False Statements / False Claims

United States v. Bowling, 770 F.3d 1168 (7th Cir. 2014)

The defendant was charged with making a false statement on a firearms form that he filled out in order to purchase a gun. He denied that he was a convicted felon. In fact he was a convicted felon (a fact that he acknowledged at trial), but he claimed that he was laboring under a mistake of fact when he filled out the form, because when he pled guilty to the predicate offense, he thought it was a misdemeanor offense. He sought to introduce evidence at the false statement trial that the prosecutor in the prior case had communicated an offer to the defense attorney in that case offering a misdemeanor disposition which the lawyer then communicated to the defendant. This, he claimed, was the source of his confusion. Excluding this evidence was reversible error.

United States v. Hale, 762 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2014)

At the meeting of creditors in a bankruptcy case, the defendant was asked, “To your best knowledge and belief, is the information contained in your petition, statements, schedules and related bankruptcy documents true, complete and accurate?” There is an ambiguity in this question, because it is not clear if the truthfulness of the answer is measured at the time the statement was made (i.e., the bankruptcy schedules were filed) or at the time of the creditors’ meeting. In this case, the ambiguity was important, because the defendant learned after filing the schedules that one of the assets was worth substantially more than what he had listed on the schedule. Because of this ambiguity, the defendant could not be convicted of making a false statement in a bankruptcy proceeding.

United States v. Ashurov, 726 F.3d 395 (3rd Cir. 2013)

It is a crime under 18 U.S.C. §1546, to knowingly making a false statement under oath a document required by the immigration laws. It is also a crime “to knowingly present any such document which contains any such false statement.” This latter section is ambiguous regarding whether the document must be under oath. The word “such” suggests that the document must be under oath, but that second law only refers to a “false statement” being contained in the document. The Third Circuit, applying the Rule of Lenity, holds that the latter provision also requires proof that the document was made under oath.

United States v. White Eagle, 721 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2013)

Merely failing to reveal another person’s crime is not sufficient to support a false statement offense under § 1001. The fact that the defendant made a statement about another person’s conduct (a partial disclosure), and omitted to reveal that the other person had committed an offense is not a “silent statement” that supports a conviction. See also United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957 (D.C.Cir. 2008).

United States v. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2013)

In this en banc decision, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendants should have been permitted to introduce evidence that the defendants (who were charged with making a false statement to a bank in violation of § 1014) were told by their broker that lying in response to certain questions on a loan application form was permissible. Th evidence was relevant to whether the defendants actually knew that their answers were false and whether they believed that answering the questions in that way would “influence” the bank’s decision.

United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125 (3rd Cir. 2013)

The defendant was convicted of making a false statement when he said that he had not received money from the bribe payor. He later entered a guilty plea to related charges and signed an appeal waiver. With regard to the false statement conviction, what he said was actually true (unbeknownst to him), because the money was paid by a government agent posing as a confederate of the bribe payer. The Third Circuit held that the conviction for making a false statement could not be sustained, because what the defendant said was true and, moreover, it would be a manifest injustice to enforce the appeal waiver on this count of the conviction.

United States v. Kurlemann, 736 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2013)

A material omission on a bank loan application is not a “false statement” under 18 U.S.C. § 1014. A material omission may amount to fraud, but § 1014 only prohibits false statements, not fraud.

United States v. Alexander, 679 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2012)

In order to succeed in a § 1014 false statement prosecution, the government must establish that the victim financial institution was FDIC insured. In this case, the government proved that Bank of America was FDIC insured, but not that Bank of America, N.A. or Bank of America Mortgage was FDIC insured or that the latter two institutions were subsidiaries of Bank of America so that they qualified under § 1014.

United States v. Fontenot, 665 F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2011)

The defendant, a state politician, “borrowed” money from two businessman. The loan was in cash and was illegal under state campaign finance laws. Later, the defendant filled out a loan application at a bank and failed to reveal this “debt” and was prosecuted for making a false statement under both § 1001 and § 1014. The Fifth Circuit held that omitting to mention an illegal debt was not a false statement. If the debt is unenforceable, it does not qualify as “debt” as that term is generally understood.

United States v. Spurlin, 664 F.3d 954 (5th Cir. 2011)

Because of some ambiguity in the question on the form that the defendant allegedly answered inaccurately, a false statement conviction could not be sustained.

United States v. Smith, 641 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2011)

Venue for a false statement prosecution is where the statement was made. In this case, the government sought to prosecute the defendant in the jurisdiction that was the subject matter of the false statement. The government argued that there was a ‘substantial contacts” test for venue. The Tenth Circuti rejected this theory.

United States v. Ford, 639 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2011)

The defendant did not disclose his financial relationship with certain entities on his state disclosure forms (he was a state senator). The Sixth Circuit holds that these “false statements” were not within the jurisdiction of a federal agency and therefore could not form the basis for a § 1001 violation. The fact that the subject matter of the non-disclosure was an entity that received federal funding, did not make the false statement within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.

