477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 221,665 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
439 U.S. 322 (1979) Cited 4,305 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that district courts have discretion to refuse to apply offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel against a defendant if such an application of the doctrine would be unfair
Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
Concluding that the same cause of action can exist in two cases only where the same set of transactional facts are involved in those cases and that, where the transactional facts differ, the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply
Holding that petition for cancelation of trademark that had been awarded through default judgment was precluded because the petition's effect was to collaterally attack a judgment in an infringement action
Stating that the term privity "is simply a shorthand way of saying that nonparty [i.e. , a party not named in a prior action] will be bound by the judgment in that action"
Holding that third-party evidence should not be disregarded in evaluating the strength of a mark for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion
Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"