VEEVA SYSTEMS INC.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 22, 20212021001395 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 22, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/091,347 04/05/2016 John Howard V0020 9641 125563 7590 10/22/2021 Veeva Systems Inc. 4280 Hacienda Drive Pleasanton, CA 94588 EXAMINER MANDEL, MONICA A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3621 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/22/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): donald.wilson@veeva.com ip.mail@veeva.com lin.deng@veeva.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JOHN HOWARD, ELIE CAHALLITA, GREGORY BAKER, and ALAN WANG ____________ Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, JAMES P. CALVE, and NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed July 6, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed December 18, 2020), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed October 21, 2020) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed October 4, 2019). Appellant identifies VEEVA SYSTEMS INC. of Pleasanton, California as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 3). Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 2 CLAIMED INVENTION The Specification states, “[t]he subject technology relates generally to customer relationship management (‘CRM’), and more particularly to territory management for CRM systems” (Spec. ¶ 1). Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is the sole independent claim and representative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A method for managing territory assignment for a customer relationship management (“CRM”) system, the method comprising: [(a)] loading customer data from the CRM system to a memory device, wherein the customer data comprises account information and wherein the account information comprises names and addresses of a first account and a second account; [(b)] receiving a first rule for territory assignment for a first territory from a first user, wherein the first rule comprises a first rule criterion for defining accounts in the first territory; [(c)] receiving a request for executing the first rule to process the customer data; [(d)] processing the customer data with the first rule to determine that the first account belongs to the first territory according to account information of the first account and the first rule criterion; [(e)] assigning the first account to the first territory, wherein accounts in the first territory are defined by the first rule criterion in the first rule; and [(f)] storing the first territory as the first account’s territory information m a territory management database. REJECTIONS Claims 1–18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claims 1–18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Aleksiejczyk et al. (US 2008/0281858 Al, published Nov. 13, 2008) Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 3 (“Aleksiejczyk”) and Liu (US 2005/0256737 Al, published Nov. 17, 2005) (“Liu”). ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (Appeal Br. 10–12). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 4 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).2 That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the 2 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates the revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 5 additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54–55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, in rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determined that independent claim 1, when given its broadest reasonable interpretation, recites “assignment of territory data for customers,” which the Examiner concluded is a “certain method of organizing human activity” and, therefore, an abstract idea (Final Act. 3). The Examiner also determined that the recited abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application; that claim 1 does not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself; and that the dependent claims are patent ineligible for substantially the same reasons (id. at 3–5). Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 6 Br. 10–12). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on an improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is titled “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR TERRITORY ASSIGNMENT,” and discloses, in the Background section, that in the pharmaceutical sales industry where sales representatives visit, call, or send emails to physicians to communicate product information, employers, i.e., pharmaceutical companies, often use a customer relationship management (“CRM”) system to manage physicians’ professional information (Spec. ¶ 2). These companies also may manage data availability to their sales representatives by territories, e.g., geographic areas (id.). Thus, “[e]ach sales representative may access data in the CRM of his/her company employer, specifically data of physicians in the territory [to which] he/she is assigned” (id.). Claim 1 is directed to a method for managing territory assignment for a CRM system, and recites that the method comprises: (1) “loading customer account information, including names and addresses of a first account and a second account into a memory device, i.e., “loading customer data from the Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 7 CRM system to a memory device, wherein the customer data comprises account information and wherein the account information comprises names and addresses of a first account and a second account” (step (a)); (2) receiving a first rule criterion for defining accounts in a first territory, and determining, based on the criterion and the first account information, whether the first account belongs to the first territory, i.e., receiving a first rule for territory assignment for a first territory from a first user, wherein the first rule comprises a first rule criterion for defining accounts in the first territory; receiving a request for executing the first rule to process the customer data; [and] processing the customer data with the first rule to determine that the first account belongs to the first territory according to account information of the first account and the first rule criterion (steps (b) thorough (d)); and (3) if the first criterion is met, assigning the first account to the first territory and storing the first territory as the first account’s territory information in a territory management database, i.e., “assigning the first account to the first territory, wherein accounts in the first territory are defined by the first rule criterion in the first rule” and “storing the first territory as the first account’s territory information in a territory management database” (steps (e) and(f)). Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 1 cannot be sustained because claim 1 does not recite subject matter that falls within any of the three enumerated groupings of abstract ideas (Appeal Br. 10–11; see also Reply Br. 3). Yet, Appellant cannot reasonably deny that assigning customer account information to a particular territory and storing territory information in a territory management database, as recited in claim 1, so that a sales representative may access customer data in the territory to which he Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 8 is assigned, constitutes “managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people” and/or commercial interactions (in the form of marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations). As such, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites a method of organizing human activity and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea because any alleged abstract idea is integrated into a practical application (Appeal Br. 11–12). The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP, Ninth Edition (rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ pac/mpep/old/mpep_E9R08-2017.htm) § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. In particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if, inter alia, “[the] additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field.” Id. At the same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra- solution activity to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 9 Appellant argues here that claim 1 recites a combination of elements (i.e., loading customer data from the CRM system to a memory device, receiving a first rule for territory assignment for a first territory from a first user, receiving a request for executing the first rule to process the customer data, assigning the first account to the first territory, and storing the first territory as the first account’s territory information in a territory management database), which provides “a specific improvement over prior art systems by allowing remote users to assign accounts to territory based on rules in a CRM system” (Appeal Br. 12). Yet, to the extent this approach amounts to an improvement at all, that improvement is not in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to another technology or technical field; instead it constitutes, at best, an improvement to the abstract idea of assigning customer account information to a designated territory, which is not enough for patent eligibility. See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[P]atent law does not protect such claims[, i.e., claims to an asserted advance in the realm of abstract ideas], without more, no matter how groundbreaking the advance.”). This is particularly so, where, as here, we find no indication in the Specification that the operations recited in claim 1 require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, invoke any allegedly inventive programming, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components as tools operating in their normal and ordinary capacity. Although Appellant ostensibly contends otherwise (Appeal Br. 12 (“The claim as a whole integrates the method into a practical application.”)), the relevant question under Step 2A, Prong 2, moreover, is not whether the Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 10 claimed invention itself (i.e., loading customer data from the CRM system to a memory device, receiving a first rule for territory assignment for a first territory from a first user, receiving a request for executing the first rule to process the customer data, assigning the first account to the first territory, and storing the first territory as the first account’s territory information in a territory management database) is a practical application; instead, the question is whether the claim includes additional elements beyond the judicial exception that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Here, the only additional elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea are generic computer components, i.e., “a customer relationship management (‘CRM’) system”; “a memory device”; and “a territory management database” (See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 16–20, 46, 47, 50). “And after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea are no more than generic computer components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 11 Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appellant asserts that “[i]mproving the functioning of a computer or improving a technical field amounts to significantly more than an abstract idea” (Appeal Br. 12). And Appellant argues that “[t]he pending claims recite a specific, non-generic, non-routine technique of processing customer data from a CRM system with a first rule to determine that a first account belongs to a first territory according to the account information and the first account and the first rule criterion,” which “improves territory information management for an enterprise” (id.). Appellant argues, “[t]his, alone, is sufficient for the claims to be considered as reciting significantly more than an abstract idea, even if the claims are considered as