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Volvo Trademark Holding AB v. Wolvol Inc.

91207836 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2019)
Volvo Trademark Holding AB v. Wolvol Inc.

25 Cited authorities

  1. Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC

    668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 104 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

  2. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 188 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

  3. Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin

    396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 72 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

  4. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 72 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

  5. Recot, Inc. v. Becton

    214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration

  6. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP

    746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 24 times
    Reviewing the weight given to the similarity-of-the-marks factor for legal error

  7. In re Viterra Inc.

    671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 26 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

  8. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc.

    293 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 34 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2002), this court held that the marks WAVE and ACOUSTIC WAVE have trademark strength independent of the Bose “house mark,” although the marks appear in the same sales literature.

  9. Kenner Parker Toys v. Rose Art Industries

    963 F.2d 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks

  10. Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.

    753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 13 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that appellant demonstrated entitlement to a "statutory cause of action" under the Lanham Act

  11. Section 1125 - False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden

    15 U.S.C. § 1125   Cited 15,375 times   321 Legal Analyses
    Holding "the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional"

  12. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,806 times   124 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

  13. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,585 times   272 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

  14. Section 1063 - Opposition to registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1063   Cited 146 times   19 Legal Analyses
    Identifying "dilution by blurring ... under section 1125(c) as a permissible grounds for opposition to a registration"

  15. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"