Competence To Stand Trial Or Enter Guilty Plea

Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003)

The Court found insufficient justification to forcibly medicate the defendant in order to render him competent to stand trial. The four factors to consider are (1) the treatment is medically appropriate; (2) the medication is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial; (3) there are no less intrusive alternatives; and (4) the medication is necessary to significantly further important governmental trial-related interests.

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996)

Though the state may presume that the defendant is competent and require him to shoulder the burden of proving his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence, the state may not require that the defendant prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence.

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993)

Despite language in precedents to the contrary, the standard for assessing the competence of a defendant to enter a guilty plea is the same as for assessing the defendant’s competence to stand trial: whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Moreover, the defendant’s capacity to waive the assistance of counsel is measured by the same standard – the ability to understand the nature of the proceeding and to waive the right to counsel with an understanding of what is being waived.

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)

The involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medication to a defendant during his murder trial, in the absence of findings by the district court about the need for that treatment, created a substantial risk that the defendant’s right to participate in his own defense was impaired.

United States v. Brooks, 750 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2014)

The trial court did not make sufficient findings on the first Sell factor, that is, whether there are sufficiently important governmental interests at stake to justify the administration of involuntary medication. One ingredient of this calculus is the amount of time the defendant is facing if convicted versus the amount of time that he would be involuntarily committed based on his refusal to take the medication and therefore remain hospitalized based on his incompetence to stand trial (coupled with the amount of time he has aleady been committed). The court should also consider other factors including any risk that evidence would be lost due to any delay, or other prejudice that might affect the government’s ability to proceed to trial at a later date.

United States v. Curtis, 749 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2014)

The trial court failed to make adequate findings on the fourth Sell factor, whether administering anti-psychotic drugs constituted medically appropriate treatment for the defendant. The district court did not consider the circumstances relevant to such a required finding, such as the defendant’s need for long term treatment and his current qualify of life.

United States v. Debenedetto, 757 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014)

The trial court made inadequate findings on several of the Sell factors and the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the lower court for further findings.

United States v. Chavez, 734 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2013)

At the Sell hearing, the expert testified that a specific treatment plan had not yet been prepared and the decision about which drugs to use had not yet been made. The expert testified that he was awaiting court approval before making these decisions. The Tenth Circuit held that the treatment plan and the specific drugs must be identified before the hearing to enable the trial judge to make the appropriate Sell findings.

United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2013)

The trial court failed to adequately address the Sell factor realting to less intrusive means of restoring defendant to competence. A remand was required to address this consideration.

United States v. Gillenwater, 717 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013)

The defendant was represented by counsel at a competency hearing. The attorney refused to call him to the stand and the defendant complained – disruptively – and was removed from the courtroom. The Ninth Circuit holds that a defendant has a constitutional right to testify at his competency hearing, even over the advice of counsel. (The dialogue at the hearing was essentially as follows: “Counsel: I have advised him not to testify.” Defendant: “That’s because you’re a criminal.” Court: “Mr. Gillenwater, that’s enough.” Defendant: “Then get me the fuck out of here.”)

United States v. Ross, No. 09-1852 (6th Cir. 2012)

Even though the defendant had previously waived his right to counsel and was permitted to proceed pro se, when the government moved for a competency hearing and the judge agreed, an attorney should have been appointed to represent the defendant.

United States v. Grigsby, 712 F.3d 964 (6th Cir. 2013)

In a particularly fact-intensive opinion, the Sixth Circuit concludes that involuntary medication of the defendant was not appropriate in this case. Among the factors the court considered was the length of the possible sentence (according to the Guidelines), the likelihood of a successful insanity defense, and the likelihood and length of involuntary civil commitment if the prosecution did not proceed.

United States v. Dreyer, 693 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2012)

The defendant, a psychiatrist, developed dementia at the age of 63 and entered into a drug conspiracy. He entered a guilty plea. The Ninth Circuit held that at the sentencing hearing, the judge should have sua sponte ordered a competency hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the defense attorney declined to have the defendant speak, because he didn’t know what the defendant would say and his dementia might lead him to deny responsibility and he might say something inappropriate. This should have prompted the trial judge to order a competency examination. The appellate court also ordered that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand because of comments made by the trial judge that reflected her premature judgment about the defendant’s possible incompetence and his manipulative behavior. See also 705 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2013) (opinion regarding denial of rehearing en banc).

