V.F. Corporation v. Anthony Fisher

17 Cited authorities

Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 104 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 188 times 30 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 72 times 4 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 72 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 26 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
In re Detroit Athletic Co.
903 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2018) Cited 17 times
Finding "the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first"
In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.
315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Cited 11 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.
951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 14 times
Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”
In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc.
837 F.2d 463 (Fed. Cir. 1988) Cited 10 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between furniture and "general merchandise store services," and rejecting the distinction between goods and services as having "little or no legal significance"
Federated Foods v. Fort Howard Paper Co.
544 F.2d 1098 (C.C.P.A. 1976) Cited 16 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the mere existence of modern supermarket containing wide variety or products should not foreclose further inquiry into the likelihood of confusion arising from the use of similar marks on any goods so displayed
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,806 times 124 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,585 times 272 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 2.52 - Types of drawings and format for drawings
37 C.F.R. § 2.52 Cited 29 times
Providing rules for applicants “who seek to register words, letters, numbers, or any combination thereof without claim to any particular font style, size, or color”
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

V.F. Corporation v. Anthony Fisher

17 Cited authorities

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Finding "the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first"

Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion

Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”

Finding similarity between furniture and "general merchandise store services," and rejecting the distinction between goods and services as having "little or no legal significance"

Stating that the mere existence of modern supermarket containing wide variety or products should not foreclose further inquiry into the likelihood of confusion arising from the use of similar marks on any goods so displayed

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing rules for applicants “who seek to register words, letters, numbers, or any combination thereof without claim to any particular font style, size, or color”

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"