This week's edition examines to cases of competence to be executed, Franklin v. Francis and Cox v. Norris. InFranklin, after a hard fight over several years by the Ohio Public Defender's Office, the Sixth Circuit holds that it lacks jurisdiction to block the execution of a volunteer. In Cox the Eighth Circuit holds the challenge to competency is too little too late. In the only other capital case, Trevino v. Johnson (Fifth Circuit) a panel splits over the question of whether the disctrict court should have recused itself.

Finally, in an adminstrative note, the archives are temporarily down for editions sent after mid-December 1998 due to server problems.

In Focus

Franklin v. Francis:Sixth Circuit for the first time in a generation permits the execution of an Ohio death row inmate. Despite years of successfully fighting the consenusal execution of Wilford Berry, the Sixth Circuit holds:

This case was the subject of a previous appeal, Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1998). There, we held that the Ohio Supreme Court correctly found that Berry was competent to waive collateral review of his sentence and that, therefore, the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the next friends of the condemned.

After this case was remanded to the district court, the next friends petitioned the district court under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment because of allegedly new, previously undisclosed evidence of serious injuries that Berry sustained during a riot at the Mansfield Correctional Institution on September 5, 1997. They assert that these injuries might affect Berry's current competency. In support of their position, they have submitted an affidavit from Dr. David L. Bachman, a neurologist, who indicates that "there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to suggest that [Berry] sustained a significant concussive injury at the time of his beating." He went on to say that "injury to the frontal part of the brain may result in abnormalities of behavior that impair judgment and insight. Deficits in these areas may impact on the prisoner's ability to make competent judgments regarding his legal claims." This was supported by the earlier opinion of Dr. Douglas Mossman, according to the petitioners.

However, the previous hearing on Berry's competency was held in June 1997, several months before the riot at Mansfield. Although the decision from the Ohio Supreme Court finding that Berry was competent to waive his rights was filed on December 3, 1997, in State v. Berry, 80 Ohio St. 3d 371 (1997), the issue of competency was decided a substantial time before Berry received his injuries in the riot at the prison. On the other hand, the state filed an affidavit by Dr. Michael S. Witter, a clinical psychologist, stating that he has "talked with inmate Berry at least once every two weeks since his incarceration at CNC." He went on to say that he last spoke to Berry on the same date he signed his affidavit, August 20, 1998, and that although he showed symptoms of anxiety, he did not have any "signs or symptoms of severe mental illness." He also stated that Berry had been seen monthly by the staff psychiatrist and other members of the mental health staff.

The district court properly analyzed the motion under Rule 59. As it said, "litigants may not utilize Rule 59 to raise issues unrelated to the merits of the judgment sought to be amended," citing Osternick v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989). As it properly found, the only issue that the district court had jurisdiction to consider was whether the Ohio Supreme Court used the correct legal standard to determine Berry's competence. Our decision previously found that the correct standard was applied, so a Rule 59 motion is not appropriate here. The district court further analyzed the proceeding by stating that "if the newly discovered evidence does significantly change the posture of this case, as Petitioners argue it does, then the Ohio state courts must first be given the opportunity to consider the evidence before this court may address it." Petitioners have not presented any new evidence in the state court; therefore, they have not met their burden of proving they exhausted state remedies with regard to this evidence. At this point, the issues raised by the new evidence are appropriate for consideration only in the Ohio state courts.

The Ohio Supreme Court, acting through its trial court, found that Berry had "a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed." See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165 (1990). As the district court appropriately observed, if there is any new evidence to be considered or bad faith to be determined on that issue, the Ohio state courts should decide those questions.

