Arson and Explosives

United States v. Ressam, 128 S.Ct. 1858 (2008)

The United States Supreme Court held that the federal offense that outlaws possessing explosives during the commission of a felony offense does not require that the explosives be “in relation to” the felony. All that is required is that the explosives are possessed at the same time that the felony is being committed. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary conclusion was reversed.

Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000)

Arson of a private residence does not affect interstate commerce for purposes of the federal arson statute’s jurisdictional element, even though the residence was insured and mortgaged through out-of-state entities and heated with out-of-state natural gas.

United States v. McBride, 724 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2013)

The crime of arson is not proven simply with evidence that the defendant used an accelerant to burn down a building. It is not arson unless the conduct is committed maliciously. It is not a crime, for example, to burn down an old shed in your backyard, even with the use of an accelerant. There must be some proof of malice, such as the fact that the building is no owned by the defendant, or that the building, if owned by the defendant, was burned down for the purpose of defrauding an insurance company, or to harm or injure occupants. The evidence in this case was not sufficient to support a conviction.

United States v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2009)

The defendant was convicted of mail fraud (§ 1341), arson to commit mail fraud (§ 844(h)), arson to commit wire fraud (§ 844(h)), and arson (§ 844(i)). The Fifth Circuit held that consecutive sentences for arson and use of fire to commit mail fraud and mail fraud are permissible. However, consecutive sentences for use of fire to commit mail fraud and use of fire to commit wire fraud are not permissible if there is only one fire.

United States v. Craft, 484 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2007)

While affirming several counts of conviction, the Seventh Circuit held that the arson of the Hells Angels “clubhouse” was not a federal offense, because the clubhouse was not sufficiently connected to interstate commerce. While some of the members’ dues were used to pay for members’ interstate trips, this was not a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 182 (3rd Cir. 2005)

The defendant burned a church which bought supplies from out-of-state and graduated students who moved out-of-state. This was insufficient evidence to establish an impact on interstate commerce. Note that this was an arson prosecution, not a prosecution under the church burning statute, as in Ballinger, infra.

United States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2003)

Arson of a church will not necessarily amount to a federal offense, because of the absence of a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce, even if members of the church come fromother states, the church has membership in an interstate organization, and there are interstate transfers of church funds.

United States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2002)

The Eleventh Circuit panel initially held that there was insufficient interstate commerce evidence to convict the defendant of burning down several churches in rural Georgia in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(1). The statute expressly requires proof that the arson be “in or affect interstate commerce.” When purely intrastate activity is involved and the government argues that this activity affected interstate commerce, the proof must demonstrate a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce. REVERSEDby the en banc court January 10, 2005. 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). The en banc court upheld the conviction on the theory that the defendant was traveling from state-to-state and burning churches wherever he went, thus satisfying the interstate commerce requirement.

United States v. Spruill, 118 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 1997)

Though the statute is worded awkwardly, 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) outlaws making threatening mailings or phone calls, which threaten physical injury by means of fire or explosives. The government argued, unsuccessfully, that the statute outlawed any threatening communication, one example being through the use of fire or explosive. The court concluded that only threats involving fire or explosives are covered by the statute.

United States v. Yoakam, 116 F.3d 1346 (10th Cir. 1997)

The evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s arson conviction. Though the evidence was sufficient to prove that the fire was caused by arson, the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant was the perpetrator. Even if there is evidence of financial motive, this is not sufficient to convict the defendant.

United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1996), modified at 90 F.3d 444

The defendant burned down the house of his next door neighbor. Because the neighbors’ house was not used for, and did not affect, interstate commerce, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §844(i) could not be sustained. The court concluded that, to sustain a conviction under the “affecting interstate commerce” theory, the government would have to prove that the residence had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.