The Supreme Court handed downSchirro v. Smithsince the last "edition." The issue in Smith concerned whether the Ninth Circuit should have permitted Arizona to use its own rules in evaluating mental retardation claims or mandate a jury trial for those claims. The Supreme Court remands holding that Arizona's must be allowed to develop its own response to Atkins and hence the Ninth Circuit's ordering of a jury trial on that issue was inappropriate. What is perhaps most telling in the Court's action though is dicta that strongly suggests that some rules implemented by the various states may run afoul of Atkins.

In the lower courts several notable "wins" are had. The Ninth Circuit, en banc, grants penalty phase relief on ineffectiveness inSummerlin v. Schirro. The Florida Supreme Court inState v. Steeleupholds Florida's sentencing provisions, after noting that Florida was the sole outlier on permitting a judge to impose death where the jury was not unanimous in either the findings aggravators and/or recommendation of death; the case is listed as a "win" as it Steele court holds judges are permitted to require advance notice of aggravators. InBennett v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.mandamus is granted to prevent use of new aggravating circumstances (the case had been previously remanded) as the government had not shown sufficient cause as to why it had not sought to present the "new" aggravators prior to the case being remanded.

In the news,this articleran recently on the problems highlighted inState v. Steele(above) with the Florida death penalty scheme and what needs to be done to help the statute survive likely legal challenges. Somewhat relatedly, the Delaware Supreme Court heard arguments as to whether Ring v. Arizona and/or state precedent requires juries to be unanimous when recommending death.Press reportsnote that with a surge in abolition in Africa 99 countries have now formally abolished the death penalty with an additional 40 countries recognizing either a formal moratorium or are considered de-facto abolitionists since they have not carried out any executions for at least 10 years.Finally, calling the "US death penalty 'woefully short of justice'" in its byline, the AFP wire service today runs a review of state killing American style inthis articlethat has already traversed the world.

Find below the execution schedule of serious dates for the rest of the year. At the moment Eric Nance is scheduled to be the 1000th execution of the modern era. If stay rates remain at their routine levels number 1000 will likely be one of the December dates or possibly a yet to be set date during the first weeks in January.

All appellate opinions available on Lexis, and Lexis cites for the various appellate courts are available for free at Lexisone.com.

Full edition archived athttp://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/051024.htm

As always, thanks for reading. - k

Recent Executions

October

20 Luis Ramirez (Texas)25 William Williams Jr. (Ohio)

Pending Executions

October

26 Marlin Gray (Missouri)

November

2 Jaime Elizalde (Texas)

3 Melvin White (Texas)

4 Arthur Wise (South Carolina----volunteer)

4 Brian Steckel (Delaware)

9 Charles Thacker (Texas)

11 Steven McHone (North Carolina)

15 Robert Rowell (Texas)

15 John Spirko (Ohio)

16 Shannon Thomas (Texas)

18 Elias Syriani (North Carolina)

28 Eric Nance (Arkansas)

29 John Hicks (Ohio)

30 Robin Lovitt (Virginia)

December

2 Daryl Atkins (Virginia)

2 Kenneth Boyd (North Carolina)

7 Tony Ford (Texas)

13 Stanley Williams (California)

Supreme Court

Schirro v. Smith, No. 04-1475 (10/17/2005)States must continue to be free to experiment in creating standards to determine mental retardation, in light of Atkins v. Virginia. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, erred in ordering Arizona to try mental retardation by jury trial. "Arizona had not even had a chance to apply its chosen procedures when the Ninth Circuit preemptively imposed its jury trial condition."

Washington v. Recuenco, 05-83 (10/17/2005) Cert granted on whether Blakely error is structural or subject to harmless error analysis. Doug Berman has several posts on these matters that are worth the read as to what Summerlin means, recent comments by Justice Scalia as to jury trial and structural errorand comments on Recuenco.

In Favorem Vitae et Libertatis

Summerlin v. Schirro, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22316 (9th Cir 10/17/2005) (en banc) Penalty phase relief granted on ineffective assistance of counsel on a 10-1 vote.

Moorman v. Schirro,2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22061 (9th Cir 10/13/2005) Remand ordered to determine whether procedural default should be excused due to state court counsels' deficient performance.

Bennett v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 121 Nev. Adv. Rep. 78 (Nev 10/20/2005) Bennett's death sentence was vacated previously on appeal. After the sentence with was vacated the state supreme court held that certain aggravators with which Bennett was originally charged can't support a finding of aggravating circumstances on facts similar to his. New precedent does not serve as cause to permit the government to seek an amended notice of aggravating circumstances to add new aggs.

