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Teamsters Local No. 379

211 N.L.R.B. 629 (N.L.R.B. 1974)
Teamsters Local No. 379

8 Cited authorities

  1. National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.

    386 U.S. 612 (1967)   Cited 392 times
    Holding that union employees' refusal to install third-party manufacturer's product was not prohibited under § 158(b)(B), because it was an action "pressuring the [union members'] employer for agreements regulating relations between [the employer] and his own employees"

  2. Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Council

    341 U.S. 675 (1951)   Cited 494 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming Board's assertion of jurisdiction over activities taking place at local construction site based on finding that "any widespread application of the practices charged might well result in substantially decreasing" the flow of interstate commerce

  3. Electrical Workers v. Labor Board

    366 U.S. 667 (1961)   Cited 186 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a union may picket a secondary employer only when the primary employer is at the job site

  4. Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co.

    341 U.S. 665 (1951)   Cited 126 times
    Noting that section 8(b) was intended to preserve "the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes"

  5. Steelworkers v. Labor Board

    376 U.S. 492 (1964)   Cited 75 times
    Stating that section 8(b) prohibits labor unions from engaging in "secondary boycotting" by "exert[ing] pressure on an employer not involved in the relevant labor dispute ('the secondary employer') in order to obtain a favorable result in the ongoing labor dispute with another employer ('the primary employer')"

  6. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.

    191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951)   Cited 27 times
    In Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 155, 191 F.2d 642, 28 A.L.R.2d 377, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869, 72 S.Ct. 110, 96 L.Ed. 653 (1951), we held that the word "employees," as used in section 2(5) to define "labor organization," was not itself to be defined in its generic sense. It was to be given only the meaning attributed to it by section 2(3) when the question before the court was whether a given organization was subject to the restrictions of the secondary boycott provision.

  7. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, No. 175 v. N.L.R.B

    294 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1961)   Cited 6 times

    No. 15957. Argued May 29, 1961. Decided July 6, 1961. Mr. Herbert S. Thatcher, Washington, D.C., with whom Mr. David Previant, Milwaukee, Wis., was on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. Hans J. Lehmann, Atty., N.L.R.B., with whom Messrs. Stuart Rothman, General Counsel, N.L.R.B., Dominick L. Manoli, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B., and Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B., were on the brief, for respondent. Mr. Harry S. Littman, Washington, D.C., filed a brief on behalf of McJunkin Corp

  8. Milwaukee Plywood Company v. N.L.R.B

    285 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1960)   Cited 5 times

    No. 12991. December 20, 1960. Gerard D. Reilly and Lawrence T. Zimmerman, Washington, D.C.; Reilly Wells, Washington, D.C., of counsel, for petitioner. Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Duane B. Beeson, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C., Stuart Rothman, General Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, Nancy M. Sherman, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C., for respondent. Before DUFFY, KNOCH and CASTLE, Circuit Judges. DUFFY,