477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 223,587 times 42 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Holding that mere allegations do not create a material issue of fact if the nonmovant cannot "point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record at least by a counter statement of a fact or facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a knowledgeable affiant."
Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
Finding no error because, "while the Board did not make explicit findings about the strength of the [opposer’s mark], the Board’s opinion reveals that the Board considered this factor"
Holding that appellant's JOSE GASPAR GOLD mark is "nearly identical" to registrant's GASPAR'S ALE mark once the descriptive and non-dominant terms JOSE, GOLD and ALE are properly discounted