Tao Licensing, LLCv.Bender Consulting Ltd. d/b/a Asian Pacific Beverages

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 7, 2017

No. 92057132 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 7, 2017)

This Opinion is a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: December 7, 2017

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Tao Licensing, LLC
v.
Bender Consulting Ltd. d/b/a Asian Pacific Beverages
_____

Cancellation No. 92057132
_____

Howard J. Shire and Jeremy S. Boczko of Andrews Kurth Kenyon LLP
for Tao Licensing, LLC

Evan A. Raynes of Symbus Law Group, LLC
for Bender Consulting Ltd. d/b/a Asian Pacific Beverages
_____
Before Adlin, Heasley, and Lynch
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Lynch, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Tao Licensing, LLC (“Petitioner”) petitions to cancel Registration No. 4169245 for
the mark TAO VODKA1 for “Alcoholic beverages except beers” in International Class

1 Issued on the Principal Register on July 3, 2012, from an application filed July 11, 2011,
under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b), with a subsequent statement
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33 on the grounds of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1152(d), likelihood of dilution under Sections 14 and 43(c) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064 and 1125(c), lack of a bona fide intent to use the
mark under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), and nonuse as of
the statement of use under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).2
Petitioner alleges that Bender Consulting Ltd. d/b/a Asian Pacific Beverages
(“Respondent”) pursued its registration of TAO VODKA only after Respondent’s
owner failed in his attempt to sell Kai Vodka to Petitioner for use in Petitioner’s TAO
restaurants and nightclubs.3
Petitioner pleads ownership of Registration Nos. 24723934 and 37703215 both for
the mark TAO in standard characters for, respectively, “Restaurant services” and
“Night clubs, special events and party planning; and coordinating and providing
facilities for entertainment events in the nature of parties and special events
featuring music, singing, dancing, lectures, and celebrity or professional

of use asserting first use and first use in commerce at least as early as April 9, 2012. The
mark is in standard characters, and “VODKA” has been disclaimed.
2 22 TTABVUE (Amended Complaint).
3 90 TTABVUE 8 (Petitioner’s Brief).
4 Issued July 24, 2001, from an application filed January 3, 2000, asserting first use and use
in commerce at least as early as October 26, 2000; renewed.
5 Issued April 6, 2010, from an application filed May 26, 2009, asserting first use and first
use in commerce at least as early as October 26, 2000; Section 8 affidavit accepted. The
registration includes a statement that “[t]he English translation of ‘TAO’ in the mark is the
way.”
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entertainment.” Petitioner also alleges prior common law rights in TAO “in
connection with the sale of alcoholic beverages, including vodka.”6
In its answer, Respondent denies the salient allegations of the amended petition
and asserts the affirmative defense of acquiescence. However, Respondent did not
submit any evidence regarding the defense, nor did it argue acquiescence in its brief.
The defense is therefore waived. See Harry Winston, Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem Corp.,
111 USPQ2d 1419, 1422-23 n.7 (TTAB 2014).
I. Evidentiary Record
Respondent submitted the declaration testimony of Marcus Bender, its sole owner,
which includes numerous exhibits. The parties agreed to permit witnesses to testify
by affidavit or declaration, provided that the adverse party had the opportunity to
cross-examine.7 Petitioner objects to Mr. Bender’s testimony on a variety of grounds,
including hearsay, lack of personal knowledge, irrelevance, and that it constitutes
opinion testimony from a non-expert. Petitioner also seeks to exclude exhibits to the
declaration that, according to Petitioner, constitute hearsay or lack proper
foundation. Respondent did not address the objections in detail, except to defend
against allegations that the declaration should be excluded because it was prepared
by Respondent’s attorney, rather than by Mr. Bender.8

6 22 TTABVUE 5 (Amended Complaint).
7 39 TTABVUE 3. This stipulation occurred prior to the revision of Trademark Rule 2.123(a),
37 CFR § 2.123(a), which now allows for affidavit and declaration testimony, subject to
certain requirements, without the need for a stipulation.
8 93 TTABVUE 10 n.1 (Respondent’s Brief).
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As to the testimony itself, “the Board generally does not strike testimony taken in
accordance with the applicable rules on the basis of substantive objections; rather,
the Board considers such objections when evaluating the probative value of the
testimony at final hearing.” Bd. of Regents v. S. Ill. Miners, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1182,
1194 n.19 (TTAB 2014) (citations omitted). We therefore overrule the objection but
will weigh the relevance and strength or weakness of the objected-to testimony,
including any inherent limitations therein. For example, we have disregarded any
opinion testimony regarding the conclusions of law in this case. Alcatraz Media, Inc.
v. Chesapeake Marine Tours, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1755 (TTAB 2013), aff’d mem.,
565 Fed. Appx. 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Turning to the objected-to exhibits, “[a]s a general matter, we do not treat
testimony as to third-party out-of-court statements as proof of the truth of the matter
asserted. The same is true for published articles [and internet website printouts].
However, such materials are frequently competent to show, on their face, matters
relevant to trademark claims (such as public perception), regardless of whether the
statements are true or false. Accordingly, they will not be excluded outright, but
considered for what they show on their face.” Harry Winston, 111 USPQ2d at 1427-
28. The objections to copies of third-party registrations attached as exhibits are
overruled. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (“TBMP”)
§ 704.03(b)(1)(B) (June 2017). In short, as indicated, “the Board is capable of
assessing the proper evidentiary weight to be accorded the testimony and evidence,
taking into account the imperfections surrounding the admissibility of such
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testimony and evidence. Thus, we have considered the evidence, keeping in mind the
objections, and have accorded whatever probative value the testimony and evidence
merits.” United States Playing Card Co. v. Harbro, LLC, 81 USPQ2d 1537, 1540
(TTAB 2006).
Turning to Petitioner’s proposed expert testimony of James William Bonbrest, its
Chief Operating Officer, Respondent notes that it “does not object to the Board’s
consideration of Mr. Bonbrest’s declaration,” but alleges that “he is certainly not an
expert witness, and as he works for [Petitioner], he is clearly biased.”9 We need not
treat Mr. Bonbrest as an expert, but credit his testimony as a fact witness with
experience in the restaurant and nightclub industry, including interactions with
spirits manufacturers and distributors.10 However, “[w]e have also weighed the
probative value of [the] testimony against any potential bias,” Alcatraz Media, 107
USPQ2d at 1755, including taking account of Mr. Bonbrest’s potential bias based on
his employment with Petitioner. To the extent Mr. Bonbrest’s testimony may be
entitled to less weight because of his bias, Mr. Bender’s also would be, because he too
is affiliated with a party.
The record11 consists of:

9 93 TTABVUE 30 n.41 (Respondent’s Brief).
10 47 TTABVUE 3-4 (Bonbrest Declaration).
11 Petitioner generally cited to evidence by document title and paragraph number, transcript
page number, or Bates number, and therefore is directed to the guidance in Turdin v.
Trilobite, Ltd., 109 USPQ2d 1473, 1476 n.6 (TTAB 2014):
Because the Board primarily uses TTABVUE in reviewing evidence, the Board prefers
that citations to material or testimony in the record that has not been designated
confidential include the TTABVUE docket entry number and the TTABVUE page
number. For material or testimony that has been designated confidential and which
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• The pleadings;
• The file of Registration No. 4169245;
• Excerpts of the file histories of Petitioner’s pleaded registrations, Petitioner’s
Second Notice of Reliance, 41 TTABVUE 4-46;

• Status-and-title copies of Petitioner’s pleaded registrations, Registration Nos.
2472393 and 3770321, Petitioner’s First Notice of Reliance, 40 TTABVUE 5-
22;

• Excerpts of the file history of Respondent’s Application Serial No. 86518176 for
the mark TAO OF VODKA, Petitioner’s Seventh Notice of Reliance, 70
TTABVUE 4-11;

• Excerpts of Respondent’s interrogatory answers and responses to document
requests, Petitioner’s Eighth Notice of Reliance, 86 TTABVUE 6-63;

• Excerpts of Respondent’s responses to requests for admission and
interrogatory answers, Petitioner’s Sixth Notice of Reliance, 46 TTABVUE 2-
20;

• Excerpts of Petitioner’s Interrogatory Answers, Respondent’s Notice of
Reliance, 58 TTABVUE 5-20;

• The amended testimony declaration of Mr. Bender, 80 TTABVUE 5-56, and
exhibits thereto, 81 TTABVUE 3-254, 82 TTABVUE 2-323, 83 TTABVUE
(confidential version);

• Mr. Bender’s testimony on cross-examination and exhibits thereto, 72
TTABVUE 2-245, 73 TTABVUE (confidential version);

• Excerpts from Petitioner’s discovery deposition of Mr. Bender and exhibits
thereto, Petitioner’s Fifth Notice of Reliance, 44 TTABVUE 11-47, 45
TTABVUE (confidential version);

• Mr. Bonbrest’s testimony declaration and exhibits thereto, 47 TTABVUE 3-
117; 48 TTABVUE (confidential version);

• Mr. Bonbrest’s rebuttal testimony declaration and exhibits thereto, 69
TTABVUE 2-20;

does not appear on TTABVUE, the TTABVUE docket entry number where such
material or testimony is located should be included in any citation.
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• The testimony declaration of Richard Wolf, a Managing Member of Petitioner,
and exhibits thereto, 49 TTABVUE 3-157, 51 TTABVUE (confidential version);

• Mr. Wolf’s rebuttal testimony declaration and exhibit thereto, 67 TTABVUE 2-
6, 68 TTABVUE (confidential version);

• Excerpts of various printed publications, Petitioner’s Fourth Notice of
Reliance, 43 TTABVUE 6-65.

