Co-Defendant’S Guilty Plea Or Conviction

United States v. Head, 707 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2013)

In order to prosecute a person for accessory after the fact, the government must prove that some other person actually committed the underlying offense. Proving only that the other person was convicted of the underlying offense is not sufficient. Introducing the principal’s conviction in this case was reversible error and the failure to prove that the principal actually committed the offense resulted in an appellate determination that the government offered insufficient evidence to support the accessory’s conviction, thus barring a retrial. The defendant in the accessory prosecution must also be permitted to offer evidence that she was not aware that the principal committed the offense, or that the principal was acting in self-defense.

United States v. Landron-Class, 696 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2012)

Evidence, or argument about co-defendants’ or co-conspirators’ guilty pleas or convictions is inadmissible.

United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

It was error (though harmless) for the district court judge to explain to the jury that certain co-defendants listed in the indictment had entered guilty pleas prior to trial.

United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878 (5th Cir. 1998)

The defendant denied her guilt of participating in an odometer roll-back scheme. When the case agent was testifying, the prosecutor repeatedly asked if the defendant’s name was included in the paperwork that was associated with other people who were prosecuted in connection with the scheme. The Fifth Circuit held that this line of questioning essentially suggested that the fact that the defendant had done title work for individuals later convicted of odometer fraud established her guilt. This was improper guilt by association. Reversible error.

United States v. Ramirez, 973 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1992)

The only evidence against the defendant in this conspiracy prosecution was offered by a guilty-pleading codefendant. The trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury that they should not consider the co-defendant’s plea as evidence against the defendant.

United States v. Cosentino, 844 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1988)

Once a defendant launches an attack on the credibility of a co-conspirator who is testifying for the government, the government is free to introduce the entire plea agreement, including those portions which bolster the witness’ credibility. However, absent such an attack, such evidence is not admissible to support a witness’ credibility. The government is always permitted to introduce the impeaching aspects of the plea agreement in order to diffuse the defendant’s efforts to introduce such matters in a more damaging manner. But the bolstering aspects of a plea agreement may only be introduced once the credibility of the witness has been attacked, even if this occurs in the opening statement.

United States v. Fernandez, 829 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1987)

The credibility of a government witness was not challenged on cross-examination to the extent justifying the admissibility of a cooperation agreement between the government and a witness on re-direct examination. Only after a witness’ credibility has been challenged is a plea agreement by that witness admissible.

United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993)

The prosecutor stressed during closing argument the fact that the defendant’s witness, an alleged co-conspirator, was convicted of the same crime and his version of the facts was apparently rejected by the prior jury. This was plain error, necessitating a reversal even though there was no objection at trial.

United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1992)

Though the error was harmless, the trial court should not have permitted the government to reveal to the jury, and should not himself have mentioned, that six non-testifying co-defendants had pleaded guilty to various counts of the indictment.

United States v. Leach, 918 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1990)

References to a co-conspirator’s guilty plea may amount to plain error. An exception to this rule applies when the record reflects a defensive strategy which relies on the co-conspirator’s guilt. Here, with respect to some of the counts, the error was plain error. The prosecutor had the duty, after realizing that the guilty co-conspirator would not testify, to request an instruction which limited or struck the evidence which he had introduced regarding that co-conspirator’s guilty plea.

United States v. Cunningham, 804 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1986)

The government improperly introduced in evidence at the defendants’ counterfeit trial the guilty plea of his relatives for the offense of passing counterfeit currency. The government introduced no evidence that the defendants were aware of their relatives’ guilty plea, and thus no proof that the defendants were aware that the currency was counterfeit.

United States v. Carraway, 108 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 1997)

The trial court erred – but it was harmless – in permitting the government to offer the guilty pleas of five non-testifying co-defendants on the basis that it would put the charged conspiracy “into context.”

United States v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 1994)

Though the error was harmless in this case, it was error to permit a co-defendant’s counsel to refer during opening statement to another co-defendant’s guilty plea.

United States v. Brown, 108 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 1997)

During the trial, news accounts of the guilty plea of a corporate co-defendant were read by certain jurors. After trial, questioning of the jurors revealed that some of the jurors considered this information in their deliberations. This extraneous influence on the jury’s deliberations supported the trial judge’s decision to grant a new trial.

United States v. Smith, 806 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1986)

It is plain error for a prosecutor during closing argument to refer to the defendant’s co-conspirators’ having pled guilty. The prosecutor stated that these pleas should be used as substantive evidence against the defendant.

United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1990)

The government committed reversible error in introducing evidence of a co-conspirator’s conviction. The co-conspirator did not testify, and thus there was no need to impeach him. The court reviews the government’s various arguments why the evidence should have been admissible, and also that it was harmless error, and rejects each of these arguments. The error was harmful and tainted not only the conviction with regard to counts where the co-conspirator was involved, but also all other counts of the indictment. The court characterized the government’s efforts to introduce this evidence as governmental misconduct.

United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1987)

A co-defendant’s guilty plea may not be used as substantive evidence of a defendant’s guilt. The admission of the co-defendant’s unredacted plea agreement was clear error, even though the trial judge instructed the jury the plea agreement could be considered only for purposes of evaluating the co-defendant’s credibility.