White Farm Equipment Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJun 22, 1979242 N.L.R.B. 1373 (N.L.R.B. 1979) Copy Citation WHITE FARM EQUIPMENT CO. White Farm Equipment Company, a Subsidiary of White Motor Corporation and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL- CIO-CLC, and its Local 745. Case 9-CA 8835 June 22, 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND TRUESDAI.E On May 30, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Hen- ry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this pro- ceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging Party, herein called the Union, filed excep- tions and supporting briefs.' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, only to the extent consistent herewith. Following a Board-conducted election in June 1971, the Union was certified as the exclusive bar- gaining representative of a unit of Respondent's warehouse employees at its parts depot in Columbus, Ohio. Thereafter, Respondent and the Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement effective from August 15, 1971, through August 15, 1974. The par- ties subsequently executed a second agreement, effec- tive from August 15, 1974, through August 13. 1977. On June 28, 1974, prior to expiration of the Union's then-applicable agreement with Respondent, Ronald H. Janetzke, general counsel for the Union's District Council Seven, wrote Respondent requesting the following information: I. The master plans and summary booklets con- taining the agreements between Respondent and in- surance carriers who provide medical insurance cov- erage, sickness and accident insurance coverage, and life insurance coverage for the unit employees. 2. The total number of males, females, whites, blacks, and other minority applicants who sought em- ployment from January 1, 1973, to the date of the 'The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company filed a motion for oral argument. as well as a request to submit a brief amrricus curiae. Firestone's request to file a brief as aumcus uriae was granted by the Board b) telegraphic order: however, its motion for oral argument is hereby denied as the record and briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the parties. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also filed a motion for leave to file a brief umi us curiae. which was opposed b Respondent. We hereby grant the EF(X"s motion, and have considered its brief which was submitted along with the request letter, and the total number in each respective group who were actually hired, on a monthly basis. According to Janetzke's letter, the information was sought in furtherance of an internal union program calling for the elimination of all forms of discrimina- tion in plants represented by lUE.2 The letter further explained that the information was needed by the Union in order for it to complete an analysis of whether plant practices of Respondent might be in conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964., and in order to assure that no contractual pro- visions discriminate against employees. The following provision with respect to discrimination is contained in the parties' collective-bargaining agreements:4 ARTICLE 16--DISCRIMINATION Neither the Company nor the Union shall dis- criminate in any manner whatsoever against any employee because of race, sex, political or reli- gious affiliation, nationality, marital status, phys- ical or mental handicap, or membership or non- membership in any labor or other lawful organi- zation. Having received no reply to its June 28. 1974, let- ter. the Union reiterated its information request on August 8. On August 19. Respondent replied to the Union's letters, supplied the Union with a booklet describing the insurance programs as they applied to the bargaining unit, and summarized several changes in previous insurance benefits which had resulted from recent contract negotiations. These changes re- lated to a new collective-bargaining agreement, effec- tive from August 15, 1974, through August 13, 1977, which was agreed upon by the parties during negotia- tions occurring from July 10 to August 14, 1974. Janetzke, the union agent making the information re- quest and to whom Respondent's reply was ad- dressed, had not participated in the negotiations for the new collective-bargaining agreement. Although Respondent supplied the descriptive in- surance booklet, it failed to provide either the insur- ance master plans or the applicant and hiring data requested, claiming with respect to the employment statistics that it had maintained no tabulation of data 2 Janetzke testified at the hearing that the nternational Union (UE) in March 1973 commenced implementation of a program to eliminate all race and sex discrimination in plants represented by it. pursuant to resolutions adopted at is convention in 1972. After first attempting to implement the program through local unions and its staff representatives working with local unions, the districts of the International were eventually assigned responsi- bility for the program. Thus. the information request letter was sent to Re- spondent by Janetzke after he had first met with representatives of Local 745 and ascertained that officials cf the L.ocal had neither the insurance master plans nor information regarding Respondent's hiring practices. 