In an edition light on cases due to the recent holiday, the focus this week is on the Supreme Court's decision earlier this week inMinnesota v. Carter.

In Focus

Minnesota v. CarterThe Supreme Court on Tuesday handed privacy rights a defeat by limiting the right of guests to a reasonable expectation of privacy in other people's homes. The meat of the opinion holds:

A divided Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that respondents had "standing" to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment because they had " `a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' " 569 N. W. 2d 169, 174 (1997) (quoting Rakasv. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143(1978)). The court noted that even though "society does not recognize as valuable the task of bagging cocaine, we conclude that society does recognize as valuable the right of property owners or leaseholders to invite persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct a common task, be it legal or illegal activity. We, therefore, hold that [respondents] had standing to bring [their] motion to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of Thielen's observations." 569 N. W. 2d, at 176; see also 569 N. W.2d 180, 181. Based upon its conclusion that the respondents had "standing" to raise their Fourth Amendment claims, the court went on to hold that Thielen's observation constituted a search of the apartment under the Fourth Amendment, and that the search was unreasonable. Id., at 176-179. We granted certiorari, 523 U. S. ___ (1998), and now reverse.

The Minnesota courts analyzed whether respondents had a legitimate expectation of privacy under the rubric of "standing" doctrine, an analysis which this Court expressly rejected 20 years ago in Rakas. 439 U. S., at 139-140. In that case, we held that automobile passengers could not assert the protection of the Fourth Amendment against the seizure of incriminating evidence from a vehicle where they owned neither the vehicle nor the evidence. Ibid.Central to our analysis was the idea that in determining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his (and not someone else's) Fourth Amendment rights, the "definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing." 439 U. S., at 140. Thus, we held that in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e.,one which has "a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Id.,at 143-144, and n. 12. See also Smithv. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740-741(1979). . . . .

The text of the Amendment suggests that its protections extend only to people in "their" houses. But we have held that in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else. In Minnesotav. Olson, 495 U. S. 91(1990), for example, we decided that an overnight guest in a house had the sort of expectation of privacy that the Fourth Amendment protects. . . . .

In Jonesv. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 259(1960), the defendant seeking to exclude evidence resulting from a search of an apartment had been given the use of the apartment by a friend. He had clothing in the apartment, had slept there " `maybe a night,' " and at the time was the sole occupant of the apartment. But while the holding of Jones--that a search of the apartment violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights--is still valid, its statement that "anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality," id.,at 267, was expressly repudiated in Rakasv. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128(1978). Thus an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.

Respondents here were obviously not overnight guests, but were essentially present for a business transaction and were only in the home a matter of hours. There is no suggestion that they had a previous relationship with Thompson, or that there was any other purpose to their visit. Nor was there anything similar to the overnight guest relationship in Olsonto suggest a degree of acceptance into the household. While the apartment was a dwelling place for Thompson, it was for these respondents simply a place to do business.

Property used for commercial purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes than residential property. "An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home." New Yorkv. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 700(1987). And while it was a "home" in which respondents were present, it was not their home. Similarly, the Court has held that in some circumstances a worker can claim Fourth Amendment protection over his own workplace. See, e.g., O'Connorv. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709(1987). But there is no indication that respondents in this case had nearly as significant a connection to Thompson's apartment as the worker in O'Connorhad to his own private office. See id., at 716-17.

If we regard the overnight guest in Minnesotav. Olsonas typifying those who may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home of another, and one merely "legitimately on the premises" as typifying those who may not do so, the present case is obviously somewhere in between. But the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder, all lead us to conclude that respondents' situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises. We therefore hold that any search which may have occurred did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights.

Because we conclude that respondents had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, we need not decide whether the police officer's observation constituted a "search." The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Habeas

Abbamonte v. USASecond Circuit examines the scope of habeas review for federal prisoners, and holds that where the factual predicate for a claim lies outside the record, even if initially raised on direct appeal, relief may be had.

Allen v. ThomasEleventh Circuit holds that a pleas agreement which waives the right to appeal must knowingly and specifically waive the right to federal habeas review.

Miller v. ChampionTenth Circuit holds:

Although the record indicates that Mr. Miller requested an evidentiary hearing in state court, the court denied this request. We now join every other circuit that has confronted this question and hold that where, as here, a habeas petitioner has diligently sought to develop the factual basis underlying his habeas petition, but a state court has prevented him from doing so, § 2254(e)(2) does not apply. See Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 337; McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998); Burris v. Parke, 116 F.3d 256, 258-59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 462 (1997); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1997); Love v. Morton, 112 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the AEDPA does not preclude Mr. Miller from receiving an evidentiary hearing. Thus, Mr. Miller is entitled to receive an evidentiary hearing so long as his allegations, if true and if not contravened by the existing factual record, would entitle him to habeas relief. See Medina, 71 F.3d at 368-69. (some internal citations omitted)

Prisoner's Rights and Prosecutorial Misconduct

Davis v. KellySecond Circuit holds that allegations of retaliatory transfer and subsequent dismissal in the district court, without adequate opportunity to identify officials responsible for the challenged transfer orders, was premature.

Swan v. BanksNinth Circuit holds 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(e) of the PLRA applies only prospectively

Recent Cert Grants of Note

97-2048 O'SULLIVAN, WILLIAM V. BOERCKEL, DARREN

Question: May an individual who is in custody pursuant to a state criminal conviction pursue claims in a federal habeas petition if those claims were not raised on direct appeal in a petition for discretionary review to the state's highest court?

98-223 FLORIDA V. WHITE, TYVESSEL TYVORUS

Question: Do police generally need a court warrant before they can search vehicles under state forfeiture laws that allow seizure of property linked to drug crimes?

98-262 JOHNSON, PERRY, ET AL. V. HADIX, EVERETT, ET AL.

Question: Whether, in litigation pending on the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the attorney fee provision of PLRA Sec. 803(d), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d), applies to fees awarded after the Act's effective date for services rendered after that date. 2. Whether, in such litigation, this fee provision applies to fees awarded after the Act's effective date for services rendered before that date.

Other Perspectives

Law Journal Extra-- without a doubt the best source of free legal news on the web has of note this week

Articles:

Law Schools urged to defend capital cases

Courthouse:

THE DISTRICT COURT should use a de novo standard to review dismissals of prisoners' complaints under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appealsheld Nov. 20. Ruiz v. U.S., 97-20950. . . . . Affirming in a per curiam ruling, the appeals court said, "[C]losely analogous to Sec. 1915A...is 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(c), which directs the district court to dismiss, on its own motion or the motion of a party, 'any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983...or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.' This Court reviews de novo a dismissal under Sec. 1997e(c).... Because the language of Sec. 1915A tracks the language of Sec. 1997e(c), we will therefore employ the same de

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