Confession - Fruit of Illegally Obtained Confession

United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction of physical evidence that is discovered as the result of a Miranda tainted statement of the defendant. The defendant was arrested for violating a restraining order. The police officer questioned the defendant at the time of the arrest without properly advising him of his Miranda rights. The defendant told the officer where his gun was located in the house. The 5 – 4 decision of the Supreme court concluded that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not extend to physical evidence discovered as a result of a statement taken without Miranda warnings.

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (2004) The police intentionally interrogated the suspect without providing Miranda warnings. During the course of this interrogation, the suspect confessed to being involved in a murder. Immediately thereafter, the police Mirandized the suspect and asked her to repeat what she had just said. The Supreme Court held that this procedure violated Miranda and ordered that the subsequent, Mirandized statement be suppressed. Distinguishing Oregon v. Elstad, the Court concluded that the intentional effort to circumvent Miranda in a manner that eviscerated the protection rendered the subsequent statement inadmissible. In Oregon v. Elstad, the initial questioning amounted to a brief casual question that elicited an incriminating response, followed much later by a Mirandized statement that did not exploit the earlier statements.

Lujan v. Garcia, 734 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2013) After his arrest for murder, the defendant was given defective Miranda warnings that failed to properly advise him of his right to counsel. He gave a full confession. The state trial court denied a Motion to Suppress. The California appellate court held that the confession should have been suppressed pursuant to Miranda, but it was otherwise voluntary. The defendant’s testimony at trial, therefore, was not tainted by virtue of the improperly admitted confession. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant’s testimony at trial represented the fruit of the poisonous tree. Relying on Harrison v. UnitedStates, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), the court held that once the trial court permitted the inadmissible confession into evidence, the defendant’s testimony, which was prompted by the need to explain the confession, was the fruit: “The question is not whether the petitioner made a knowing decision to testify [at trial], but why. If he did so in order to overcome the impact of confessions illegally obtained and hence improperly introduced, then his testimony was tainted by the same illegality that rendered the confessions themselves inadmissible.”

United States v. Barnes, 713 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2013) The agents’ interrogation technique in this case was a clear violation of the principle announced in Missouri v. Seibert. The defendant was questioned in custody without Miranda warnings. He incriminated himself. The defendant was then given the warning and repeated the incriminating statement.

United States v. Swanson, 635 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2011) The defendant was arrested on a warrant charging him with possession of a weapon in violation of state law. The judge who issued the warrant wrote on the warrant that there would be no bond, unless the defendant turned in his gun. When he was arrested, the defendant was told about the bond condition by the arresting officer before he was Mirandized. This statement by the police amounted to interrogation. The defendant responded by telling the police where his guns were in the house. The statement should have been suppressed. Later the defendant was taken to the police station where he received Miranda warnings and he gave a statement. This latter statement was inadmissible pursuant to Seibert. The court also held that the defendant’s supposed consent to search his vehicle to find an additional shotgun was involuntary, because the officers serving the arrest warrant stated that he was “ordered” to turn over all guns, thus implying that he had no choice in the matter.

United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 12/1/10) The Second Circuit elaborates on the rule announced in Missouri v. Seibert. First, the court agreed with several other courts in holding that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion represents the controlling decision in the Seibert decision. Second, the court holds that numerous factors, objective and subjective, may be considered in deciding whether the two-step interrogation procedure was intentionally used by the police. Finally, the court holds that the government has the burden of proving that the procedure used was not deliberately designed to evade the Miranda protection. The court concluded that the procedure utilized in this case constituted a violation of Seibert and that the government failed to prove that it was not a deliberate violation.

Dixon v. Houk, 627 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2010) When initially questioned, the defendant stated that he would not answer questions without a lawyer. The police approached the defendant a second time, did not Mirandize him and offered to “cut him a deal” after which the defendant made an incriminating statement. He was the Mirandized and repeated the incriminating statement. The statement was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of Miranda, it violated his right to counsel, it was not “voluntary” (because of the offer of a deal) and violated Seibert. THE SUPREME COURT REVERSED, HOLDING THAT THE TWO-STEP SEIBERT TYPE OF INTERROGATION WAS NOT EMPLOYED BY THE POLICE IN THIS CASE. Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S.Ct. 26 (2011).

