The Florida Supreme Court's holding inMoody v. Florida, leads off this week's edition. Offering a gentle reminder that the Fourth Amendment still exists, theMoodyCourt holds that a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the illegal Terry stop should have been granted. The police officer, the Moody Court holds, in this case was "acting on a hunch or mere suspicion and thus acted illegally."

Four other grants of relief are also noted. InCargle v. Mullina Tenth Circuit panel reverses conviction "based, individually, on ineffective assistance of counsel and, cumulatively, on the combined impact of this error and prosecutorial misconduct," as well as for multiple listed additional reasons for reversing the actual death sentence. The Ninth Circuit reverses inDouglas v. Woodfordon penalty phase ineffectiveness. InGarden v. Delawarethe Delaware Supreme Court reverses on the trial court's override to death holding that the trial judge failed to give adequate "weight" to the jury's recommendation. The California Supreme Court inCalifornia v. Burgenerremands as the trial court applied the wrong standard on appellant's motion for modification of verdict.

This week's Focus section comes fromFindLaw.com's essayistand Rutgers Law Professor Sherry F. Colb. Prof. Colb's essay, "When a Prostitute Kills: The Execution Of Aileen Carol Wuornos" covers familiar territory in a new light, the execution of Aileen Carol Wuornos. Prof. Colb's essay makes a strong argument about the law of rape and self-defense, and ends up asking two questions for everyone it answers.

Finaly, in an event most are now familiar with, just days before Florida released its 23rd exonerated man from death row, Rudolph Holton (discussed last week), Governor Jeb Bush announced a proposal to abolish the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC) offices that oversee Florida's death penalty appeals. Lawyers from the CCRC were instrumental in securing the release of Holton, as well as other Florida death row inmates who were exonerated, including Juan Melendez and Frank Lee Smith. Bush said that he favors providing the death row inmates currently represented by the regional offices with private attorneys who voluntarily register to take on capital cases, a proposal that has drawn sharp criticism from experienced defense attorneys in the state.

EXECUTION INFORMATION

Since the last edition the following people have been executed in the United States:

HOT LIST

Moody v. Florida, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 49; 28 Fla. L. Weekly S 77 (FL 1/23/2003) (dissent) "[T]he motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal Terry stop should have been granted."

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court's determination of the historical facts, but must independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine the constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth Amendment. See Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001); Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 1999); Albritton v. State, 769 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The historical facts in this case are not in dispute.

Dowdy testified at the suppression hearing that he first met Moody in 1987 or 1989. Before the traffic stop on May 23, 1994, it had been a year or two years since Dowdy had any contact with Moody. It may have been as long as three years since Dowdy last checked Moody's driving status. Although Dowdy knew that Moody had been in prison at some time prior to 1994, he did not know exactly when Moody was in prison, for how long, or when Moody was released. Additionally, Moody's prior license suspension [*11] was not for a fixed period, and it was possible for Moody to regain a valid license within a few days. Moody could have easily obtained a valid license before Dowdy stopped him on May 23, 1994. Based on these facts, it cannot be said that Dowdy had fresh knowledge concerning Moody or the status of his driver's license at the time of the traffic stop on May 23, 1994. Therefore, upon our independent review of the mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine the constitutional issues, we conclude that Dowdy was acting on a hunch or mere suspicion and thus acted illegally in stopping the defendant. Because the information on which Dowdy relied was not fresh, the trial court erred in denying Moody's motion to suppress.

The dissenting opinion of Senior Justice Harding submits that our analysis of the staleness doctrine ignores United States Supreme Court precedent, namely, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002), and United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 101 S. Ct. 690 (1981). That line of cases discusses the necessity that an officer have a reasonable suspicion, under the totality [*12] of the circumstances, that criminal activity may be afoot, so as to justify an investigatory stop. The dissent asserts that the totality of the circumstances in this case justified the stop because the officer's experience and knowledge of the defendant and the defendant's driving status evinced an objective manifestation to support the investigatory stop.

While we recognize that the totality of the circumstances may have, at an early point in time, justified the investigatory stop, we also recognize that under the staleness doctrine, justification for an investigatory stop may dissipate with time. When, as in this case, as many as three years passes without any further information about a person's driving status, and when, as in this case, that person's license can be restored through a simple administrative process, the staleness of the officer's information is indeed an important factor in considering the totality of the circumstances showing an objective manifestation to justify the stop. See Denton v. State, 524 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (staleness is an "important factor" in determining probable cause, although not the only factor).

The majority does [*13] not ignore Supreme Court precedent; we have considered the totality of the circumstances. Under these circumstances, we find that the information the officer relied upon to justify the investigatory stop was stale and the stop was therefore illegal.

Although the stop was illegal, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not automatically render any and all evidence inadmissible. A court may admit such evidence if the State can show that (1) an independent source existed for the discovery of the evidence, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319, 40 S. Ct. 182, 17 Ohio L. Rep. 514 (1920); or (2) the evidence would have inevitably been discovered in the course of a legitimate investigation, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984); or (3) sufficient attenuation existed between the challenged evidence and the illegal conduct, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963). None of these three exceptions are supported in this record.

First, the State did not argue, nor do we find any evidence in this record to support, an independent source for the discovery [*14] of the evidence. What the State did argue was that the Davis P-380, and all of the other evidence, would have inevitably been discovered after Foster turned in the Rossi .38 and told police he bought it from Moody. In making a case for inevitable discovery, the State must show "that at the time of the constitutional violation an investigation was already under way." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 457, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). "Inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements . . . ." Id. at 444 n.5. In other words, the State cannot argue that some possible further investigation would have revealed the evidence. See State v. Duggins, 691 So. 2d 566, 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Bowen v. State, 685 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (holding that speculation may not play a part in the inevitable discovery rule and that the focus must be on demonstrated fact capable of verification). In other words, the case must be in such a posture that the facts already in the possession of the police would have led to this evidence notwithstanding the police misconduct. In this case, however, [*15] the police had not initiated any investigation of Moody for the Mitchell murder prior to the traffic stop, and the police had no reason to suspect Moody had any involvement in the murder.

Second, the evidence does not support the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. It is speculation to argue that once Foster turned in the murder weapon and told the police that Moody sold it to him, the police would have ultimately obtained the search warrants and then discovered the other evidence Moody sought to have suppressed. Foster stated that when Moody sold him the Rossi .38, Moody was concerned about the P-380 that the police found in his car. Had Moody not been illegally stopped, we cannot say that it was inevitable that the police would have found the P-380, that Moody would have become concerned about the weapons and sold Foster the Rossi .38, or that Foster would have turned the weapon in to police. The illegal stop and Moody's initial arrest set in motion an unbroken chain of events, which included the discovery of the P- 380, Moody's sale of the Rossi .38 to Foster, a second arrest for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Foster's attempt to help get Moody out [*16] of jail for the second arrest by turning in the Rossi .38 to police, and the search of the several residences. These events were the result of the initial stop, and nothing in this record demonstrates that the State would have inevitably discovered any of the evidence Moody sought to suppress.

Finally, the record demonstrates that the evidence was not sufficiently attenuated. At the first suppression hearing, the State mentioned that there were issues of attenuation but did not develop this argument in any detail. In order to determine if evidence is sufficiently attenuated, the court must consider three factors: (1) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the discovery of the evidence sought to be suppressed; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. Walker v. State, 741 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975)).

The temporal proximity of the arrest and the discovery of the evidence sought to be suppressed was immediate. In fact, the initial stop of Moody and the discovery of the Davis P-380 handgun occurred [*17] contemporaneously. The officers discovered the gun at the scene of the stop while Moody was sitting in the back seat of the patrol car.

Furthermore, there were no intervening circumstances between the stop and the discovery of the handgun. The chain of events, beginning with the stop and ending with the discovery of the gun and other equipment in Moody's car, was not interrupted by any superseding event.