United States v. Neal, 679 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2012)

Both the defense and the government agreed that a competency determination was appropriate. The government insisted on an in-patient examination; the defendant argued that out-patient evaluation was sufficient. The Eighth Circuit held that as a matter of Due Process, the trial court must make findings before ordering an in-patient (custodial) evaluation under 18 U.S.C. §4241.

United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2012)

This comprehensive opinion reviews the law regarding forced medication under the standards of See, Riggins and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (9th Cir. 2012), ultimately holding that forced medication in this case was appropriate.

United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2011)

In this federal death penalty trial, the defendant insisted on representing himself. The Ninth Circuit held that even over the defendant’s objection, standby counsel has the right to assert that the defendant was not competent to waive his right to counsel, or to waive his right to appeal.

United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010)

The trial court erred in its application of the Sell factors. The defendant was charged with illegal reentry. The Ninth Circuit began by holding that the government must establish that the Sell factors are met with clear and convincing evidence. The government failed to prove the second factor (the administration of drugs is substantially likely to render the defendant competent and that there will not be significant side effects impairing the defendant’s ability to consult with counsel). The government also failed to satisfy the fourth factor: the medication is in the defendant’s best interest.

United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010)

The defendant was incompetent to stand trial. The district court, however, ordered that she be medicated in order to render her competent. The Fourth Circuit held that the trial court did not properly apply the Sells test. The Sells test requires that even if the government has an important interest in prosecuting the defendant, there may be special circumstances that are countervailing. The lower court failed to consider sufficiently the special circumstances in this case. Such circumstances include the length of time already served by the defendant; the nature of the crime; the treatment proposed; and, finally, a determination of whether this case is sufficiently exceptional (as opposed to routine) to justify forced medication. The court also noted that the presumption of innocence should play a role in the court’s consideration of the forced medication issue.

Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 2010)

The state court judge failed to order a psychiatric examination, despite the fact that the defendant had a history of mental illness, attempted suicide during trial and was committed to a psychiatric facility during trial. Failing to assess his competency violated the Due Process Clause.

United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2010)

Defendant’s behavior during trial should have prompted the court to re-evaluate whether the defendant was competent to stand trial (to say nothing of representing himself). 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).

United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2009)

The court reviews the various factors that the court should consider in deciding whether the government has a sufficient interest in forcefully medicating the defendant in order to render her competent to stand trial. Among the factors that weigh against the government’s purported interest would be the amount of time the defendant has already served in pretrial confinement; the fact that the defendant might be involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility if the criminal case is not pursued; the likelihood that medication will succeed in allowing the defendant to regain her competence. The trial court in this case did not engage in the proper analysis and a remand was necessary to address these various factors.

United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 2009)

The trial court erred in failing to sua sponte conducting a competency hearing when the defendant, acting pro se, cross-examined witnesses about completely irrelevant matters and accused the judge and agents of being members of a conspiracy.

Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 290 (3rd Cir. 2009)

The defendant was tried for murder in state court and found guilty. The record established that he suffered from the effects of a gunshot to the head (self-inflicted) and psychological trauma. He slept through much of the trial and suddenly screamed during the prosecutor’s closing argument and was removed from the courtroom. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a competency hearing.

McMurtrey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2008)

There was considerable evidence during the state trial that the defendant was not competent, including the amount of medication he was taking, his lack of memory and his erratic behavior. The state trial court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing violated the defendant’s right to due process. This due process violation was not cured by a hearing conducted thirteen years later.

United States v. Hernandez-Vazquez, 513 F.3d 908 (2008)

The Ninth Circuit extensively reviews Sell jurisprudence and concludes that the trial court failed to spell out limitations on its Sell order that allowed the B.O.P. to medicate the defendant so that he would be competent. The trial court may not provide unlimited authority to the B.O.P. to provide necessary treatment and medication.

Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 2007)

The defendant sufficiently demonstrated that he was incompetent when he entered a guilty plea to a double murder twenty years earlier. Granting habeas relief was appropriate.