II. Standing and Priority
“A petitioner is authorized by statute to seek cancellation of a mark where it has
‘both a “real interest” in the proceedings as well as a “reasonable” basis for its belief
of damage.’” Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111
USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting ShutEmDown Sports, Inc. v. Lacy, 102
USPQ2d 1036, 1041 (TTAB 2012) and citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50
USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner’s prior registrations for a mark similar to
Respondent’s mark, used with restaurant and nightclub services that prominently
feature goods such as Respondent’s, establish Petitioner’s real interest and standing.
See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (petitioner’s prior registrations establish “direct commercial interest and its
standing to petition for cancellation”); Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670
F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982).
Although both Petitioner and Respondent own registrations, it is undisputed that
Petitioner has priority. The January 3, 2000 and May 26, 2009 filing dates of the
applications that matured into Petitioner’s pleaded registrations precede the July 11,
2011 filing date of the application that matured into Respondent’s challenged
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registration. See Brewski Beer Co. v. Brewski Bros. Inc., 47 USPQ2d 1281, 1284
(TTAB 1998) (A petitioner who owns a registration may rely on it to establish
constructive first use as of the application filing date). Respondent has neither alleged
nor proven an earlier priority date.
III. Background
Petitioner owns and operates several restaurants and nightclubs named TAO in
cities including New York and Las Vegas (hereinafter, “TAO venues”).12 The TAO
venues attract millions of customers annually.13 Lists of the top-grossing restaurants
and nightclubs in the United States routinely feature the TAO venues,14 which also
have been named “Best Mega Nightclub” on Las Vegas Weekly’s “Vegas’ Best 2009”
list,15 “Nightclub of the Year” on the 2010 Nightclub and Bar Awards list,16 and one
of the “10 Most Instagrammed Restaurants in America.”17 A 2007 New York Times
article on TAO in Las Vegas reported it as “the highest grossing independent
restaurant in the United States,” and noted that “[e]ven judged against other huge-

12 49 TTABVUE 3-4 (Wolf Declaration).
13 Id. at 6.
14 Id. at 107 (R&I Restaurants & Institutions 2008 list), 105 (R&I Restaurants & Institutions
2009 list), 108 (R&I Restaurants & Institutions 2010 list), 110 (Huffington Post report on
Restaurants & Institutions’ list of Top 100 Independent Restaurants of 2010), 112-17
(www.restaurantbusinessonline.com), 146 (www.8newsnow.com).
15 Id. at 69.
16 Id. at 65.
17 Id. at 122-125 (www.foodandwine.com).
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volume restaurants, where revenues in the tens of millions are not unusual, Tao is
setting a new standard.”18
While Petitioner’s registrations are in standard characters, extending to any font
style, see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
and Trademark Rule 2.52(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(a), Petitioner also has established prior
use of the mark in the following style: .19
Turning to Respondent, Mr. Bender formed the company in 1990 and is its sole
owner.20 He formed a related entity, Kai Vodka LLC (“Kai”), in 2006 whose “main
product” is named Kai Vodka.21 Respondent is Kai’s managing member and a part
owner.22 According to Mr. Bender, “Kai and [Respondent] are separate entities, but
the companies frequently cooperate on various projects in order to reduce costs.”23 In
2010, Mr. Bender visited one of the TAO venues in an unsuccessful attempt to sell it
Kai Vodka.24 Thereafter, on July 11, 2011, Respondent filed the intent-to-use
application for TAO VODKA that matured into the registration at issue.

18 49 TTABVUE 104.
19 E.g., 49 TTABVUE 34 and 80-96, 44 TTABVUE 24-37, 47 TTABVUE 35-48.
20 80 TTABVUE 6 (Amended Bender Declaration).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 45 TTABVUE 26 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition).
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Mr. Bender acknowledged that TAO VODKA “is the same product” as Kai Vodka
– manufactured in the same way with the same formula and ingredients.25 As Mr.
Bender described it, the only difference between the products is “the name, the
positioning, and the target audience.”26
Mr. Bender testified that Respondent and Kai both “were involved in securing the
formula and label approvals required for the sale of TAO VODKA in the United
States,” and that “Kai also imported TAO VODKA into the United States on
[Respondent’s] behalf.”27 Kai registered the trade name “Tao Vodka Imports” in
Hawaii in 2011, and according to Mr. Bender, “sometimes used this trade name when
assisting [Respondent] with various tasks relating to TAO VODKA.”28 Mr. Bender’s
amended declaration testimony in this regard conflicts with the original statement
in his discovery deposition that Tao Vodka Imports was a d/b/a of Respondent, which
statement Mr. Bender subsequently changed on the errata sheet for the deposition
transcript.29 An employee of Kai submitted the application for vodka formula
approval to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau in Kai’s name.30 Although
the formula approval application lists the product name as Kai Vodka, Mr. Bender

25 Id. at 35; see also 80 TTABVUE 8 (Amended Bender Declaration).
26 45 TTABVUE 35 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition). See Trademark Rule
2.116(g), 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(g) (“The Board may treat as not confidential that material which
cannot reasonably be considered confidential, notwithstanding a designation as such by a
party.”).
27 80 TTABVUE 12 (Amended Bender Declaration).
28 Id. at 6-7.
29 Id.; 81 TTABVUE 22-23 (errata sheet); 45 TTABVUE 48 (Confidential Bender Discovery
Deposition); see also 72 TTABVUE 28 (Bender Cross Examination Testimony).
30 72 TTABVUE at 24-25.
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alleges that it “encompassed TAO VODKA” because it used the same formula.31 The
TAO VODKA label itself included the email address info@kaivodka.com and the
website http://www.kaivodka.com.32 Mr. Bender acknowledged that vodka “is
typically imported by the trademark owner, but in this case, it was imported by
another entity – Kai.”33 Mr. Bender testified that he discussed the formula for and
manufacturing of TAO VODKA with the Vietnamese distillery and consultant that
later manufactured it “sometime during the first quarter of 2011.”34
Respondent filed a statement of use (“SOU”) on April 24, 2012, in advance of the
September 20, 2012 SOU deadline, alleging use of the mark in commerce as of April
9, 2012. Respondent’s specimen of use showed its mark on a bottle in the following

31 80 TTABVUE 8 (Amended Bender Declaration); see also 72 TTABVUE 25 (Bender Cross
Examination Testimony, stating, “This is the formula that we used for Tao Vodka and is the
same formula as it is for Kai Vodka.”).
32 72 TTABVUE 29 (Bender Cross Examination Testimony).
33 Id. at 32.
34 80 TTABVUE 7 (Amended Bender Declaration).
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font: .35 However, no sales under the TAO VODKA mark occurred until
more than 2½ years later, in December 2014, a fact we discuss in more detail infra.36
To establish use of the mark in commerce for purposes of the SOU, Respondent
focuses on one case of sample bottles of TAO VODKA. In mid-April 2012, the
Vietnamese distillery shipped one case of vodka samples bearing the TAO VODKA
mark to Kai.37 The sole receipt reflecting this importation shows the recipient as Mr.
Marcus Bender of Kai Vodka, LLC, and indicates that the goods cost $6.38 The receipt
further indicates that the goods were “Sold To” Kai.39
Mr. Bender stated that he was “[b]asically trying to sell it by showing it [the
sample bottles bearing the TAO VODKA mark] to various parties, but never actually
made a sale.”40 Mr. Bender provided the samples, at no charge,41 to three entities: an

35 44 TTABVUE 42 (Petitioner’s Fifth Notice of Reliance).
36 45 TTABVUE 97 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition); 72 TTABVUE 67 (Bender
Cross-Examination Deposition); 83 TTABVUE 11 (Confidential Exhibit N to Amended
Bender Declaration).
37 80 TTABVUE 10 (Amended Bender Declaration).
38 72 TTABVUE 33-36 (Bender Cross-Examination Deposition).
39 Id. at 57-59 (Mr. Bender reviewed the receipt and explained that it shows the “Consignee”
as Kai, and indicates that the goods were sold to the consignee.
40 45 TTABVUE 75 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition).
41 Id. at 51.
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out-of-state shareholder of Kai named J.M. Stevens & Associates,42 a restaurant
across the street from Mr. Bender’s office in Hawaii named Tango Contemporary
Café, and a distributor named Northern Wine & Spirits, Inc., which received the
samples in Mr. Bender’s office in Hawaii. Mr. Bender testified that providing samples
“to distributors and retailers is a customary, tried-and-true method of conducting
business in the alcoholic beverage industry” to allow them to evaluate the product.43
He stated that Respondent provided samples bearing the TAO VODKA mark to
investor J.M. Stevens who, according to Mr. Bender, “agreed to offer the product to
distributors, retailers, and other investors on Bender’s behalf.”44 Mr. Bender testified
that J.M. Stevens is “not a distributor so he can’t sell vodka.”45 As to the samples
shared with Northern Wine & Spirits, Inc. and Tango Café, “they did not purchase it.
They only looked at it and reviewed it.”46 Mr. Bender also acknowledged that
Respondent legally could not sell the goods directly to Tango Café.47 None of these
sales or distributions is supported by corroborating documentation. Rather, the
evidence consists solely of, as Mr. Bender characterized it, “Just my word to you.”48
Mr. Bender testified as follows:

42 80 TTABVUE 12 (Amended Bender Declaration). We do not consider Mr. Bender’s factual
assertions regarding what J.M. Stevens may have done with the samples after receiving
them, because they are either hearsay or speculation. See 45 TTABVUE 86-88.
43 80 TTABVUE 11 (Amended Bender Declaration), 83 TTABVUE 8 (Confidential Exhibit K).
44 Id. at 12.
45 45 TTABVUE 87 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition).
46 72 TTABVUE 48 (Bender Cross-Examination Deposition).
47 Id. at 50.
48 Id. at 49-50.
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Q. So just to summarize, J.M. Stevens & Associates, Northern Wine & Spirits,
and Tango cafe have never purchased a single bottle of Tao Vodka; is that
correct?
A. That’s correct.
***
Q. And is it correct to say that none of these entities have ever sold a single
bottle of Tao Vodka?
MR. RAYNES: Same objection to form, relevance and foundation.
THE WITNESS: I believe it's true, uh-huh, that they have not.49

Prior to any sales under the mark, Respondent altered the font shown above, in
response to a complaint from Petitioner.50 According to Mr. Bender, Petitioner
“specifically complained about the font used for the TAO VODKA mark. I disagreed
with [Petitioner]’s complaints, but I immediately began to redesign the TAO VODKA
label in May 2012.”51 According to Mr. Bender, five more cases of vodka labeled TAO
VODKA were imported “on [Respondent’s] behalf on or about August 23, 2012.”52
However, the record includes no information about any disposition of these goods in
2012. Mr. Bender alleges that Respondent limited the number of samples it
distributed after receiving the cease-and-desist letter from Petitioner in April 2012.53
As noted above, the first sales under the TAO VODKA mark took place in December
2014.54

49 45 TTABVUE 94 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition).
50 80 TTABVUE 15 (Amended Bender Declaration).
51 Id. at 15.
52 Id. at 13.
53 Id. at 15.
54 45 TTABVUE 97 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition); 72 TTABVUE 67 (Bender
cross-examination deposition); 83 TTABVUE 11 (Confidential Exhibit N to Amended Bender
Declaration).
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In May 2012, Respondent “proposed a business relationship” with Petitioner,55
and Petitioner has provided written documentation of the proposal from December
2012.56 Despite the lack of sales under the mark at that point, the proposal seeks
inter alia a very substantial sum in the mid-six-figures from Petitioner for the sale of
the TAO VODKA registration and “all common law right and goodwill associated
therewith.”57
IV. Nonuse as of the Statement of Use
“It is clear that an applicant cannot obtain a registration under Section 1 of the
Trademark Act for goods or services upon which it has not used the mark. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051.” Grand Canyon West Ranch, LLC v. Hualapai Tribe, 78 USPQ2d 1696, 1698
(TTAB 2006). The Trademark Act provides that “[t]he term ‘use in commerce’ means
the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to
reserve a right in a mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Christian Faith Fellowship
Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 120 USPQ2d 1640, 1642 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(providing an overview of the statutory use in commerce requirement); Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 USPQ2d 1768, 1773-75 (TTAB 1994) (reviewing the
legislative history), aff’d without published opinion, White v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 108 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (opinion available at 1997 WL 76957). The
Trademark Act further specifies that a trademark shall be deemed to be in use in

55 80 TTABVUE 16 (Amended Bender Declaration).
56 68 TTABVUE 8-11 (Confidential Exhibit A to Wolf Rebuttal Declaration).
57 Id. at 8.
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commerce when the goods bearing the mark “are sold or transported in commerce.”
15 U.S.C. § 1127. In this case, we consider whether the importation or distribution of
samples described above meets the use in commerce requirement.58
The parties frame their nonuse arguments around the April 24, 2012 filing date
of the statement of use (“SOU”) underlying the challenged registration, as
Respondent filed the SOU in advance of the September 20, 2012 SOU deadline.
Petitioner emphasizes that the record includes no documentary evidence that
Respondent used the mark as of the date of the SOU. Petitioner insists that the April
2012 invoice and corresponding shipping receipt from the Vietnamese distillery show
Kai Vodka, LLC as the buyer and recipient, not Respondent. Petitioner also
emphasizes that the back label of the bottle, the front label of which served as
Respondent’s specimen, identifies Kai Vodka, LLC as the brand owner.59 Petitioner
questions the reliability of Respondent’s story, pointing out that while Mr. Bender
testified that he received the shipment on or about April 12, 2012, the shipping
receipt indicates that the Vietnamese distillery filled it out April 14, 2012.60

58 Throughout the subsequent discussion of use and transportation in commerce, we cite and
discuss some cases from prior to the revised definition of use in commerce that took effect in
November 1988 as part of the Trademark Law Revision Act, requiring bona fide rather than
token use. See Paramount Pictures, 31 USPQ2d at 1773-74. Because the new definition set a
higher standard for the quantum and nature of use, prior case law under the old “token use”
requirement is instructive because uses that did not qualify under the token use definition
will not qualify under the newer, more stringent definition.
59 See 81 TTABVUE 157-58 (Amended Bender Declaration Exhibit G).
60 83 TTABVUE 6 (Amended Bender Declaration Confidential Exhibit H); 72 TTABVUE 37-
38 (Bender Cross-Examination Deposition).
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Respondent concedes that it had not sold any goods under the mark as of the SOU
filing date and did not sell goods until December 2014 at the earliest, when
Respondent received a purchase order from a distributor.61 However, according to
Respondent, the distribution of vodka samples in late April 2012 (which we note was
before the SOU deadline) suffices to establish the requisite use in commerce. In
response to the references to Kai Vodka, LLC on the relevant documents, Mr. Bender
testified that Kai Vodka, LLC used Tao Vodka Imports as a d/b/a, and imported the
TAO VODKA samples “because of the contractual agreement between [the
manufacturer] and Kai. [Respondent] had no contractual agreement with [the
manufacturer].”62
Regardless of whether Respondent or Kai imported the samples, Respondent
seems to concede in its brief63 that it should not have relied on the April 9, 2012
shipment of vodka from the Vietnamese manufacturer as Respondent’s date of first
use in commerce in its underlying application. Drawing a distinction between
importation and subsequent distribution, Respondent points to its provision of
samples to third parties shortly after the vodka was imported as establishing that
Respondent “made sufficient use of the TAO VODKA mark by [April 24, 2012].”64

61 45 TTABVUE 97 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition); 72 TTABVUE 67 (Bender
Cross-Examination Deposition); 80 TTABVUE 16 (Amended Bender Declaration).
62 45 TTABVUE 67 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition).
63 93 TTABVUE 45 (Respondent’s Brief).
64 Id.
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It is clear that on this record, the importation of vodka, whether by Respondent or
by Kai acting on Respondent’s behalf, does not establish the requisite use or
transportation in commerce. In Avakoff v. Southern Pacific Co., 765 F.2d 1097, 226
USPQ 435, 436 (Fed. Cir. 1985), our primary reviewing court held that a shipment of
goods from the manufacturer to the trademark owner did not satisfy the use or
transportation in commerce requirement, as “it was a shipment of the goods in
preparation for offering the goods for sale. It did not make the goods available to the
purchasing public.” 226 USPQ at 436. Even when the shipment in Avakoff was
considered in conjunction with contemporaneous advertising and subsequent sales of
the goods, the activities failed to meet the standard because “mere advertising … does
not constitute trademark use” and “subsequent sales of [goods] bearing the marks is
not relevant in the absence of use in commerce prior to filing.” Id. In Clorox Co. v.
Salazar, 108 USPQ2d 1083, 1087 (TTAB 2013), the Board held that “transportation
of goods from a manufacturer to the owner of the trademark, even when the goods
bear the trademark, is purely a delivery of the goods to the trademark owner in
preparation for offering the goods for sale and, therefore, does not constitute bona
fide use of applicant’s mark in commerce.” Thus, neither the April nor the August
2012 shipment of vodka qualifies as use or transportation in commerce.
Turning to the distribution of samples, Petitioner analogizes it to mere advertising
of the goods, and contends that such promotional activity does not qualify as use.
According to Petitioner, the distribution of free samples does not equate to
availability for sale, and does not constitute the requisite use. In addition, Petitioner
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addresses in turn the particular recipients of the samples, emphasizing that the
nature of each transaction undermines Respondent’s claim of bona fide use in
commerce. As to J.M. Stevens, Petitioner points out that it is a shareholder of Kai
Vodka, LLC, the importer of the samples.65 As to Northern Wine and Spirits,
Petitioner asserts that this distribution occurred at Mr. Bender’s office in Honolulu,
thus not in interstate commerce, and the recipient never became a distributor of TAO
VODKA.66 As to Tango Café, because Respondent has stressed that an importer such
as itself could not legally sell directly to a retailer such as Tango Café,67 Petitioner
argues that handing samples to it could not qualify as lawful use in commerce. Also,
Petitioner again points out that this was an entirely intrastate activity.
Before addressing the legal issues raised by these arguments regarding
distribution of samples, we pause to make observations regarding Mr. Bender’s
testimony. Mr. Bender testified that he distributed two to three complimentary
sample bottles of vodka bearing the mark to each of the three entities referred to
above, on Respondent’s behalf.68 Mr. Bender’s cross-examination testimony regarding
statements made in his declaration has undermined his credibility.69 His cross-
examination testimony reflects a lack of knowledge concerning key aspects of the
declaration he provided as direct testimony, such as the assertions regarding third-

65 90 TTABVUE 36 (Petitioner’s Brief); see also 80 TTABVUE 12 (Amended Bender
Declaration).
66 90 TTABVUE 37 (Petitioner’s Brief).
67 80 TTABVUE 10-11 (Amended Bender Declaration).
68 Id. at 12-13.
69 E.g., 72 TTABVUE 76-79, 107-09 (Bender Cross-Examination Deposition).
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party use of TAO marks, which he admits for the most part he did not “personally
check.”70 As a result, we find the more self-serving aspects of his testimony less
persuasive. See Jim Dandy Co. v. Martha White Foods, Inc., 458 F.2d 1397, 173 USPQ
673, 676 (CCPA 1972) (rejecting proffered showing of use in commerce based on
witness testimony that was “far from clear and definite”). In addition, we cannot
ignore Respondent’s lack of any records or other documentation corroborating Mr.
Bender’s testimony about the samples.71 The presence of business records would
strengthen the case that these transactions occurred in the ordinary course of trade,
and the absence of such records does the opposite. Cf. Research in Motion Ltd. v.
NBOR Corp., 92 USPQ2d 1926 (TTAB 2009) (lack of documentation contributes to
finding lack of bona fide intent to use a mark); Commodore Electronics Ltd. v. CBM
Kabushiki Kaisha, 26 USPQ2d 1503, 1507 (TTAB 1993) (without countervailing facts,
“the absence of any documentary evidence on the part of an applicant regarding such
intent is sufficient to prove that the applicant lacks a bona fide intention to use its
mark in commerce as required by Section 1(b)”). We now consider the legal issues,
accepting for the sake of their consideration Respondent’s reliance on its asserted
distribution of samples.
Depending on the particular facts and industry practice, some types of
promotional activities, such as distributing samples, may qualify as use in commerce.
See Automedx, Inc. v. Artivent Corp., 95 USPQ2d 1976, 1981 (TTAB 2010) (observing

70 Id. at 78-79.
71 See id. at 50-51 (Bender Cross-Examination Deposition, acknowledging only testimony, but
no documents, offered to support assertions about the samples).
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that “[u]se in commerce should be interpreted with flexibility to account for different
industry practices.”). While “test marketing has been recognized as sufficient to
establish use of a mark,” id., such test marketing typically involves some limited
actual sales rather than complimentary samples such as Respondent’s.72 See, e.g., id.;
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. G.C. Murphy Co., 199 USPQ 807, 812 (TTAB
1987) (“[s]ales of goods under a brand name in a test marketing area are actual sales
from which rights in a mark can accrue…. The use of a mark necessary to create a
proprietary right therein must be an ‘open and notorious’ use reaching purchasers or
prospective purchasers of the goods in connection with which the mark is used.”). And
even the sale of samples, in and of itself, does not necessarily meet the standard. In
Hydro-Dynamics, Inc. v. George Putnam & Co., 811 F.2d 1470, 1 USPQ2d 1772, 1774
(Fed. Cir. 1987), our primary reviewing court held that sending a box of samples to
obtain the opinion of an independent distributor did not qualify as use in commerce,
even though the distributor sold the samples to customers, because the purpose of
the shipment was “advisory consultation on the merits of a proposed trademark.” See
also Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 209 USPQ 1033, 1046 (TTAB 1981) (“a shipment
of an article or a prototype of an article for testing and experimentation is not a public
use upon which trademark rights are created”). The determination thus is a fact-

72 While actual sales are not required for statutory use in commerce, see, e.g., McDonald’s
Corp. v. McKinley, 13 USPQ2d 1895, 1898 n.6 (TTAB 1989), in the context of test marketing,
whether the goods are sold can help inform whether the activity is in the ordinary course of
trade.
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based inquiry as to whether the activity in question is bona fide use in the ordinary
course of trade.
Under the three-tiered system for alcohol sales (about which both parties agree),
“a manufacturer or an importer (such as [Respondent]) can only sell its product to a
distributor, who can only sell its products to a retailer, who in turn only sells it to the
public.”73 Here, Respondent has acknowledged that J.M. Stevens is a shareholder of
Kai and is not a distributor.74 Respondent repeatedly attempts to rely on Kai’s
activities as being on behalf of Respondent to support bona fide intent to use and use
in commerce, such as Kai importing samples and Kai obtaining formula and label
approvals.75 Sales under or uses of a mark which are “entirely between and within [a
party’s] organizations [do] not constitute a public use of the mark. Thus, such
activities cannot be relied upon for any purpose herein.” See McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co.
v. H-P Tool Mfg. Corp., 141 USPQ 405, 406 (TTAB 1964); see also Sterling Drug Inc.
v. Knoll A.G. Chemische Fabriken, 159 USPQ 628, 631 (TTAB 1968) (“To acquire
trademark rights there has to be an ‘open’ use, that is to say, a use has to be made to
the relevant class of purchasers…. There was no such ‘open’ use rather the use can
be said to be an ‘internal’ use, which cannot give rise to trademark rights.”); see also
Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mf. Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 1260, 185 USPQ 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1975)
(sale of clothes to its sales managers was “insufficiently public to secure trademark

73 69 TTABVUE 4 (Bonbrest Rebuttal Declaration); see also 80 TTABVUE 10-11 (Amended
Bender Declaration).
74 72 TTABVUE at 11 (Bender Cross-Examination Deposition).
75 80 TTABVUE 6, 12 (Amended Bender Declaration).
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ownership,” because “secret, undisclosed internal shipments are generally
inadequate to support the denomination ‘use.’”). Moreover, Mr. Bender acknowledged
that J.M. Stevens is “not a distributor so he can’t sell vodka.”76 As Mr. Bender
described the activity at one point, “I sent bottles to Jim Stevens for him to share with
industry people that he knows as well as potential investors.”77 The record includes
no evidence from J.M. Stevens regarding the disposition of the samples. Taking into
account all the evidence regarding sharing samples with J.M. Stevens, we find that
the record reflects more of a preliminary outreach for general feedback or a potential
investment in a possible project to sell TAO VODKA.
As for Tango Café, after explaining that Respondent is not a distributor, and could
not directly sell vodka to a restaurant, a type of retailer in the three-tiered system,
Mr. Bender described the activity in more detail:
Q. Did [Tango Café] contact a distributor to acquire Tao Vodka?

A. There was no distributor. This was a way to begin the process of finding out
if we could actually solicit a distributor and create more product. This was actually
a stepping stone into the first steps of being able to produce the product on a
grander scale and be able to then resell it to distributors and importers.