Capital Cases

Trevino v. JohnsonFifth Circuit in a split panel holds that trial court did not err in recusing itself and denies relief on the substantive claims of improper penalty phase instructions, jury voir dire, and failure to disclose favorable evidence. As to issue on which the panel split, recusal:

Trevino filed his habeas petition in the federal district court in June 1997; therefore, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) applies to his case. See Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1997). Under AEDPA, "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability (COA) can only issue if a habeas petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "A 'substantial showing' requires the applicant to 'demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues (in a different manner); or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1114 (1997). The COA requirement is jurisdictional in nature--before an appellate court can address the merits of an order denying federal habeas relief, the court (or the federal district court) must grant a COA. See Whitehead v. Johnson, 157 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that AEDPA's COA requirement is jurisdictional); Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 457 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that AEDPA "imposed a jurisdictional prerequisite on appeal from a final order in a federal habeas proceeding, prohibiting the appeal unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 'certificate of appealability'"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1567 (1998). The district court denied Trevino a COA to appeal his denial of habeas relief on November 12, 1997. Therefore, the respondent argues, unless we find that Trevino has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in connection with his state-court conviction, we lack jurisdiction to consider issues relating to the district court's adjudication of Trevino's federal habeas petition.

There is some force to this argument. The AEDPA language does preclude an appeal from a district court's order denying habeas relief until either the district court or the court of appeals grants a COA. We assume arguendo, without deciding, that a court can only issue a COA upon a finding that the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with respect to his underlying state-court conviction. Therefore, the reasoning goes, because Trevino's contention that Judge McBryde abused his discretion in failing to stand recused is unrelated to his underlying state-court conviction, we lack jurisdiction to consider the issue.

However, we find that we have jurisdiction to consider whether Judge McBryde abused his discretion in denying Trevino's recusal motion. Trevino's arguments regarding the recusal motion are not addressed to the merits of Judge McBryde's order denying his habeas petition. Rather, he argues that Judge McBryde lacked the authority to deny habeas relief because the judge should have recused himself and that the order denying habeas relief must therefore be vacated. While we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of a district court order denying habeas relief without issuing a COA, we do have jurisdiction to consider whether a district court judge properly declined to stand recused and therefore had the authority to deny a habeas petition. We are guided to this conclusion by our reasoning in Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998), where we considered whether we had jurisdiction to determine whether a district court judge abused her discretion in denying a recusal motion before she remanded the case to state court. Our jurisdiction was limited in that case by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." See Tramonte, 136 F.3d at 1027. We found that even though the district court's actual order remanding the matter to state court was unreviewable, we could adjudicate whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the recusal motion. See id. at 1027-28. We noted that once a judge recuses herself, that judge must take no further action save for transferring the matter to a different federal judge, and that if the district court judge should have recused herself, any orders entered after disposing of the recusal motion should be vacated. See id. at 1028. Therefore, our review of the recusal issue would not constitute a review of the remand order, a review prohibited by statute. See id. Instead, "we would be performing an essentially ministerial task of vacating an order that the district court had no authority to enter into for reasons unrelated to the order of remand itself." Id. Thus, we concluded that we had jurisdiction over the appeal, and we proceeded to analyze whether the district court judge should have recused herself. See id.

We similarly find that we have jurisdiction to consider whether Judge McBryde abused his discretion in denying Trevino's recusal motion in this case. As in Tramonte, if Judge McBryde erred in refusing to stand recused, we must vacate any orders he entered after denying the recusal motion. See United States v. Anderson, No. 97-11205, 1998 WL 781240, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 10, 1998) (vacating sentence after determining that Judge McBryde abused his discretion in denying a recusal motion); United States v. Avilez-Reyes, No. 97-11392, 1998 WL 781243, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 10, 1998) (same); Tramonte, 136 F.3d at 1028 ("Thus, if Judge Lemmon should have recused herself, any orders she entered following disposition of the recusal motion should be vacated."). Our consideration of whether to vacate the district court's order denying habeas relief would therefore not constitute an appeal of the merits of that order, a review prohibited by AEDPA in the absence of the issuance of a COA. Instead, as in Tramonte, we are determining whether we must vacate an order that Judge McBryde may have had no authority to enter.

