CA6: Clerk issued arrest warrant without judicial authority; not unreasonable unless no PC

By John Wesley Hall
Law Offices of John Wesley Hall

May 15, 2016

That court clerks issue arrest warrants, but not acting as a neutral and detached magistrate, is not a constitutional violation unless the arrest was without probable cause. Plaintiffs, given four amendments to the complaint, never show that the arrest was without probable cause, and the case was properly dismissed. Graves v. Mahoning Cnty., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8697 (6th Cir. May 12, 2016):

But that does not mean the plaintiffs prevail. To establish a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim, the plaintiffs must show a violation not of the Warrant Clause but of the Reasonableness Clause. “[F]or § 1983 liability” in Fourth Amendment cases, “the seizure must be ‘unreasonable.'” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989); see, e.g., Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 618 (6th Cir. 2014). And violating the Warrant Clause does “not invariably violate the Reasonableness Clause.” Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 452 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc); see, e.g., Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 565-66; cf. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 169, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008). The plaintiffs may not prevail merely by showing that they were arrested with a defective warrant; they must show that they were unreasonably seized.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures,” not warrantless ones. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006); Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 440-42 (7th Cir. 1986). What is “unreasonable” varies from case to case, from type of seizure to type of seizure. “[N]either a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989). No one thinks, for example, that the border patrol needs a warrant (or even individualized suspicion) to seize a person at the airport to check his eligibility to enter the country. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976). It is only when the seizure at issue “requires a warrant” that “the failure to satisfy the Warrant Clause” creates a problem. Baranski, 452 F.3d at 445.

The seizure at issue in today’s case—an arrest—does not require a warrant. Warrantless arrests were “taken for granted at the founding,” Moore, 553 U.S. at 170 (quotation omitted), and the passage of time has only deepened that understanding, see, e.g., id. at 171. In case after case, courts ask not whether the police had a valid arrest warrant but whether the seizure was “reasonable.” See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-24, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, T.D. 3686 (1925); Boykin v. Van Buren Township, 479 F.3d 444, 449-50 (6th Cir. 2007); Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 251, 255-57 (6th Cir. 2003).

That means arrests are “reasonable” when the officer had “probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2004); see Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 5.1(b) (5th ed. 2015). Yes, there are exceptions—say for arrests in a home. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-601, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980). But no such exception applies here, leaving us with the general rule: “[E]ven [when] the arrest warrant is invalid,” probable cause is “sufficient to justify arrest.” United States v. Fachini, 466 F.2d 53, 57 (6th Cir. 1972) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 565-66; U.S. ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 450 F.2d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 1971).

The plaintiffs’ complaint fails to account for this imperative. They never allege that they were arrested without probable cause. Without facts going to this “crucial question,” Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959), the plaintiffs cannot state a Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim against anyone, see Brower, 489 U.S. at 599-600, the county and townships included, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694-95, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), because they have not alleged a violation of their rights. The district court thus correctly dismissed this case at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.