342 U.S.C. 2000e The agreement which expired on August 15 1974, did not include the phrase "physical or mental handicap": the provision is otherwise identical in the two agreements 242 NLRB No. 201 1373 I)ECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD responsive to the Union's request and therefore did not have the information available. Respondent did, however, advise the Union that of the 12 active bar- gaining unit employees, all were male and I was black. In ensuing correspondence, more fully described in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, Respon- dent reaffirmed its refusal to comply with the Union's information request. When subsequently asked by the Union in a letter from Janetzke dated August 29, 1974, why it had no female employees and only one black employee in the bargaining unit, Respondent declined to respond specifically, but, by letter dated September 18, 1974, advised the Union of its position regarding the other information requested. Thus, with respect to the insurance master plans, Respondent took the position that its contractual commitment was one of providing negotiated benefits and that the manner in which it chose to fulfill that obligation was its own prerogative. Regarding the applicant and hir- ing data requested, Respondent stated that the Union was requesting information "covering an activity in which the Union has no responsibility or accountabil- ity under the terms of our Agreement." and denied the information request. On October 3, 1974. the Union filed the charge initiating this proceeding. The Administrative Law Judge, relying upon the uncontradicted testimony of Respondent's industrial relations director that Local 745 negotiators made no mention of possible discrimination in fringe benefits or hiring practices during the ongoing negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement. concluded that the Union had not established its right to the requested information. Noting the Union's failure to advert to the pending information request throughout the negotiations, while reaching a contract accord on subjects as to which the information had been re- quested, the Administrative Law Judge found that the Union's purpose in requesting the information could not have been either to negotiate a new con- tract or to police the administration of an existing contract. While observing that "fulfillment of its duty of fair representation under Title VII" appeared to be the Union's purpose in making the information re- quest, the Administrative Law Judge speculated that the Union did not even want the information for that purpose, "but rather for the purpose of creating the appearance of fulfulling it." Thus, he concluded that the Union's silence in the face of its foreknowledge of possible discrimination, as evidenced by its informa- tion request letters, warranted the conclusion that the Union did not want the requested information for a legitimate collective-bargaining purpose. Accord- ingly, he dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we find that the failure of the Local's representatives to reiter- ate the Union's information request during negotia- tions for a new collective-bargaining agreement does not warrant a conclusion that the information was not relevant to the Union's collective-bargaining function. Both the International Union (IUE) and its local 745 are the recognized bargaining representa- tive, and the International clearly had a right to re- quest the information. That the Union subsequently executed a new collective-bargaining agreement with- out the benefit of Respondent's prior disclosure of the information requested does not establish that the in- formation was not relevant. Rather, as stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir- cuit with respect to a union's execution of a contract without the disclosure of requested information, "The most that can be inferred from the Union's action is that the advantages of a contract in hand outweigh those which the Union might later obtain when all relevant information would be available to it."1 Consequently, the issue in this case is not what the Union's purpose was in requesting the information, but rather whether the information is relevant to the Union's proper performance of its duties as bargain- ing representative "Once requested information is found to be relevant to the Union's representative function, it is not controlling that such information might also be used for other purposes." We have considered the relevancy of information such as that sought by the Union herein in several recent deci- sions8 and, unlike the Administrative l.aw Judge, find the information requested is relevant to the Union's proper performance of its bargaining obligation. Specifically, with respect to the copies of the master agreements between Respondent and various insur- ance carriers, we have held in The East Davtonl Tool and Die (o., supra, as well as in Automation & Mea- surementr Diivion, 7he Bendix ('orporationr supra, that such information is presumptively relevant insofar as it pertains to unit employees.? Nor does the fact that N 1 R B v. Yawman & Erhe Manujailcriulrg (Co. 187 F:.2d 947. 