We in the United States in the past week have killed the 500th person since the reinstitution of capital punishment, "In Depth" this week lists the 500. The good news, however, is, as seemingly always, the Holiday season seems to have slowed slow down the machinery of death, and this holiday season is no exception with just three capital cases having been reported decide by the various federal Courts of appeal during last week. "In Focus" this week examines just one of these cases out of the Sixth Circuit case,Carpenter v. Mohr,detailing procedural default and competency of appellate counsel.

In Focus

Carpenter v. MohrSixth Circuit grants partial relief on an appellate ineffectiveness claim and in so doing exhaustively analyzes procedural default. Although post-AEDPA, the panel, albeit sub silentio, examines the cases as if no change in standards under the AEDPA has occurred despite a different (Herbert v. USA) panel holding a much more radical standard.

Carpenter argues that the district court erred initially by determining that the cause for his procedural default of his sufficiency of evidence claim (here ineffective assistance of appellate counsel) must itself be subjected to a procedural default analysis before it may constitute cause. He argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478(1986), only imposed an exhaustion requirement on the cause asserted by the habeas petitioner in connection with the procedural default of the primary habeas claim. We agree.

Carpenter is correct in that the district court erroneously conflated the exhaustion requirement with the procedural default or waiver rule. The two inquiries are analytically distinct. See Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that "the question of whether a respondent is barred from litigating in a federal habeas corpus proceeding constitutional claims that were forfeited before the state court is distinct from the issue of exhausted state remedies"); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26n. 28 (1982) (finding that waiver is separate from the question of exhaustion and exhaustion simply requires a petitioner to exhaust those remedies "available in the court of the State"). In Murray, the Court held that an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim must merely be presented to the state courts as an independent claim, before it can be used to establish cause for the state procedural default of a separate claim. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-89. . . .

A careful reading of Murraymakes clear that the Supreme Court was concerned only that a federal court not infringe on a state court's right to decide issues pertaining to the state court conviction first, and thus felt that an exhaustion requirement, one that had not previously been required in reference to the cause element, needed to be implemented.

"Th[is] exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the highest court in the state in which the petitioner was convicted has been given a full and fair opportunity to rule on the petitioner's claims." Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878, 881 (6th Cir. 1990). Significantly, "[t]o exhaust his or her remedies, a petitioner for federal habeas corpus relief is only required to raise his claims before the state's highest court. The fact that the state court does not address the merits of the claim does not preclude a finding of exhaustion." Id.at 883; see also Rudolph v. Parke, 856 F.2d 738, 739 (6th Cir. 1988) ("It is settled law in this circuit that a constitutional claim which is presented to the state courts, regardless of whether they address and dispose of it, will satisfy the exhaustion requirement."). Furthermore, exhaustion applies even if a claim was procedurally defaulted in state court, because in such cases there are no longer remedies available for the petitioner to exhaust. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161(1996); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732(1991); Engle, 456 U.S. at 125-26 n.28 (1988).

Here, the state expressly conceded that Carpenter exhausted his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. J.A. at 16. Carpenter presented his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in his state court petition to reopen his direct appeal, and thus provided the state court with the first opportunity to determine the claim. When this petition was denied, he then appealed that denial to the Ohio Supreme Court. True, the state court declined to rule on the merits of his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim because Carpenter filed the claim late, and according to the state court, without good cause for his delay. Carpenter, however, has exhausted all available state remedies for the claims. While the state court's denial of Carpenter's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim on procedural grounds now precludes him from raising the claim as an independent habeas claim, it does not preclude him from asserting the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause for his state court procedural default of his sufficiency of the evidence claim. A petitioner is permitted to assert ineffective assistance of counsel as cause, even if the state court has denied the claim based on a procedural default, so long as the claim was presented to the state courts and it is exhausted. Put another way, the Supreme Court simply requires exhaustion of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in order for it to constitute cause. The claim must be presented to the state courts, and all available remedies foreclosed, or the exhaustion requirement will not be met. Once all available remedies in state court are precluded and the state court may no longer pass on the claim, however, it is exhausted and may be utilized as cause. There is no additional requirement beyond exhaustion in order for a petitioner to utilize ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause for the procedural default of an independent claim. Cf. Meeks,749 F.2d at 325-26 (finding that a petitioner's habeas claims were exhausted when the petitioner joined the claims in an application for delayed appeal in state court, even though the claim was ultimately denied in state court due to a procedural default).