being directed to a judicial exception for argument’s sake” (Appeal Br. 12). Yet, we are not persuaded for the same reasons outlined above that claim 1, thus, provides an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to another technology or Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 12 technical field as opposed to an improvement to the abstract idea of assigning customer account information to a particular territory, which is not enough for patent eligibility. We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2–18, which fall with claim 1. Obviousness Independent Claim 1 and Dependent Claims 4–18 We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because Aleksiejczyk, on which the Examiner relies, does not disclose or suggest “assigning the first account to the first territory, wherein accounts in the first territory are defined by the first rule criterion in the first rule,” i.e., limitation (e), as recited in claim 1 (Appeal Br. 13–14; see also Reply Br. 4–6). Instead, we agree with the Examiner that Aleksiejczyk discloses the argued limitation (Final Act. 12–13 (“Aleksiejczyk discloses wherein accounts in the first territory are defined by the first rule criterion in the first rule (the search results, i.e.[,] in Fig.5, are defined by the search criterion — ‘city or zip code,’ [0036]–[0038])”); see also Ans. 5–6). Aleksiejczyk is titled “Itinerary Search Tool for Territory Management,” and discloses a method for electronically creating an itinerary schedule for a field representative based on customer data (see, e.g., Aleksiejczyk ¶¶ 2, 4, 5). Aleksiejczyk explains that “[i]t is important for field representatives to optimize coverage of their respective territories” and Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 13 that “[p]lanning future sales calls based on geography facilitates travel planning thus maximizing efficiency” (id. ¶ 4). Aleksiejczyk describes that the process of creating an itinerary schedule begins when a user, e.g., a sales representative, initiates a search for candidates, e.g., customers, within a geographical area by selecting a geographic indicator, e.g., a zip code, as a search criterion (id. ¶¶ 36–37). The results of the search, i.e., a list of candidate matches, are displayed to the user in tabular form; and candidates can then be selected from the list for assignment to selected time slots (id. ¶ 38, Figs. 5, 6). Appellant argues that the obviousness rejection cannot be sustained because Aleksiejczyk merely discloses that “candidates are identified from a database by a search criterion based on their geographic indicator,” e.g., a city, zip code (Appeal Br. 14). Appellant, thus, maintains that rather than “assigning the first account to the first territory,” the candidates in Aleksiejczyk “already have their territories, and nothing in Aleksiejczyk indicates that they need to be assigned to a territory again” (id. (further noting that it appears that the Examiner “is trying to read both the ‘recited territory’ and the recited ‘first rule criterion’ on the ‘city or zip code’ in Aleksiejczyk”)). Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of Examiner error at least because, as the Examiner observes, “Aleksiejczyk implicitly discloses that candidates (i.e.[,] accounts) are assigned territories” (Ans. 5). Indeed, Appellant, by its argument (i.e., that the candidates in Aleksiejczyk “already have their [assigned] territories”), admits as much. Appellant maintains, as described above, that “nothing in Aleksiejczyk indicates that [candidates] need to be assigned to a territory Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 14 again” (Appeal Br. 14). Yet, “Aleksiejczyk does not need to disclose that territories need to be assigned again in order to demonstrate a disclosure [i.e., assigning candidates to a territory based on a rule criterion, e.g., a city or zip code] that already exists within the reference” (Ans. 5). The city or zip code, as disclosed in Aleksiejczyk, is a “first rule criterion,” as claimed, and we agree with the Examiner that “the claims are broad enough to encompass that the first rule criterion is data that represent[ ] the first territory” (id. at 5–6). We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 4–18, which are not argued separately. Dependent Claims 2 and 3 Claim 2 depends from independent claim 1, and recites that the method of claim 1 further comprises “associating a second user with the first territory.” Claim 3 depends from claim 2, recites that the method of claim 2 further comprises “creating a user group for the first territory; and adding the second user to the user group for the first territory.” In rejecting claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Examiner cited Aleksiejczyk as disclosing the claimed subject matter (Final Act. 7 (“Aleksiejczyk further discloses associating a second user with the first territory (a second ‘representative’ different from the first user who searches the same ‘city or zip code,’ [0019], [ 0036])”)). Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 2 cannot be sustained because “[a]gain, the Examiner is trying to read both the recited ‘territory’ and the recited ‘first rule criterion’ on the ‘city or zip code’ in Aleksiejczyk, Appeal 2021-001395 Application 15/091,347 15 which is not permitted” and that claim 3 is patentable for at least the same reason (Appeal Br. 15). We, however, agree with the Examiner that claim 2 is broad enough to “encompass that any user that is associated in any way with the first territory is a ‘second user.’ As such, . . . the second user can be any one of multiple physicians associated with the territory (Aleksiejczyk, [0038]) or a second . . . user of the system, such as a sales representative (Aleksiejczyk, [0019])” (Ans. 6). We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claims 2 and 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–18 101 Eligibility 1–18 1–18 103 Aleksiejczyk, Liu 1–18 Overall Outcome 1–18 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation