In the one case hot listed this week, Hall v. Texas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has levied their opinion on the execution of the mentally retarded. Coming as a surprise to no one, the Hall Court has held that the execution of a person with mental age of an eight to ten year old does not offend either the United States Constitution constitution or Texas's Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a capital case, Ring v. Arizona, No. 01-488. The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide the constitutionality of having a judge, rather than a jury, decide the sentence in a death penalty case. The case will apply Apprendi v. New Jersey, in which the Court held that a judge could not make findings which would increase a defendant's sentence beyond the maximum, since that amounted to an additional conviction. The D.C. Federal Defenders and the New York State Defender's Association have gathered an incredible database on and library on Apprendi issues, that should be visited for resources should the need so arise.

Kicking off what will be several weeks of a focus on mental status and mental health issues are excerpts from the amici curiae brief in McCarver v. North Carolina of American Association of Mental Retardation, et al. Overviews of mitigation, mental status, and possibly neuropharmocology, will be covered in upcoming editions as well as case law as to what counsel must do in order to meet their Sixth Amendment obligations.

Several people have requested the briefs in United States v. Plaza concerning the term "match" as it relates to fingerprints. Should you have the briefs and be willing to share please feel free to forward at karl@karlkeys.com OR fax to 617.249.0219.

Finally, the twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Gary Gilmore execution that marked the resumption of capital punishment was noted on January 17, 2002. In commemoration, seven activists were arrested after unfurling a 30-foot-long banner that read "STOP EXECUTIONS." Immediately after the banner was unfurled, Supreme Court police rushed the protesters and ripped the banner from their hands. All seven remain in jail at the time of mailing.

Since the last edition there have been the following domestic executions:

9 Michael Moore Texas

9 James Johnson Missouri

16 Jamarr Arnold Texas

Executions slated and considered likely for January 2002:

24 Amos King Florida

29 Stephen Anderson California

29 John Romano Oklahoma

30 Windell Broussard Texas

31 Randall Hafdahl Texas

31 David Woodruff Oklahoma

This week's edition is at http://www.capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/020114.htm

HOT LIST CASES

Hall v. Texas, 2002 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 9 (Tex Crim App. 1/16/2002) Relief denied on claims relating to whether the constitutionality of violating the mentally retarded.

We note that the United Supreme Court has granted certiorari twice this year on the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty of the mentally retarded. On September 25, 2001, the Supreme Court dismissed as improvidently granted the writ of certiorari granted in McCarver v. North Carolina. n20 The case of Atkins v. Virginia n21 is still pending.

Hall argues that his cognitive abilities necessarily reduce his culpability to such a level that the assessment [*17] of death is a disproportionate punishment. In support of his point, Hall points out testimony from his own expert, clinical and forensic psychologist Dr. Mark Cunningham, who testified that Hall was mildly retarded and generally functioned at the level of an eight- to ten-year-old child. Hall then notes that Texas law does not allow the execution of children who are eight to ten chronological years old, and in fact, does not even prosecute children of that age. Thus, he argues, the law should not allow the execution of a person with the "mental age" of a child.

The United States Supreme Court answered this question in Penry when it addressed whether it is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to execute a mentally retarded person "with Penry's reasoning ability." n22 The Supreme Court reasserted the principle that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant, and defendants who commit criminal acts "that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse." n23 Indeed, the Court agreed that mental retardation has long been [*18] regarded as a factor that may diminish an individual's culpability for a criminal act. n24 However, the Court could not conclude that all mentally retarded people, by virtue of their mental retardation alone and apart from any individualized consideration of their personal responsibility, inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty. n25 In other words, mentally retarded persons are individuals whose abilities and experiences can vary significantly. And, although retarded persons often have difficulty learning from experience, some are fully capable of learning, working, and living in their communities. n26 In light of these diverse capacities and life experiences, the Court concluded that it could not be said that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with the death penalty. n27