We do note that, although our review of the issue has not found a large number of cases directly addressing the issue, the Second and Seventh Circuits have considered the issue in slightly different contexts. See, e.g., Reyes v. Keane, 118 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1997) (habeas petitioner who fails to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in state court may not present that claim as cause for procedurally defaulted habeas claim); Lemons v. O'Sullivan, 54 F.3d 357, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). Those cases are distinguishable from the present case, for in both cases the petitioner completely failed to raise the ineffective assistance claim in state court. Here, however, Carpenter raised the claim in the primary avenue available to him under Ohio law (application to reopen his direct appeal). Hence, Carpenter provided the state court with the first opportunity to address the claim, although the court declined to do so on a procedural basis. Therefore, we do not decide whether a petitioner's complete failure to raise an ineffective assistance claim in the state courts would be insufficient under Murray. Under a broad reading of Murray,we note that it probably would be insufficient, as the Seventh and Second Circuits have held.

Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred by finding that before it could consider whether the ineffective assistance of Carpenter's appellate counsel established cause for the state procedural default of Carpenter's sufficiency of the evidence claim, it must first determine whether the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was itself procedurally defaulted, rather than simply exhausted. Principles of comity do not require placing a procedural default analysis on claims asserted as cause. We believe that the exhaustion requirement mandated by Murrayis sufficient, and ensures that the state court has the first opportunity to hear such claims. Moreover, as noted earlier, a petitioner will be effectively "punished" for procedurally defaulting the ineffective assistance claim by only being able to assert it as cause for a procedural default and not being permitted to assert it as an independent habeas claim. The Supreme Court in Murraydid not implement a procedural default requirement for claims asserted as cause, and until it does, we see no reason to engraft such a requirement on our own.

Capital Cases

Williams v. TaylorThe Fourth Circuit, demonstrating what a difference the new AEDPA standards make, denies relief in this capital case:

Williams contends, however, that we erroneously construed § 2254 inGreen v. French. Thus, Williams argues that the standard of review adopted in that case should not be followed here. This argument need not detain us long. "It is well established that a decision of this Court is binding on other panels unless it is overruled by a sub- sequenten bancopinion of the Court or an intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court."Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808, 821 (4th Cir.) (citingIndustrial Turnaround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 1997)),cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 199 (1998). Neither the en banc Court nor the United States Supreme Court has overruled (or even called into question) the standard of review adopted by this Court inGreen v. French. Indeed, sinceGreen v. Frenchwas decided, we have applied the new standard inFitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 362 (4th Cir. 1998),Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1998), andCardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 339 (4th Cir. 1998). As a consequence, the standard of review enunciated inGreenv. Frenchcontinues to be the binding law of this Circuit.

Although the Virginia Supreme Court unanimously found that Williams's trial counsel were not ineffective,see Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 200 (Va. 1997), the district court concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court unreasonably appliedStrickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668(1984), andLockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364(1993), in finding no prejudice. In addition, the district court found that the Virginia Supreme Court "made an error of fact in discussing its finding of no prejudice." (J.A. at 1102.) Finding that Wil- liams's trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate, prepare, and present certain evidence in mitigation of punishment during the sentencing phase of Williams's trial, the dis- trict court ordered that the writ be granted. In contrast to the district court, we conclude that the Virginia Supreme Court's finding of no prejudice was neither based on an unreasonable application of the tests set forth by the United States Supreme Court inStricklandandLockhartfor determining prejudice, nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing held by the Danville Circuit Court.

Duvall v. KeatingTenth Circuit examines the condemn's right under to a pardon:

Although a prisoner has no constitutional right to a clemency proceeding, a state may provide such a right.SeeHerrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 414 (1993) ("[T]he Constitution . . . does not require the States to enact a clemency mechanism."). Oklahoma's constitution creates a right to seek clemency before the Pardon and Parole Board.SeeOkla. Const. art. VI, § 10. It is the Board's duty to conduct an impartial investigation and study of each applicant for clemency.Seeid.However, the Oklahoma constitution places the ultimate decision whether to grant clemency in the hands of the Governor.Seeid.Even though the Governor's power to grant clemency is discretionary, his power is somewhat circumscribed, for he can only commute a death sentence upon the favorable recommendation of the Pardon and Parole Board.Seeid.This requires a majority vote of the Board in favor of clemency.Seeid.