State v. Steele, 2005 Fla. LEXIS 2043 (FL 10/12/2005) Court votes to uphold Florida's sentencing provisions permitting a judge to impose death where the jury was not unanimous in either aggravators or recommendation of death (the only state in the nation that does so). The Steel Court goes on to permit, however, judges to order advance notice of aggravators.

The bottom line is that Florida is now the only state in the country that allows the death penalty to be imposed even though the penalty-phase jury may determine by a mere majority vote both whether aggravators exist and whether to recommend the death penalty. Assuming that our system continues to withstand constitutional scrutiny, we ask the Legislature to revisit it to decide whether it wants Florida to remain the outlier state.

Favoring Death

Aguilar v. Dretke, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22031 (5th Cir 10/12/2005) Relief denied on claims relating to lesser included offenses, as well as request for COA on six additional charges arising, directly or indirectly, from prior counsel's poor performance.

Floyd v. State, 2005 Fla. LEXIS 2042 (FL 10/12/2005) Relief denied on claims relating to the "(1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) admission of collateral crime evidence; (3) admission of photographic evidence; (4) admission of expert testimony; (5) the State's closing argument; (6) inquiry into prior convictions; (7) the applicability of Ring v. Arizona and (8) the applicability of the Eighth Amendment."

Leal v. Dretke, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22180 (5th Cir 10/13/2005) Relief and COA denied on claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that the Texas capital sentencing scheme's special issues are unconstitutionally vague.

Howard v. Dretke, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22106 (5th Cir 10/6/2005) Relief and stay denied on a grab bag of claims including failure of Howard's federal post-conviction counsel to file for certiorari -- Howard was executed earlier this month.

The district court then appointed Baxley "to represent Howard throughout the remainder of his federal proceedings." Id. In September 2005, William Zapalac, counsel to the clerk's office of United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, e-mailed Baxley, "inquiring whether [Baxley] intended to file anything in this court on behalf of Mr. Howard prior to his scheduled execution." E-mail from William Zapalac, Counsel to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Clerk's Office, to Steve Baxley (Sept. 21, 2005, 11:56:00 CDT). Baxley's complete response follows: "My understanding is that I no longer represent Mr. Howard and that I was only appointed [*18] for the limited purpose of filing an appeal regarding the denial of the certificate of appealability." Id. Judging by his response to this court, Baxley may not have understood that he had any obligation beyond filing an appeal regarding the district court's denial of a COA.

That said, we do not believe that there is any reasonable probability that, had Baxley filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, the writ would have been granted or a substantial possibility that our decision to deny a COA would have been reversed.

Malicoat v. Mullin, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 21946 (10th Cir 10/11/2005) Relief denied on claims including that "(1) his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to argue that a carving in the courtroom bearing the inscription "AN EYE FOR AN EYE AND A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH" deprived him of a fair trial. Mr. Malicoat also argues that the OCCA erred by (2) concluding that, under Beck v. Alabama he was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of second-degree depraved-mind murder; (3) concluding that no finding of Mr. Malicoat's intent to kill was required to support the death sentence, in violation of the Eighth Amendment principles set forth in Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona; (4) rejecting Mr. Malicoat's claim that the prosecution's closing arguments during the guilt and sentencing stages deprived him of a fair trial; (5) concluding that the admission of a photograph of the victim while alive, although error, was harmless; (6) rejecting Mr. Malicoat's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Finally, Mr. Malicoat argues that (7) the cumulative effect of these errors also deprived him of a fair trial."

United States v. Minaya, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23799 (SDNY 10/12/2005) In relevant portion, a decision on whether or not to authorize death has not been made by DoJ and at such an early stage it would be inappropriate to decide whether to sever related cases or not.

Davis v. State, 2005 Fla. LEXIS 2052 (FL 10/20/2005) Relief denied on a grab bag of issues following an evidentiary hearing on claims including: "(1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel during pre-trial, voir dire and guilt phase of trial; (2) due process violations arising from the State's withholding of material and exculpatory evidence and presenting misleading evidence; (3) violations of Davis's Sixth Amendment rights by the State's failure to reveal that it had made promises to jailhouse informants or that they were operating as agents of the State; (4) prosecutorial misconduct involving improper comments made to the jury along with the introduction of inadmissible evidence in addition to ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to these alleged errors; (5) inadequate mental health expert assistance along with ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to provide the background materials necessary for an adequate evaluation; (6) ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel for failure to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence; (7) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the introduction of the details of a prior felony during the penalty phase; and (8) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the trial court admitting victim impact evidence during both the guilt and penalty phases of trial."