The principle set forth in Penry applies with equal force today. Although Hall presented evidence that he generally functions at the level of an eight- to ten-year-old child, the jurors were required to consider this evidence only in light of all of the evidence presented. So long as the sentencers could consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of mental retardation in imposing sentence, and make an individualized determination whether "death is the appropriate punishment" in this particular case, the Eighth Amendment does not preclude the assessment of a death sentence. n28

The jurors not only had Dr. Cunningham's assessment that Hall functioned as a child, but they also had his concession that Hall would be considered only "mildly retarded." Furthermore, the jury had the testimony of the State's expert, Dr. [*20] Randall Price, who was not convinced that Hall was retarded. Instead, Price testified that Hall could be mildly retarded, but he also might be of borderline intelligence. Price further noted that, in his professional opinion, Hall functioned more in the adolescent to young adult stage. Additionally, persons who had worked with Hall at Kroger testified that he did not appear mentally challenged--just lazy. Finally, the jury was able to observe Hall's behavior first-hand in the videotaped interview he gave the press. n29

In light of this evidence, we cannot say that Hall's due process rights have been violated or that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Points of error eight and nine are overruled.

SUPREME COURT CASES & NEWS

Ring v. Arizona, No. 01-488. Question unavailable, however, appears to be something to the effect of whether Walton v. Arizona survive Apprendi v. New Jersey.

POSITIVE CAPITAL CASE RESULTS

Peterkin v. Horn, No. 95-CV-3989 (E.D.Pa. 01/07/2002) Motion for reconsideration granted "on the basis of the trial court's jury instructions regarding a finding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances . . .. "

In now re-examining the instructions given to the jury by the trial judge in the context of this case as a whole and in light of the Banks v. Horn decision, we must now agree with Petitioner that there exists "a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the foregoing instruction in such a way that prevented the consideration of constitutionally relevant (i.e. mitigating circumstances) evidence." Banks, 271 F.3d at 549 quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380, 110 S.Ct. at 1190. Indeed, the instructions which Judge Sabo gave to Mr. Peterkin's jury with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the manner in which they should be weighed virtually mirror those given to Mr. Banks' jury. We shall therefore adopt the Third Circuit's finding in that case that "the instructions are in themselves ambiguous, allowing for a jury to infer that the requirement of unanimity applies both to aggravating and mitigating circumstances" and there is no way that a juror would understand that a mitigating circumstance could be considered by less than all jurors." Banks, 271 F.3d at 548. Likewise, the Third Circuit's conclusion that "a reasonable juror could readily infer from the fact that the distinctions between the burden of proof were explained but no mention made of a distinction between a requirement of unanimity for a finding of aggravating circumstances and the requirement for mitigating circumstances, that the same requirement of unanimity applied" is equally applicable here. Id. We therefore find that Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief for the same reasons set forth in Banks.

CAPITAL CASES - RELIEF DENIED

Tennesse v. Davidson, No. M1998-00105-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn.Crim.App. 01/07/2002) Relief denied most notably on: " (1) Whether the trial erred when it denied the appellant's motions to change venue, strike the venire and grant additional peremptory challenges; (2) Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; (3) Whether a witness for the prosecution should have been allowed to offer opinion testimony; (4) Whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury about the unanimity of its verdict; (5) Whether the jury's verdict is proper; (6) Whether the prosecutor has unlimited discretion in seeking the death penalty; (7) Whether the death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner; and (8) Whether Tennessee courts employ an adequate proportionality review."

Hall v. McLesky, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn.App. 1/11/2002)"[A] timely challenge to the erroneous jury instruction would "more probably than not" have led to a different result."