Assuming that this court has jurisdiction to review Mr. Duvall's allegations,seeOhio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, __ U.S. __, 118 S. Ct. 1244, 1249-52 (1998) (plurality opinion) (exercising jurisdiction over and addressing procedural due process claim involving Ohio's clemency process);id.at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (addressing merits of due process challenge to clemency procedures), we must resolve whether his § 1983 claim involves a violation of his constitutional rights. Mr. Duvall alleges two constitutional violations: (1) a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and (2) an Eighth Amendment violation. The Due Process Clause applies when the government deprives a person of life or an established liberty interest.SeeU.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. However, inWoodard, the Supreme Court divided with regard to whether a person has procedural due process rights with respect to a death penalty clemency hearing. The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, concluded that the Due Process Clause provides no constitutional safeguards as to clemency procedures. Although recognizing that a death row prisoner "maintains a residual life interest, e.g., in not being summarily executed by prison guards,"seeWoodard118 S. Ct. at 1250 (plurality opinion), the Chief Justice stated that a death row prisoner cannot use this interest to mount a procedural due process challenge to a clemency determination,seeid.In addition, the Chief Justice found that a death row prisoner has "no substantive expectation of clemency" because, under Ohio law, clemency lies within the discretion of the executive.Id.at 1251. Further, the Chief Justice rejected the argument thatEvitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), creates a "second strand" of procedural due process protection encompassing clemency proceedings in that they are not "an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant."Id.at 1252 (plurality opinion) (quotingEvitts, 469 U.S. at 393). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, concluded that, because a death row prisoner retains some life interest before execution, "some minimalprocedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings," even if the power to grant clemency is solely entrusted to the executive.Id.at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that a prisoner has an interest in life up to the date of his execution, and that the Due Process Clause therefore applies to all proceedings up to the final execution, including those involving clemency.Seeid.at 1255 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, examining the Court's narrowest majority holding, we assume that some minimal level of procedural due process applies to clemency proceedings.

Because clemency proceedings involve acts of mercy that are not constitutionally required, the minimal application of the Due Process Clause only ensures a death row prisoner that he or she will receive the clemency procedures explicitly set forth by state law, and that the procedure followed in rendering the clemency decision will not be wholly arbitrary, capricious or based upon whim, for example, flipping a coin.SeeWoodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring). We underscore that our review is limited to analyzing the procedures used during the clemency proceedings and not the substantive merits of the clemency decision.SeeConnecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) ("[C]ommutation decisionshave not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review." (emphasis added)).

As described above, the Oklahoma constitution describes the procedure to be used in granting clemency. Mr. Duvall fails to show that he was deprived of any procedure set forth in the Oklahoma constitution, for he was given the opportunity to and did participate fully in the clemency process. He applied for and was granted a clemency hearing before the Pardon and Parole Board. The Board carefully reviewed his case, but because Mr. Duvall failed to persuade a majority of the Board to vote in favor of clemency, the Board did not forward a recommendation for clemency to the Governor.SeeOkla. Const. art. VI, § 10. At this point, Mr. Duvall's request for a commutation of his death sentence is final, for the Governor cannot grant clemency in the absence of a favorable recommendation by the Board.Seeid.Therefore, because the Governor's discretionary power to grant clemency was not invoked, the Governor's position on clemency is irrelevant to this case. In addition, the record is devoid of evidence that the Board was prevented from conducting or failed to conduct an impartial investigation and study of Mr. Duvall's application for clemency, or that it utilized procedures that were arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. Indeed, Mr. Duvall does not challenge the Board's conduct. Therefore, we conclude that Mr. Duvall has suffered no due process violation.

Having determined that Mr. Duvall's right to due process has not been violated, we find no basis for his allegation of an Eighth Amendment violation, for this court has already upheld the constitutionality of Mr. Duvall's death sentence in his federal habeas proceedings.SeeDuvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 792-94, 798 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, we find Mr. Duvall's § 1983 claim is without merit.

Habeas

Windham v. Merkle NinthCircuit holds, that despite the state's failure in not raising the issue in the court below, remands the habeas petition for examination of procedural default.

