Under Armour, Inc. v. Evade, LLC

30 Cited authorities

In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 188 times 30 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 72 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Recot, Inc. v. Becton
214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 56 times
Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay North America, Inc.
786 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 30 times 5 Legal Analyses
Explaining that although the "Board is not required to discuss every piece of evidence," it cannot "disregard [evidence] without explanation" or "short-cut its consideration of the factual record before it"
Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC
794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 28 times 2 Legal Analyses
Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 26 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group
637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) Cited 27 times 3 Legal Analyses
Considering "corporate studies tracking awareness of the CITIBANK mark"
In re Nat. Data Corp.
753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 70 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
Menendez v. Holt
128 U.S. 514 (1888) Cited 336 times 6 Legal Analyses
Holding that, although the plaintiff had delayed in bringing suit, "there was neither conduct nor negligence which could be held to destroy the right to prevention of further injury"
Rule 15 - Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Cited 91,428 times 91 Legal Analyses
Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint
Rule 803 - Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay-Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is Available as a Witness
Fed. R. Evid. 803 Cited 12,727 times 85 Legal Analyses
Recognizing exception to rule against hearsay for records of regularly conducted activities
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,585 times 271 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Under Armour, Inc. v. Evade, LLC

30 Cited authorities

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration

Explaining that although the "Board is not required to discuss every piece of evidence," it cannot "disregard [evidence] without explanation" or "short-cut its consideration of the factual record before it"

Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Considering "corporate studies tracking awareness of the CITIBANK mark"

Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"

Holding that, although the plaintiff had delayed in bringing suit, "there was neither conduct nor negligence which could be held to destroy the right to prevention of further injury"

Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint

Recognizing exception to rule against hearsay for records of regularly conducted activities

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"