375 U.S. 405 (1964) Cited 213 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Act “prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that effect.”
In Joy Silk the Court held that when an employer could have no doubt as to the majority status or when an employer refuses recognition of a union "due to a desire to gain time and to take action to dissipate the union's majority, the refusal is no longer justifiable and constitutes a violation of the duty to bargain set forth in section 8(a)(5) of the Act".
29 U.S.C. § 151 Cited 5,092 times 34 Legal Analyses
Finding that "protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce" and declaring a policy of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining"