Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"
Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
Holding that "little weight is to be given [to third-party] registrations in evaluating whether there is likelihood of confusion" because "[t]he existence of these registrations is not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them"
15 U.S.C. § 1115 Cited 1,913 times 34 Legal Analyses
Providing that registration of a mark "shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark" but "shall not preclude another person from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect"