Confession - Miranda - Interrogation Requirement

Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004)

When a defendant has been indicted, the Sixth Amendment forbids the use of any statement that has been “deliberately elicited” from him by the police. In this case, the defendant had been indicted and the police went to his house and told him that they were there to discuss his involvement in a drug distribution conspiracy. The defendant responded in an incriminating way. The Supreme Court held that the statement was inadmissible because the statement was deliberately elicited by the police. The Court held that “deliberately elicited” is different than the “interrogation” standard of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).

Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990)

After his arrest for driving under the influence, the defendant was brought to a police station where he was asked a number of questions, including his name, address, height, weight, eye color, and the date of his sixth birthday. He was unable to answer this last question. He also made several incriminating statements during the course of performing a physical sobriety test. At that point, he was advised of his Miranda rights. The Supreme Court holds that only the defendant’s response to the question concerning his sixth birthday constituted a testimonial response to custodial interrogation. His other comments during the course of the physical sobriety test were not the product of interrogation and could be admitted despite the failure of the police to issue prompt Miranda warnings. Thus, evidence about the defendant’s slurred speech and lack of muscular coordination revealed by his responses to the demographic questions was admissible. The question relating to his sixth birthday, however, elicited a testimonial response, because it was the content of his answer, not the method of speaking, which the state sought to introduce.

Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987)

The defendant invoked his right to remain silent after his arrest. Subsequently, the defendant’s wife went to the police station and talked to the defendant in a private room. In the room, however, was a police officer for purposes of safety and a tape recorder which was clearly visible to anyone. The Supreme Court holds that this does not constitute interrogation and the statements made by the defendant were permitted to be introduced at trial to rebut his insanity defense.

Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2014)

The defendant was in custody in a county jail on charges that he raped his wife, ex-wife and a daughter. A social worker interviewed the defendant for a possible “family court action.” The Second Circuit held that this amounted to custodial interrogation and should have been preceded by a Miranda warning. A social worker is a mandatory reporter and thus is involved in law enforcement. Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court held in Mathis v. UnitedStates, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), if a civil IRS agent questions a defendant while in custody, Miranda warnings are required. See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (court-appointed psychiatrist interviewing defendant should have given Miranda warning). Admitting the statements that the defendant gave to the social worker was reversible error that required granting a writ.

United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2012)

The defendant was stopped on the road on suspicion that he was involved in a drug transaction. Eventually, he was arrested. He was asked, “Will I find anything in the car when I search it?” The defendant responded that there was a gun in the car. The question qualified as “interrogation” and was not subject to the public safety exception. Because this appeal followed a conditional guilty plea, the proper remedy was to remand the case and allow the defendant to withdraw his plea, if he chooses to do so.

United States v. Swanson, 635 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2011)

The defendant was arrested on a warrant charging him with possession of a weapon in violation of state law. The judge who issued the warrant wrote on the warrant that there would be no bond, unless the defendant turned in his gun. When he was arrested, the defendant was told about the bond condition by the arresting officer before he was Mirandized. This statement by the police amounted to interrogation. The defendant responded by telling the police where his guns were in the house. The statement should have been suppressed. Later the defendant was taken to the police station where he received Miranda warnings and he gave a statement. This latter statement was inadmissible pursuant to Seibert. The court also held that the defendant’s supposed consent to search his vehicle to find an additional shotgun was involuntary, because the officers serving the arrest warrant stated that he was “ordered” to turn over all guns, thus implying that he had no choice in the matter.

Smiley v. Thurmer, 542 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2008)

The police asked the defendant numerous questions about his knowledge of the cause of the victim’s death, who lived in the same house as the defendant. The defendant was in custody on other charges at the time. No Miranda warnings were given and the state explained that this was permissible, because the defendant was not being interrogated; he was just being asked questions. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and held that pursuant to RhodeIsland v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), any “questioning” constitutes interrogation, for Miranda purposes if the police anticipate that the person being questioned will provide answers to the questions. Admitting the un-Mirandized statements was error that required granting the writ.

United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 2008)

The police were at the defendant’s apartment searching for a gun. The government conceded that he was in custody. The police urged the defendant to cooperate and offered leniency. The defendant did not respond. The police then obtained consent to search the apartment from another occupant and announced this, within earshot of the defendant. He then revealed the location of the gun. The First Circuit held that this encounter amounted to “interrogation” for Miranda purposes and because no warnings were given, the defendant’s statement should have been suppressed.

United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2008)

Certain “booking” questions do not amount to interrogation for Miranda purposes. The questions that were posed to the defendant in this case, however, did not qualify as “booking” questions. Questions such as, “When he arrived at his house?” were not booking-type questions.

United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 (3rd Cir. 2006)

The defendant carjacked a jeep and then had a wreck. He was in the back of a patrol car after the wreck and the officer, who knew the defendant from the neighborhood, engaged him in conversation. The conversation was not preceded by a Miranda warning and the defendant answered questions about how he got there, how he got out of the jeep and where he got the gun. This “conversation” qualified as “interrogation” for Miranda purposes. The Third Circuit noted that the perception of the defendant and the intent of the officer are relevant in deciding whether the “conversation” amounts to interrogation.

United States v. Chen, 439 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2006)

INS questioning of the defendant amounted to “interrogation”. Chen was in INS custody in administrative detention; an agent went to talk to him about the target of an alien-smuggling investigation. The statements that he gave during this interview were later used as the basis for proving that earlier statements he made to the INS were false.

United States v. Padilla, 387 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004)

During the process of arresting the defendant, the officer said something to the effect that this was the defendant’s last chance to cooperate in the investigation of another target. This statement was not preceded by Miranda warnings. The statement qualified as “interrogation” and the defendant’s response should have been suppressed – though the failure to suppress the evidence was harmless error.

United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 1997)

Questions posed by the police to the defendant after he was in custody amounted to "interrogation" and should have been preceded by Miranda warnings. One officer asked the defendant where the other people he had been with were. This question was not a simple information-gathering query, such as when an officer is merely asking for someone's identity. The question was posed to ascertain who the co-conspirators were. Harmless error.

United States v. Montana, 958 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1992)

After effectively invoking his right to remain silent, the defendant was transported in the DEA agent’s car. The agent said to the defendant that he could help himself if he cooperated. This amounted to interrogation and the defendant’s response was not admissible.

Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928 (3rd Cir. 1990)

Two defendants were arrested for murder. One confessed; the other was confronted with his confederate and asked, “How much did you tell them?” That statement was admitted at trial. The Third Circuit concludes that this does constitute interrogation, if the defendant was, in fact, aware that his confederate had confessed when he was confronted with him. The decision contains a lengthy discussion of the current status of Rhode Island v. Innis, and its application to cases in which a defendant, who has asserted his right to remain silent, is confronted with circumstances that the police should know will elicit an incriminating statement, such as the confession of a co-defendant.

United States v. Elias, 832 F.2d 24 (3rd Cir. 1987)

The defendant was detained in his parked vehicle and asked about irregularities in his driver’s license. During the suppression hearing, there were inconsistencies in the State’s evidence regarding the level of coercive pressure to which the defendant was subjected. The lower court held that the defendant made an “uninvited spontaneous utterance” that was not the product of interrogation. The record, however, clearly revealed that the defendant was answering the officers’ questions when he acknowledged the presence of cocaine in his briefcase. The statement should have been suppressed, because the defendant was never Mirandized.

United States v. Soto, 953 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1992)

After the defendant invoked his right to the assistance of counsel, the police began to inventory his property. Upon finding a picture of the defendant’s wife and child, the officer asked, “What were you doing with crap like that when you have these two waiting for you at home?” The defendant responded, “That’s not my coke.” This statement was not admissible and required a new trial. The officer’s question amounted to interrogation.

United States v. D.F., 63 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995)

The defendant, a juvenile, was involuntarily committed to a mental health facility due to drug problems. Patients were encouraged to talk to therapists and were rewarded for doing so. A therapist, aware that the juvenile was a suspect in a murder case, questioned the juvenile about her past behavior, without clearly informing her that the questioning was designed, in part, for investigative purposes. This rendered the confession involuntary. Though the therapist was not a law enforcement agent, she questioned the defendant with an eye toward a future prosecution. This decision was re-affirmed after remand from the Supreme Court at United States v. D.F., 115 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1997). In this latter decision, the court addresses at some length the role of an appellate court in determining the voluntariness of a confession.

Killebrew v. Endicott, 992 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1993)

Though it was harmless error, the state trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce a non-Mirandized statement. The officer “told” the defendant (who was in custody) that he wanted to know whether the defendant acted alone; and advised the defendant that any cooperation would be made known to the D.A. The defendant said he acted alone. The state argued that the officer did not “ask” the defendant anything; he merely “told” him what he was interested in. This was interrogation, nevertheless.

Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 1995)

Prior to the time that the defendant was given his Miranda warnings, he was told about the incriminating evidence which the police already had against him. He promptly made an incriminating statement. The tactic of revealing incriminating evidence against the defendant amounted to interrogation. The statement made by the defendant at that time was not admissible. The officers then read the defendant his Miranda warning and he made additional incriminating statements. These statements, too, had to be suppressed. The initial statements represented the “beachhead” in interrogation parlance and, once that is achieved – that is, once the defendant makes the first admission – subsequent admissions are easier to obtain. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The police are not allowed to use the tactic of using pre-advice interrogation to open up a suspect. Admitting the confession, however, was harmless error.

United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1993)

The defendant was stopped by police investigating a bank robbery. The police had reason to believe that the car in which the defendant was stopped was the car used in the robbery. The police asked the defendant whose car it was. The defendant responded that it was his car. This amounted to interrogation and did not qualify as “routine booking questions” in light of the officer’s knowledge about the car and his intent in asking the question – and his knowledge that the inquiry could lead to an incriminating response. Miranda warnings should have preceded this inquiry.

United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1986)

During questioning, the police asked the defendant what his address was. The officer knew at that point that a large quantity of cocaine had been found at an apartment and he was interrogating the defendant to find out if that was his apartment. The defendant’s response should have been preceded by a Miranda warning and the responses were therefore suppressed.

United States v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1993)

The defendant was arrested at the airport. He was brought to the DEA office and read his Miranda warnings by one of the arresting agents. He responded by turning his head away. This was, at least, an equivocal invocation of his right to remain silent and further questioning had to be preceded by an attempt to ascertain whether the defendant did, in fact, desire to remain silent. Nevertheless, within twenty minutes of this occurrence, other agents told the defendant about the length of the sentence he was facing and the value cooperation would be at this time. This amounted to interrogation and in light of the equivocal request to remain silent, was improper. Admitting the subsequent statement into evidence was reversible error. This case probably did not survive the decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). See Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994).

Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1992)

After running a roadblock and having had her car shot at by police, the defendant crashed her car. When she emerged from the car, she was confronted by several officers with guns drawn. One officer asked her if she liked shooting at troopers. Her response (“We had to.”) was inadmissible. The defendant was in custody at the time she exited the car and because the police did not Mirandize her, this was improper interrogation. The state’s claim that the question was merely rhetorical and thus, not “interrogation,” was not persuasive. “Assuming arguendo the question was rhetorical, if the accused is in custody, the police do not read the accused her rights and a question is asked and answered, then the statement must be suppressed.”

United States v. Gomez, 927 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991)

After his arrest, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and responded that he wanted to speak with an attorney. Following this request, an agent told the defendant that he should immediately discuss with his attorney the benefits of cooperating and that if he cooperated he could get a sentence of less than life in prison. A few minutes later, the defendant – having not seen an attorney – gave a full statement. The agent’s comments amounted to improper continued “interrogation” and the resulting confession should have been suppressed. “Interrogation” means “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”