949 12d (Cir. 1951). It is. of course. well established that the dut to hbargain cllectively includes a duty to provide relevant in!ormationr needed hb a labor organiza- tion fr the proper performance of its duties as the emploees' bargaining representative. NI..R.B v. Truitt .ntuautt/t-uring (C., 351 S 149 (1956): VI. R.R . A.,me Industrial Co., 385 U.S 432 (19671. Detri Edow,,, (onl- panm v. N.I. R.B., 99 S.(Ct. 1123, 85 LC I 1. 129 (March 5. 1979). 7 The Eust Dauton T.)l & Die ( , 239 NLRB 141 (1978), n 6 Indeed. as :e have recently observed. "lI informlation is relevsant to collective hargain- ing. it loses neither its relevance nor its aailahilit, merels because a uniion additionally might or intends toi use it to attllempt to enlorce statutor and contractual rights before an arbitrator. the Board. or court" 14 etinghoulre Eklclri (rprration. 239 NLRB 106 (1978) 8 See. e.g., Wfesting 'ott¥ Electrim, (orporaton ltril, he Eal Dt l ) To)ol toil Die (',, supra, .utoealion& iteluremcnt i[i)imii,. the Rendti ( 'orpo- ratio, 242 N.RB 62 (1979). 4 See also Sstoe-Wod lrd 1nc., 123 NlRB 287. 288 (1959L) and (,/hit (,oninltliilattoil. In , 72 NL RB 1909 ( 19681. 1374 W'HITE FARN EQUIPMENT (O(). the master insurance agreements may apply to em- ployees of Respondent other than those included in the bargaining unit serve to relieve Respondent of its obligation to provide those portions of the master agreements which apply to the unit employees. Such master agreements are clearly relevant to the Union's policing and administration of its contract with Re- spondent, and Respondent has not effectively rebut- ted the presumed relevancy of this information. Ac- cordingly, we find that by refusing to furnish copies of the master plans, insofar as they relate to the unit employees, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. With respect to the applicant and hiring data sought by the Union, we have likewise held such data to be presumptively relevant, inasmuch as it is "inte- gral to the Union's fulfillment of its functions as statutory bargaining representative of unit employ- ees."' 0 The Board has stated, "an employer's hiring practices inherently affect terms and conditions of employment."" As we do not find Respondent to have effectively rebutted the presumption of rele- vancy of the requested applicant and hiring informa- tion, we conclude that by refusing to supply informa- tion as to the race and sex of applicants for employment and of bargaining unit employees hired. Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act. Finally, the General Counsel has alleged that Re- spondent additionally violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by its failure to respond to the Union's query as to why it had no female and very few black employees. We do not find this request relevant to the Union's duties as the employees' bargaining repre- sentative, however, as it would appear to seek a sub- jective response or argument rather than objective data to be employed by the Union in furtherance of its representative function. Accordingly, we shall not require Respondent to provide the Union with its rea- sons for not hiring more female and black employ- ees.'2 CON(CI.USI()NS ()F LA 1. White Farm Equipment Company, A Subsid- iary of White Motor Corporation, is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL. CIOCLC. and its Local 745, are each labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. ° Au1tonai11lwn & alItIure'IntI D o,,ron,. The Bendl ,t C (7jra1r lttn, ltipra " Tanner l,fotor l.iwrn. Itd.. 148 NLRB 1402. 1404 1064). entt;rcemenl denied on other grounds 419 F.2d 216 (9h (it 14h969). 12 7tf e Eatno D E, 1w,, ariand Die (.. uipra 3. All warehouse employees employed by the Re- spondent at its parts depot in Columbus, Ohio, ex- cluding all office clerical employees, professional em- ployees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col- lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL CIO-CLC, and its Local 745, are, and at all times material herein have been. the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing to furnish the above-named Union with copies of the master plans, insofar as such plans pertain to unit employees, containing the agreements between Respondent and insurance carriers who pro- vide medical insurance coverage, sickness and acci- dent insurance coverage, and life insurance coverage for unit employees. as requested by the Union on June 28. 1974, Respondent has engaged in. and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. By refusing to furnish the above-named Union with information respecting the race and sex of appli- cants for employment during the years 1973 and 1974, including the race and sex of those applicants hired, as request by the Union on June 28, 1974, Re- spondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. TIl RMEDY Hlaving found that Respondent has committed vio- lations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we shall require it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As we have found that Respon- dent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act b failing and refusing to furnish the Union certain in- formation, we shall order Respondent to furnish the I U E and its Local 745 with copies of the current mas- ter plans, insofar as they pertain to unit employees. containing the agreements between Respondent and insurance carriers who provide medical insurance coverage, sickness and accident insurance coverage. and life insurance coverage for unit employees. \'We shall also order Respondent to furnish the Union with current data respecting the race and sex of applicants tor employment, as well as those actually hired. as described in the Union's letter of June 28. 