COA holds that evidence of prior thefts and Y-chromosome DNA evidence were admissible in murder trial

In People v. Wood, No. 315379, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected numerous claims of error and affirmed the defendant’s convictions of alternative counts of first degree premeditated murder and felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a) and (b), larceny in a building, MCL 750.360, and possessing or using a stolen financial transaction device, MCL 750.157n(1). Specifically, the court ruled that the trial court did not err in allowing admission of 404(b)(1) evidence of defendant’s prior thefts from elderly women. The court reasoned that the evidence was admissible to show intent to commit larceny and intent to inflict great bodily harm or intent to kill the victim. The court also upheld the trial court’s admission of Y-STR DNA testing to isolate the male Y-chromosome DNA on a scarf used to bind the victim’s hands. The scarf contained DNA from four individuals, only one of which was a man. The court recognized that Y-STR DNA testing is an accepted practice, and held that the method’s limitations go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence.

These convictions stem from the robbery and brutal murder of an 80-year-old woman at her home in Royal Oak in November of 2011. The defendant’s accomplice agreed to testify against him in exchange for pleading guilty to reduced charges. She testified that the two had broken into the home to steal from the woman, who had recently paid the defendant to rake leaves, because the two were homeless and both had drug addictions. The two entered the occupied home through an unlocked door and told the victim she was being robbed. They stole money, credit cards, a cell phone, and jewelry from the home, and when the victim tried to lock herself in the bathroom, the defendant beat her severely. He then showed his accomplice a knife and went into the room where he had dragged the victim. The victim was later found dead with multiple stab wounds in her neck.

The defendant appealed on multiple grounds. First, he argued that the court erred by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b)(1), which allows admission of evidence of prior acts, besides the present offense, for a non-character purpose under certain circumstances. Here, the other acts included prior acts of theft from elderly women, two who had disabilities, and theft of a gun and the knife used in the stabbing from another family for which the defendant did odd jobs. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in admitting the other acts as evidence, because the prior thefts were admissible to show intent to commit larceny and intent to inflict great bodily harm or intent to kill the victim, since in one of the previous thefts he entered the woman’s home armed with a baseball bat. Further, the court held that both the previous thefts from vulnerable women and the theft of the knife were sufficiently related to the offense of conviction that they could show a common scheme or plan. Since proving intent and a common scheme or plan are permissible non-character purposes under MRE 404(b)(1), the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence.

Next, the defendant argued that the court erred in admitting DNA evidence from a scarf used to bind the victim’s hands. Because the scarf contained DNA from at least four people, only one of whom was male, the forensic analyst submitted the sample for Y-STR DNA testing to isolate the male Y-chromosome DNA. Unlike more common STR DNA testing, which can identify a unique individual, Y-STR DNA testing cannot because a man will have the same Y-STR DNA profile as his father and grandfather, and because random matches in the general population are also possible. Since the forensic analyst testified in detail about the limitations of Y-STR DNA evidence, and Y-STR DNA testing is an accepted practice, the court held that the method’s limitations go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence and it was properly admitted.

The court also rejected the defendant’s arguments that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly commenting on the credibility of the accomplice’s testimony and that the trial court improperly bolstered her credibility through the standard accomplice and addicted informer jury instructions it used. Further, the court rejected arguments that the police mishandled evidence and that a detective gave an improper lay opinion when he testified that a knife recovered from the vicinity of the crime was the same used to kill the victim.