Confession - Miranda – Sufficiency of Waiver

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) The defendant was read the Miranda warning and did not respond when asked if he waived the right to remain silent. He was then questioned for several hours, during which time he answered very few questions, just silently listening to the interrogation. Then he answered one question. The Supreme Court held that in order to invoke the right to remain silent and to thereby terminate further interrogation, the defendant must unequivocally invoke the right to remain silent. Simply remaining silent is not sufficient. In addition, once the defendant answered the question, this amounted to a waiver of the right to remain silent.

Sessoms v. Runnels, 691 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) After receiving Miranda warnings, in order to invoke the prohibition of further questioning required by Edwards v. Arizona, the defendant’s invocation of the right to an attorney must be unambiguous. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). What happens, however, if the defendant invokes his right to counsel in an ambiguous manner before he is read his Miranda rights? In this en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit holds that questioning must stop. The rationale is that an effort to obtain the assistance of counsel prior to being read Miranda warnings must be honored even if the request is not clear, because the target may not fully understand his rights at that point in time; whereas after having been informed of his rights, the defendant’s rights should be clear to him and therefore, his invocation must be unambiguous. Following remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the en banc court concluded that the invocation in this case was, in fact, unambiguous, so further questioning was inappropriate. Sessoms v. Grounds, 776 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2015). The defendant asked, “There wouldn’t be any possible way that I could have a – a lawyer present while we do this?” and then “Yeah, that’s what my dad asked me to ask you guys – uh, give me a lawyer.” There was nothing ambiguous about this request.

Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2009) The panel opinion, 502 F.3d 394, contained a thorough consideration of the law requiring that a Miranda waiver must be voluntary (i.e., free from coercion) and knowing. The court begins by reminding that the requirement that a confession be voluntary is a different matter than requiring that a Miranda waiver be voluntary. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). In order to prove that a confession is involuntary, police coercion is required, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Police coercion is not required in order to establish that a Miranda waiver was not voluntary. In this case, based on the defendant’s age, education and IQ and other factors relating to his mental state, the paneld concluded that the evidence did not establish that the defendnat voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Rehearing was granted – and the en banc court reversed the panel opinion, reinstating the conviction, 557 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2009)( en banc).