1974. re- questing such data. Hiouever. in view of the dlax in 1375 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD this proceeding necessitated by the holding of oral argument and our considered deliberation as to the proper approach to be taken in cases involving union information requests such as that made by the Union herein, we shall order Respondent to furnish current race and sex information rather than the data for 1973 and 1974 as originally requested by the Union. Thus, we shall order Respondent to, on request, fur- nish the Union with the total number of males, fe- males, whites, blacks, and other minority applicants who sought employment during the 12 month period immediately preceding the date of our Order herein, and with the total number in each respective group who were actually hired, on a monthly basis. Finally, inasmuch as we do not find Respondent's unlawful conduct to warrant a broad remedial order, we shall order Respondent to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from in any like or related manner infringing upon the employee rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board hereby orders that the Respondent, White Farm Equipment Company, A Subsidiary of White Motor Corporation, Columbus, Ohio, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain with International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL- CIO-CLC, and its Local 745, as the exclusive bar- gaining representatives of Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit described below, by refusing to furnish copies of the master plans, insofar as such plans pertain to unit employees, containing the agree- ments between Respondent and insurance carriers who provide medical insurance coverage, sickness and accident insurance coverage, and life insurance coverage for unit employees, as requested by the Union on June 28, 1974. The appropriate unit is: All warehouse employees employed by the Re- spondent at its parts depot in Columbus, Ohio, excluding all office clerical employees, profes- sional employees, guards, and supervisors as de- fined in the Act. (b) Refusing to bargain with the above-named la- bor organizations, as the exclusive bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the unit described above, by refusing to furnish the information re- quested on June 28, 1974, respecting the race and sex of applicants for employment during the years 1973 and 1974, including the race and sex of those appli- cants hired. (c) In any like or related mannei interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named or any other labor organiza- tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Sec- tion 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, furnish the above-named Union with copies of the current master plans, insofar as such plans pertain to unit employees, containing the agreements between Respondent and insurance carri- ers who provide medical insurance coverage, sickness and accident insurance coverage, and life insurance coverage for unit employees as requested in the Union's letter of June 28, 1974. (b) Upon request, furnish the above-named Union with current data respecting the race and sex of appli- cants for employment, including those hired, during the 12-month period immediately preceding the date of this Order, as described in the Union's letter of June 28, 1974, requesting such data. (c) Post at its Columbus, Ohio, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' 3 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc- tor for Region 9, after being duly signed by Respon- dent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here- with. MEMBER MURPHY, dissenting in part: I agree with my colleagues on the majority that Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to supply its employees' recognized bargaining representative with copies of master insur- ance plans, insofar as they pertain to unit employees. As stated in my separate opinion in Automation & Measurement Division, The Bendix Corporation, 242 11 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of' the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posled Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board." 