Our conclusion that we have jurisdiction to consider whether Judge McBryde abused his discretion in denying Trevino's recusal motion comports with the case law of several other circuits, in which courts of appeal have considered whether a district court judge should have recused himself before denying habeas relief without determining that the applicant had made a jurisdictional showing. See Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947, 947 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding jurisdiction to consider whether a district court abused its discretion in denying a recusal motion before it denied habeas relief, despite the fact that the issue was unrelated to the applicant's underlying state-court conviction, because "federal procedural law governing recusal entitles [the petitioner] to have his habeas corpus petition heard by a[n unbiased] judge"); Taylor v. Campbell, 831 F.2d 297, No. 87-5678, 1987 WL 38693, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 1987) (unpublished opinion) (vacating a district court's denial of habeas petition based on violation of recusal statute without granting a certificate of probable cause, the pre-AEDPA equivalent of a COA); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1118 (4th Cir. 1978) (vacating a district court's denial of a habeas petition brought by a state prisoner because district court abused its discretion in denying recusal motion). We therefore proceed to evaluate Trevino's claim that Judge McBryde should have recused himself.

Trevino brought his recusal motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which states that "[a]ny . . . judge . . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." This recusal standard is objective; the relevant inquiry is whether a "reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Health Servs. Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 486 U.S. 847 (1988); see Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (In re Continental Airlines Corp.), 901 F.2d 1259, 1262 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716, 720-21 (5th Cir. 1988). We review a district court judge's decision not to recuse himself for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 299 (5th Cir.) (reviewing a district court's denial of a recusal motion for an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 620 (1996); In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 927 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The issue of judicial disqualification is solely one of law. It is a sensitive question of assessing all of the facts and circumstances in order to determine whether the failure to disqualify was an abuse of sound judicial discretion.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On the facts of this case we hold that Judge McBryde did not abuse his discretion by failing to recuse himself from Trevino's case. At oral argument, Trevino's counsel analogized this case to two recently decided cases where we held that Judge McBryde abused his discretion by failing to recuse himself under § 455(a) because of participation by counsel in Fifth Circuit Judicial Council proceedings. See Anderson, 1998 WL 781240, at *2; Avilez-Reyes, 1998 WL 781243, at *1-*2. In each case, we emphasized that, at the time Judge McBryde ruled on the recusal motion, he was aware that the defendant's attorney had already testified against him. See Anderson, 1998 WL 781240, at *1 ("The average person when viewing this specific situation, would question Judge McBryde's ability to be impartial in a case involving an attorney who has testified adversely against Judge McBryde in a Judicial Council proceeding."); Avilez-Reyes, 1998 WL 781243, at *1 (finding that defendant's case "became infected with the appearance of impropriety once Stickney, [the defendant's] attorney, testified against Judge McBryde in the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council proceedings" a month before the recusal motion was brought). In contrast to Anderson and Avilez-Reyes, Brender never actually testified in either of the evidentiary hearings relating to Judge McBryde held by the special investigating committee of the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council. In fact, the record is devoid of any evidence as to what Brender would have said had he been called to testify.(1)

Unlike the situations in Anderson and Avilez-Reyes, we are convinced that a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances of this case, would not harbor doubts about Judge McBryde's impartiality. We are mindful that the reasonable person standard in the recusal context contemplates a "well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person." United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990)).

A showing of potential bias by a judge against a party's attorney does not generally suffice to require a judge to disqualify himself under § 455(a). Rather, the general rule, adopted in this and several other circuits, is that "an appellate court, in passing on questions of disqualification[,] . . . should determine the disqualification on the basis of conduct which shows bias or prejudice or lack of impartiality by focusing on a party rather than counsel." Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975); see FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 576 n.13 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Friction between court and counsel does not constitute bias."); In re Cooper, 821 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1987); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1399 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1980). Bias against a party's attorney does not require disqualification unless "it can also be shown that such a controversy would demonstrate a bias for or against the party itself." Henderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 901 F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Davis); see also In re Cooper, 821 F.2d at 839 ("It is true that occasionally exceptional circumstances do arise where a judge's attitude toward a particular attorney is so hostile that the judge's impartiality toward the client may reasonably be questioned."); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Bias against an attorney is not enough to require disqualification under § 455 unless petitioners can show that such a controversy would demonstrate a bias against the party itself."). Trevino does not allege any circumstances suggesting that a reasonable person would harbor doubts about Judge McBryde's impartiality toward him; his only argument is based solely on the relationship between Judge McBryde and Brender. We find that a reasonable, well-informed observer would not harbor doubt about Judge McBryde's impartiality in adjudicating Trevino's habeas claim, where any potential bias would have been directed against Trevino's attorney and there is no suggestion of bias directed at Trevino himself.

Cox v. Norris (PDF format only at this time) Eighth Circuit holds finds Petitioner failed to overcome presumption of sanity; execution will not be stayed under Ford v. Wainwright.

This matter came before the Court on petitioner Cox's motion to proceed with a second or successive habeas corpus application in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), movant must receive our authorization in order for the district court to consider such an application. On February 15, 1999, we entered our order denying Mr. Cox's motion. We now briefly explain our reasoning. Petitioner who is scheduled to be executed on February 16, 1999, alleges, through counsel, that he has very recently become incompetent and that it would be cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of the Eighth Amendment for the state to put him to death as planned. This constitutional claim is based upon the Supreme Court's holding in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).

Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Ford establishes the relationship between the Eighth Amendment, mental incompetency, and the death penalty. Justice Powell stated, "I would hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." Ford, 477 U.S. at 422. Justice Powell further noted that the state "may properly presume that [a] petitioner remains sane at the time [the] sentence is to be carried out, and may require a substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger [an insanity] hearing process." Id. at 426 (footnote omitted). We believe this presumption and test applies to our consideration of Mr. Cox's current claims.

We have examined petitioner's motion with attached and submitted statements and affidavits and have compared these papers with the state's response and attached exhibits. Even disregarding the extreme lateness of the motion, we find that Mr. Cox

has clearly failed to overcome this presumption of sanity. Indeed, the petitioner's papers barely support a valid assertion of mental incompetence as opposed to the substantial threshold showing of insanity required by Ford.

Prior to February 13, 1999, Mr. Cox, who has been represented by the same counsel since 1991 and has advanced numerous claims in several forums, had never tendered any allegation of insanity or mental incompetency. Even as late as petitioner's

appearance before the State of Arkansas Clemency Board on February 3, 1999, no such suggestions were made.

In the face of this failure, Mr. Cox now submits several statements of fellow death row inmates recounting what could be termed, at best for Mr. Cox, mostly idiosyncratic behavior occurring from several months to several years ago.

Given the several statements from physicians and others concerning Mr. Cox's very recent and rational behavior submitted by the state, we find that there has been no substantial threshold showing of insanity and incompetence. Thus, there is no likelihood of the occurrence of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Supreme Court Capital CaseDocket

Jones v. USA The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Monday in United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998). Questions Presented:

1. Whether petitioner was entitled to a jury instruction that the jury's failure to agree on a sentencing recommendation automatically would result in a court-imposed sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.

2. Whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury instructions led the jury to believe that deadlock on the penalty recommendation would automatically result in a court-imposed sentence less severe than life imprisonment.

3. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that the submission of invalid non-statutory aggravating factors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt..

In pertinent part the instruction reads:

After you have completed your findings as to the existence or absence of any aggravating or mitigating factors, you will then engage in a weighing process. In determining whether a sentence of death is appropriate, you must weight any aggravating factors that you unanimously find to exist -- whether statutory or nonstatutory ñ against mitigating factors . . . that any . . . of you find to exist. You shall consider whether all the aggravating factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death. Based upon this consideration, you the jury, by unanimous vote, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, or sentenced to some other lesser sentence. . . .

Keep in mind, however, that regardless of your findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, you are never required to recommend a death sentence.

If you recommend the imposition of a death sentence, the court is required to impose that sentence. . . . In deciding what recommendation to make, you are not to be concerned with the question of what sentence the defendant might receive in the event you determine not to recommend a death sentence or a sentence of life without the possibility of release. That is a matter for the court to decide in the event you conclude that a sentence of death or life without the possibility of release should be recommended. . . .

In order to bring back a verdict recommending the punishment of death or life without the possibility of release, all twelve of you must unanimously vote in favor of such specific penalty.

Slack v. McDaniel, --- S.Ct. ----, 1998 WL 717391 (Feb. 22, 1999)(The case is from the Ninth Circuit. The on Monday Court granted certiorari in this habeas case limited to the following question:

If a person's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254 is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies and he subsequently exhausts his state remedies and refiles the §2254 petition, are claims included within that petition that were not included within his initial §2254 filing 'second or successive' habeas applications?