This record contains limited information concerning the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. Dowdy testified at the suppression hearing that he had heard of the murder but had no reason to believe that Moody was involved until the day after the arrest when the sheriff's department contacted him about the P-380 handgun. That information then linked Moody to the crime scene. In fact, when Dowdy called in the serial number of the gun to headquarters, the serial number came up with a "hit," meaning the gun had been reported stolen, but headquarters indicated the gun was a .38, not a P-380. Dowdy could not confirm at the time of the initial stop and arrest whether the gun was in fact stolen. Thus, Moody was booked and released with a citation, the equivalent of a notice to [*18] appear. There is no evidence that the officers had a motive for stopping Moody, other than to determine the status of his driver's license. Based on these facts, it cannot be said that the discovery of the evidence was attenuated from the initial police misconduct, i.e., the illegal stop.

Because the record in this case does not support an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal Terry stop should have been granted.

SUPREME COURT

No cases noted this week.

CAPITAL CASES ( Favorable Disposition)

Garden v. Delaware, 2003 Del. LEXIS 58 (Del 1/24/2003) The trial court "erred in his consideration of the weight to be given to a jury's determination that the aggravating factors did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances."

California v. Burgener, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 526 (CA 1/27/2003) Remanded ordered as the trial court applied the wrong standard on appellant's motion for modification of verdict.

Douglas v. Woodford, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1082 (9th Cir 1/24/2003) "[T]he failure to adequately investigate Douglas's social history and mental health was prejudicial during the penalty phase."

Cargle v. Mullin, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1298 (10th Cir 1/27/2003) (*PCI) "We hold that petitioner is entitled to relief from his capital convictions based, individually, on ineffective assistance of counsel and, cumulatively, on the combined impact of this error and prosecutorial misconduct. We also hold that petitioner is entitled to relief from his death sentences based, individually, on ineffective assistance of counsel and, cumulatively, on the combined impact of all three errors cited immediately above. However, we reject in Part III petitioner's claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and death sentences."

CAPITAL CASES ( Unfavorable Disposition)

In re Scott, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 525 (CA 1/27/2003) Relief denied "on allegations that (1) trial counsel failed to investigate and to adequately present a mental defense at the guilt phase, (2) trial counsel failed to investigate and to adequately present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, and (3) these failures rendered counsel's advice to waive a jury uninformed and hence ineffective."

Torres v. Mullin, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1069 (10th Cir 1/23/2003) (*PCI) Relief denied on "claims: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting; (3) that the prosecution engaged in misconduct that warrants a new trial or, in the alternative, a new sentencing proceeding; (4) that the prosecution destroyed potentially exculpatory fingerprint samples; (5) that Mr. Torres's death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because the trial court's instructions failed to direct the jury to give individualized consideration to Mr. Torres's involvement in the homicides; and (6) that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing."

Damren v, Florida, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 46 (FL 1/23/2003) Relief denied on numerous claims Those not summarily denied include whether (A) counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel failed to present (1) evidence of a nonstatutory mitigator, potential brain damage, (2) potential character witnesses, (3) evidence that Damren was addicted to cocaine; (B) the trial court erred in denying his request for certain public records from the State Attorney's office; (C) application of the HAC aggravator and (D) counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the trial court informed the jury that its role was merely advisory.

Lawler v. Georgia, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 71 (GA 1/28/2003) (*RC, *PCI) Relief denied on: (1) sufficiency; (2) composition of county jury lists; (3) use of victim impact; (4) motion to suppress various pieces of evidence; (5) motion to recuse 13 prospective jurors for cause; (6) trial courts failing to permit certain questions of a nurse concerning ethics; (7) recusal of a juror for tardiness; and (8) proportionality.

NOTABLE NONCAPITAL CASES

None noted this week.

FOCUS

This week's Focus section comes from FindLaw.com's essayist, and Rutgers Law Professor Sherry F. Colb. Prof. Colb's essay, "When a Prostitute Kills: The Execution Of Aileen Carol Wuornos" covers familiar territory in a new light, the execution of Aileen Carol Wuornos. Prof. Colb's essay makes a strong argument about the law of rape and self-defense, and ends up asking two questions for everyone it answers.

On October 9th, the State of Florida executed Aileen Carol Wuornos by lethal injection. Described in the media as a serial killer, a phrase that evokes such sadistic characters as Ted Bundy and Jeffrey Dahmer, Wuornos may in fact have been a serial victim.

Aileen Wuornos was a prostitute. Over a span of two years, the evidence showed, she killed at least six men whom she encountered as customers. Wuornos claimed initially that she had killed these johns after they assaulted or raped her. But she would have necessarily faced a significant obstacle before any jury, in offering claims of self-defense: the fact of her profession.

Why People Reject the Rape Claims of Prostitutes

Because she was a prostitute, Wuornos's rape accusations would strike many people as implausible. A prostitute is often viewed as willing to have sex indiscriminately with any stranger or acquaintance ready to pay. As such, people often conclude, a woman like that simply cannot be raped. Like a railroad obligated to serve all interested customers, the prostitute becomes a metaphorical common carrier, from whom anyone prepared to pay the price may demand service.

Under the law, however, at least on the books, a woman does not forfeit her right to bodily integrity by becoming a prostitute. No matter how regularly and under what circumstances she says yes, in other words, she never gives up her right to say no.

But the law in theory does not necessarily translate well into practice. To be a prostitute - in the eyes of customers, jurors, and our society more generally - is to hand over a blanket consent to sexual relations.

How Prostitutes' Plight Exposes the Precarious Nature of Rape Prosecutions Generally

Though the prostitute is an extreme case, her status reveals the precarious nature of a woman's right to protection from rape. Until a few decades ago, for example, most states refused to apply their rape laws - even in theory - to sexual assaults by men against their wives.

By choosing a man as a life-long partner, legislators reasoned, a wife gives herself over to her husband for sex at his pleasure. When that absolute sexual accessibility is coupled with a man's legal obligation to support his wife financially, the analogy to prostitution becomes difficult to escape.

While marital rape has become a crime in theory, it is in fact almost never prosecuted. Meanwhile, the promiscuity of an unmarried rape victim persists - to this day - in reducing substantially the odds of a criminal conviction. The man who rapes a non-virgin, for example, still faces a far more forgiving jury than the attacker who deflowers a virgin.

A Strange Twist in the Wuornos Case: Her Confession

So Aileen Wuornos could have expected little or nothing in the way of legal consequences for any man who raped her. And the man too might have predicted in advance that he could rape her with impunity.

Perhaps because of this knowledge, or maybe because of the nature or sheer number of men who frequent prostitutes, rape is an occupational hazard for women in the oldest profession. And for reasons outlined, its prosecution is about as uncommon as its occurrence is common.

In the Wuornos case, however, there is a twist. A few years ago, after being convicted and sentenced to death, Wuornos admitted that she had deliberately robbed and killed her victims.

If Wuornos really did deliberately rob and kill six or more innocent men, then she is no victim (unless one thinks that anybody executed by the State--no matter how heinous the crime and how clear-cut the evidence--is a victim). But what if she had been innocent?

What Would Have Happened Had There Been No Confession?

What if Wuornos--probably a guilty woman--was sentenced to die simply because of her profession? Imagine, in other words, a different version of the case as it might have unfolded had Wuornos not confessed. What would such a case tell us about how we, as a society, view prostitutes?

The jurors in our hypothetical almost-Wuornos case could have believed one of two things. They might have concluded that the victims never tried to rape the defendant in the first place. Or alternatively, they might have believed that even if the men did try to rape her, she implicitly accepted this treatment by failing to quit her job, as a reasonable person would have done. Either way, responsibility for whatever occurred would have rested squarely on the shoulders of the defendant.

Boys will be boys. The underlying assumption would be that even if the men did try to rape her, she - as a prostitute who, by hypothesis, had been raped before - had no right to kill them in self-defense. She had assumed the risk of rape by remaining a prostitute.

A Comparison Between Aileen Wuornos and Bernhard Goetz

For a useful comparison, consider the case of Bernhard Goetz. Goetz was mugged on a number of occasions and decided that he would get even. Because prior assailants had been members of minority groups, he decided to carry out his own informal sting operation on minorities as well.

