Court Rejects Settlement Because of Cy Pres Issues

A federal court recently rejected a proposed settlement of an economic loss class action because of the details of its cy pres component. See In re Hydroxycut Mktg & Sales Practices Litig. (Dremak v. Iovate Health Scis. Grp.), No. 09-cv-1088 (S.D. Cal. 11/19/13).

The “Settlement Class” was defined as including those persons who purchased various Hydroxycut Products between May 9, 2006 and May 1, 2009, inclusive.The settlement relief consists of a $10 million Cash Component and a $10 million Product Component. Settlement Class Members who opted to receive cash were to receive $25 for each Hydroxycut Product they purchased. In lieu of cash, Settlement Class Members could elect to receive a Product Bundle for

each purchase of a Hydroxycut Product. Any amount remaining in the Cash Component after payment of Notice and Claim Administration Expenses, and Eligible Cash Claims would constitute the “Residual Settlement Amount.” If any funds remained after six years from the Effective Date of the deal, the remainder was to be paid out pursuant to the cy pres doctrine to certain types of organizations (such as ones promoting community-based solutions for common and preventable diseases like cancer, heart disease, diabetes, obesity, and asthma).

The cy pres doctrine allows a court to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable portions of a class action settlement fund to indirectly benefit the entire class. See Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz.Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990). When employing the cy pres doctrine, unclaimed funds should be put to their next best use, e.g., for “the aggregate, indirect, prospective benefit of

the class.” Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has held that cy pres distribution must be “guided by (1) the objectives of the underlying statute(s); and (2) the interests of the silent class members.” Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1307. A cy pres distribution is an abuse of discretion if there is “no reasonable certainty” that any class member

would benefit from it. Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012). A court should not find that a settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable unless the cy pres remedy accounts for the nature of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the objectives of the underlying statutes, and the interests of the absent class members.

Generally, a district court can approve a class action settlement if the court finds that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). When the settlement is reached before formal class certification, settlement requires a higher standard of fairness and a more probing inquiry than may normally be required under Rule 23(e).

Here, the court concluded that the cy pres remedy did not satisfy the standards for cy pres relief set forth by the Ninth Circuit. and denied the motion for final approval of the settlement. The court found that the proposed cy pres distribution in this proposed settlement did not benefit the class. At the hearing, defendant's counsel explained that under a separate master settlement agreement governing the personal injury cases in the multi-district litigation, personal injury claimants are to be paid out of a $14 million settlement fund. And cy pres distributions for personal injury claimants in this action reduce the amount that Iovate must pay into the personal injury fund, yet, said the court, providing no additional benefit to the personal injury claimants and no benefit at all to the class members who suffered no personal injury.

The court rejected the argument that causing a benefit in the form of "facilitating settlement" in this action or the separate personal injury actions is the type of “indirect benefit” that cy pres remedies are meant to provide. The focus, said the court, should be on whether the funds themselves are being used for the benefit of the class.

The cy pres remedy was also problematic, said the court, because it allowed for a disproportionate distribution of settlement funds to personal injury claimants. In doing so, the cy pres remedy fails to take into account the interests of the majority of absent class members who did not suffer any personal injury, and the nature of this action, which mostly concerned alleged unfair competition, consumer protection, and product warranty claims, not personal injury liability.

Because of the expenses and claims, it appeared that more than half the settlement might be used for cy pres distribution to the personal injury claimants. The court expressed concern that so little of the sizeable settlement fund directly benefitted the class. Under the terms of the settlement, most of the fund could be channeled into cy pres distribution. The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation provide that where a settlement involves individual distributions to class members and there are funds remaining after the distributions, the settlement should

presumptively provide first for further distributions to participating class members unless the amounts involved are too small to make individual distributions economically viable or other specific reasons exist that would make such further distributions impossible or unfair. See ALI Principles § 3.07(b) (2010).

Thus, the court found that the cy pres distribution was not guided by the interests of the class

members. It appeared to the court that the cy pres relief was being used as a vehicle to help settle the personal injury cases, not to provide an indirect prospective benefit to the entire class. The court also contrasted that class counsel was seeking $5 million in fees based in part on a percentage of the total fund.