United States v. Valenzuela-Puentes, 479 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2007)

The district court did not clearly apply the correct standard in determining that the defendant would be competent if he was administered medication involuntarily. This finding must be made under a standard of clear and convincing evidence.

United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2005)

Because of acrimony between the defendant and his counsel, counsel moved to withdraw. On the day his motion was filed, the court conducted a competency hearing. Counsel declined to participate in light of his pending motion to withdraw. After a brief discussion, the court determined that the defendant was competent. This procedure was improper. The defendant was denied the right to counsel at his competency hearing.

United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2006)

The defendant was medicated for the purpose of enabling him to be sentenced. The government did not, however, satisfy the Sell factors.

United States v. White, 431 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2005)

The district court improperly ordered that the defendant be involuntarily medicated without first following the administrative procedures outlined in 28 C.F.R. § 549.43. These procedures permit the defendant to have a due process hearing before a psychiatrist. The district court is not permitted to bypass these procedures.

United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2005)

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The trial court erred in denying the defendant a continuance after the government experts testified about the types of drugs they intended to use to medicate the defendant “back into competency.” The attorney could have hired an expert prior to the hearing, but the expert would have needed more time after the government witnesses testified to prepare a response to their planned treatment protocol. The other factors governing whether a denial of a continuance was an abuse of discretion also counseled in favor of reversing the decision of the lower court.

Burt v. Uchtman, 422 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2005)

The defendant in this death penalty trial was under heavy medication, including psychotropic drugs. Suddenly, during trial and against the advice of his attorney, he insisted on entering a guilty plea. The trial court should have conducted a competency hearing to determine whether the defendant was competent to make this decision.

United States v. Morrison, 415 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2005)

The trial court failed to properly analyze the need for the administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Sell standard. Before undertaking the four-part analysis, the court must first decide whether it is appropriate to medicate the defendant to ensure the defendant’s safety or the safety of others. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (deciding standard for administration of drugs to convicted felon); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (applying Harper to pre-trial detainees).

United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005)

Though the government adequately addressed the issue of the importance of the case because of the seriousness of the charges, the presentation in the lower court did not adequately address the Sell factor dealing with the specific medications that would be used and that the medications were necessary. A remand to address these concerns was ordered.

United States v. Ghane, 392 F.3d 317 (8th Cir. 2004)

The government’s experts opined that if the defendant was forcibly medicated, there was a ten percent chance that he would be restored to competency to stand trial. The Eighth Circuit concludes that this evidence was insufficient to satisfy the Sell test for the forcible medication of a defendant. The second Sell factor articulated above, includes a component that the involuntary medication is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial. A ten percent chance is not a substantial likelihood.

United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2004)

The defendant offered proof in his § 2255 petition that he was under the influence of a powerful narcotic drug (painkiller) at the time he entered his guilty plea and that his attorney was aware of this. The district court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the factual support for this claim.

United States v. Friedman, 366 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2004)

The trial court correctly concluded that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. The Ninth Circuit also held that the government was entitled to appeal this decision as an appealable collateral order.

United States v. Rinaldi, 351 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2003)

Between the time the defendant entered his plea and the scheduled sentencing date, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that he suffered from A.D.D. The trial court ordered that the defendant be committed for a 45-day evaluation. The Seventh Circuit held that the provisions of Fed.R.Crim.P. Rule 12.2 do not apply, because the defendant was relying on a defense of insanity: his claim related only to his intent to present a diminished capacity defense (lack of capacity to form specific intent).

Deere v. Woodford, 339 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003)

An evidentiary hearing in the district court would be required to determine whether the defendant was competent to enter a guilty plea. A psychiatrist offered his opinion that the defendant understood what was going on around him, but he had no ability to help in his defense and had a compulsion to be punished with the death penalty. His guilty plea was the product of that compulsion. In short, he was bent on self-destruction.

United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245 (3rd Cir. 2003)

Pursuant to Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) and Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), a trial court must order a competency hearing must be conducted if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is not competent to participate in the proceeding. The court must examine the unique circumstances of the case and decide whether the defendant has the capacity to assist in his own defense and comprehend the nature and possible consequences of a trial. If either prong is not met, the court has reasonable cause to order a competency hearing. The trial court’s failure to order a competency hearing in this case was reversible error.