United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2010)

The defendant was charged with securities fraud in connection with the method by which he accounted for certain sales. According to the government, the method violated GAAP. The proof at trial, however, failed to prove that materiality of the misrepresentations that were made on the financial statements. The court also reversed the counts of the indictment dealing with lying to auditors. The basis of the reversal on these counts, in part, was the failure to prove that the defendant had a culpable state of mind (i.e., willful and knowing deception).

United States v. Saybolt, 577 F.3d 195 (3rd Cir. 2009)

A prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 286 for conspiring to defraud the government by submitting a false, fraudulent or fictitious claim to the government requires proof that the defendants conspire to submit a material false statement. On the other hand, § 287 which simply outlaws submitting a false claim does not require proof of materiality.

United States v. Hayes, 574 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2009)

Though the government proved that the form sent to the government agency in connection with the defendant’s home health care agency contained a false statement, there was insufficient evidence that the defendant knew the false statement was submitted to the agency. The form was filled out by a co-conspirator.

United States v. Ali, 557 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2009)

The defendant was charged with making a false statement on a naturalization document. He had been married to a Canadian woman and then, prior to the divorce being finalized, he married a woman in Georgia. He answered a question on a naturalization form that he had never been married to two women at the same time. The defendant claimed that he could not be guilty of making a false statement because a bigamous marriage, under Georgia law, was void ab initio, therefore he was never actually married to the woman in Georgia. The government moved to bar this defense on the theory that it represented a “mistake of law” defense. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that if the defendant in fact believed that he was not married, based on the void ab initio principle, then he was not guilty of knowingly making a false statement.

United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

The defendant was formerly the chief of staff of the Government Services Administration. He was considering taking a golfing trip with a lobbyist, Jack Abramoff, and solicited an ethics opinion about whether it was permissible for him to go on the trip. He omitted to tell the ethics officer that Abramoff was arguably doing business, or seeking to do business, with the GSA. This failure to include the pertinent facts in his ethics inquiry could not form the basis for a false statement prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1). When it comes to a “concealment” false statement, the government must prove that the defendant had a duty to disclose the facts that were concealed. No such duty existed in this case, where the defendant was voluntarily seeking an ethics opinion.

United States v. Manning, 526 F.3d 611 (10th Cir. 2008)

When a defendant provides false information to a probation officer in connection with the preparation of a presentence report, he may be prosecuted for a § 1001 violation. Though the report is furnished by the probation officer to the court, this kind of statement does not qualify as a “statement, representation, writing or document submitted to a judge,” and thus does not qualify for the § 1001(b) exception to the coverage of the statute. The probation officer is not the equivalent of a courier, who merely transmits the statement to the judge.

United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007)

The defendant’s false statement conviction was reversed. The allegation was that he submitted an environmental report to the EPA certifying that it was true, when, in fact, the report contained false information. However, the certification only stated that he knew that the reports was prepared by a competent person and that he was told by that person that it was accurate. The government introduced no evidence that the reports were not prepared by a qualified person, or that the qualified person did not tell the defendant that the reports were accurate.

United States v. Horvath, 492 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2007)

The defendant made a false statement to a probation officer in connection with a presentence interview. The Ninth Circuit holds that conduct is encompassed within the exception for statements made by a party to a judge or magistrate. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b). See also the various opinions filed in connection with the denial of the government’s request for rehearing, en banc, 522 F.3d 904 (2008).

United States v. Jiang, 476 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2007)

The evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Because of the uncertainty regarding the nature of the questions asked by the law enforcement officer and the answers given by the defendant about his export of amplifiers, a conviction could not be sustained. At best, the exchange was ambiguous.

United States v. Hoover, 467 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2006)

The trial court’s jury charge improperly expanded the indictment by offering a theory by which the jury could find that the statement made by the defendant was false, in a manner different than the manner set forth in the indictment. The indictment alleged that he made a false statement about how many people complained to him about a financing arrangement of his car dealership. Specifically the indictment said that “he knew the statement was false because “more than one person told him about the ‘double floorplanning.’” The jury was instructed, however, that he could be found guilty if he knew the statement he made to the police was false, but did not limit the basis upon which he knew it was false. The Sixth Circuit held that, pursuant to Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), if the government chooses to specifically charge the manner in which the defendant’s statement is false, the government should be required to prove that it is untruthful for that reason.

United States v. Cacioppo, 460 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2006)

The defendants were prosecuted for making a false statement in connection with ERISA reports, 18 U.S.C. §1027. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury that a conviction could be predicated on a finding that the defendant recklessly disregarded whether his statement was false, or not. The statute requires proof of “knowing” false statements and reckless disregard for the truthfulness of a statement is not the same as knowing that a statement is false.

United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005)

Repeating the same false statement to a law enforcement officer on two separate occasions does not constitute two separate crimes of violating § 1001, if the second false statement did not independently impair a government investigation.

United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2005)

The defendants were charged with making false statements (and failing to make mandatory disclosures) in connection with mine safety reporting requirements. One count of the indictment was deficient, because it failed to properly identify the specific failure to report that is required by the regulations. A judgment of acquittal was also appropriate on that count.