Prisoner's Rights and Prosecutorial Misconduct

Walters v. EdgarsSeventh Circuit examines standing in this prisoner's right suit and dismisses potentially meritorious claims on the grounds that plaintiff's had suffered no cognizable injury, even assuming deprivation of constitutional rights governing access to the courts. Plaintiffs in this suit are frequent flyers on the frivolous law suit express and had not been prevented from filing a potentially meritorious suit.

Requests

Two requests are being sent out this week. The first is for a list member who seeks titles and where to obtain a good primer on the nuts and bolts of a direct capital appeal. The second is a request from another list member who is seeking information on any cases in which claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at a first trial that resulted in a reversal on appeal that so infected the second trial as the render it arguably unfair and volitive of due process.

In Depth

Despite the efforts of attorneys and activists, both in this country and abroad, the 500th person since the reinstitution of capital punishment in the United States occurred this week in South Carolina with the death of Andrew Smith. During this busy holiday season please take a moment to remember those left behind by the 500, the friends and family of those left behind by the murders for which those 500 were condemned, and for a nation who finds at the end the of this most violent of all centuries that it has the moral right to kill its own citizens. Here are the names of those we have killed (compiled by Abe Bonowitz, and the crew of the Abolitionist Action Committee, thanx Abe).

Gary Gilmore, John Spenkelink, Jesse Bishop, Steven Judy, Frank Coppola, Charlie Brooks, John Evans, Jimmy Lee Gray,Mississippi,Robert Sullivan, Robert Wayne Williams, John Eldon Smith, Anthony Antone, John Taylor, James Autry, James Hutchins, Ronald O'Bryan, Arthur Goode, Elmo Patrick Sonnier, James Adams, Carl Shriner, Ivon Stanley, David Washington, Ernest Dobbert, Timothy Baldwin, James Dupree Henry, Linwood Briley, Thomas Barefoot, Ernest Knighton, Velma Barfield, Timothy Palmes, Alpha Otis Stephens, Robert Lee Willie, David Martin, Roosevelt Green, Joseph Carl Shaw, Doyle Skillem, James Raulerson, Van Roosevelt Solomon, Johnny Paul Witt, Stephen Peter Morin, John Young, James Briley, Jesse de la Rosa, Marvin Francois, Charles Milton, Morris Mason, Henry Martinez Porter, Charles Rumbaugh, William Vandiver, Carroll Cole, James Terry Roach, Charles William Bass, Arthur Lee Jones, Daniel Thomas, Jeffrey Allen Barney, David Funchess, Jay Pinkerton, Ronald Straight, Rudy Esquivel, Kenneth Brock, Jerome Bowden, Michael Smith, Randy Woolls, Larry Smith, Chester Wicker, John Rook, Michael Wayne Evans, Richard Andrade, Ramon Hernandez, Elisio Moreno, Joseph Mulligan, Richard Tucker, Edward Earl Johnson,William Boyd Tucker, Anthony Williams, Benjamin Berry, Alvin Moore, Jimmy Glass, Jimmy Wingo, Elliott Johnson, Richard Whitley, John Thompson, Connie Ray Evans, Willie Celestine, Willie Watson, John Brogdon, Sterling Rault, Beauford White, Wayne Ritter, Dale Pierre Selby, Billy Mitchell, Jospeh Starvaggi, Timothy McCorquodale, Robert Streetman, Willie Jasper Darden, Wayne Felde, Leslie Lowenfeld, Earl Clanton, Arthur Bishop, Edward Byrne, James Messner, Donald Gene Franklin, Jeffrey Daugherty, Raymond Landry, George Mercer, Theodore Bundy, Leon Rutherford King, Aubrey Adams, Henry Willis, Stephen McCoy, Michael Lindsey, William