United States v. Loyla-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1997)

Defendant's suicide attempt on the eve of trial should have prompted a competency hearing. When questioned about his understanding of why he was in court, his only response was, "I don't know. I've never been here like this, so I don't know." A hearing to determine his competency should have been held.

United States v. Nevarez-Castro, 120 F.3d 190 (9th Cir. 1997)

After a defendant is released from a hospital where he had been committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), the court shall conduct a competency hearing in accordance with § 4247(d). 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e). This is not discretionary. The court's failure to conduct a competency hearing in this case required a remand to conduct a competency hearing and a new trial.

United States v. Boigegrain, 122 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1997)

A commitment order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) is appealable. That section empowers the district court to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for a period up to four months for treatment and to determine if the defendant is likely to attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed.

United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674 (3rd Cir. 1998)

After the defendant was examined by one psychiatrist who found him incompetent to stand trial, the defendant was committed to an institution. About one month later, a psychiatrist certified that the defendant was then competent. The trial was held. Two times prior to trial, however, the judge received reports that suggested that the defendant might not be competent to proceed. At no time was a hearing held. The failure to hold a hearing violated 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Even after an expert opines that the defendant has regained his competence, subsection (e) of § 4241 mandates in no uncertain terms that a hearing beheld and a finding made.

United States v. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d 480 (1st Cir. 1994)

In deciding whether to grant a continuance, the factors which should be considered are (1) the extent of the defendant’s diligence in preparing his defense prior to the date set for hearing; (2) the likely utility of the continuance if granted; (3) the inconvenience to the court and the opposing party, including witnesses; (4) the extent to which the moving party may have suffered prejudice from the denial. Here, the defendant sought a continuance to obtain a psychiatric evaluation of his competence to be sentenced. Though the defendant was not particularly diligent and there was certain inconvenience to the expert witnesses, the trial court erred in not granting a short continuance in order to enable the defendant to retain an expert to evaluate his competence to be sentenced.

United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1990)

The trial court expressed serious reservations about the defendant’s mental competence to stand trial; yet, at the same time he allowed the defendant to “knowingly and intelligently” waive his right to trial counsel. Because the trial court failed to adequately address the competence of the defendant prior to allowing him to waive his right to trial counsel, a new trial was necessary.

United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1987)

At his sentencing hearing, it was established that the defendant had been a habitual cocaine user for 16 years and was not able to help his attorney in structuring his defense. Under these circumstances, a hearing was required to determine whether the defendant was competent to stand trial and participate in his own sentencing.

United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1995)

18 U.S.C. §4241 requires the district court to conduct a competency hearing at any time prior to sentencing if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. In this case, the trial court denied defendant’s request for a hearing. This was error. In determining whether there is reasonable cause to order a competency hearing, a trial court must consider all evidence before it, including evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and the medical opinions concerning the defendant’s competence. Here, the defendant attempted to commit suicide the day after the verdict was reached, but prior to the forfeiture proceeding. Medical experts opined that he suffered from depression before the suicide attempt, possibly as long as two years before the trial.

United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286 (6th Cir. 1996)

The defendant gave notice that she was intending to offer the defense of diminished capacity and or mental disease or defect, pursuant to Rule 12.2(b). The district court ordered that the defendant be detained and examined, pursuant to Rule 12.2(c) and 18 U.S.C. §§4241 and 4242. The appellate court reversed. Because the defendant did not indicate that she would be raising an insanity defense, those provisions did not apply. Moreover, there was no basis for ordering a competency examination, because there was no information suggesting that she was not competent to stand trial.

United States v. Graves, 98 F.3d 258 (7th Cir. 1996)

The defendant, who had never committed a crime, had a severe stroke and suddenly began robbing a bank, over and over again. At the guilty plea proceeding he had apparent trouble understanding some of the questions. The trial judge questioned the defendant closely about his understanding of the proceedings and concluded on the record that he did understand the proceedings. The Seventh Circuit, however, held that in this situation, a full-scale hearing with expert testimony is required to determine the competency of the defendant.

Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1996)

The defendant had a long history of mental illness. Prior to the beginning of his trial, he had been committed to a hospital after it was determined that he was not competent to stand trial. Subsequent hearings revealed that he had improved to the point that he was competent. Nevertheless, the trial court erred in not conducting another hearing immediately prior to (or during) the trial. During the trial, the defendant testified that the murder was somehow related to the Gulf War, or perhaps President Bush. He also commented on the balanced budget, the “Reagan Party” and Bill Clinton’s tenure as governor (this was in Arkansas), and his increase in taxes. The appropriate remedy was to conduct a post-conviction competency hearing.

Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1997)

The Due Process Clause requires a trial judge to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing whenever the evidence before it raises a reasonable doubt whether a defendant is mentally competent to go to trial, or enter a guilty plea. In this case, the defendant had previously been declared incompetent and was taking large doses of anti-psychotic drugs. The state trial court should have inquired whether the defendant was using the drugs at the time of the plea. Indications existed that he was not using the drugs, and thus his ability to comprehend the proceedings would have been compromised.

United States v. Hoskie, 950 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991)

The record established that the defendant was not competent to stand trial.

United States v. Williams, 113 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1997)

The defendant’s conduct during the trial should have triggered a competency hearing. The defendant spoke rapidly and at times incoherently and, according to the appellate court was “out of control.”

Sena v. New Mexico State Prison, 109 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1997)

One year prior to entry of the plea, the state court judge had declared the defendant incompetent to stand trial. Between then and the time the plea was entered, no judicial determination had been made that the defendant had regained his competence. Even though there was a report submitted to the court that the defendant was competent, the trial judge was obligated to conduct an adversary hearing to properly resolve this issue.

Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991)

The trial court erred in holding that the defendant, who suffered from paranoid delusions, was competent to stand trial. The state trial court used an incorrect legal standard, focusing on the defendant’s awareness of his surroundings, rather than inquiring into his rational thought process, as well.

James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992)

An evidentiary hearing was required to determine the validity of defendant’s contention that he was tried while incompetent in violation of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). The Court spells out the difference between a claimed violation of Pate which requires that a competency determination be made sua sponte when the trial court determines that the defendant may not be competent; and a claim simply that the defendant was tried while incompetent – but not focusing on the trial court’s failure to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing.

Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575 (11th Cir. 1990)

Courts must focus on three factors in determining whether the trial court violated the defendant’s procedural due process rights by failing to hold sua sponte a competency hearing: (1) Evidence of the defendant’s irrational behavior; (2) the defendant’s demeanor at trial; and (3) prior medical opinion regarding the defendant’s competence to stand trial. The state trial court in this case erred in not conducting such a hearing in light of the evidence which indicated that the defendant may well have been incompetent to enter a guilty plea. There was psychiatric testimony that the defendant suffered from auditory hallucinations, and was a severe paranoid schizophrenic. During the plea colloquy, the defendant asked if he could have psychiatric treatment. Furthermore, the state trial judge wrote a letter to the Department of Corrections requesting that the defendant be committed to Central State Hospital. Finally, there was evidence that the defendant had attempted suicide on more than one occasion. Therefore, the writ of habeas corpus was granted and the case remanded to determine whether a nunc pro tunc inquiry could be made into the question of whether the defendant was, at the time of the plea hearing, incompetent to plead guilty.

Bailey v. Spears, 847 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1988)

A habeas petitioner alleged sufficient facts to raise questions about his sanity at the time of the offense, and his competence to stand trial, requiring a remand for the taking of additional evidence.

Demos v. Johnson, 835 F.2d 840 (11th Cir. 1988)

The trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendant’s request for a psychiatric examination. Evidence indicated that the defendant had a history of glue sniffing and had two prior occasions of psychiatric treatment.

Agan v. Dugger, 835 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1987)

During the course of the grand jury proceedings, and at sentencing, the defendant expressed no regret at having committed a murder, expressed dissatisfaction that his victim had not died a more painful death, and announced his intention to find and murder the partner of his victim. The court holds that this “highly irregular” conduct should have prompted the judge to conduct a competency hearing prior to accepting the guilty plea.

United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392 (D.C.Cir. 1991)

An order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §4241(a), requiring the defendant to submit to a thirty-day evaluation, is appealable. This is an order analogous to an order denying bond. Though not a final order, it is a collateral order which is immediately appealable.