Non-Capital Habeas Cases

Munkus v. Furlong Tenth Circuit holds that counsel and the courts have no affirmative duty to inform a defendant of the right to selfrepresentation.

Prisoner's Rights and Governmental Misconduct Cases

Harrell v. Cooks Seventh Circuit, in a humorous fact pattern, holds that police lost of evidence is not actionable by those claiming possessory interest in the property citing qualified immunity.

Luck v. Rovenstine Seventh Circuit holds that a one-week detention without a Pugh v. Gerstein hearing is not covered by the qualified immunity doctrine for suits against county sheriff in his official capacity.

Qian v. Kautz Seventh Circuit holds that police were unwarranted in re-arresting a Chinese speaker who had already tested negative for intoxicants on charges of Operating While Intoxicated was unwarranted despite unusual behavior and symptomology of intoxication (in reality he was suffering from a subdural hematoma).

In Depth

This week's "In Depth" covers contact information for various organizations involved in capital defense. (List from the Southern Center for Human Rights site).

NAACP Legal Defense Fund

George Kendall

Song Richardson

99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor

New York, NY 10013

Phone (212) 219-1900

Fax (212) 219-2052

National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys

Renée McDonald, Capital Resource Counsel

83 Poplar Street, N.W.

Atlanta, GA 30303-2122

Phone (404) 688-1202

Fax (404) 688-9440

Paul Petterson, Indigent Defense Coordinator

1627 K Street, N.W., Suite 1200

Washington, DC 20006

Phone (202) 872-8688 x. 224

Fax (202) 331-8269

e-mail psp@nacdl.com

Southern Center for Human Rights

Stephen B. Bright, Director

Palmer Singleton

Charlotta Norby

Christopher Johnson

Tanya Greene

83 Poplar Street, N.W.

Atlanta, GA 30303-2122

Phone (404) 688-1202

Fax (404) 688-9440

e-mail rights@schr.org

Habeas Assistance & Training Project

Mark E. Olive

1900 Center Point Boulevard, No. 80

Tallahassee, FL 32308

Phone (904) 877-7210

Fax (904) 671-7210

John H. Blume

1247 Sumter Street, Suite 201

P.O. Box 11744

Columbia, SC 29211

Phone (803) 765-1044

Fax (803) 765-1143

Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel (trial counsel)

David I. Bruck

1247 Sumter Street, Suite 201

P.O. Box 11744

Columbia, SC 29211

Phone (803) 765-1044

Fax (803) 765-1143

e-mail dbruck@scsn.met

Kevin McNally

513 Capitol Ave

P.O. Box 1243

Frankfort, KY 40602

Phone (502) 227-2142

Fax (502) 227-4669

e-mail KMcNALLY@MIS.NET

Other State based resources

ALABAMA

Equal Justice Initiative

Bryan Stevenson, Director

114 North Hull Street

Montgomery, AL 36104-3796

Phone (334) 269-1803

Fax (334) 269-1806

ARIZONA

Federal Public Defender Office

Denise I. Young

222 N. Central Avenue, Suite 810

Phoenix, AZ 85004

Phone (602) 379-3670

Fax (602) 379-4300

CALIFORNIA

California Appellate Project

Michael G. Millman, Director

One Ecker Place, Suite 400

San Francisco, CA 94105-2750

Phone (800) 779-0507

(415) 495-0500

Fax (415) 495-5616

Center for Capital Assistance

Scharlette Holdman

Jay Pultz

529 Castro Street

San Francisco, CA 94114

Phone (415) 621-8860

Fax (415) 621-8830

State Public Defender

801 K Street, Suite 1100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Phone (916) 322-7442

Fax (916) 327-0459

State Public Defender

221 Main Street, Tenth Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105

Phone (415) 904-5600

Fax (415) 904-5635

COLORADO

Office of the Public Defender

David D. Wymore

110 16th Street, Suite 800

Denver, CO 80202

Phone (303) 620-4888

Fax (303) 620-4931

CONNECTICUT

Office of Chief Public Defender,Trial Services Unit

Patrick J. Culligan, Chief of Trial Services

E-mail: patrick.culligan@po.state.ct.us

30 Trinity Street

4th Floor

Hartford, CT 06106

Phone (860) 509-6418

Fax (860) 509-6495

Additional contacts:

