TruServ Corp.

10 Cited authorities

Konczak v. Tyrrell
444 U.S. 1016 (1980) Cited 116 times
No. 79-682. January 7, 1980, October TERM, 1979. C.A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 603 F. 2d 13.
Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc.
596 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979) Cited 160 times
Holding that “Vision Center” constituted a descriptive term when used to describe “a clinic providing optical goods and services” and, under the circumstances, lacked secondary meaning
In re Pacer Technology
338 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
No. 02-1602. DECIDED: August 4, 2003. Appeal from the Court of Appeals, Gajarsa, Circuit Judge. Thomas E. Schatzel, Law Offices of Thomas E. Schatzel, of Los Gatos, California, argued for appellant. Raymond T. Chen, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were John M. Whealan, Solicitor; and Cynthia C. Lynch, Associate Solicitor. Before LOURIE, GAJARSA, and LINN, Circuit Judges. GAJARSA
Yamaha Intern. Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co.
840 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988) Cited 46 times 2 Legal Analyses
Finding secondary meaning for shape of guitar head always appearing in advertising and promotional literature
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.
703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 20 times 2 Legal Analyses
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
In re Gyulay
820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
In re K-T Zoe Furniture, Inc.
16 F.3d 390 (Fed. Cir. 1994) Cited 4 times 1 Legal Analyses
No. 92-1509. February 8, 1994. Jerome A. Gross, Jerome A. Gross Associates, of St. Louis, Missouri, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Carol J. Hamilton. Nancy C. Slutter, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Solicitor. Of counsel were Richard E. Schafer, Lee E. Barrett and Albin F. Drost. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before
Application of Hollywood Brands
214 F.2d 139 (C.C.P.A. 1954) Cited 11 times
Finding secondary meaning based upon $1,153,000 in general advertising over six years with about one-third directed to the alleged trademark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,615 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

TruServ Corp.

10 Cited authorities

Holding that “Vision Center” constituted a descriptive term when used to describe “a clinic providing optical goods and services” and, under the circumstances, lacked secondary meaning

Finding secondary meaning for shape of guitar head always appearing in advertising and promotional literature

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.

Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

Finding secondary meaning based upon $1,153,000 in general advertising over six years with about one-third directed to the alleged trademark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"