(The) Blues Foundation, Inc. v. Daniel S. Marolt

22 Cited authorities

Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories
456 U.S. 844 (1982) Cited 1,295 times 25 Legal Analyses
Holding that secondary liability for trademark infringement arises when a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe
Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 109 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
Herbko Intern., Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.
308 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002) Cited 47 times
Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp.
240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) Cited 38 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that 1–888–M–A–T–T–R–E–S–S “immediately conveys the impressions that a service relating to mattresses is available by calling the telephone number”
In re Steelbuilding.com
415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 26 times 2 Legal Analyses
Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning
Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.
753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 16 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that appellant demonstrated entitlement to a "statutory cause of action" under the Lanham Act
Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982) Cited 58 times
Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
Guantanamera Cigar Co. v. Corporacion Habanos
729 F. Supp. 2d 246 (D.D.C. 2010) Cited 13 times
Noting that "the market for experts who possess that unique knowledge should be the focus analysis of the third factor" and seeking the rates of comparable experts
Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co.
238 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001) Cited 15 times
Holding mark "Number One in Floorcare" was "generally laudatory phrase" not entitled to trademark protection in light of absence of evidence of secondary meaning; noting, "Self-laudatory or puffing marks are regarded as a condensed form of describing the character or quality of the goods."
Rule 15 - Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Cited 95,825 times 92 Legal Analyses
Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,610 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 1092 - Publication; not subject to opposition; cancellation
15 U.S.C. § 1092 Cited 21 times
Providing for cancellation of marks on USPTO's Principal and Supplemental Registers
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 24 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

(The) Blues Foundation, Inc. v. Daniel S. Marolt

22 Cited authorities

Holding that secondary liability for trademark infringement arises when a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Holding that 1–888–M–A–T–T–R–E–S–S “immediately conveys the impressions that a service relating to mattresses is available by calling the telephone number”

Affirming the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, because the mark was descriptive of online services for the design of steel buildings, and lacked secondary meaning

Holding that appellant demonstrated entitlement to a "statutory cause of action" under the Lanham Act

Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"

Noting that "the market for experts who possess that unique knowledge should be the focus analysis of the third factor" and seeking the rates of comparable experts

Holding mark "Number One in Floorcare" was "generally laudatory phrase" not entitled to trademark protection in light of absence of evidence of secondary meaning; noting, "Self-laudatory or puffing marks are regarded as a condensed form of describing the character or quality of the goods."

Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing for cancellation of marks on USPTO's Principal and Supplemental Registers

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"