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Texas Department of Transportation v. Richard Tucker

No. 92030882 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 2010)
Texas Department of Transportation v. Richard Tucker

12 Cited authorities

  1. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett

    477 U.S. 317 (1986)   Cited 223,445 times   42 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

  2. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 195 times   33 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

  3. National Cable Television v. Am. Cinema

    937 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 83 times
    Rejecting contention that “American Cinema Editors” did not have trademark rights in the acronym “ACE”

  4. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice

    710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 89 times
    Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them

  5. Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co.

    236 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 33 times
    Finding no error because, "while the Board did not make explicit findings about the strength of the [opposer’s mark], the Board’s opinion reveals that the Board considered this factor"

  6. Opryland USA v. Great American Music Show

    970 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 24 times
    In Opryland, Opryland USA opposed the registration of "THE CAROLINA OPRY," arguing that the term was confusingly similar to Opryland's own marks.

  7. Lloyd's Food Products, Inc. v. Eli's, Inc.

    987 F.2d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that third-party evidence should not be disregarded in evaluating the strength of a mark for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion

  8. Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's, Inc.

    961 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"

  9. King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen

    496 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 8 times

    Patent Appeal No. 9245. June 6, 1974. J. Timothy Hobbs, Washington, D.C. (Mason, Fenwick Lawrence, Washington, D.C.), attorney of record, for appellant. William B. Mason, Arlington, Va. (Mason, Mason Albright, Arlington, Va.), attorney of record, for appellee. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 178 USPQ 121 (1973)

  10. Rule 56 - Summary Judgment

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56   Cited 340,936 times   164 Legal Analyses
    Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit

  11. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,616 times   275 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

  12. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"