Ronald Gold - E-mail - ronald.gold@po.state.ct.us

Karen A. Goodrow - E-mail - karen.goodrow@po.state.ct.us

Barry Butler- E-mail - barry.butler@po.state.ct.us

Michael Courtney - E-mail - michael.courtney@po.state.ct.us

FLORIDA

Capital Collateral Representative

Michael Minerva, Director

Martin L. McClain, Chief Assistant

1533 South Monroe Street

Tallahassee, FL 32301

Phone (904) 487-4376

Fax (904) 487-1682

Office of the Public Defender, Capital Unit

1320 N.W. 14th Street

Miami, FL 33125

Phone (305) 545-1859

Fax (305) 545-1994

GEORGIA

Southern Center for Human Rights

Stephen B. Bright, Director

Palmer Singleton

Charlotta Norby

Christopher Johnson

Tanya Greene

83 Poplar Street, N.W.

Atlanta, GA 30303-2122

Phone (404) 688-1202

Fax (404) 688-9440

E-mail - rights@schr.org

Georgia Resource Center

Steve Bayliss & Beth Wells

101 Marietta Tower, Suite 3310

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Phone (404) 614-2014

Fax (404) 614-4656

Multicounty Public Defender

Georgia Indigent Defense Council

Mike Mears, Director

985 Ponce de Leon Avenue

Atlanta, GA 30306

Phone (404) 894-2595

Fax (404) 206-5154

ILLINOIS

Illinois Capital Resource Center

Marshall Hartman, Director

600 West Jackson Street

Chicago, IL 60661

Phone (312) 814-5100

Fax (312) 814-5951

Cook County Public Defender, Capital Defense Unit

2650 South California Street, 7th Floor

Chicago, IL 60608

Phone (312) 890-3217

Fax (312) 890-3247

Illinois State Appellate Defender, Capital Litigation Division

600 West Jackson Blvd., 6th Floor

Chicago, IL 60661

Phone (312) 814-5100

Fax (312) 814-5951

INDIANA

Public Defender of Indiana, Capital Litigation Division

Tom Hinseley, Chief

1 North Capitol, Suite 800

Indianapolis, IN 46204

Phone (317) 232-2475

Fax (317) 323-2307

KANSAS

Death Penalty Defense Unit

Ronald E. Wurtz

112 S.W. 6th Street, Suite 302

Topeka, KS 66603

Phone (913) 296-6555

Fax (913) 291-3979

KENTUCKY

Department of Public Advocacy

Allison Conally, Public Advocate

100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302

Frankfort, KY 40601

Phone (502) 564-8006

Capital Post-Conviction Unit

Randall L. Wheeler, Director

Phone (502) 564-3948

Fax (502) 564-3949

Jefferson County Public Defender

Daniel T. Goyette, Director

200 Civic Plaza

719 West Jefferson

Louisville, KY 40202

Phone (502) 574-3800

Fax (502) 574-4052

LOUISIANA

Loyola Death Penalty Resource Center

Nicholas Trenticosta, Director

636 Baronne Street

New Orleans, LA 70113

Phone (504) 522-0578

Fax (504) 586-8155

Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center

Clive A. Stafford Smith, Director

636 Baronne Street

New Orleans, LA 70113

Phone (504) 558-9867

Fax (504) 558-0378

MARYLAND

Maryland Public Defender, Capital Defense Division

520 West Fayette Street

Baltimore, MD 21201

Phone (301) 333-4840

Fax (301) 333-3275

MISSOURI

Missouri Public Interest Litigation Clinic

Sean D. O'Brien, Director

5319 Rockhill Road

Kansas City, MO 64110

Phone (816) 363-2795

Fax (816) 363-2799

Missouri Public Defender, Capital Litigation Division

Karen Kraft, Director

1221 Locust Street, Suite 410

St. Louis, MO 63103

Phone (314) 340-7662

Fax (314) 421-0829

NEVADA

Nevada Appellate & Post-Conviction Project

Michael Pescetta, Director

330 South Third Street, Suite 700

Las Vegas, NV 89101

Phone (702) 388-6577 x. 279

Fax (702) 388-6261

NEW JERSEY

Office of Public Defender, Appellate Section

31 Clinton Street

P. O. Box 46003

Newark, NJ 07101

Phone (201) 877-1200

Fax (201) 877-1239

NEW YORK

