United States Postal Service v. RPost Communication Limited

9 Cited authorities

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 217,235 times 40 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 188 times 30 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems
223 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 78 times 2 Legal Analyses
Concluding that the same cause of action can exist in two cases only where the same set of transactional facts are involved in those cases and that, where the transactional facts differ, the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
Lloyd's Food Products, Inc. v. Eli's, Inc.
987 F.2d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1993) Cited 18 times
Holding that third-party evidence should not be disregarded in evaluating the strength of a mark for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion
Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's, Inc.
961 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 12 times
Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"
King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen
496 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974) Cited 8 times
Patent Appeal No. 9245. June 6, 1974. J. Timothy Hobbs, Washington, D.C. (Mason, Fenwick Lawrence, Washington, D.C.), attorney of record, for appellant. William B. Mason, Arlington, Va. (Mason, Mason Albright, Arlington, Va.), attorney of record, for appellee. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 178 USPQ 121 (1973)
Rule 56 - Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Cited 330,300 times 158 Legal Analyses
Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,585 times 271 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

United States Postal Service v. RPost Communication Limited

9 Cited authorities

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Concluding that the same cause of action can exist in two cases only where the same set of transactional facts are involved in those cases and that, where the transactional facts differ, the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Holding that third-party evidence should not be disregarded in evaluating the strength of a mark for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion

Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"

Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"