Utah v. Honie, 2002 Utah LEXIS 5; 2002 UT 4 (Utah 1/11/2002) Save for the "arrgument that Utah's statutory scheme unconstitutionally fails to channel sentencing discretion by failing to narrow the class of persons who are eligible for the death penalty," trial counsel's failure to object

Utah v. Daniels, 2002 Utah LEXIS 4; 2002 UT 2 (Utah 1/11/2002) Relief denied on claims "that (1) he was denied the right to a fair trial because he was tried in a courtroom located inside a prison; (2) the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury on manslaughter; (3) his sentence imposed by a vote of ten of twelve jurors should be vacated because article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a unanimous jury at sentencing; and (4) a 1997 amendment to section 76-3-207(4) of the Utah Code, which changed the sentencing rules from requiring jury unanimity to a vote of ten of twelve, violates section 68-3-3 of the Utah Code, a prohibition on the retroactive application of statutory amendments, and the ex post facto clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions."

OTHER NOTABLE CASES

United States v. Amador-Leal, No. 01-10037 (9th Cir. 01/09/2002) Trial court's failure to explain immigration consequences of a plea agreement does not render such an agreement void.

United States ex rel Smith v. Walls, No. 01-1888 (7th Cir. 01/07/2002) As Illinois does not impose any filing preconditions for successive petitions, a successive petition that is later dismissed as procedurally barred is "properly filed" as long as it conforms to Illinois' formal filing requirements the successive state petition tolled the AEDPA's filing deadline.

Blair v. Crawford, No. 99-17665 (9th Cir. 01/07/2002) For purposes of the AEDPA certain extraordinary writs will toll the time in which to file a petition.

Garcia v. United States, No. 00-15480 (11th Cir. 01/09/2002) Gray v. Maryland is not retroactively applicable.

United States v. Avants, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 190 (5th Cir 1/7/2002) "[T]he federal and state murder prosecutions in this case, although identical in their respective elements, are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns -- specifically, the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was represented by counsel only in the state proceeding, are not barred in this federal proceeding."

Donovan v. State of Maine, No. 01-1367 (1st Cir 01/10/2002) Under 28 USC 2244(d)(1), where habeas petitioner was presumed to have a 90-day period to file a certiorari with the US Supreme Court to challenge a state conviction, the statute does not presume a three-day period to mail the denial to petitioner.

Dilosa v. Cain (01/09/02 - No. 00-31359) In murder case where defendant claimed someone of a difference race than defendant committed the murder, prosecution's failure to disclose hair sample evidence found on victim's body that did not belong to defendant was material.

Israfil v. Russell, No. 01-3030 (6th Cir 01/08/02) Under 28 USC 2244(d)(2), a state court holding that a post-conviction motion was untimely under state law will preclude any tolling for filing a habeas corpus petition under the AEDPA.

Randolph v. Kemna, No. 01-1056 (8th Cir 01/09/2002) Under Missouri law, state's practice of not asserting exhaustion defense to habeas cases, for failing to seek a transfer to Missouri Supreme court, will preclude them from raising that defense, even if a habeas petitioner sought transfer of some of his claims.

Wright v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., No. 00-11105 (11th Cir 01/10/2002) A state court's unexplicated rejection of a federal constitutional issue still qualifies as an adjudication under 28 USC 2254(d), so that it is entitled to deference upon habeas review.

DELAYED PUBLICATION, AMENDED & DEPUBLISHED OPINION

Palmer v. Carlton, No. 99-5952 (6th Cir. 01/04/2002) Adopting the "unexhausted" claim holdings of the Second Circuit in Zarvela v. Artuz the panel holds:

To achieve the objective of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), as reenforced by AEDPA, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), which is to assure that a district court will not grant relief on unexhausted claims, the Second Circuit established the following framework for circumstances in which a dismissal without prejudice "'could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack.'" Zarvela, 254 F.3d at 380 (quoting Freeman v. Page, 208 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2000)). A district court should dismiss only the unexhausted claims in the habeas petition and stay further proceedings on the remaining portion until the petitioner has exhausted his/her remedies in state court. Id. To allay the concern that a petitioner might take an undue amount of time to pursue state court remedies, the court imposed a brief, reasonable time limit upon the petitioner to present claims to state courts and return to federal court exhaustion, "normally 30 days" after a stay is entered for the former, and "30 days" after state court exhaustion is completed for the latter. Id. at 381. "If either condition of the stay is not met, the stay may later be vacated nunc pro tunc as of the date the stay was entered, and the petition may be dismissed." Id. In addition, the court ruled that the defendant's first habeas petition should have been stayed since complete dismissal jeopardized the timeliness of his collateral attack. Id. at 382

Russell v. Hug, No. 99-16999 (9th Cir. 01/04/2002) "[A] federal district court, in its Criminal Justice Act Plan, may require members of its indigent defense panel to be members not only of the district court's own bar, but also of the State Bar."

FOCU

As the first in a series of "Focus" segments dealing with issues of mental health and the death penalty, find below excerpts from the amici curiae brief in McCarver v. North Carolina of American Association of Mental Retardation, et al:

II. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OPPOSE THE EXECUTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION BECAUSE THE PRACTICE OFFENDS OUR SHARED MORAL VALUES

In reaching the conclusion that people with mental retardation should not be subjected to the death penalty, legislators, jurors, mental disability professionals, and ordinary citizens are mak-ing a moral judgment. That judgment, in turn, reflects their understanding of the condition of people with mental retardation, and their beliefs about how capital punishment should be imple-mented

A. It Is Widely Recognized That The Culpability Of Defendants With Mental Retarda-tion Is Reduced By The Effects Of Their Intellectual Disability

Societal attitudes toward people with mental disabilities are undergoing substantial transfor-mation. It is increasingly accepted that people with mental retardation can be productive, con-tributing citizens of their communities, and that their integration into those communities should be a goal of governmental policies. Longstanding patterns of "historic mistreatment, indiffer-ence, and hostility," Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 608 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), are being confronted. But the hard realities of the limitations im-posed by mental retardation, and the incomplete success of our society's attempts to provide necessary supports to all people with that disability, remain. The recognition of those realities is the centerpiece of the consensus involved in this case

This Court, too, has recognized that all people with mental retardation "have a reduced abil-ity to cope with and function in the everyday world." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). As amici wrote in Penry, "[t]his reduced ability is found in every di-mension of the individual's functioning, including his language, communication, memory, atten-tion, ability to control impulsivity, moral development, self-concept, self-perception, suggesti-bility, knowledge of basic information, and general motivation." While there are variations among people with mental retardation, all share these basic disabilities from childhood and throughout their lives

Few legislators considering proposals on this topic had immersed themselves in the details of the clinical literature before making their decisions, nor had many voters whose opinions were being reflected. But what they understood both instinctively and from their life's experiences pointed to the same conclusion; the execution of an individual with mental retardation is morally unacceptable

Part of this understanding is that mental retardation is a substantial disability for every indi-vidual who has it. This disability circumscribes intellectual functioning and learning in ways that directly limit culpability. Legislators understood, or came to understand, that no one claimed that mental retardation categorically meant that the defendant was entitled to acquittal on the basis of his disability. But since the death penalty is reserved for the most culpable in-dividuals, the limitations imposed by the disability are, as this Court found in Penry, quintessen-tially mitigating

B. It Is Widely Recognized That The Disability Of Mental Retardation Is Not A Condi-tion That Is, In Any Sense, The Defendant's Fault, Or Something For Which He Is Responsible

Some conditions may appropriately be considered as mitigating evidence in capital trials even though they involve some voluntary act by the defendant. For example, intoxication at the time of the offense or drug addiction may reduce culpability despite the fact that they involved defendant's own choice. By contrast, mental retardation is never the result of an individual's voluntary choice, and thus is a condition for which he does not bear personal responsibility. Just as jurors tend to be most sympathetic to mitigation claims that involve conditions beyond an individual's control, Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1565 (1998), so too legislators took note of the fact that mental retardation is not a chosen condition

C. It Has Come To Be Recognized, Particularly In Recent Years, That A Defendant's Mental Retardation Greatly Increases The Likelihood Of The Conviction And Exe-cution Of A Factually Innocent Individual, And That This Risk Is Intolerable