Waldrip v. Head, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 663 (10/11/2005) Relief denied on whether the habeas court erred in denying Waldrip's evidence suppression claims and in denying Waldrip's claim regarding the State's use, during his competency trial, of his silence and request for counsel.

Storey v. State, 2005 Mo. LEXIS 391 (Mo 10/18/2005) Relief denied on a grab bag of issues including: "1) counsel failed to impeach Storey's ex-wife; 2) counsel failed to call the judge and bailiff to testify in a special hearing held to investigate jury misconduct; 3) rule 29.15 counsel failed to establish jury misconduct or persuade the motion court to recall the jury during the motion hearing; 4) counsel failed to object to victim impact and other evidence admitted at trial or preserve the issue for appeal; 5) counsel failed to present evidence through additional witnesses; 6) counsel failed to find impeaching evidence or obtain independent testing of unidentified hairs found on Ms. Frey's body; 7) counsel failed to present additional mitigating evidence through several experts; 8) prosecutorial misconduct; 9) direct appeal counsel was ineffective for not raising several allegations of trial court error; 10) counsel failed to object to several points of witness testimony; 11) counsel failed to object to two of the prosecutor's arguments; 12) counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's description of the burden of proof; and 13) counsel failed to object to confusing jury penalty instructions."

Blake v State, 121 Nev. Adv. Rep. 77 (Nev 10/20/2005)Relief denied on claims including preventing-a-lawful-arrest aggravating circumstance, instruction on consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, entry of plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, challenge for cause of prospective juror, and prosecutorial misconduct during penalty phase.

Black v. State, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1129, July 19, 2005 (Tenn Crim App 10/19/2005) Relief denied on mental retardation claim, including: "(1) whether Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded; (2) whether Tennessee [law] as interpreted by the supreme court in Howell v. State, is constitutional in light of the principles outlined in Atkins v. Virginia; and (3) whether the absence of mental retardation is an element of capital murder requiring the State to bear the burden of proof and requiring submission of the issue to a jury."

Abdhur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 828 (Tenn 10/17/2005) State's lethal injection protocols upheld.

We granted review to address several issues regarding the Tennessee Department of Correction's protocol for executing inmates who have been sentenced to death by lethal injection. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the lethal injection protocol in Tennessee, which includes intravenous injections of sodium Pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride, (1) does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, (2) does not violate due process provisions under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions, (3) does not deny access to the courts in violation of the United States or Tennessee Constitutions, (4) does not violate the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, (5) does not violate the Nonlivestock Animal Humane Death Act, (6) does not violate provisions governing the practice of medicine and provision of healthcare services, and (7) does not violate the Drug Control Act or Pharmacy Practice Act.

Capital Related

Hill v. Arkansas (In re the Federal Public Defender's Representation of Defendants Sentenced to Death in State Court), 2005 Ark. LEXIS 604 (Ark 10/13/2005) Arkansas Supreme Court addresses the issue of federal defenders appearing in state court to represent people on exhaustion:

it is the responsibility of the State, and specifically state courts, to determine the availability of state remedies. That responsibility includes the appointment of qualified, competent counsel under Rule 37.5, which had its genesis in the AEDPA. It further includes the responsibility to determine if the defendant accepts appointed counsel.. . . the FPD's argument that its office is providing competent counsel in these state proceedings at no cost to the state. Its argument, in essence, is that we are looking a gift horse in the mouth. But, again, it is this state's responsibility to oversee appointment of counsel for indigent, capital defendants in state proceedings - not the responsibility of the federal government. Moreover, the FPD's assertion appears to discount principles of federalism and comity and to be at odds with the policy considerations that led to the AEDPA.

It is, therefore, the opinion of this court that counsel appointed to represent indigent, capital defendants in connection with unexhausted state remedies after the mandate has issued must comply with the criteria for appointment set out in Rule 37.5, including whether the defendant accepts appointment of counsel, and further must be appointed by this court. This, of course, does not hamper or militate against this court's appointment of the FPD for this purpose. In sum, we hold that the District Court did not err in its application of the Batson framework. n19 Wilson has submitted compelling evidence showing that the prosecutor in his case regularly acted with discriminatory animus toward African-American jurors. This evidence, coupled with the fact that numerous African-Americans were stricken from his jury, gives rise to an almost unavoidable inference that the prosecutor engaged in prohibited discrimination in this case. For the above reasons, the District Court did not err in its grant of the writ, hence we will affirm its order.

Wilson v. Beard, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22065 (3rd Cir 10/13/2005) Panel holds that the Commonwealth intentionally used race as a predicate for its strikes. Following his conviction for this crime, Wilson was tried for capital murder for killing of Jamie Lamb. Wilson was again convicted and, at the sentencing phase, the Commonwealth presented the jury with evidence of his previous conviction. The jury found two aggravating circumstances, including that Wilson "had a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence," and sentenced him to death.

Outtakes

Schirro v. Smith, No. 04-1475 (10/17/2005) The Ninth Circuit should not have preemptively created a right to jury trial in Atkins cases.

Shortly thereafter, Smith asserted in briefing that he is mentally retarded and cannot, under Atkins, be executed. The Ninth Circuit ordered suspension of all federal habeas proceedings and directed Smith to “institute proceedings in the proper trial court of Arizona to determine whether the state is prohibited from executing [Smith] in accordance with Atkins.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-2. The court further ordered that the issue whether Smith is mentally retarded must “be determined . . . by a jury trial unless the right to a jury is waived by the parties.” Ibid.

The Ninth Circuit erred in commanding the Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve Smith’s mental retardation claim. Atkins stated in clear terms that “we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” 536 U. S., at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 416-17 (1986); modifications in original). States, including Arizona, have responded to that challenge by adopting their own measures for adjudicating claims of mental retardation. While those measures might, in their application, be subject to constitutional challenge, Arizona had not even had a chance to apply its chosen procedures when the Ninth Circuit preemptively imposed its jury trial condition.

Summerlin v. Schirro, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22316 (9th Cir 10/17/2005) (en banc) Penalty phase relief granted on ineffective assistance of counsel on a 10-1 vote.

In contrast, examining the available mitigating evidence that the Supreme Court has identified as significant, Summerlin’s potential case in mitigation was strong. He had a compelling childhood history of physical and mental abuse: deserted by his father who was later killed in a police shootout; locked repeatedly in an ammonia-fumed room by his mother; and subjected to electroshock at his mother’s insistence. He had learning disabilities, to the point of being considered “functionally mentally retarded.” He was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and treated with anti-psychotic medications. He was also diagnosed as having an explosive personality disorder with impaired impulse control. One psychiatrist found indications of organic brain impairment, borderline personality disorder, and paranoid personality disorder. In his opinion, Summerlin “is deeply emotionally and mentally disturbed, unaware of the motives underlying much of his behavior, and unable, because of his problems, to exercise normal restraint and control, once his highly unstable and volatile emotions are aroused.” All of this was not only highly relevant as general mitigation, but was also evidence that could directly counter the other aggravating factor urged by the State, namely that the crime had been committed in a ‘heinous, cruel, or depraved manner,’ in the balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors by the trial court.

The State suggests that no prejudice occurred because all of the mitigating evidence was contained in Dr. Tatro’s letter attached to the presentence report. However, the report cited by the State was not a psychiatric evaluation prepared for the penalty phase. It was a letter from Tatro to Summerlin’s former attorney that pre-dated the initial trial. The purpose of the evaluation at that stage, and the focus of the letter, was to determine whether Summerlin was competent to stand trial and whether a potential insanity defense was available. Tatro’s conclusion was that no guilt phase defense was available under the M’Naghten test, which had been adopted by Arizona “as the sole standard for criminal responsibility.” State v. Ramos, 648 P.2d 119, 121 (Ariz. 1982). To sustain a defense of legal insanity under the test, “[a]n accused must have had at the time of the commission of the criminal act: (1) Such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act, or (2) If he did know, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” State v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 580, 583 (Ariz. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). These considerations are far different from those involved in a penalty phase mitigation defense. We have cautioned that in presenting a penalty phase mitigation defense based on mental health, counsel should not merely rely on competency evaluations conducted at the guilt phase, which are prepared for a different purpose. Bean, 163 F.3d at 1078-79 (concluding that defense counsel was not reasonable to rely at penalty upon mental health evidence previously amassed for competency challenge); see also Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1043-44 (stating that investigation of mental health evidence for guilt phase does not excuse failure to develop mental health mitigation evidence for penalty phase).

Dr. Tatro was a psychologist, not a psychiatrist or a neurologist. As a result, it is perhaps understandable that Dr. Tatro’s letter did not discuss a key mental health defense, namely that of psychomotor epilepsy. The evidence of psychomotor epilepsy was available to Summerlin’s counsel, but he did not pursue it. For example, Dr. Leonardo Garcia-Brunuel, a psychiatrist who examined Summerlin in the early stages of the case, was prepared to testify that Summerlin had a temporal lobe seizure disorder and had a psychomotor seizure when he committed the murder. Dr. Garcia testified that this may have caused uncontrollable behavior. Other psychiatrists, who were available to Summerlin’s attorney at the time, testified that they had not tested Summerlin for this condition, but if the diagnosis were correct, a psychomotor seizure would have strongly affected Summerlin’s ability to control his actions after the onset of the seizure. This is significant mitigation testimony that was available to Summerlin’s attorney but not presented in Tatro’s competency letter. Further, Dr. Tuchler, one of Summerlin’s other examining physicians, conceded at the state habeas evidentiary hearing that based “on material that has been brought up subsequently,” he believed that there may have been a complete loss of impulse control that affected Summerlin’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Therefore, the notion that the Tatro letter presented a complete view of available mitigating factors is not correct.

When considered in the aggregate, the available mitigating evidence in this case is far more compelling than the evidence the Supreme Court held adequate to establish prejudice in Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534-38. As the Supreme Court noted, “[h]ad the jury been able to place petitioner’s excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.” Id. at 537. Although, for the purposes of resolving this issue, we evaluate prejudice in the context of judge-sentencing, the result is the same. The fact that Summerlin’s counsel did not present evidence to mitigate the aggravated assault special circumstance, nor evidence to mitigate the alleged “heinous, cruel, or depraved manner” in which the crime was committed, undermines our confidence in the court’s imposition of a death sentence, particularly since the State was required to prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, we conclude that the failure of trial counsel to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase hearing has undermined our confidence in the sentence of death imposed by the trial judge. Had an adequate mitigation defense been presented, there is “a reasonable probability” that an objective sentencing fact finder “would have struck a different balance.” Id.; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (noting that a reasonable probability of a different result is less than the preponderance more-likely-than-not standard); Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2469 (“[A]lthough we suppose that [the sentencer] could have heard it all and still have decided on the death penalty, that is not the test.”). We therefore hold that Summerlin has established prejudice under the standards articulated in Strickland. He is entitled to habeas corpus relief.

State v. Steele, 2005 Fla. LEXIS 2043 (FL 10/12/2005) Court votes, in relevant part, to permit judges to order advance notice of aggravators.

The State argues that a notice requirement is inequitable because the defense is not required to notify the State of mitigating circumstances. We note substantive differences, however, between proving aggravating circumstances and proving mitigators. To obtain a death sentence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance, whereas to obtain a life sentence the defendant need not prove any mitigating circumstances at all. Cf. Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 249-50 (Fla. 1996) (holding that a jury is not compelled to recommend death where aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors). Moreover, the defendant may invoke “[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty.” § 921.141(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2004); see also Ford v. State, 802 So. 2d 1121, 1138 (Fla. 2001) (“We adopted the [U.S. Supreme Court’s] definition of a mitigating circumstance: ‘any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense’ that reasonably may serve as a basis for imposing a sentence less than death”) (Pariente, J., concurring in result only) (quoting Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 n.4 (Fla. 1990), receded from in part by Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2000)). The State, on the other hand, is limited to the specific aggravating factors listed in section 921.141(5). See Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla. 1979) (noting that “[t]he aggravating circumstances specified in the [Florida] statute are exclusive, and no others may be used for that purpose”) (citing Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4, 7 (Fla. 1977)). Therefore, even if it could be required, pretrial notice of specific nonstatutory mitigation could prove unwieldy.

In sum, the State’s obligation to prove one or more statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant may be subjected to a sentence of death is different in kind from the defendant’s decision whether to present mitigation. A trial court’s failure to impose a reciprocal obligation does not constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law constituting a miscarriage of justice. For these reasons, our answer to the first certified question is “no.” We add, however, that under current law the trial court cannot prohibit the State from relying on an aggravator that was either undisclosed or disclosed beyond the deadline. As counsel for the respondent acknowledged at oral argument, any violation will at most justify a continuance to allow the defendant to rebut or impeach the State’s evidence. Accordingly, the trial court in this case did not depart from the essential requirements of law in ordering the State to list the aggravators on which it intended to rely in the penalty phase of Steele’s trial.

THE SMALL PRINT

SUBSCRIBING & ARCHIVES: Capital Defense Weekly is normally written by Karl Keys. CDW is published forty (40) times (or so) a year. Archives accessible athttp://capitaldefenseweekly.com/index.html. To subscribe:capital_defense_weekly-subscribe@yahoogroups.com. The Weekly's RSS feed can be found athttp://rss.groups.yahoo.com/group/capital_defense_weekly/rss. The Daily Copy's RSS/Atom feed athttp://capitaldefenseweekly.com/atom.xml.