Goetz took an unlicensed firearm, concealed it on his person, and boarded a subway car. He then deliberately sat near a group of young, African-American men who looked threatening to him. Saying nothing, Goetz waited for the men to pounce. They did, apparently attempting to rob him, and he responded with deadly force.

Goetz hated minorities and admitted having hoped for exactly the scenario that transpired. His one expressed regret was having only paralyzed one of the men and critically injured two others, rather than killing all four of them.

Bernhard Goetz was acquitted of all charges save for illegal possession of a firearm, which carried a one-year minimum sentence.

What makes Goetz's case similar to Wuornos's is that Aileen Carol Wuornos may well have hated men as much as Bernhard Goetz hated African-Americans. Like him, Wuornos could have felt unsafe and unable to conduct her life without fear. Both Goetz and (our hypothetical, non-confessing version of) Wuornos might have retreated from danger. But they chose instead to act in ways that provided further opportunities for assault. And in both cases, there were those who questioned why each of them insisted on asking for trouble in this way.

But that is where the similarity ends. Despite his explicit racial hatred and the questions that were legitimately raised about the necessity for his repeated firing at a man who was no longer assaulting him, Goetz was acquitted. Jurors gave him the benefit of the doubt - a benefit that the criminal law demands. Sitting near hostile people on the subway, they implicitly said, does not assume the risk of being mugged.

Wuornos, in contrast, died two weeks ago at the hands of the State. She, a prostitute, would probably not have received the benefit of the doubt even if she had never confessed. She did not become a heroine in the media, even for a short time, as the subway gunman had. Rather, she was consistently depicted as a heartless villain.

Why the Wuornos Case Remains Troubling

There are unlikely to be many tears shed for Aileen Carol Wuornos. And assuming her actual guilt, that is as it should be. But the case remains a troubling one.

That is because of the possibility that Wuornos never stood a chance of receiving a fair adjudication. She might have been convicted and sentenced to death, even if she had truly acted in self-defense.

Wuornos was at best a prostitute who refused to retreat from danger. For too many people, that is still not good enough for her to deserve the law's protection from rape.

OTHER RESOURCES

The Death Penalty Information Center (Deathpenaltyinfo.org) notes:

Juvenile Case in South Carolina Mirrors Earlier Execution of 14-Year-Old

In 1944, a 14-year-old boy named George Stinney Jr. was executed in Clarendon County, South Carolina. Stinney was one of the youngest persons to be executed in the United States in the 20th century, and his electrocution shocked many people around the country. In addition to the controversy surrounding the execution of a juvenile, Stinney's case was also disturbing because of the poor representation he had received.

Today, the same county in South Carolina is preparing to execute another black defendant who was only 16 at the time of his crime. The South Carolina Supreme Court recently heard arguments on the case of Robert Conyers, who is now represented by attorney David Bruck. Bruck stressed that many of the culpability issues and racial bias factors that were called into question in the Stinney case also apply to his client. Harold Detwiler, Conyers original trial attorney, had never handled a death penalty case before and mishandled his client's trial by providing a shoddy defense and allowing inaccurate expert testimony. The appeal will serve as a measuring stick to determine "how far our standards of due process and fair play have progressed" in Clarendon County, according to Bruck. Urging the Justices to consider Clarendon County's history with the juvenile death penalty and to issue a ruling that reflects South Carolina's evolving standards regarding the execution of juvenile offenders, Bruck noted, "If this execution is carried out, the whole world will be watching." (Associated Press, January 23, 2003. The State, January 21, 2003, and The Washington Post, September 15, 1985) See also Juvenile Death Penalty.

NEW VOICES: Maryland Attorney General Calls for End to State's Death Penalty

Maryland Attorney General J. Joseph Curran, Jr., released an open letter to state leaders and Governor Robert Ehrlich stating his belief that the state's death penalty system should be abolished, in part because of the "intolerable cost of executing, every so often, the wrong person." Curran said that the death penalty is seriously flawed and does not deter crime. Curran has served as the state's top elected law official since 1986 and is widely respected among his colleagues within Maryland's government. Maryland Lt. Governor, Michael Steele, has also voiced his opposition to the death penalty (see below). (Associated Press, January 30, 2003) Read the Attorney General's letter. See New Voices.