The potential for convicting and even executing an individual with mental retardation who was innocent of the crime was part of the discussion of proposed legislation, dating back to the earliest enactment in the late 1980s. But in recent years, this chilling possibility has received renewed attention with the discovery that a number of defendants with mental retardation who had faced capital charges, and in some cases had been sent to Death Row, were incontrovertibly innocent. Although the facts of these cases are relatively familiar, amici would call the Court's attention to two of them

Earl Washington, a man with mental retardation, was sentenced to death in Virginia for mur-der on the basis of a false confession. After being incarcerated for 18 years (and coming within days of execution), Washington was later proven by DNA evidence to be innocent of the crime, and was ultimately released

Anthony Porter, another man with mental retardation, was convicted and sentenced to death in Illinois. Within days of his scheduled execution, Porter was granted a stay of execution by the Illinois Supreme Court to allow time to explore whether he was competent to be executed, see generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and whether the execution of a person with mental retardation violated the Illinois state constitution. A few weeks later, while that stay of execution was in effect, journalism students at Northwestern University conclusively demon-strated that Porter had not committed the crime, and he was released from custody

Cases like Washington's and Porter's, in addition to others, became part of the public de-bate about whether people with mental retardation should be subject to the death penalty, and increased support for state legislation

These notorious cases have focused national attention on the plight of individuals with men-tal retardation who may face capital punishment. The potential for such a Kafkaesque miscar-riage of justice has accentuated the moral consensus already in place, and heightened the sense of urgency about enacting protective legislation. As a society, we have become painfully aware of the situation facing all capital defendants with mental retardation; their intellectual limitations create inherent vulnerability. Americans fully understand the impact of an individual's mental retardation on the level of his culpability. As the reality of this problem has become clearer in the Nation's consciousness, our sense of moral repugnance has produced a renewed commitment to oppose the execution of any individual with mental retardation.

ERRAT

The Death Penalty Information Centerreports:

NEW RESOURCES: Amnesty International Report Condemns 25 Years of Executions in the U.S. On January 17, Amnesty International released a new report, "Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel: An aide-mémoire to 25 Years of Judicial Killing," a report marking the 25th anniversary of the resumption of executions in the U.S. The report focuses on some of the over 750 executions in the U.S. since 1976, citing specific cases to illustrate instances where the condemned was a juvenile, suffered from mental retardation, or was a foreign national denied consular rights. Also highlighted are cases where the defendant was executed despite doubts of his or her guilt, or received inadequate representation. Since the death penalty was reinstated in the U.S., more than 60 countries have abandoned the use of the death penalty. (Amnesty International, Press Release, 1/17/02) Read the entire report

NEW VOICES: Support for Moratorium in Marylan

As a corrections officer for 27 years, Willie "Sonny" Leggett says he supports a moratorium on executions in Maryland because he has seen prisoners change their lives for the better. "I really don't believe that the death penalty serves a purpose. Why take a life? I just don't think it's right. Plus, you might get innocent people killed," he said

The fear of wrongful executions is not the only reasons Marylanders are deadlocked on whether the state should have a moratorium. Del. Salima S. Mariott, (D-Baltimore), who sponsored last year's moratorium bill, believes, "This is an issue of racial disparity." While Marylanders are split on the moratorium, the support for a halt on executions is 65% among African Americans. (Baltimore Sun, 1/9/02) See also, Public Opinion and New Voices

Florida Capital City Passes Death Penalty Moratorium Resolutio

The City Commission of Tallahassee passed a resolution calling for a moratorium on executions in Florida by a 3-1 vote. "The figures and research done so meticulously by the American Bar and others show that the system is flawed," said Commissioner Charles Billings, a supporter of capital punishment who nevertheless voted for the moratorium. "The death penalty is either something that has to work correctly and bring justice or you can't do it." (St. Petersburg Times, 1/13/02) See also, New Voices