1376 WHITE FARM EQUIPMENT CO. NLRB 62 (1979), 4 1 agree that such information re- garding group insurance is presumptively relevant to the Union's collective-bargaining function." However, I register my vigorous dissent from my colleagues' infringement into matters properly left to the expertise of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission through their finding of an additional violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by Re- spondent's failure to supply this Union with re- quested data regarding the race and sex of both appli- cants for employment and those actually hired. As I have fully articulated my views regarding this issue in previous cases wherein similar information was sought, however, suffice it here to simply reiterate my deep concern that the Board majority in these matters shortsightedly embarks upon unfathomed seas with- out the benefit of compass, sextant, or chart.'6 ' At fn. 5. " My conclusion in this regard is based solely upon the fact that group insurance has long been recognized as emcompassed within the concept of wages (see. e.g., Sowe-Woodward Inc, supra). and thus presumptively rel- evant to collective bargaining. and not upon any interest or authority of this Board to intrude itself into matters properly left to the administrative aegis of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Thus, while I note that Congress has, since issuance of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. legislatively mandated the sexual neutrality of insurance provisions such as some of those involved herein. through passage of the Pregnancy Discrimi- nation Act, Public Law 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to specifically forbid discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, this factor does not affect the Board's authority to pass on issues such as this which fall within established collective-bargaining principles. '6 See my dissenting opinions in The East Dayton Tool & Die Co., supra. and A utomaion & Measurement Division, The Bendix Corporation, supra. See also my separate opinions in Westinghouse Electric Corporation, supra: Safe- way Stores, Incorporated, 240 NLRB 921 (1979): and The Bendix Corpora- tion, 242 NLRB 1005 (1979). APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 745 by refusing to furnish information rel- evant for the Union to fulfill its obligation to represent the bargaining unit employees. The ap- propriate unit is: All warehouse employees employed by the Respondent at its parts depot in Columbus, Ohio, excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervi- sors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization: to form. join, or assist the above-named labor or- ganization, or any other labor organization; to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL, upon request. furnish the above- named labor organization with copies of the cur- rent master plans, insofar as such plans pertain to unit employees, containing our agreements with insurance carriers who provide medical in- surance coverage, sickness and accident insur- ance coverage, and life insurance coverage for unit employees. WE WI.L, upon request, furnish the Interna- tional Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 745 with current data respecting the race and sex of applicants for employment and those actually hired during the 12-month period immediately preceding the date of the Board's Decision and Order. WHITE FARM EQUIPMENr COMPANY, A Sun- SIDIARY OF WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION DECISION STATEMENT OF TIIE CASE HENRY L. JAI.EIIrE, Administrative Law Judge: This case presents the question of a bargaining representative's right to information from an employer relating to matters of mi- nority groups and women as they may affect the Union's duty to fair representation. The proceeding was initiated by a charge filed b) the International Union of Electrical, Ra- dio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 745' on October 3. 1974. pursuant to which complaint is- sued on December 12, 1974. On January 22. 1975, a hearing was held in Columbus, Ohio. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses. and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the parties. I make the following: FINDINGS OF FAI 1. IHE ALLEGED REFLSAL ro BARGAIN Factual Setting Respondent is engaged in the operation of a warehouse in Columbus. Ohio. employing about 13 employees.2 Since June 23. 1971. the Union has been certified representative The International and Local 745 are referred to collectively as the Union. Jurisdiction is not in issue. The complaint alleges. the answer admits. and I find that Respondent meets the Board's $50.000 direct outflow standard for the assertion of jurisdiction, 1377 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of Respondent's employees in a unit of all warehouse em- ployees and has been party to collective-bargaining agree- ments with Respondent covering such employees, the most recent of which is effective from August 15, 1974, until Au- gust 13, 1977. On June 28, 1974. the Union wrote to Respondent advis- ing it of a program it had adopted for the elimination of all forms of discrimination in plants represented by it. The Union stated that in pursuance of this program it was nec- essary for it to analyze plant practices which were not spelled out in the collective-bargaining agreement but which might be in conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in which it requested that Respondent sup- ply it with the master plans and summary