Paul Thompson, Leo Edwards, Sean Patrick Flannagan, Horace F. Dunkins, Herbert Richardson, Alton Waye, James Paster, Arthur Julius, Carlos de Luna, Gerald Smith, Jerome Butler, Ronald "Rusty" Woomer, Jesse Tafero, Wilford Stokes, Leonard Marvin Laws, Johnny Ray Anderson, Dalton Prejean, Thomas Baal, John Swindler, Ronald Gene Simmons, James Smith, Wallace Norrell Thomas, Micel Derrick, Richard Boggs, Anthony Bertolotti, George Gilmore, Charles Coleman, Charles Walker, James Hamblen, Wilbert Evans, Raymond Clark, Buddy Earl Justus, Lawrence Lee Buxton, Roy Allen Harich, Ignacio Cuevas, Jerry Bird, Bobby Marlon Francis, Andrew Lee Jones, Albert Clozza, Derick Lynn Peterson, Maurice Byrd, Donald Gaskins, James Russell, Warren McCleskey, Michael van McDougall, G. W. Green, Mark Hopkinson, Joe Angel Cordova, Rickey Ray Rector, Johnny Frank Garrett, David Clark, Edward Ellis, Robyn Parks, Olan Robison, Steven Pennell, Larry Gene Heath, Donald Eugene Harding, Robert Alton Harris, William Wayne White, Justin Lee May, Stephen Hill, Nollie Martin, Jesus Romero, Roger Keith Coleman, Robert Black, Edward Dean Kennedy, Edward Fitzgerald, William Andrews, Curtis Lee Johnson, Willie LeRoy Jones, James Demouchette, Ricky Lee Grubbs, John Gardner Jr., Jeffery Griffin, Cornelius Singleton, Kavin Lincecun, Timothy Bunch, Westley Allan Dodd, Charles Stampler, Martsay Bolder, John George Brewer, James Allen Red Dog, Robert Sawyer, Syvasky Poyner, Carlos Santana, Ramon Montoya, James Clark, Robert Henderson, Darryl Stewart, Larry Joe Johnson, Leonel Torres Herrera, John Sawyers, Andrew Chabrol, Thomas Dean Stevens, Markham Duff-Smith, Curtis Harris, Walter Junior Blair, Frederick Lashley, Danny Harris, Joseph Jemigan, David Lee Holland, Carl Kelly, Ruben Cantu, David Masson, Michael Durocher, Richard Wilkerson, Kenneth DeShields, Johnny James, Joseph Wise, Antonio Bonham, Frank Guinan, Anthony Cook, Christopher Burger, Clifford Phillips, David Pruett, Keith Wells, Harold Barnard, Johnny Watkins, Freddie Webb, William Hance, Richard Beavers, Roy Stewart, Larry Aanderson, Timothy Spencer, Paul Rougeau, John Wayne Gacy, Jonas Whitmore, Charles Pickens, John Thanos, Stephen Nethery, Charles Campbell, Denton Crank, David Lawson, Andre Deputy, Robert Drew, Hoyt Clines, Darryl Richley, James Holmes, Wili Otey, Jesse Gutierrez, George Lott, Walter Williams, Warren Bridge, Herman Clark, Gregory Resnover, Raymond Kinnamon, Jesse Jacobs, Mario Marquez, Kermit Smith, Dana Ray Edmonds, Clifton Charles Russell, Willie Williams, Jeffrey Motley, Billy Gardner, Samuel Hawkins, Nelson Shelton, Thomas Grasso, James Free, Hernando Williams, Noble Mays, Nicholas Ingram, Richard Wayne Snell, Willie Clisby, Keith Zettlemoyer, Emmitt Foster, Duncan McKenzie, Varnall Weeks, Thomas Lee Ward, Gervies Davis, Darrell Devier, Willie Lloyd Turner, Fletcher Thomas Mann, Ronald Allridge, John Fearance, Karl Hammond, Larry Griffin, Roger Dale Stafford, Bernard Bolender, Tony Murray, Robert Brecheen, Vernon Sattiewhite, Leon Moser, Sylvester Adams, Barry Fairchild, Jimmy Jeffers, Carl Johnson, Charles Albanese, Phillip Lee Ingle, Dennis Stockton, Harold Joe Lane, Mickey Davidson, Herman Barnes, Robert Sidebottom, George Delvecchio, Anthony Joe Larette, Jerry White, Philip Atkins, Robert O'Neal, Bernard Amos, Hai Hai Vuong, Esequel Banda, James Briddle, Walter Correll, Richard Townes, Jr., Billy Bailey, John Albert Taylor, William Flamer, Leo Jenkins, Edward Dean Horsley, Jeffery Paul Sloan, William George Bonin, Kenneth Granviel, Antonio James, Richard Allen Moran, Doyle Williams, James Clark, Jr., Benjamin Brewer, Keith Daniel Williams, Robert South, Daren Lee Bolton, John Joubert, Joseph Savino, Tommie Smith, Fred Kornahrens, Emmet Nave, Thomas Battle, William Frank Parker, Stephen Hatch, Richard Oxford, Luis Mata, Michael Torrence, Douglas Franklin Wright, Raymond Lee Stewart, Joe Gonzales, Larry Gene Bell, John Earl Bush, Larry Lonchar, Doyle Cecil Lucas, Ellis Wayne Felker, Ronald Bennett, Frank Middleton, Jr., Gregory Warren Beaver, John Mills, Jr., Larry Allen Stout, Richard Zeitvogel, Lem Tuggle, Ronald Lee Hoke, Earl Van Denton, Paul Ruiz, Kirt Wainwright, Billy Wayne Waldrop, Randy Greenawalt,Eric Schneider, Michael Carl George, Richard Brimage, Jr., Coleman Gray, John Kennedy Barefield, Pedro Medina, David Lee Herman, David Spence, Billy Lee Woods, Kenneth Gentry, Benjamin Boyle, John Ashley Brown, Jr, Ernest Orville Baldree, Walter Hill, Terry Washington, Scott Carpenter, Anthony Ray Westley, Harry Charles Moore, Clifton Belyeu, Richard Drinkard, Clarence Lackey, Bruce Callins, Larry Wayne White, Robert Madden, Patrick Rogers, Kenneth Harris, Dorsey Johson-Bey, Davis Losada, Henry Francis Hayes, Earl Behringer, Michael Elkins, David Stoker, Eddie Johnson, Irineo Montoya, William Lyle Woratzeck, Harold McQueen, Flint Gregory Hunt, Roy Bruce Smith, Joseph O'Dell, Bobby West, Ralph Feltrop, Eugene Parry, Donald Reese, Andrew Six, Carleton Pope, James Carl Lee Davis, Mario Benjamin Murphy, Jessel Turner, Sam McDonald, Benjamin Stone, John Cockrum, Dwight Dwayne Adananduf, Ricky Lee Green, Gary Davis, Alan J. Bannister, Kenneth Ransom, Aua Lauti, Aaron Lee Fuller, Earl Matthews, Jr., Dawud Majid Mu'min, Durlyn Eddmonds,Walter Stewart, Michael Sharp, Gary Burris, Charlie Livingston, Robert Williams, Michael Satcher, Michael Lockhart, Thomas Beavers, Lloyd Hampton, Jose Ceja, Robert Smith, Ricky Lee Sanderson, Karla Fay Tucker, Steven Renfro, Tony Mackall, Michael Long, Terry Langford, Reginald Powell, John Arnold, Jerry Lee Hogue, Douglas Buchanan, Gerald Stano, Leo Jones, Milton Griffin-El, Ronald Watkins, Judi Buenoano, Daniel Remeta, Angel Breard, Glennon Sweet, Jose Villafuerte, Joseph Cannon, Lesley Gosch, Arthur Martin Ross, Frank McFarland, Steven Thompson, Robert Anthony Carter, Pedro Cruz Muniz, Douglas Gretzler, David Cargill, Clifford Boggess, Johnny Pyles, Dennis Wayne Eaton, Leo Narvaiz, Wilburn Henderson, John Plath, Thomas Thompson, Danny Lee King, Steve Wood, Zane Hill, Lance Chandler, George Ruiz Camacho Jr., Delbert Teague, Johnile Dubois, David Castillo, Kenneth Stewart, Sammy Roberts, Javier Cruz, Roderick Abeyta,Jonathan Nobles, Jeremy Sagastegui, Dwayne Wright, Ronald Fitzgerald, Tyrone Gilliam, Kenneth McDuff, Kenneth Wilson, John Noland Jr., Kevin Cardwell, Larry Gilbert, J.D. Gleaton, Daniel Corwin, Jeff Emery, Tuan Nguyen, Louis Truesdale, James Ronald Meanes, John Duvall , Andrew Lavern Smith

Errata

In a series of oops in recent weeks including an embarrassingly large number of typos, last week's errors were nothing short of mind numbing. Most notably I miscited Coleman v. Calderon as Calderon v. Thompson, please excuse any inconvenience this -- and other typos -- may have caused. My personal Christmas wish and New Year's resolution for the list is to get a better at typing & editing at two in the morning while wired on caffeine, which is usually when & how the final edits are made.

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