United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2004)

The conspirators could not have envisioned that six years after they participated in a murder, one of their confederates would lie to investigators about the crime. Under a Pinkerton theory, a conviction for making a false statement could not be sustained.

United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 2004)

The defendants submitted contracts and equipment leases to the government to demonstrate the bona fides of the parties’ relationship (in order to qualify for a government contract). Actually, the parties did not intend to have that relationship, but submitted the documents in order to win the contract. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this conduct does not amount to a false statement under § 1001. A contract is not a “false statement” unless it is fraudulent, or actually contains false statements of fact. A contract like the one at issue in this case is not like a guarantee that a party never intended to honor (which could constitute a false statement). A contract can be breached without any criminal culpability. The existence of the contract was not actually disputed, even if the parties never intended to comply with its terms, or sue the other party for breaching the contract. In a separate holding, the court held that other false statements made by one of the defendants did not fall within the jurisdiction of a federal agency and therefore could not be the basis for a § 1001 prosecution.

United States v. Karaouni, 379 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)

18 U.S.C. § 911 makes it a crime to falsely claim to be a U.S. citizen. On an I-9 employment form, the defendant checked a box indicating that he was a U.S. “national.” Checking the box did not violate § 911. Though all citizens are nationals, not all nationals are citizens.

United States v. Finn, 375 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2004)

The defendant was a law enforcement agent with HUD. His car was towed and despite his efforts to bully the towing company to release his car, the company refused to release the car without being paid. He eventually enlisted the aid of a colleague to drive the car off the lot, running though a fence. When he realized that there would be trouble, he had the friend take some petty cash from the HUD office and reimburse the towing company. On the government expenditure form and receipt, the defendant crossed out the phrase “damage to fence” and added the word “storage.” The Tenth Circuit concludes that changing the term “damage to fence” to “storage” was not a material false statement.

United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004)

The defendant was charged with violating the false claim statue (18 U.S.C. § 287) by writing a bad check to cover his girlfriend’s tax liability. A bad check written to the government to pay for a liability is not a false claim.

United States v. McNeil, 362 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2004)

A false statement in a CJA-23 (financial affidavit used to support appointment of counsel in criminal case) is not covered by § 1001. The false statement statute expressly exempts statements made during the course of judicial proceedings and an application to have appointed counsel and the accompanying financial affidavit is covered by the judicial proceeding exemption.

United States v. Dunne, 324 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2003)

Making a false statement is not a continuing offense for statute of limitations purposes.

United States v. Pickett, 353 F.3d 62 (D. C. Cir. 2004)

In order to qualify as a criminal false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c), a false statement to the legislative branch must be in connection with an investigation or review of a committee, subcommittee, commission or office of Congress. Alleging this element of the offense is essential in an indictment. In this case, the defendant (a Capitol security guard) made a “bad joke” – he left some “sugar substitute” on a desk near the entrance to the Capitol and suggested that it was anthrax. Based on the note he left next to the substance, the U.S. Attorney charged him with making a false statement in a matter involving the legislative branch. The D.C. Circuit held that the fake note was not the proper subject of a § 1001 prosecution.

United States v. Baird, 134 F.3d 1276 (6th Cir. 1998)

The defendant was charged with making a false statement to the government in an effort to obtain a progress payment on a government construction project. The defendant submitted a claim for payment based on "incurred costs," though the defendant had not yet paid for the product for which he was requesting a progress payment. Because of the confusion over the definition of the term "incurred costs," the trial court should have instructed the jury on this aspect of the charge.

United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1998)

The Sixth Circuit holds that a statement that is impliedly false may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In this case, the principal defendant’s conviction was sustained on this theory. The second defendant, however, was not shown to have shared in the lead defendant’s criminal intent and her conviction was reversed. The defendants, who were employed by the Detroit housing authority filled out various HUD forms indicating that certain people were “eligible” to participate in a low-income housing program. While those people were technically “eligible” (i.e., they had low income), they were not taken off the waiting list in the proper order and, in certain instances, had actually bribed the lead defendant to gain acceptance in the program. The second defendant was not shown to have had any knowledge of the waiting list, or the significance of the list in determining actual eligibility.

United States v. Whiteside, 285 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2002)

The defendants’ convictions were reversed on sufficiency grounds. The defendants were charged with making false statements in connection with Medicare reimbursement cost reports and conspiracy to defraud the government. In the reimbursement cost reports, the defendants reported that part of their hospital’s annual costs included certain interest payments on a note that represented a capital expenditure. According to the government, these interest payments should not have been reported as a capital expenditure. The jury convicted the defendants. The Eleventh Circuit held that it was far from clear what the appropriate definition of a “capital expenditure” is in the context of interest payments for the note. Consequently, as a matter of law, the defendants could not be found guilty of making a false statement. The court held that, “In a case where the truth or falsity of a statement centers on an interpretive question of law, the government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statement is not true under a reasonable interpretation of the law.” Id. 285 F.3d at 1351.