booklets for medical insurance, sickness and accident benefits insurance, and life insurance; for the period from January 1, 1973. to June 1974. the total number of applications for employ- ment, the number of female applicants, the number of male applicants, the number of black applicants, the number of other minority applicants, and the number of white appli- cants; and for the period from January 1, 1973, a list of the number of female, male, black, white, and other minorities hired on a monthly basis. On August 8, not having received a reply, the Union renewed its request. On August 19, Respondent replied to the request by enclosing a booklet describing the insurance programs as they applied to the bargaining unit. Respon- dent stated that the information requested concerning job applications was not available because application forms contained no question on race, and tabulation of persons who came to the warehouse to make application had been maintained. Finally, Respondent stated that it could not state exactly how many people had been hired since Janu- ary 1, 1973 by breakdown as the Respondent requested. It advised the Union that there were currently two white male employees in the bargaining unit who had been hired since January 1, 1973 and a third employee hired during that period had recently quit. Respondent stated that the change in management made it difficult to retrace history prior to January 1, 1974. Respondent added that of the present 12 active employees all were male and one was black. On August 29, 1974, the Union acknowledged receipt of the Respondent's reply and reiterated its request for the master insurance policies in order to make a full analysis of certain provisions of the plan which, it stated, appeared to be discriminatory based upon sex. The Union adverted to a bridge benefit for Class A and Class B survivors which ap- peared to it to be discriminatory toward females, and it adverted to several provisions which appeared to discrimi- nate against females in pregnancy cases. With regard to Respondent's reply that it kept no tabula- tion of persons who came to the warehouse to make appli- cation, the Union requested that Respondent undertake to make a tabulation or in the alteriative that it supply the Union with all job applications for January 1, 1973, to the date of its letter to enable the Union to make its own com- putation. Furthermore, the Union expressed inability to un- derstand why Respondent's records would not show which persons had been hired since January 1, 1973. Finally the Union reiterated its request for a statement of the reasons why there were no female employees in the unit and why only one black. The letter concluded with a request that Respondent advise the Union if it was willing to meet con- cerning such matters. On September 18, 1974. Respondent replied denying the request for applicant flow and hiring activity on the ground that the data requested covered an activity in which the Union had no responsibility or accountability under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent expressed the belief that it was in compliance with appli- cable legislation and executive orders and offered to pro- vide the Union with a written statement to such affect for its protection. As to the master insurance policies. Respondent declined to furnish them on the ground that its contractual commit- ment with the Union was to provide negotiated benefits but that the manner in which it did so was its prerogative. Re- spondent noted that the master policies in question in- volved company locations other than the one involved herein. As to the specific insurance benefits to which the Union had adverted in its letter of August 8, Respondent replied in detail. For example, it acknowledged that there was no weekly indemnity benefits in maternity cases, but denied this was discriminatory. Respondent denied that a transplant donor benefit was not available to pregnant fe- males pointing out rather that it was denied to females only in those instances where the confinement or surgery bring- ing about the transplant was by reason of the pregnancy or complications therefrom. Respondent acknowledged that pregnancy was not covered under the long term disability benefits pointing out, however, that this coverage was un- available under certain other situations. In each of the situ- tations described by the Union, as well as with any other not identified, Respondent stated that if the Union wanted benefit coverage altered bargaining demands could be pre- sented and cost considered at the appropriate time. Respon- dent did not offer to meet or expressly respond to the Union's request in that connection. Thereafter, the Union filed a charge in the instant case the complaint which issued pursuant thereto alleged that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) and () of the Act by refusing to furnish the Union with the master insurance agreements described above; by refusing to furnish the total number of' males, females, whites, blacks, and other minor- ities who sought unit positions of employment and the total number in each group actually hired in unit positions in- cluding their names, dates of hire, departments in which each was placed, starting rate of pay from January , 1973 to date of the issuance of complaint: and by refusing to furnish information concerning the reason or reasons why Respondent did not employ any females and only one black in unit positions. 11. ANAIYSIS AND) (O()N(I.tSIONS Respondent asserts a variety of defenses to the allega- tions that it has violated the Act by refusing to furnish the requested information. It does not appear to question the basic legal principle that the Union owes a duty of fair representation to all unit employees pursuant to Section 9 and 8(b) of the Act. nor does it appear to question the proposition that this duty is applicable in matters of possi- 1378 WHITE FARM EQUIPMENI CO. ble race or sex discrimination in matters of employment.' However, it asserts that the Union has, in effect, waived its right to the requested information. Respondent's assertion is based on the undisputed fact that, although the initial demand for intformation was made on June 28. 1974, the Union made no mention of possible discrimination in tringe benefits or in hiring practices during negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement beginning on JulN 10, 1974. and concluding on August 14. 1974. 4 I am not persuaded that the waiver principle is the proper legal principle to apply to the [Union's failure to mention in negotiations possible discrimination based on sex or race. Rather, it appears to me that such failure is persuasive evidence that the Union did not request the in- formation for any purpose relevant and necessary to fulfill its obligations under Section 9 and 8(h) of the Act. Except for wage and related information, which is presumptivel\ relevant, a union's right to information is dependent on a showing of relevancy and necessity. This may be done by showing that it is relevant to negotiating a new contract or to police the administration of an existing contract. The Union's purpose for its request herein cannot have been for either of these purposes because it w.as in negotiations while its request was pending, voiced no objection over Respon- dent's failure to reply to the request of June 28. and made no claim that it needed the information for anx purpose during negotiations. Thus, as to master insurance policies. if the Union believed they contained discriminatorN provi- sions, or if it was too ignorant of the insurance provisions even to form a judgment. why did it remain silent in nego- tiations and agree not only to a continuation of medical insurance benefits in the new contract, hut also to some changes in benefits unrelated to possible discrimination on the basis of sex and without even adverting to the issue of possible discrimination? As to Respondent's employment practices. the Union knew the composition of Respondent's work force, knew that Respondent employed no females and only one black in the unit, and et it made no mention during negotiations of possible discrimination in hiring. In the circumstances, the Union's silence warrants a finding that it did not want the information for the purpose of ne- gotiating any contract changes, nor to police the adminis- tration of any contract, past or present. The finding that the Union's purpose in requesting the Emporium (apwell ( o. v. Western ddtton (orlntuntt Orgazs:ation, 420 U S. 50 (1975); Indepeendent Metal i4',orAers nion. l.al ,o 1. 147 NLRB 1573 (1964): Local 1367, Internlational I,onglhl,rcnitl A.4iswatiion, AFL ('10. South Ailantic and Gul! (oaust Dsvirit. Interilainal l.ongshore- man' Associa'tion, A FL (10 and local I .ti. nternatl,.ll ILang o horertl ',l, s.rsoctation. 4 Fl. (10. 148 NI.RB 897 (1964), enfd 368 1.2d 1010 (5th (ir. 1966). cert. denied 389 S. 837 (1967). ' This is based on uncontradicted testimons ot industrial relations director Robert Finle. According to Attorney Janeike. gave specific language pro- posals to Local 745 negotiators and he assumed theN were proposed at the bargaining table No eidence was adduced to show l.ocal 745 made ans proposal related to possible discrlmination on sex or race information in question w.'as not a collecti, e-bargaininle purpose (in anx sense of the term as applied under the Act) finds further support in AttorneN Janetzke's letter of June 28. 1974. wherein he referred to practices which ". . may be in conflict with Title VII of the ivil Rights Act of 1964." Such language suggests that the LInion's purpose was fulfillment of its dutD of fLair representation under itle VII, rather than any dut\ under Section 9 and 8(b). Gen- eral Counsel and the linion appear to contend that even if such is the Ulnion's purpose it is entitled to the inf'ormation. One answer to such a contention is that it is not the func- tion of the Board to ensure compliance b a union with Title VII. As the Board stated.' "'While the Board must interpret the Act with due regard for Federal policy against racial or other arbitrary or invidious discrimination. we should not attempt to usurp the functions which Congress entrusted to the Equal Enmplo ment Opportunitl Commis- sion and other agencies." See also Ermotriunl ( pic/li/(', v. I .teri 4(ddtilttott ('omltmiunlltt OrglliCCopy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation