Tango Card, Inc.

10 Cited authorities

In re Bayer
488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007) Cited 39 times 2 Legal Analyses
Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd.
695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 23 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 61 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that the "pink" color of insulation was non-functional because it did not affect the quality of insulation in that the color used had no effect on the product's ability to regulate a building's temperature
In re Nett Designs, Inc.
236 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) Cited 28 times
Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"
In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States
675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 8 times 2 Legal Analyses
No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor
In re Stereotaxis, Inc.
429 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 7 times
Affirming TTAB's finding that STEREOTAXIS was descriptive of certain magnetic medical devices and services because it described their functions and purposes—performing the “stereotaxis” brain surgery technique
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
In re Gyulay
820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,806 times 124 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,585 times 271 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Tango Card, Inc.

10 Cited authorities

Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark

Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"

Holding that the "pink" color of insulation was non-functional because it did not affect the quality of insulation in that the color used had no effect on the product's ability to regulate a building's temperature

Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"

Affirming TTAB's finding that STEREOTAXIS was descriptive of certain magnetic medical devices and services because it described their functions and purposes—performing the “stereotaxis” brain surgery technique

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"