Q. So as of April 24th, 2012, you did not have anyone agreeing to distribute
Tao Vodka; is that correct?

A. That’s correct.78

76 45 TTABVUE 87 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition). The statement referred to
Jim Stevens, the owner of J.M. Stevens & Associates. Id. at 84.
77 Id. at 85.
78 Id. at 93-94.
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This testimony reveals that this activity was preliminary and exploratory, and
Respondent was not yet ready to introduce the product in the ordinary course of trade.
Also, as noted in Sterling Drug, 159 USPQ at 631, “a use has to be made to the
relevant class of purchasers or prospective purchasers.” Having an acquaintance at a
local establishment outside the relevant class of purchasers sample the vodka “to
begin the process of finding out if [Respondent] could actually solicit a distributor”
falls short of bona fide use in the ordinary course of trade.
As for Northern Wine & Spirits (the only one of the three that was actually a
distributor to which Respondent could conceivably sell directly), Mr. Bender stated
that “[t]hey were going to review it and see if they had interested parties in their
market.”79 In responding in the negative to a question about whether Northern Wine
& Spirits purchased the goods, Mr. Bender also stated, “They only looked at it and
reviewed it.”80 There was no written follow-up from either side, and Northern Wine
& Spirits never purchased or sold any of the product.81 While Petitioner emphasizes
that the transaction was entirely intrastate, within Hawaii, our reviewing court
recently noted that the appropriate inquiry should focus on whether the general
category of such transactions would cause a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 120
USPQ2d 1640, 1644-45, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Because one need not direct goods

79 Id. at 90.
80 72 TTABVUE 48 (Bender Cross-Examination Deposition).
81 45 TTABVUE 90 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition).
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across state lines for Congress to regulate the activity under the Commerce Clause,
there is likewise no such per se condition for satisfying the Lanham Act’s ‘use in
commerce’ requirement.”). Therefore, we do not base our findings on the intrastate
nature of the activity with Northern Wine & Spirits (and Tango Café).
We find that the record as a whole reflects that Respondent was not yet using or
even ready to use the mark in the ordinary course of trade, but was merely exploring
such use at some point in the future. In making this determination, we considered
Mr. Bender’s statements in his declaration regarding alcoholic beverage industry
practices with regard to the distribution of samples and his assertion that “[t]he
samples were provided so these companies could evaluate the product and determine
whether they wished to buy large quantities of the product.”82 However, as noted
above, we find his other characterizations of the activities more candid and
informative. The record, particularly Mr. Bender’s deposition testimony, shows that
Respondent’s activities were merely “‘in preparation for offering the goods for sale.
[They] did not make the goods available’” to Respondent’s potential consumers. See
Avakoff, 226 USPQ at 436 (quoting Board decision being affirmed). For example, in
cross-examination testimony, Mr. Bender responded to a question confirming that
none of the sample recipients purchased any of the goods by emphasizing, “Those --
those initial bottles changed to the final product. They were not ever sold, actually.
They were used as a demonstration of what we were intending to do, and then we

82 Id. at 120.
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changed the design into what it is today.”83 See Blue Bell, 185 USPQ at 6 (bona fide
use in trade requires that the mark “be affixed to the merchandise actually intended
to bear the mark in commercial transactions”). Mr. Bender also testified that none of
the three entities ever sold any TAO VODKA.84 The absence of any sales whatsoever
under the mark for more than 2½ years following Respondent’s sample-related
activities underscores their preliminary nature. While not essential to our finding,
Mr. Bonbrest’s testimony that disputes, in numerous respects, Mr. Bender’s
contention that his activity constitutes the norm for a product launch in the alcoholic
beverage industry, lends additional support for our finding.85 We find Mr. Bender’s
sharing of these samples with the three parties was more in the nature of a
preliminary advisory consultation than bona fide use of the TAO VODKA mark in the
ordinary course of trade. Thus, Respondent failed to make the requisite use of the
mark in commerce prior to the Statement of Use deadline.
V. Likelihood of Confusion
Although our determination regarding nonuse suffices to grant the petition to
cancel, given the broader nature of the parties’ dispute, we also reach the issue of
likely confusion.
The determination under Section 2(d) involves an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours

83 72 TTABVUE 52 (Bender Cross-Examination Deposition).
84 45 TTABVUE 94 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition).
85 69 TTABVUE 5-7 (Bonbrest Rebuttal Declaration).
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& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (setting forth factors to be
considered, hereinafter referred to as “du Pont factors”); see also In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any
likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between
the marks and the relatedness of the goods. See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.2d
1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry
mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential
characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”). We address these and
other relevant du Pont factors below. Petitioner bears the burden of proving its claim
of likelihood of confusion by a preponderance of the evidence. Cunningham, 55
USPQ2d at 1848.
A. The Fame of Petitioner’s Mark
Petitioner argues under the fifth du Pont factor that its TAO mark should be
deemed famous. The strength of a mark rests on the extent to which “a significant
portion of the relevant consuming public . . . recognizes the mark as a source
indicator.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323,
122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed. Cir.
2005)). This factor involves assessing the mark “‘along a spectrum from very strong
to very weak.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). A very strong mark receives a wider
latitude of legal protection in the likelihood of confusion analysis. See Palm Bay
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Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1694 (strong marks “enjoy wide latitude of legal protection” and
are “more attractive as targets for would-be copyists”). Strength may be measured
indirectly by the volume of sales and advertising expenditures in connection with the
services sold under the mark, and other factors such as length of time of use of the
mark; widespread critical assessments; notice by independent sources of the services
identified by the marks; and the general reputation of the services. Weider Publ’ns,
LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1354 (TTAB 2014); see also Bose
Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (recognizing indirect evidence as appropriate proof of strength).
To demonstrate fame, Petitioner provided a variety of evidence, some of which is
confidential and therefore will be discussed only in general terms. The TAO venues
attract millions of customers a year and are among the highest-grossing restaurants
and nightclubs in the United States.86 The confidential record includes their revenue
from January 2008 to September 2014, and the figure is quite impressive, a point
made in the New York Times article a year earlier.87 The TAO venues draw celebrity
clients, generating mainstream media attention.88 For example, media have
publicized visits to the TAO venues by Tom Cruise, Robert DeNiro, Kim Kardashian,
Sean “P. Diddy” Combs, LeBron James and many other professional athletes.89 Also,
the venues attract unsolicited media coverage, including articles in newspapers with

86 49 TTABVUE 8, 112-16 (Wolf Declaration).
87 50 TTABVUE 9 (Confidential Wolf Declaration).
88 49 TTABVUE 50-73 (Wolf Declaration Exhibit D).
89 49 TTABVUE 6 (Wolf Declaration).
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wide circulation such as the New York Times and Los Angeles Times.90 A 2007 New
York Times headline for an article on the TAO venue in Las Vegas reads, “Setting
Restaurant Records by Selling the Sizzle.”91 Petitioner also advertises the TAO
venues extensively, and the confidential record establishes quite substantial
marketing and promotional expenditures for a recent five year period.92 As noted
above, the TAO venues have received numerous forms of recognition in the industry.93
Petitioner’s evidence of commercial strength in the form of customer volume and
revenue statistics, advertising expenditures and examples, unsolicited media
coverage, and awards and distinction within and outside the restaurant industry,
reflects the renown of the mark and shows widespread consumer exposure to and
recognition of Petitioner’s mark. Overall, we find Petitioner’s TAO mark to be famous,
weighing in favor of a likelihood of confusion. However, even if we were to find the
mark to be of average strength, our ultimate ruling on the likelihood of confusion
claim on this record would remain the same.
B. The Number and Nature of Similar Marks for Similar Services
Respondent argues under the sixth du Pont factor that Petitioner’s mark is weak
and diluted because it is highly suggestive of its Asian-themed services, and because

90 Id. at 130-54.
91 Id. at 134.
92 50 TTABVUE 7, 125-26 (Confidential Wolf Declaration).
93 49 TTABVUE 65, 69, 107 (Wolf Declaration) (R&I Restaurants & Institutions 2008 list),
105 (R&I Restaurants & Institutions 2009 list), 108 (R&I Restaurants & Institutions 2010
list), 110 (Huffington Post report on Restaurants & Institutions’ list of Top 100 Independent
Restaurants of 2010), 112-17 (www.restaurantbusinessonline.com), 146
(www.8newsnow.com), 122-125 (www.foodandwine.com).
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of third-party “use and registration of ‘TAO’ in various industries.”94 However, Mr.
Bender’s cross-examination testimony made clear that he did not conduct the
searches for the third-party webpages upon which Respondent relies on this point,
nor did he verify their currency. Regarding “Table A” of his declaration that detailed
third-party use of TAO marks:
Q Did you run these reports yourself?
A No, I didn't.
Q Would someone else have told you that they were run?
A I just told you that my attorneys did.
Q Your attorneys told you this to be the case?
A They did this work.95

We therefore disregard the information in his declaration that apparently constitutes
hearsay and lacks underlying knowledge by Mr. Bender, but nonetheless consider the
webpages attached as Exhibit W and Exhibit Y for what they show on their face, as
they could have been admitted by a notice of reliance.96 FUJIFILM SonoSite, Inc. v.
Sonoscape Co., 111 USPQ2d 1234, 1236 (TTAB 2014).
The Federal Circuit has held that evidence of the extensive registration and use
of a term by others can be powerful evidence of the term’s weakness. Jack Wolfskin
Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. v. Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363,
116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC,
794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In determining the strength
or weakness of a mark, we consider both its inherent strength based on the nature of