NAACP Legal Defense Fund

George Kendall

Song Richardson

99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor

New York, NY 10013

Phone (212) 219-1900

Fax (212) 219-2052

New York Capital Defender Office

Kevin M. Doyle, Director

Susan Solomon, Internship Coordinator

80 Centre Street

Room 266

New York, NY 10013

Phone (212) 417-3187

Fax (212) 417-4175

Albany office:

New York Capital Defender

Randolph Treece, Director

Corning Tower

P.O. Box 2113

Albany, NY 12220

Phone (518) 473-9429

Fax (518) 473-9438

Rochester office:

New York Capital Defender

Tom Dunn, Director

277 Alexander Street, Suite 201

Rochester, NY 14607

Phone (716) 232-5480

Fax (716) 232-2156

The Legal Aid Society, Capital Defense Unit

Russell Neufeld

175 Remsen Street

Brooklyn, NY 11201

Phone (718) 243-6473

Fax (718) 243-6404

NORTH CAROLINA

Center for Death Penalty Litigation

Kenneth Rose, Director

200 Merrith Drive, Suite 201

Durham, NC 27713

Phone (919) 544-4650

Fax (919) 544-4620

Office of the Appellate Defender

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr.

200 Meredith Drive, Suite 200

Durham, NC 27713-2287

Phone (919) 560-3334

Fax (919) 560-3288

OHIO

Ohio Public Defender Commission, Capital Punishment Division

8 East Long Street

Columbus, OH 43215

Phone (614) 466-5394

Fax (614) 644-9972

OKLAHOMA

Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, Capital Post Conviction Division

Sue Wycoff, Division Chief

1660 Cross Center Drive

Norman, OK 73019

Phone (405) 325-3331

Fax (405) 325-7567

PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania Post-conviction Defender Organization

Robert Dunham, Director

Suite 501, The Lafayette Building

437 Chestnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19106-2414

Phone (215) 451-6500

Fax (215) 451-6555

Defender Association of Philadelphia, Capital Defender Unit

121 North Broad Street

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Phone (215) 557-4961

Fax (215) 557-4920

Defender Association of Philadelphia, Federal Court Division, Capital Habeas Unit

437 Chestnut Street., Suite 501

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Phone (215) 928-0520

Fax (215) 928-0826

SOUTH CAROLINA

South Carolina Post-Conviction Defender Organization

P.O. Box 11311

Columbia, SC 29211

Office location:

1247 Sumter Street, Suite 303

Columbia, SC 29201

Phone (803) 765-0650

Fax (803) 765-0705

TENNESSEE

Post-conviction Defender

Donald Dawson, Director

1320 Andrew Jackson Building

500 Deadrick Street

Nashville, TN 37243

Phone (615) 741-9331

Fax (615) 741-9430

TEXAS

Texas Resource Center

Eden Harrington, Director

P.O. Box 280

Austin, TX 78767-0280

Office location:

205 West 9th Street, Suite 201

Phone (512) 320-8300

Fax (512) 477-2153

Texas Defender Service

Mandy Welch, Director

P.O. Box 66269

Houston, TX 77266

Office location:

412 Main Street, Suite 700

Phone (713) 222-7788

Fax (713) 222-0260

VIRGINIA

Virginia Post-Conviction Assistance Project

The Heritage Building

100 East Main Street

P.O. Box 506

Richmond, VA 23204-0506

Phone (804) 643-6845

Fax (804) 643-6819

Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse

Penny White

Washington & Lee University School of Law

Lexington, VA 24450

Phone (540) 464-8557

Fax (540) 463-8488

WASHINGTON

Timothy K. Ford

Robert S. Mahler

MacDonald, Hoague & Bayless

1500 Hoge Building

705 Second Avenue

Seattle, WA 89104-1745

Phone (206) 622-1604

Fax (206) 343-3961

E-mail law@mhb.wa.com

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