United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 623 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 2010) If physical evidence is seized as the result of a confession that was obtained in violation of Miranda, the physical evidence is not suppressed. United States v. Patane. However, if physical evidence is seized as the result of a confession that was obtained pursuant to an illegal detention (and therefore a Fourth Amendment violation), then the physical evidence is the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation and is suppressed pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States.

United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2009) The Seventh Circuit explored the problem of interpreting Seibert in light of the fractured opinions that composed the decision to reverse the conviction. No majority explained what the rationale of the decision was. One interpretation is that Elstad has been limited and the focus is on the defendant’s state of mind. Another interpretation focuses on whether the police intended to exploit the two-step process. The Heron court did not decide how to resolve this dilemma, but the case is worth considering whenever a Seibert issue arises.

United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2008) After learning incriminating information from the defendant during pre-Miranda questioning, the police promptly Mirandized the defendant and asked him the same questions. This violated Seibert and required that the post-Miranda statements be suppressed.

United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135 (8th Cir. 2006) Relying on Seibert, the Eighth Circuit held that a Mirandized statement that was obtained immediately after obtaining an un-Mirandized statement was the fruit of the tainted statement and should be suppressed.

United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2006) The federal agents interrogated the defendant in the manner described in Seibert – that is, a two-step procedure in which the defendant is interrogated without being warned of his rights, and as soon as he confessed, he was Mirandized and asked to repeat, or write down, the confession. The Ninth Circuit remanded this case to the district court to reconsider its decision in light of Seibert. The Court noted, moreover, that because of the splintered opinions in Seibert, the rationale that garnered at least five votes was the opinion of Justice Kennedy (albeit not the “majority” opinion), which stated that the two-step interrogation process must have been conducted intentionally for the purpose of subverting Miranda’s protection. Thus, not all preMiranda statements will taint a subsequent Mirandized statement, even if the latter statement follows close on the heels of the earlier statement.

United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221 (3rd Cir. 2005) The Third Circuit remanded this case to the trial court to conduct a more thorough Seibert analysis. The court noted that Justice Kennedy’s test – which focuses on the intention of the officers in conducting a “two-step” interrogation – was not properly analyzed by the trial court.

United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2004) For nearly two hours, the police interrogated the defendant prior to giving him Miranda warnings. The defendant was told that if he cooperated, he would be released. Based on Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (2004), the Mirandized statement was inadmissible. Moreover, the post-Miranda statements were the product of coercion. Though the promise of release is not alone a basis for finding the confession involuntary, it is one of many factors that supported the trial court’s finding that the confession was not voluntary.

United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405 (1st Cir. 1998) The defendant was present when two friends played Russian Roulette, resulting in the death of one of the friends. The defendant was later arrested on a parole violation warrant. While in court on his matter, the police questioned him (without Mirandizing him) and asked about the killing. He implicated the surviving friend, as well as himself. He later was asked to testify at the surviving friend’s murder trial, which he did (further implicating himself). The First Circuit concluded that the testimony at the friend’s trial was the inadmissible fruit of the Miranda-tainted interrogation. The court considered whether the prior trial testimony was involuntary, but concluded that though it was obtained through some deception (the officer did not advise the defendant the purpose for which he was being questioned, and even assured him that it was not for purposes of a criminal case against him), the statement did not satisfy the definition of “involuntary” in current Supreme Court parlance. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Turning to the Miranda issue, the court concluded that the defendant was being interrogated and was “in custody” – though he was already under arrest for his own parole matter, the interrogation occurred in a separate room in the courthouse where the defendant was taken by the interrogating officer. The next question is whether testimony at a co-defendant’s trial can qualify as “fruit” of a Miranda-tainted statement. The Supreme Court has already held that Miranda does not apply to testimony in court. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (grand jury witness is not entitled to a Miranda warning before testifying). Also, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) held that there is no “fruit” exclusionary rule where a Miranda tainted statement is followed by a statement that is preceded by a fully Miranda warning and waiver. In this case, however, the First Circuit distinguished Elstad. Here, the initial tainted statement was not the product of a mere “technical” Miranda violation. Second, there was a substantial nexus between the first statement and the trial testimony. Third, the trial testimony (which the government was seeking to introduce at the defendant’s own trial) was itself not preceded by Miranda. In all three respects, Elstad is distinguishable.