Public Opinion Split on Preferred Punishment

A recent ABC News/Washington Post poll found that while 64% of Americans support the death penalty when no other alternative is offered, they remain divided on the appropriate punishment for those convicted of murder when given the option of life in prison. When given a choice, 49% percent choose the death penalty and 45% choose life in prison. (ABCNews.com, January 24, 2003) See Public Opinion.

Gov. Bush Seeks Closing of Florida's Death Penalty Appeals Offices

Just days before Florida released its 23rd exonerated man from death row, Rudolph Holton (see below), Governor Jeb Bush announced a proposal to abolish the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC) offices that oversee Florida's death penalty appeals. Lawyers from the CCRC were instrumental in securing the release of Holton, as well as other Florida death row inmates who were exonerated, including Juan Melendez and Frank Lee Smith. Bush said that he favors providing the death row inmates currently represented by the regional offices with private attorneys who voluntarily register to take on capital cases, a proposal that has drawn sharp criticism from experienced defense attorneys in the state and newspapers such as the St. Petersburg Times. In a recent editorial, the paper stated:

In the long run, the shift to private attorneys is likely to be more expensive and will result in such a drop-off in the expertise and experience of the lawyers handling these cases that mistakes are bound to occur.

. . .

As yet, no private registry counsel has represented a death row prisoner from the beginning of the post-conviction process through the death-warrant stage. When attorneys on the list realize how little the state is willing to pay for these complicated representations, three things will happen: conscientious attorneys will drop off the registry, some attorneys will bill the state for more than the stated limits (the state promises to fire any attorney who dares do this) and only lawyers willing to cut corners will remain.

. . .

If Bush is not careful, his plan might take us back to 1984 when the state's execution machinery ground to a halt. In those days, not enough attorneys were willing to volunteer to represent prisoners on death row and the Florida Supreme Court stayed two death warrants because the inmates didn't have counsel. It was this crisis that led to the creation of the 1st Capital Collateral Representation office.

(St. Petersburg Times, January 26, 2003) See Costs and Innocence.

NEW VOICES: Maryland Lt. Governor Urges Closer Look at State's Death Penalty

Maryland Lt. Governor Michael Steele recently said that he is troubled by a University of Maryland study that revealed racial bias in the state's capital punishment system (see below). Steele said that he will advise Governor Robert Ehrlich to take a closer look at the study's findings through a more thorough review of the research. This second review would enable state leaders to recommend possible legislative reforms to address the fairness problems identified in the original study. Steele said that he will proceed cautiously when advising the Governor about upcoming executions, and he said that he will be an advocate for mercy. Steele noted, "I feel it is important to relay to the governor and respond to the question of: Should we do this? What is to be gained beyond providing satisfaction to someone who wants to see this individual die?" (Washington Post, January 26, 2003). See New Voices and Race and the Death Penalty.

TRACKING PROGRAM INFORMATION

Tracking program of covered cases on innocence and on race claims. The following designators are being used currently, but feel free to forward comments on how the tracking system might be improved:

*PCI from the face of the decision a possible claim of actual innocence appears possible.

*SCI from the face of the decision (and possibly other evidence) a strong claim of actual innocence is had.

*RC from the face of the decision questions about the interplay of race is made.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

If you have found this e-zine useful feel free to pass it on to a friend or colleague. You might also want to visit: http://www.lidab.com/ (Louisiana's public defender), probono.net (ABA/ABCNY) & http://www.capdefnet.org/ (federal defender & arguably the best death penalty defense site on the net). These other resources have many prepackaged motions and law guides dealing with death penalty issue. Findlaw.com 's new service provides e-mail style newsletters on a wide variety of subjects at newsletters.findlaw.com , including both a free weekly free criminal law and limited state court decision lists (note that Findlaw's analsysis is very questionable at times, so caution is advised). For information generally on the death penalty please visit the Death Penalty Information Center (http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org).