the money must be given with a specific quid pro quo in mind.

United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641 (3rd Cir. 1991)

Though some of the defendants clearly participated in the acts which amounted to extortion, the proof did not establish that they knew an extortionate threat had been made.

United States v. Taylor, 966 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1992)

The trial court’s instruction to the jury did not adequately explain the need to find a specific quid pro quo in order to convict a public official under the Hobbs Act.

United States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402 (4th Cir. 1990)

The government failed to demonstrate that the victim’s effort to pay the defendant’s demands were reasonably likely to affect interstate commerce. Therefore, the defendant’s Hobbs Act conviction was reversed. The court does not rely on the fact that there had been no actual effect on interstate commerce. Rather, the court focused on the fact that if the facts had been as the defendant believed, there still would not have been any effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995)

The defendants, a bail bondsman and local law enforcement agents, would arrest people at a roadside rest area and agree to drop the charges after bond had been posted. With respect to the people arrested who had not traveled in interstate commerce, the facts did not show any impact on interstate commerce and the Hobbs Act convictions on these counts would be set aside.

United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995)

A private person who extorts money from another private person in exchange for his promise to help the “victim” with the defendant’s influence over a public official does not violate the extortion provision of the Hobbs Act. The defendant did not “threaten” the victim with fear of harm and because he was a private person, he was not acting under color of official right.

United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 1996)

Even where payments are made to a public official in a context other than a campaign contribution, the government must prove that there was a quid pro quo.

United States v. DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1989)

The defendant’s Hobbs Act conviction was reversed because of the government’s failure to establish any effect on interstate commerce. The money used to pay the bribe was FBI funds; the sought-after action of the government officials was to permit the use of propane tanks within the city limits. The defendants did nothing which either increased or decreased the flow of propane as the result of the bribe. As a result, there was no effect on interstate commerce by virtue of the money paid or the action undertaken by the officials.

United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1992)

The trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that no quid pro quo was required for a Hobbs Act conviction. McCormick v. United States. The quid pro quo must be clear and unambiguous, leaving no uncertainty about the terms of the bargain.

United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1991)

This conviction was spoiled by an instruction inconsistent with McCormick v. United States. The jury was incorrectly instructed that the government was not required to prove that the defendant demanded or directly solicited the payment in question or that he offered anything specific in return.

United States v. Frost, 61 F.3d 1518, modified, 77 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 1996), judgment vacated on other grounds, 117 S.Ct. 1816 (1997)

The defendants were political rivals of a city council member. They sent an extortion letter to their rival (threatening to expose his extramarital activity if he did not resign). The defendants were charged with a Hobbs Act violation. The evidence, however, failed to establish a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce. Although the indictment sufficiently alleged an interstate commerce nexus, the government’s proof fell short of its intended purpose. The affairs of the city council were linked to interstate commerce; but there was no showing that the resignation of one member of the six-member city council would have impacted the continuing business of that governing body in such a manner as to constitute a violation of the federal statute. Therefore, the extortion threat, if it had succeeded, was not shown to be likely to have the natural effect of obstructing commerce.

United States v. Davis, 30 F.3d 108 (11th Cir. 1994)

In order to establish Hobbs Act extortion, it is necessary to establish a specific quid pro quo. Because of the failure to properly charge the jury in this case, the conviction was set aside.

United States v. O’Keefe, 825 F.2d 314 (11th Cir. 1987)

The evidence was insufficient to support the defendants’ Hobbs Act conviction where they accepted the money to perform a service, despite the fact that they were members of local governing authorities.