The Tallahassee resolution comes only days after Florida released its 22nd wrongfully convicted death row inmate, Juan Melendez, who spent 18 years on the state's death row (see below). See also, Innocence and the Death Penalty

U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Major Death Penalty Cas

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide the constitutionality of having a judge, rather than a jury, decide the sentence in a death penalty case. The case, Ring v. Arizona, (No. 01-488), will apply an earlier U.S. Supreme Court case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, in which the Court held that a judge could not make findings which would increase a defendant's sentence beyond the maximum, since that amounted to an additional conviction. In Arizona and eight other states, judges decide whether to impose the death penalty after a jury has determined guilt. The Ring case could affect the sentences of as many as 800 death row inmates. (Associated Press, 1/11/02) See also, Supreme Court

CORRECTION

Last week's edition appeared to overstate the number of court's that have moved towards correcting their historic reluctance to grant relief to death row inmates. Most notable among the Courts listed was the California Supreme Court. As has been pointed out since the last edition, the California Supreme Court, despite a rosy thaw several years ago, remains very chilly towards the claims in death penalty cases with only one capital case relief grant in recent memory. I had relied on the earlier thaw for my analysis and did not adequately weigh the negative change in recent years my apologies for any confusion.

If you spot an error or questionable use in any "analysis" please do not hesitate to contact the weekly at oops@karlkeys.com so that a correction may issue.

FAX IT! A new update feature is being offered. Several courts are unable to post their decisions on the net & they don't appear in Westlaw or Lexis until months well after publication & therefore they wont appear here. Your help is needed. Feel free to telefax any opinion (or even winning motion) you think may be germane to

(617)249-0219FREE

or

(617)249-0557FREE

which have been set up to turn your fax into a document file so that it can be used

RELATED RESOURCES You might want to check out the following internet resources other than this newsletter. Findaw.com's new service provides e-mail style newsletters on a wide variety of subjects at http://newsletters.findlaw.com, including both a free weekly criminal law and state court decisions. Similarly, www.lidb.com (Louisiana's public defender), probono.net (ABA) & www.capdefnet.org (federal defender) have many prepackaged motions and law guides dealing with death penalty issue. Finally, the discussion groups above can help you with any questions you might have.

NOTICES, DISCLAIMERS & CREDIT

DISCLAIMER: Karl Keys, Esq* is an attorney duly admitted in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This weekly has been prepared for educational & information purposes. Pursuant to the applicable rules governing attorney conduct this weekly & related website may or may not be construed as legal advertising, however, at of an abundance of caution please treat it as such. No claim as to legal specialization within the meaning of that term as applied lawyer advertising is made. Use does not constitute creation of an attorney-client relationship. If you have a legal question contact a lawyer authorized to practice in your state. Complete disclaimer located athttp://capitaldefenseweekly.com/disclaimer.html. Submissions related to this letter may be reproduced without further notice. Translation: Reading this newsletter & writing to me does not make me (or those I work with, for or for me) your lawyer. Although I'm not taking on any additional capital clients and the purpose of this newsletter is not to generate new clients, to be on the safe side I am complying with the rules governing lawyer advertising. If you are in a jam call a lawyer in your state.

FAIR USE NOTICE: This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, & social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who've expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research & educational purposes. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. Copyright waived for noncommercial use, save for the copyrights owned by others.Translation: You can use my stuff for noncommercial purposes (such as professional education, your newsletter, etc) but don't use materials that I have listed as being the intellectual property of others because under federal law I simply can't give away the rights of others to their own intellectual property.

WARNING: Although the news letter & related web site are award winning and used as a resource by many, be forewarned it is usually written under the influence of extrreme caffeination at very late hour of the night/morning & normally without consultation of others. Perfection takes time that doing this newsletter on a weekly basis for free, on top of a busy work & practice schedule, simply does not allow. Please use caution before citation, which is why Lexis cites are used (see Lexisone.com on how to plug into that fantastic database system) to allow a quick double check.

CREDITS & PUBLICATION INFORMATION: ISSN: 1523-6684