94 93 TTABVUE 15 (Respondent’s Brief).
95 72 TTABVUE 77-78 (Bender Cross Examination Deposition).
96 82 TTABVUE 3-100 and 175-99.
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the term itself and its commercial strength based on use in the marketplace. Cf. In re
Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96 USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (measuring both conceptual and marketplace strength). Use evidence may
reflect commercial weakness, while third-party registration evidence that does not
equate to proof of third-party use may bear on conceptual weakness if a term is
commonly registered for similar goods or services. See Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics,
Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 917 (CCPA 1976) (even if “there is no evidence of actual use” of
third-party registrations, such registrations “may be given some weight to show the
meaning of a mark in the same way that dictionaries are used ”).
Turning first to the third-party use evidence, the most probative consists of U.S.-
based restaurant and alcoholic beverage webpages using Tao-formative names as
presumptive indicators of source.97 For example, the record includes webpages of:
• E-Tao restaurant in Houston98
• RJ Tao restaurant and lounge near Little Rock99
• Sushi Tao restaurant in Arcata, California100
• Tao restaurant in Salisbury, Maryland101
• Tao Asian restaurant in Pelham, Alabama102

97 We have no basis upon which to conclude that webpages involving other types of goods and
services, such as health food stores, 82 TTABVUE 25-28, nonalcoholic tea drinks, id. at 57-
60, 63-67, and 88-90, dried herbal tea, id. at 61 and 68-72 or herbal chocolates, id. at 77-79,
are sufficiently similar to bear on weakness of the term in this case. The evidence at 82
TTABVUE 175-98 suffers the same flaw. We also disregard foreign webpages. See, e.g., 82
TTABVUE 13-14, 30-36, 76, 90.
98 Id. at 3-4 (Exhibit W).
99 Id. at 5-6.
100 Id. at 7.
101 Id. at 12.
102 Id. at 15.
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• Tao Asian in Winter Garden, Florida103
• Tao Garden in Winter Park, Florida104
• Tao Chen’s restaurant in Chesteron, Indiana105
• Tao Garden restaurant in Chandler, Arizona106
• Tao Kitchen restaurant in Phoenix and Peoria, Arizona107
• Tao New Asian restaurant in Billings, Montana108
• Tao Tao restaurant in Sunnyvale, California109
• Tao Too restaurant in Germantown, Tennessee110
• Tao Vietnamese Japanese Cuisine in San Diego111
• Tao’s Asian Cuisine restaurant in East Longmeadow, Massachusetts112
• Tao’s Oriental Cuisine in Colorado Springs113
• The Tao of Tea Original Tao Teahouse in Portland, Oregon114
• a Yelp directory entry for Tao Sushi in San Francisco115
• a Yelp directory entry for Tao Yuen Pastry restaurant in Oakland,
California116
• a Yelp directory entry for Tao San Jin restaurant in Antioch,
California117
• the Facebook page of Tao Cha Café in Edmond, Oklahoma118

103 Id. at 16, 22.
104 Id. at 17.
105 Id. at 18-19.
106 Id. at 20-22.
107 Id. at 23-24.
108 Id. at 29.
109 Id. at 39-40.
110 Id. at 43.
111 Id. at 44-46.
112 Id. at 51-54.
113 Id. at 55-57.
114 Id. at 87.
115 Id. at 92.
116 Id. at 93.
117 Id. at 94.
118 Id. at 95.
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• Mission Wine & Spirits, Jason’s Wine & Spirits, Robert Burns Wines, the
Liquor Collection, Continental Wine & Liquor websites all offering or
promoting Raynal Tao Liqueur119
• Tao Vineyards promoting various Tao wines120
• Tao for beer on tap at Ocean City Brewing Company121
• a Beer Advocate review for Fen Tao beer from a Texas brewery122

Respondent did not show how long or how extensively these apparent third-party
marks have been used. We have no sense of the degree of consumer exposure to these
marks. Furthermore, the 2013 and 2014 dates on the faces of many of these webpages
reflect that Respondent compiled this evidence almost two or in some cases more than
three years before they were submitted in 2016, thereby lessening their probative
value. Although Mr. Bender’s declaration included a voucher of their currency, as
noted above, his cross-examination testimony reflected no legitimate basis for this
voucher123 and we therefore do not credit it. Finally, Mr. Bender also admitted that
Petitioner successfully challenged numerous restaurants using “Tao” in their names,
including several apparently referenced in the third-party webpages.124

119 Id. at 8-11, 80-82.
120 Id. at 47-50.
121 Id. at 82-86.
122 Id. at 89.
123 When asked about the dates of the third-party webpages in particular, as reflected in a
table in his declaration, Mr. Bender stated “I – you know, I – I’m not sure, to be honest with
you. You know, the dates there, I don’t know what they actually – it looks like they tie
together with when this was actually printed out.” 72 TTABVUE 76 (Bender Cross-
Examination Deposition). And later when asked if the years provided “refer to the years that
your attorney told you that they saved this report,” Mr. Bender replied, “You know, I’m really
not sure.” Id. at 77.
124 80 TTABVUE 32-34 (Amended Bender Declaration); 82 TTABVUE 198-285 (Amended
Bender Declaration Exhibit Z).
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The record also includes use-based third-party registrations of marks that consist
of or include TAO. Most however, cover goods or services that we have no basis to find
related to Petitioner’s services, such as human resources consultation, clothing,
digital media, cosmetics, soft drinks, tea and organizing tea ceremonies. Such
registrations have no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to
this case. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (disregarding third-party registrations for goods in other classes where the
proffering party “has neither introduced evidence, nor provided adequate explanation
to support a determination that the existence of I AM marks for goods in other classes,
… support a finding that registrants’ marks are weak with respect to the goods
identified in their registrations”). Only one use-based registration, FEN TAO for
beer,125 covers more related goods, in that, like Respondent’s goods, they are alcoholic
beverages.
As to commercial weakness, “[t]he probative value of third-party trademarks
depends entirely upon their usage.” Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1693.
Respondent’s failure to establish the current nature and extent of use of the third-
party marks, particularly given the previously discussed shortcomings of the
evidence, serves to diminish its probative value. Also, Respondent’s admission that
Petitioner is assertive in enforcing its TAO mark, including against some of these
establishments, undermines the persuasiveness of this evidence.126 Taken as a whole,

125 82 TTABVUE 171 (Amended Bender Declaration).
126 93 TTABVUE 38 (Respondent’s Brief); 80 TTABVUE 32-34 (Amended Bender
Declaration); 82 TTABVUE 198-285 (Amended Bender Declaration Exhibit Z).
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we cannot infer such a degree of recent consumer exposure as would show that
consumers generally distinguish among marks containing “tao” based on minor
distinctions.127 Cf. Primrose Retirement Communities, LLC v. Edward Rose Senior
Living, LLC, 122 USPQ2d 1030 (TTAB 2016) (weakness found based on at least 85
actual uses of ROSE-formative marks for similar services, eight similar third-party
registrations, expert testimony and other evidence regarding the common nature of
ROSE-formative marks in the industry, and testimony by opposer that it did not
vigorously enforce its mark).
As to the conceptual strength of Petitioner’s mark, Petitioner has acknowledged
that “tao” in Chinese means “the way,” but contends that “other than the goodwill
achieved by Petitioner, the term ‘TAO’ has no definition or connotation concerning
Tao’s services.”128 The third-party evidence set out above shows numerous uses of
“tao” in connection with restaurants featuring Asian food. Based on this evidence,
which can be analogous to dictionary evidence that a term may have a recognized
suggestive meaning, Jack Wolfskin, 116 USPQ2d at 1136, we find that in the context
of restaurant services, “tao” suggests that the restaurant has an Asian theme or

127 Because of the staleness of the evidence and the enforcement efforts by Petitioner, the
record regarding third-party use evidence in this case differs from those in Rocket
Trademarks Pty Ltd. v. Phard S.p.A., 98 USPQ2d 1066 (TTAB 2011), which, as an additional
distinction, involved proof of actual purchases of goods branded with the third-party marks,
and In re Broadway Chicken Inc., 38 USPQ2d 1559 (TTAB 1996), which, as an additional
distinction, involved a much greater volume of third-party use evidence.
128 90 TTABVUE 14 (Petitioner’s Brief). Petitioner’s Registration No. 3770321 translates
TAO as “the way.” 49 TTABVUE 23. A definition in the record defines “tao” as “a Chinese
concept signifying ‘way,’ ‘path,’ ‘route,’ or sometimes more loosely, ‘doctrine’ or ‘principle.’” 81
TTABVUE 215 (Amended Bender Declaration, Exhibit U from Wikipedia.com).
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serves Asian food. This suggestive meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s use of TAO
in connection with its Asian-themed restaurants and nightclubs.
Considering the record in its entirety, although “tao” has a suggestive meaning in
the restaurant industry, given the compelling evidence that Petitioner’s mark for its
top-grossing restaurants and nightclubs is famous and widely known by consumers,
the nature and quantity of third-party use and registration evidence does not
convince us that Petitioner’s mark is weak or entitled to only a limited scope of
protection. The commercial strength of Petitioner’s TAO mark outweighs any
conceptual weakness.
C. Similarity of the Marks
Turning to the first du Pont factor, involving the comparison of the marks, we
consider them “in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.” Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1691 (quoting du Pont, 177
USPQ at 567). We remain mindful that “marks ‘must be considered . . . in light of the
fallibility of memory’ and ‘not on the basis of side-by-side comparison.’ [citation
omitted].” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir.
2014). We also bear in mind our finding that Petitioner’s mark is strong. See Joseph
Phelps Vineyards, 122 USPQ2d at 1735 (this factor “warrants reasonable weight”).
The only difference between the marks is the addition of the generic term VODKA
to Respondent’s mark. Although there is no mechanical test to select a dominant
element, consumers would be more likely to perceive a distinctive term, even if
suggestive, rather than a generic term such as VODKA, as the source-indicating
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feature of the mark. See, e.g., In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34 (affirming
TTAB’s finding that the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA CAFE was
DELTA, not the disclaimed generic term CAFE); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1534
(TTAB 2009) (finding that the dominant portion of the mark BINION’S
ROADHOUSE was BINION’S, not the disclaimed descriptive wording
ROADHOUSE). “[I]n articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of
confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less
weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re Nat’l Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 750-51 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Stone
Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157,
1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, the dominant portion of Respondent’s mark is identical
to Petitioner’s mark.
The shared term, TAO, results in a similar look, sound, meaning, and commercial
impression. We do not find that VODKA changes the meaning of TAO in the context
of the mark as a whole, or creates a basis on which consumers would distinguish
source.
D. Relatedness of the Goods and Services
As to the goods and services, we must determine whether their degree of
relatedness rises to such a level that consumers would mistakenly believe the parties’
goods and services emanate from the same source. In making this analysis of the
second du Pont factor, we look to the identifications of goods and services in the
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pleaded and challenged registrations, as well as the goods for which Petitioner has
established prior use (vodka). See Stone Lion Capital Partners, 110 USPQ2d at 1162;
Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783,
1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Petitioner’s services are: “Restaurant services” and “Night
clubs, special events and party planning; and coordinating and providing facilities for
entertainment events in the nature of parties and special events featuring music,
singing, dancing, lectures, and celebrity or professional entertainment.” Respondent’s
registration identifies “alcoholic beverages except beer.” In this case, when comparing
restaurant services to alcoholic beverages, we must also follow our reviewing court’s
holding that “the fact that restaurants serve food and beverages is not enough to
render food and beverages related to restaurant services for purposes of determining
the likelihood of confusion. Instead, . . . ‘to establish likelihood of confusion a party
must show something more than that similar or even identical marks are used for
food products and for restaurant services.’” In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340,
68 USPQ2d 1059, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also St. Helena
Hospital, 113 USPQ2d at 1087 (explaining the need to show “‘something more’ than
the mere fact that the goods and services are ‘used together’” in situations where the
relatedness of the goods and services is obscure or not generally recognized).
The record shows the requisite “something more” to establish that the alcoholic
beverages and restaurant and nightclub services are related in this case. First,
Petitioner’s evidence shows that it uses its TAO mark to promote alcoholic beverages,
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which are the primary source of revenue in the TAO venues.129 Petitioner’s menus
offer alcoholic drinks, including at least one vodka drink, that bear TAO-formative
names, such as the “Tao-tini,” “Tao-hito,” “Tao-apolitan,” “Tao Cherry Jubilee,” and
“Tao-love potion #9.”130 The TAO venues in New York and Las Vegas have offered the
“Tao-tini” and “Tao-hito” since their opening in 2000.131 Petitioner also engages in
joint promotional events at the TAO venues with vodka manufacturers such as Stoli,
Ciroc and Ketel One.132 For example, promotional material for Khloe Kardashian’s
30th birthday celebration at one of the TAO venues shows both the TAO and CIROC
marks and highlights drinks containing vodka, including the “Tao-apolitan”:

129 49 TTABVUE 9 (Wolf Declaration) (“sales of alcoholic beverages, spirits and cocktails are
integral to the TAO brand, and account for more than 50% of all revenue. Compare Exhibit H
(providing total revenue at the TAO Venues, with, Paragraph 23 [confidential], supra
(providing total alcohol and vodka sales at the TAO Venues.)”).
130 Id. at 10, 77, 82.
131 Id. While Respondent criticizes the lack of documentary evidence of actual use of these
names, we find the testimony and corroborating documentary evidence in the form of
promotional materials, menus, and a news article sufficient.
132 Id. at 10 and 79-92 (Exhibit F).
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133
Petitioner also advertises “Vodka Open Bars” at events at the TAO Venues.134
Petitioner’s evidence shows that consumers are exposed to its TAO mark used in the
names of vodka drinks served at the TAO venues, in connection with “open vodka
bars” advertised for the TAO Venues, and in co-sponsorship with vodka brands. Thus,
Petitioner has affirmatively promoted an association between its nightclub mark and
vodka.
Second, Petitioner has supplied evidence of the popularity, especially in the high-
end restaurant and nightclub industry, of providing customers with “bottle service”

133 Id. at 78.
134 47 TTABVUE 35-49 (Bonbrest Declaration Exhibit F).
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that includes alcohol with private labels bearing the mark of the restaurant or
nightclub.135 Mr. Bonbrest’s fact testimony, corroborated by exhibits attached to his
declaration, indicates that “private-label bottling is prevalent in the restaurant and
nightclub industries, and becoming more prevalent, especially amongst the well-
known restaurants and nightclubs.”136 Mr. Bonbrest provided 18 examples of such
private labelling of alcoholic beverages by restaurants (four of which are different
locations of the same restaurant group) and clubs and, for most, he attached
corroborating documents to his declaration.137 Several of them appear along with
TAO on the list of highest-grossing independent restaurants.138 Mr. Wolf also
provided testimony of a similar nature.139 A 2012 New York Times article identified
the Pink Elephant as a “high-end late-night club,” stating, “Bottle service is the rule;
they have their own Pink Elephant brand of vodka, from France.”140 A 2014 article
from the Washington City Paper describes the growing trend among District of
Columbia restaurants of offering “their own brands on the bar menu.”141 While, as

135 Id. at 12-15, 104-06 (Mile High Spirits’ webpage identifies it as a “full service private label
distillery”); id. at 99-103 (Terressentia Spirits’ webpage includes testimonials from “Private
Label Customers,” including restaurants and bars).
136 Id. at 12. Respondent has expressed a preference for the term “own label” instead of
“private label,” 93 TTABVUE 29, but we do not find the distinction in terminology important
for this discussion. We agree with Respondent that the persuasive value of private label
evidence in this case would come from alcoholic beverages being sold by restaurants and
nightclubs under the same mark used for their services.
137 47 TTABVUE 12-15 and 53-97 (Bonbrest Declaration).
138 49 TTABVUE 112-16 (Wolf Declaration) (e.g., Carmine’s, Smith & Wollensky).
139 Id. at 10-11.
140 47 TTABVUE 54-55.
141 Id. at 108-11.
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Respondent points out, when considered relative to the total number of restaurants
and bars, the number of examples may be small, Mr. Bonbrest’s testimony and the
media articles to which consumers have been exposed suggest that consumers on a
widespread basis must be aware of the practice, and particularly may have
encountered private labelling in establishments like the TAO venues. Along with the
other points previously discussed, this industry trend and the media attention it has
received contribute to “something more” showing that consumers would be likely to
perceive Respondent’s goods as related to Petitioner’s services. Compare Coors
Brewing Co., 68 USPQ2d at 1064 (court found “something more” lacking where the
only basis was de minimus evidence of restaurants brewing or serving private label
beer) with In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815-16 (TTAB 2001) (finding the
requisite “something more” showing the relatedness of wine and restaurant services
based on industry practice of private labeling as well as other considerations).
Third, Respondent’s actions show that it believed that consumers would view
Respondent’s vodka and Petitioner’s services as related. Specifically, the record
shows that Respondent’s sole owner rebranded an existing vodka product, Kai Vodka,
as TAO VODKA, after an unsuccessful attempt to sell Kai Vodka to the TAO Venues.
Respondent also initially displayed TAO on its vodka label using a stylized font very
similar to Petitioner’s.142 Respondent next sought to sell its registration to Petitioner
at a high price and enter into a lucrative business arrangement to sell large volumes

142 44 TTABVUE 42 (Petitioner’s Fifth Notice of Reliance); 80 TTABVUE 15 (Amended
Bender Declaration).
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of TAO VODKA to Petitioner to serve in the TAO Venues.143 Given this course of
dealing and the very minimal evidence in the record of other contemporaneous efforts
by Respondent to market TAO VODKA, we find that Respondent anticipated a
benefit from implying a connection to Petitioner, a benefit that could only exist if
Respondent believed that consumers would actually see Respondent’s products as
related to Petitioner’s restaurant services. We therefore find that Respondent’s
actions contribute something more to the relatedness of the goods/services inquiry on
the unique facts in this case, evidencing that consumers would believe that the goods
and services come from the same source or sponsor. Cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Blue Shield
Plans v. United Bankers Life Ins. Co., 362 F.2d 374, 150 USPQ 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1966)
(the actions of a businessperson “intimately concerned with the probable reaction of
prospective purchasers in the market” manifests “highly persuasive” evidence on that
point) (citation omitted); Tisch Hotels v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 146 USPQ
566, 570 (7th Cir. 1965) (“[W]e think that defendants adopted plaintiffs’ name
deliberately with a view to obtaining some advantage from plaintiffs’ investments in
promotion and advertising. The inference of likelihood of confusion is therefore
readily drawn because the adoption itself indicates that defendants expected that
likelihood to their profit.”) (citations omitted); see also Frehling Ent., Inc. v. Int’l Select
Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 52 USPQ2d 1447, 1453 (11th Cir. 1999) (“If it can be
shown that a defendant adopted a plaintiff's marks with the intention of deriving a
benefit from the plaintiff's business reputation, this fact alone may be enough to

143 68 TTABVUE 8-11 (Confidential Exhibit A to Wolf Rebuttal Declaration).
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justify the inference that there is confusing similarity.”); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom
McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 25 USPQ2d 1913, 1924 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying
Second Circuit law and stating, “[i]f there was intentional copying the second comer
will be presumed to have intended to create a confusing similarity of appearance and
will be presumed to have succeeded.”).
This case is more like In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) than Coors Brewing, on which Respondent relies. The Shell court found
the requisite showing based in part on evidence of an overlapping customer base and
a greater degree of similarity of the marks. Id.; see also Coors Brewing, 68 USPQ2d
at 1064 (distinguishing Shell on these bases). Here, the marks are also extremely
similar, unlike the Coors Brewing marks that contained prominent differing design
elements. Furthermore, Respondent’s attempt to sell its vodka to Petitioner
establishes that the parties’ customer bases overlap, just as in Shell.
Based on this record, we find consumers are accustomed to encountering alcoholic
beverages such as Respondent’s together with restaurant and nightclub services such
as Petitioner’s, under the same mark. Respondent attempted to exploit this strategy
with Petitioner. Also, Petitioner has used its TAO mark in connection with vodka
drinks and vodka open bar services. Consumers therefore would likely infer that
Respondent’s goods, offered under the nearly identical mark, emanate from the same
source as Petitioner’s services, or are sponsored by Petitioner.
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E. Trade Channels
We presume that because Respondent’s and Petitioner’s identifications contain no
trade channel restrictions, their goods and services travel through all usual channels
of trade therefor. See Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908; see also Cunningham 55 USPQ2d
at 1846 (affirming Board finding that where the identification is unrestricted, “we
must deem the goods to travel in all appropriate trade channels to all potential
purchasers of such goods”). According to the testimony and other evidence, the usual
trade channels for vodka include nightclubs and restaurants such as Petitioner’s Tao
venues. In fact, as discussed above, the TAO venues derive more than half of their
revenue from alcohol sales.144 Respondent’s own activities attempting to sell its TAO
VODKA in Petitioner’s TAO venues leave no doubt as to the overlap in trade channels
and classes of consumers.
Respondent argues that because its direct customers are distributors rather than
individual consumers, the trade channels and consumers differ. However,
Respondent acknowledges that its direct customers would in turn sell the same
branded alcohol to retailers including restaurants, who would then sell it to
consumers. This makes clear that alcohol subject to the three-tiered system
ultimately can be sold under its brand name to individual consumers in restaurants
and nightclubs such as Petitioner’s. Thus, we do not find Respondent’s argument
persuasive.

144 49 TTABVUE 9 (Wolf Declaration).
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The evidence amply demonstrates that, under the third du Pont factor, the goods
and services identified in the respective registrations move in overlapping channels
of trade to the same general classes of customers.
F. Actual Confusion
Respondent argues that the lack of known instances of actual confusion weighs in
its favor, particularly given Petitioner’s claim that its mark is famous. Petitioner
counters that Respondent’s limited use minimized the opportunity for actual
consumer confusion to occur. See du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567 (identifying seventh and
eighth du Pont factors as “[t]he nature and extent of any actual confusion,” and “[t]he
length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use
without evidence of actual confusion”). We agree that Respondent’s limited use145 and
sales created “little opportunity for confusion to have occurred.” See Barbara’s Bakery
Inc. v. Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283, 1287 (TTAB 2007) (where the respective marks
coexisted in the marketplace for at least nine years, absence of actual confusion
nonetheless deemed “of little probative value” because of the absence of a significant
opportunity for such confusion to occur, given “the minimal scope of applicant’s actual
use of her mark in the marketplace”). Accordingly, we find the seventh and eighth
factors neutral.

145 Respondent first sold to a distributor in December 2014, and the first recorded sale by that
distributor to end consumers took place later in 2015. 72 TTABVUE 67-69 (Bender Cross
Examination Deposition).
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G. Purchasing Conditions
Respondent, asserting careful purchasing conditions, again relies on identifying
its direct customers as distributors rather than end consumers of alcohol in an effort
to argue careful purchasing conditions. Respondent also points to the $24-$27 retail
sales price of its vodka as well as its unusual rice-based, gluten-free nature as
supporting customer care in purchasing, even if end consumers are considered.146 But
Respondent’s identification of goods is not limited as to price or ingredients. There is
no basis to find that ordinary consumers purchasing alcoholic beverages within the
normal range of prices would exercise more than an ordinary degree of care.
Moreover, given the similarity of the parties’ marks, as well as the overlap in their
trade channels, we are not convinced that even careful purchasers would avoid
confusion. See Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d
1840, 1841-42 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (even sophisticated purchasers can be confused by very
similar marks). This factor is neutral.
H. Bad Faith
Under the thirteenth du Pont factor, Petitioner maintains that Respondent acted
in bad faith in adopting the TAO VODKA mark, and that this weighs in favor of likely
confusion. See, e.g., J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460,
1462, 18 USPQ2d 1889, 1891 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Whether there is evidence of intent
to trade on the goodwill of another is a factor to be considered.”); Jewelers Vigilance

146 93 TTABVUE 33.
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Committee, Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 853 F.2d 888, 7 USPQ2d 1628, 1630 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (“proof of intent to trade on another’s goodwill” can provide “persuasive
evidence of likelihood of confusion”) (citation omitted). We have discussed our
consideration of some of Respondent’s more eyebrow-raising activities in connection
with other factors. See Ava Enters., Inc. v. Audio Boss USA, Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1783,
1787 n.8 (TTAB 2006). In particular, such activities include: Respondent’s selection
and adoption of TAO VODKA for the same product as Kai Vodka after Petitioner
declined to purchase Kai Vodka;147 Respondent’s adoption of a font very similar to
that used by Petitioner for its marks;148 and the nature of the “business proposal”
Respondent made to Petitioner.149 We find that this evidence further suggests
confusion is likely.150
Conclusion as to Likely Confusion
Considering all the relevant factors, we find confusion likely to arise from
Respondent’s use of a mark strikingly similar to Petitioner’s commercially strong
TAO mark for goods shown to be related to Petitioner’s restaurant and nightclub
services.

147 45 TTABVUE 26, 35 (Confidential Bender Discovery Deposition); 80 TTABVUE 8
(Amended Bender Declaration).
148 44 TTABVUE 42 (Petitioner’s Fifth Notice of Reliance); 80 TTABVUE 15 (Amended
Bender Declaration).
149 68 TTABVUE 8 (Confidential Wolf Rebuttal Testimony).
150 Respondent accuses Petitioner of bad faith in the form of overly aggressive enforcement
of its TAO mark. We find no bad faith on Petitioner’s part.
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Decision: Respondent’s lack of use of its mark in commerce prior to the deadline
for filing the statement of use, and the likely confusion between Petitioner’s and
Respondent’s marks represent the bulk of the parties’ dispute. Each ground provides
an independent basis to cancel Respondent’s registration. Accordingly, the petition
for cancellation is granted and Registration No. 4169245 will be cancelled in due
course. In the interest of judicial economy, we do not reach the remaining claims of
lack of bona fide intent to use the mark or dilution.