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The Ipe Clip Fastener Company, LLC

No. 85798512 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 22, 2015)
The Ipe Clip Fastener Company, LLC

13 Cited authorities

  1. In re Nat. Data Corp.

    753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 70 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"

  2. Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd.

    695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 23 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"

  3. In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp.

    240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 38 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that 1–888–M–A–T–T–R–E–S–S “immediately conveys the impressions that a service relating to mattresses is available by calling the telephone number”

  4. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP

    373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 30 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness

  5. In re Steelbuilding.com

    415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 26 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning

  6. Yamaha Intern. Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co.

    840 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 46 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding secondary meaning for shape of guitar head always appearing in advertising and promotional literature

  7. In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States

    675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 8 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor

  8. Application of Abcor Development Corp.

    588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 36 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

  9. In re Gyulay

    820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

  10. In re K-T Zoe Furniture, Inc.

    16 F.3d 390 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 4 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 92-1509. February 8, 1994. Jerome A. Gross, Jerome A. Gross Associates, of St. Louis, Missouri, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Carol J. Hamilton. Nancy C. Slutter, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Solicitor. Of counsel were Richard E. Schafer, Lee E. Barrett and Albin F. Drost. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before

  11. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,585 times   271 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

  12. Section 2.41 - Proof of distinctiveness under section 2(f)

    37 C.F.R. § 2.41   Cited 11 times   4 Legal Analyses

    (a)For a trademark or service mark - (1)Ownership of prior registration(s). In appropriate cases, ownership of one or more active prior registrations on the Principal Register or under the Trademark Act of 1905 of the same mark may be accepted as prima facie evidence of distinctiveness if the goods or services are sufficiently similar to the goods or services in the application; however, further evidence may be required. (2)Five years substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce. In appropriate