University of Miami

10 Cited authorities

Beckwith v. Commr. of Patents
252 U.S. 538 (1920) Cited 175 times 1 Legal Analyses
Defining “composite marks” as those which “contain both registerable and nonregisterable matter”
In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP
373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004) Cited 30 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness
In re MBNA America Bank, N.A.
340 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Cited 11 times 1 Legal Analyses
Noting that arbitrary marks are inherently distinctive
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.
703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 19 times 2 Legal Analyses
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
In re Gyulay
820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
Application of Colonial Stores Incorporated
394 F.2d 549 (C.C.P.A. 1968) Cited 22 times
Holding that “SUGAR & SPICE” for baked goods was “more than a mere description of the ingredients of the goods” because it evokes associations with the rhyme “everything nice”
Cummins Engine Co. v. Continental Motors
359 F.2d 892 (C.C.P.A. 1966) Cited 12 times
Rejecting challenge to standing even though petitioner "was not using the term as a trademark nor did it co[n]template doing so," and concluding that "[a]ppellee as a competitor of appellant clearly has reason to believe it will be damaged to the extent required by statute"
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,585 times 272 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 1141 - Definitions
15 U.S.C. § 1141 Cited 50 times 2 Legal Analyses
In this subchapter: (1) Basic application The term "basic application" means the application for the registration of a mark that has been filed with an Office of a Contracting Party and that constitutes the basis for an application for the international registration of that mark. (2) Basic registration The term "basic registration" means the registration of a mark that has been granted by an Office of a Contracting Party and that constitutes the basis for an application for the international registration

University of Miami

10 Cited authorities

Defining “composite marks” as those which “contain both registerable and nonregisterable matter”

Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness

Noting that arbitrary marks are inherently distinctive

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.

Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

Holding that “SUGAR & SPICE” for baked goods was “more than a mere description of the ingredients of the goods” because it evokes associations with the rhyme “everything nice”

Rejecting challenge to standing even though petitioner "was not using the term as a trademark nor did it co[n]template doing so," and concluding that "[a]ppellee as a competitor of appellant clearly has reason to believe it will be damaged to the extent required by statute"

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"